

EURASIAN STUDIES



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The 'New Great Game':
Pipeline Politics in Eurasia
Ariel COHEN

Oil and Russian Imperialism
in the Transcaucasus
Michael P. CROISSANT

The Islamic Influence on ethnic nationalism
in the North Caucasus:
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Communication Between The Turkish Republics
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The 'New Great Game':

Pipeline Politics in Eurasia

INTRODUCTION

Ariel COHEN

President Clinton did not address the crucial issue of the Caspian Sea oil on his latest visit to Moscow. This is a vital subject: the vast expanses of the former Soviet Union harbor oil and gas riches which will be crucial for fuelling the global economy in the next century. These are huge reserves, 30-50 billion barrels, larger than Alaska's Northern Slope and the North Sea combined, and similar to those of Kuwait. The oil in the Caspian Sea is mostly under the territorial waters of Azerbaijan in the Caspian Sea, while the Central Asian oil fields are in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The largest gas reserves are in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Control over these energy resources and export routes out of the Eurasian hinterland is quickly becoming one of the central issues in post-Cold War politics. Similar to the "Great Game" of the early twentieth century, which pitted the British interests against those of the Russian Empire and the German Reich, today's struggle involves geopolitics and oil.

The world is facing a choice between a cooperative exploitation of natural resources and a wasteful struggle which will cost a fortune in blood and treasure. Regional conflicts in the Caucasus and Central Asia are threatening today to deny Western access to the vital oil and gas reserves the world will need in the twenty first century. Wars in Chechnya, between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and in Georgia, were started or exacerbated by the Russian military, and are tied to control over the future pipeline routes. Powerful interests in Moscow are attempting to ensure that Russia will be the only route to export the energy resources of Eurasia to global markets.

The U.S. needs to ensure free and fair access for all interested parties to the oil fields of the Caucasus and Central Asia. These resources will be crucial

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to ensuring prosperity for the first half of the twenty-first century and beyond. Access to Eurasian energy reserves could reduce the West's dependence on Middle East oil and ensure lower oil and gas prices (and concomitant economic growth) for decades to come. Moreover, oil revenues can boost the independence and prosperity of the southern New Independent States (NIS) through production royalties and transit fees, which will benefit their state budgets. For example, Azerbaijan could generate over \$ 2 billion a year revenue from its oil fields, while Georgia would get over \$ 500 million a year from the transit fees. With these new-found oil riches, more powerful New Independent States (NIS) would depend less of Russia economically and militarily. Independent and self-sufficient former Soviet states will effectively deny Russia the option to restore a full-fledged empire in the region.

THE KEY QUESTION

Western participants in the Azerbaijani and Kazakhstani pipeline projects (1) are facing a simple question: is a neo-imperialist Russia (aided and abetted by Iran) going to dominate the development of Eurasian oil and its exports, or it will be an equal and fair player in the region, together with Turkey, the three Caucasian states (Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan), and, in the future, possibly Iran (2). Russia, a major natural gas exporter, might also become a future threat to plans for a natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to China and possibly, Japan.

Reasonable Russian interests, such as access for Russian companies to bid for the exploration and transport of oil and gas in the region must be respected. However, the West has a paramount interest in assuring that the three Caucasian states, as well as the three Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) maintain their independence and remain mostly secular and reasonably pro-Western. A U.S. partnership with Turkey in pursuing these goals will remain crucial for decades to come.

OIL POLITICS AND RUSSIAN NEO-IMPERIALISM IN THE "NEAR ABROAD"

The main threat to the equitable development of Eurasian oil is the current Russian attempt to dominate the region in a de facto alliance with the radical Islamic regime in Teheran (3). Today Russia is benefiting from the state of "frozen instability" in the Caucasus, which effectively denies independence and economic development to the states in the region, and hinders viable and lu-

crative exporting routes to the oil consortia in the area.

Moscow has gone beyond words in establishing its power in the Caucasus. The Russians are pursuing a policy of military basing in the Caucasus aimed at placing Moscow in a position of exclusive control over all future pipelines in the region. In 1995 Armenia and Georgia signed agreements allowing Russia to post its military on their soil. Georgia permitted four bases, Armenia three. But while Armenia signed the agreements voluntarily, as a precaution against its historic foe, Turkey; Georgia's President Eduard Shevardnadze has been threatened with death on several occasions. Azerbaijan came under severe pressure from Moscow to allow Russian bases on its territory, but thus far has refused to do so. In addition, members of the CIS are required to police their borders jointly with Russian border guards, thus denying the national governments effective control over their territory.

The Russian Foreign Ministry claims that the land-locked Caspian Sea should be declared a lake. Such a declaration would force all littoral countries to develop Caspian natural resources in a condominium - a guarantee that very little would be achieved because of incessant bickering between the states. This position would effectively deny a cash flow the NIS in the area at a time when they are strapped for cash amidst a very difficult economic reform. In addition, Moscow and Teheran have quoted out of context the 1920 and 1941 Soviet-Iranian protocols, which assert that no "outside powers" may be allowed to participate in the development of the Caspian Sea. It is obvious that even if these protocols, concluded by regimes that no longer exist, were valid, exploration by private companies does not qualify as the activities of "outside powers".

Moreover, Russia is now advancing arguments that drilling in the Caspian Sea will endanger that ecosystem. It is difficult, though, to imagine more damage to the Caspian than that incurred under the Soviets. That ecological catastrophe was created through the construction of hydroelectric dams on the Volga, uncontrolled pesticide pollution by Soviet collective farmers, and pervasive radioactive and chemical tests in the basins of the Volga, the Kama, and the Ural Rivers. Finally, Russian decision makers simply state, "We will not give up our oil." This intransigent position may be a winning one - always concerned with the overall relationship with Moscow, the West might acquiesce to Moscow's demands to control access to the hydrocarbon resources.

Unfortunately, Moscow's position gaining support in Western Europe. For example, French Foreign Ministry officials accept the Kremlin claims about the

"Caspian lake" at face value. Moreover, Paris is willing to see the Iranian ayatollahs as equal partners in the Caspian oil policy debates (4).

BACK TO THE FUTURE:

ATTEMPTS TO REINTEGRATE THE SOUTH

Russian political elites have not overcome the imperialist ideology that inspired both pre-1917 and Soviet expansionism. For today's Moscow bureaucrats and generals, as well as for their predecessors in St. Petersburg prior to 1917, the turbulent periphery in the South is a source of political fortunes, promotions and careers. For Russian politicians in search of a grand cause (**velikoye delo**), re-establishing the empire is a winning proposition, especially in the murky "Weimar" environment in the aftermath of imperial collapse. And neo-imperialism seems to be working: in each zone of instability Moscow identified and supported the most pro-Russian faction, be it the Trans-Dniestrian ethnic Russians in Moldova, the separatist Abkhazs, the warlords and former communist leaders in Azerbaijan, or the pro-communist clans in Tajikistan.

Competing political interests often prompt local elites to challenge the faction in power and to seek Moscow's support. Russian oil chieftains and military commanders on the ground are also interested in the continuation of links with the metropolis. This is a classic scenario for imperial expansion. What is common to all these instances is that without Russian support, the pro-Moscow faction could not have dominated its respective region, and would be forced to seek a negotiated and peaceful solution to the conflict.

The struggle for the re-establishment of the Russian sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union started in early 1992 - almost immediately after the declaration of Russian independence. While not a full-scale military involvement, this struggle employs a broad spectrum of use of force, military, covert action, diplomatic and economic measures. The Southern tier of the former USSR is a zone of feverish Russian activity aimed at tightening its grip in the aftermath of the Soviet collapse. The entire Southern rim of Russia is a "turbulent frontier", a highly unstable environment in which metropolitan civilian and military elites, local players and mid-level officers and bureaucrats drive the process of reintegration (5).

Upon dismembering the Soviet Union, President Yeltsin called for a re-examination of Russia's borders to the detriment of her neighbors, especially Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Upon his return from a state visit to the U.S. in Sep-

tember of 1994, he reiterated Russia's "right" to conduct "peacemaking" in the "near abroad", to protect Russian speakers and to exercise freedom of action in its sphere of influence (6). These statements were echoed on numerous occasions by Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and other key policy makers in Moscow. In his September, 1995 Decree "On Approval of the Strategic Policy of the Russian Federation Toward CIS Member States," (7) Yeltsin outlines plans to create a CIS military and economic union. Some observers have termed this design an informal empire "on the cheap", a "sustainable empire" (8) which is less centralized than the old Soviet Union, but much more consolidated than the British Commonwealth or even the European Union. The aim of such an arrangement would be, among other things, to ensure Russia's control of the oil and gas reserves in Eurasia. The recent agreement on intra-CIS customs Union signed in the Kremlin on April 2, 1996, was hailed in Moscow as the first step toward a deeper CIS integration. This process will, no doubt, tighten the grip of the Russian oil companies over Eurasian energy resources.

WHO ARE THE KEY PLAYERS?

The Russian military and the security services are by far the most resolute driving force behind the restoration of a Russian-dominated CIS and are playing a key role in ensuring Moscow's control over pipeline routes. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Berlin Wall terminated, at least temporarily, confrontation with the West, leaving the Red Army's General Staff, the military intelligence (GRU) and the ex-KGB desperately seeking new missions.

Russian military involvement in the Caucasus effectively seeks to deny any exporting options that do not depend upon Moscow's will and whim. As will be detailed further, the Russian military supported the Georgian opposition to President Zviad Gamsakhurdia, who was replaced by Eduard Shevardnadze in May 1992 (9). The military was involved in detaching Abkhazia from the independent state of Georgia in 1992-1993. Russian top brass sold modern weapons to both sides in the Karabakh conflict. They were also behind the insurrection which deposed the democratically elected president of Azerbaijan, Abulfaz Elchibei (10).

The Russian intelligence services are also involved. The successor to the KGB's First Chief Directorate, now known as the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia (SVRR) and led by KGB general and Middle Eastern expert Evgenii

Primakov, published an important document in 1994 on Russia's policies in the "near abroad" called "Russia-CIS: Does the Western Position Require Correction?" (11) General Primakov's analysts-turned-economists argue that any integration of the CIS states into the global economy which is not carried out via Moscow is doomed to fail -- as recently demonstrated by Russia's pressure on Kazakhstani and Azerbaijani joint ventures which attempted to export their oil without Russian participation. The states of the CIS' southern tier were coerced by Russia even before they declared their independence from the USSR. Moscow incited local pro-Russian factions, such as Abkhazians in Georgia, Armenian in Karabakh, and hard-line communist pro-Russian clans in Tajikistan, to challenge the independence and territorial integrity of these nascent states. As a result, hundreds of thousands were left dead, wounded and homeless. In addition, these violent conflicts blocked the transit routes to the West for the Caspian and Central Asian oil.

REGIONAL CONFLICTS AFFECTING OIL TRANSIT ROUTES: THE TRAGEDY IN ABKHAZIA

For centuries the Caucasus was a frontier between Europe and Asia, and between Islam and Christendom. Long a hotbed of ethnic warfare, the region was ripe for Russian to find and exploit dissatisfied ethnic minorities, such as the Abkhaz. The bitter year-long war in Abkhazia (1992-1993) claimed over 35,000 lives; and was precipitated by Russian military involvement authorized by Defense Minister Grachev.

The Russian move was aimed at weakening Georgia, undermining Turkish and Western influence in the region, and controlling access to its oil. Gaining control over the long Black Sea coastline in Abkhazia, protecting the Russian ports of Novorossiysk and Tuapse, and moving closer to the Georgian oil-exporting ports in Poti, Supsa and Batumi perfectly suited Russia's plans.

As Russia became entangled in Chechnya and word about Chechen commando training camps being operated from Abkhazia spread, Moscow started to show less support of its Chechen allies, the Abkhaz. But despite Georgian acquiescence on military basing rights, Russia refused to effectively cooperate in restoring Georgian territorial integrity.

THE DRAMA IN GEORGIA

Russia is attempting to prevent the oil from going the "Western" route through Shevardnadze's Georgia. Moscow's support of civil strife in that coun-

try resonates with its goal of perpetuating "frozen instability" in the Caucasus. Political chaos makes Georgia a less attractive route for Eurasian oil. From 1991 through the end of 1993, Georgia was in the midst of a bloody civil war which pitted supporters of President Eduard Shevardnadze and ousted President Zviad Gamsakhurdia against each other. Political violence became chronic. Eventually, the defeated Gamsakhurdia either committed suicide or was murdered under mysterious circumstances at the end of 1993. But even after his victory over Gamsakhurdia, the authority of Eduard Shevardnadze was challenged by politicians, warlords and militias.

In exchange for crucial Russian support, Shevardnadze was finally forced to join the CIS, a step he had previously bitterly opposed. When he attempted to read a press release announcing this step, Russian diplomats took it out of his hands and gave him a Moscow-authored text to read.

In 1995, Moscow brought pressure on Shevardnadze not to build a pipeline for Azeri oil through Georgian territory. Under the current plan, the Azeri oil consortium will bring so-called "early" oil to the Georgian port of Supsa (between Poti and Tbilisi) from where it is going to be exported by tanker to Turkey. Soon after Shevardnadze refused to cancel the pipeline plan in a meeting with Chernomyrdin, he was injured in an assassination attempt. A car bomb exploded next to his vehicle. Shevardnadze has repeatedly stated that Russia was behind the attempt on his life. The suspected culprit, Shevardnadze's security chief, Igor Georgadze, son of the Georgian communist presidential candidate, escaped to Russia, from where he continues to threaten Shevardnadze's life (12). Shevardnadze demanded that his "allies" extradite the suspect, and the Russian Prosecutor General's Office issued an order for his arrest. However, the Russian Interior Minister refused the extradition. Shevardnadze may have further jeopardized his relations with Moscow by publicly opposing President Yeltsin's call to turn the CIS into a military bloc as a counterbalance to NATO (13).

THE WAR IN CHECHNYA

One of the main goals of the Russian occupation of Chechnya is to ensure control of the pipeline which goes from Baku, via Grozny, the Chechen capital, to Tikhoretsk. The pipeline ends at the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk, which is designed by Russia to be the terminal for both the Kazakh (Tengiz) and Azerbaijani pipelines. In addition, Grozny boasts a large refinery with 12 million tons per annum processing capacity.

During its brief self-proclaimed independence under President Jokhar Dudayev (1991-1994), Chechnya illegally exported crude and refined products from the Grozny-Baku pipeline worth hundreds of millions of US dollars, cooperating with corrupt politicians in Moscow to obtain export licenses.

Moscow sought to interdict the situation and control the oil fields around Grozny. Russia proceeded to create diffuse centers of power which competed with Dudayev (14). Massive but covert Russian military action, which included the use of armored units, artillery and helicopters, was launched to support anti-Dudayev clan militias. In 1994, the desperate Dudayev administration, fighting for its physical survival, turned to radical Islamic elements throughout the Middle East and Central Asia, leading to the Islamization of the conflict.

The Russian army's Chechen campaign started in December 1994, with a cease-fire negotiated in July of 1995. Grozny, the capital of Chechnya, was destroyed. Over 30,000 people were killed, more than 300,000 became refugees. Low-intensity hostilities still continue. The southern border region of the Russian Federation increasingly resembles Lebanon or Yugoslavia, complete with hostages, refugees and vendettas. The outlook for oil transportation through Chechnya (the "Northern" route) looks increasingly questionable in the absence of a settlement of this conflict (15).

THE KARABAKH CONFLICT

With yet another round of peace talks ending without result in September of 1995, U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Gali sent Undersecretary-General Aldo Ajello as a special envoy to the region (16). With Russian links to Armenia getting stronger, and growing animosity between Moscow and Baku, it is highly doubtful whether a settlement of this tragic conflict will be reached any time soon. Behind the calls for peaceful resolution conflict remains Russia's ruthless attempt to keep the Caucasus weak, unstable and divided -- and to prevent an oil route from materializing.

The enclave of Karabakh is situated in a possible strategic oil route from the Caspian Sea to Turkey. Populated by Armenians, Karabakh was put under Azerbaijan's jurisdiction in 1921, after Stalin negotiated a treaty in the Transcaucasus between Communist Russia and Turkey. The strife between the Armenians and Azerbaijanis escalated in 1988, and full-scale war broke out in 1992. Today, Karabakh is a self-proclaimed republic; the cease-fire has been holding since May 1994. The battles were fought by independent Karabakh forces rather than by the Armenian army, though strong Armenian support

was undeniable. Thus far, Azerbaijan has suffered a political and military defeat at the hands of the Armenians: Baku has seen three changes of regime, losing one-fifth of its territory since the collapse of the USSR. One million people, mostly Azerbaijanis, became refugees as a result of this war.

Russia has intermittently supported the Armenians, despite reports of large scale weapons supplies to Azerbaijan. Moscow suggested that it become a guarantor of peace in the region, sending in 3,000 peacekeepers, but the idea of **Pax Russica** was resisted by the other OSCE powers (17). Russia and Iran are increasingly cooperating to keep Turkey and the West out of the region. The OSCE "Minsk group" which consists of Russia, the U.S., Turkey, France, Sweden, and Italy was charged with finding a solution, but so far its success has been extremely limited. Eventually, Moscow, under Western pressure, agreed to a multilateral OSCE peacekeeping force for Karabakh. This force is yet to materialize, and so is a peace agreement between the warring parties. However, it is the intransigence on the part of all parties to the conflict, including Russia, that frustrate a coordinated OSCE attempt to end the war.

AZERBAIJAN

The turmoil in oil-rich Azerbaijan is occurring against a backdrop of defeat on the battlefields of Karabakh. Also at stake is the implementation of a \$ 6 billion, 4 billion barrel Caspian Sea shelf petroleum deal between Azerbaijan and a consortium of large international oil companies. While the Russian oil company Lukoil was part of the international consortium with 10 percent of the deal, other Russian oil interests felt excluded. Both the Russian foreign ministry and the Russian defense ministry came out squarely against the deal, demanding at least 25 percent for Russian companies.

The Caspian Sea oil deal was facilitated first by President Abulfaz Elchibei, who was overthrown in June 1993 by former Azerbaijani KGB Chief and Brezhnev Politburo member, General Heydar Aliiev. Aliiev later became president with 98.5 percent of the "popular vote" (18). It was Aliiev who signed the agreement in September 1994.

Despite his KGB and communist pedigree, Russia considers Aliiev's policies too independent. A warlord (and ex-Prime Minister) Suret Husseinov, who reportedly enjoys good connections with the Russian military, and especially with Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, (19) was a key player in ousting Elchibei and engineering Aliiev's return. Later, Husseinov turned against Aliiev and, together with other Azerbaijani politicians, attempted to overthrow him

on four occasions. According to Azerbaijani sources, Husseinov was supported by Russian military and oil interests opposed to the Caspian Sea oil deal (20). In December 1994, several prominent anti-Aliyev politicians united against the president of Azerbaijan. In spring of 1995, a coup (reportedly, with Moscow's backing), was unsuccessfully attempted against Aliiev. Russia also played the ethnic separatism card against Aliiev, supporting the Lezgin national movement in the North of the country and the Talysh one in the South.

Throughout 1994-1995, Aliiev withstood Russian pressures to create joint military forces, deploy troops and establish bases on Azerbaijani territory. Under Russian pressure, Azerbaijan joined the CIS, but resisted the introduction of Russian troops. However, with the Karabakh conflict still unsettled, and the status of the Caspian Sea disputed, Moscow is keeping its deck full. "The bottom line is not whether a peace will come, but who will broker and guarantee it" (21).

On October 9, 1995, the Azerbaijani International Oil Consortium (AIOC) announced that "early" oil (approximately 80,000 barrels a month) would be split between two pipelines. The northern line would go to the Russian port of Novorossiysk (via unstable Chechnya) and the western pipeline to the Georgian port of Supsa in two separate pipelines. This was a compromise decision supported by the Clinton administration and aimed at placating Moscow, but failing to do so.

WESTERN RESPONSE IN EURASIA NEEDED

The West has an opportunity to develop Eurasian oil resources for the early twenty-first century. In order to ensure free and fair access to these reserves, the United States government should develop a comprehensive policy dealing with the region and equal access to its resources for all interested parties.

The West and U.S. should strive to preserve the independence and economic viability of the New Independent States in the region. It should implement programs supporting nation-building of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Central Asian states. Economic reforms, including privatization of industries and agriculture, should be continued. Sanctions on technical assistance to Azerbaijan should be lifted, in order to boost the U.S. leverage in the region. Training for the civil and security services of these countries should be carried out. The U.S., in cooperation with Great Britain, Germany and France should prevent **de facto** and **de jure** reconstitution of Moscow's sphere of influence in the southern CIS.

The administration should work through the OSCE and via bilateral channels, toward defusing ethnic conflicts in the region. The OSCE has jurisdiction to settle conflicts in Chechnya, Abkhazia and Karabakh. It must step up efforts to bring together the leaders of states and separatist ethnic groups in order to find acceptable political solutions leading to lasting peace. New conflicts, such as between the Azerbaijanis, and the Lezgins and the Talysh should be prevented from flaring up.

Western allies should strengthen secular Muslim societies, notably Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and possibly Uzbekistan, against Islamic militant groups. Not only Russian ambitions, but also Islamic radicalism, may threaten the pro-Western orientation of regimes in the region. Economic development, support of basic human rights, and cultural affinity with the West, including secular Turkey, are important to prevent radicalization. In the case of Turkey, rapprochement with the European Union, including eventual membership in EU, must be pursued. Subversive Iranian encroachment in the region must be effectively countered.

U.S. should ensure that Russia is an equal partner -- but not a dominant player with dictatorial powers -- in the development of the region. Russian oil companies should be assured of equitable access to the development of oil resources and pipeline projects. The strategic goal of the West should be the creation of a "level playing field" that will allow Russian and Western corporations to participate in the development of Eurasian energy resources on an equal footing. If the governments allow economic interests to predominate, Russian-Western cooperation will be assured. What needs to be prevented is the Russian security establishment's attempts to impose a single direction for the pipelines -- north, via Russian territory. This kind of geopolitical diktat would give Moscow an unacceptable level of control over the flow of oil to Western markets and will make the West vulnerable to Russia's political whims.

Finally, the U.S. should support Turkey's quest to manage busy waterways and protect sensitive ecosystems, notably the Bosphorous Straits and the environmentally damaged Black Sea, from oil transportation hazards. Turkey has raised serious concerns regarding tanker exports of Eurasian oil via the narrow and twisting Bosphorus Straits. Today, the Straits already are one of the busiest maritime passages in the world. Tanker explosions, as the one in 1994, may block the Straits, cause severe damage and endanger lives in the greater Istanbul metropolis (population 10 million). Recent accidents prove that Turkish concerns are justified. In addition, tanker traffic in the stormy Black Sea

will further endanger its severely damaged biosphere. Fishing in the Black Sea dropped 90 percent in the last 40 years due to industrial pollution from the littoral states, and many beaches became unsafe for the formerly thriving resort industry. The safest route for Eurasian oil, which is preferred by Western oil companies, is a large pipeline from the Caucasus via Turkey to the Eastern Mediterranean port of Ceyhan.

CONCLUSION

The struggle for Eurasian oil is a multi-dimensional security, geopolitical and economic game. At stake is the future of Russia -- whether it will develop as an empire or a democracy. If Russia pursues a cooperative engagement with the West in the Caucasus, it will strengthen its economic and political integration with the West. If it chooses to challenge the West and revert to the oil imperial ways, it is likely that Russia will become increasingly hostile toward the West in other areas as well. In the process, its people will be called upon to pay a high price in the attempt to reassert superpower status.

The oil and gas reserves of the Caucasus and Central Asia are vital for Western geostrategic and economic interest in the 21st century. They have the potential to secure the prosperity and economic growth bolstered by low oil prices. In addition, these resources are key to ensuring revenues, and with them the sovereignty, of the New Independent States in the region. In addition, the wealth brought by oil may fuel not only economic, but also democratic development in the southern NIS. The independence and freedom of these countries will stand in the way of potential Russian imperial expansion.

The Russian military and political establishment is attempting to impose a sphere of influence in the CIS and ensure control over the region's oil. If a hardliner, such as the communist leader Gennady Zyuganov, wins the Russian presidential elections in June 1996, these efforts may redouble. Such a development will mean a major setback for U.S. and Turkish interests, as it will signal an attempt by Russia to come back as an anti-Western power in the Eurasian heartland. In addition, control over the Caucasus and Central Asia will allow Russia geographical proximity to and closer cooperation with the anti-Western regimes in Tehran and Baghdad. Moreover, Russia, Iran and Iraq may pursue a common interest in driving the price of oil higher. With the prospect of an unfriendly China emerging, the U.S. might face a chilling scenario of its geostrategic and economic positions worsening on both fronts.

The U.S. should undertake a serious dialogue with Russia concerning the

energy issues. Oil should remain an economic, rather than a geostrategic, problem. The U.S. should assure Russia that its companies will be included in future economic ventures in the region. Russian companies alone do not have the technological and financial resources to develop the hydrocarbon reserves of Eurasia. The governments in the region will need Western oil companies in order to do that. In addition, the U.S. has to strengthen cooperation with the Trans-Caucasian and Central Asian states, and more fully employ the OSCE to settle ethnic conflicts. Finally, cooperation with our Turkish allies should be broadened, and a strategic cooperation with Ankara on oil issues initiated.

The New Great Game in Eurasia is about much more than cheap oil. It is about Russia's future and about the character of the next century's international relations. It is about the chance of millions of people of the former Soviet Union to live in peace, relative wealth and freedom. Finally, it is about ensuring adequate Western access to Eurasian oil and its transportation to global markets, no matter what political road Russia chooses in the future. This Great Game is quickly becoming a paramount challenge for American policy making toward the year 2000 and beyond.

Footnotes:

1. The Azerbaijani International Oil Consortium (AIOC) includes British Petroleum, Azerbaijani SOCAR, Amoco, Penzoi, Unocal, McDermott International, Exxon, Ramco Energy, Lukoil (Russia) and Turkish Petroleum. The Caspian Sea Pipeline Consortium includes Chevron, the government oil companies of Russia and Kazakhstan, and until recently, Oman.
2. Provided the regime in Teheran abandons its support of international terrorism and militant Islamic movements abroad, or disappears from the scene altogether.
3. Russia is currently supplying nuclear reactors to Teheran, and its intelligence services are training Iranian secret agents.
4. Personal interviews, French Foreign Ministry, March 1996.
5. Ariel Cohen, **Russian Imperialism: Development and Decline**, (New York: Praeger), spring 1996, forthcoming, Chapter 1.
6. Radio Liberty-Radio Free Europe Daily Report, October 5, 1995.
7. Russian Federation Presidential Edict No 940 of September 14, 1995 "On Approval of the Strategic Policy of the Russian Federation Toward CIS Member States," FBIS-SOV-95-188, September 28, 1995, p. 19.
8. Ian Bremmer and Anthony Richter, "The Perils of Sustainable Empire," **Transition**, March 15, 1995, p. 14.
9. Russian representatives offered Armenia and Azerbaijan the opportunity to jointly invade Georgia to remove Gamsakhurdia. Interview with a senior Armenian official. Washington, D.C., October 1995.
10. Personal interviews with Arkady Dubnov, ethnic conflict correspondent for **New Times**, Moscow, June 1993. Reportedly, Suret Guseinov, the warlord who led the revolt, is married to the daughter of a Russian general.
11. **Rossiia-SNG: nuzhdayetsia li v korrekktivke pozitsii zapada**, Sluzhba Vneshnei Razvedki Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Moskva, 1994.

12. Jamestown Foundation Monitor, October 23, 1995.
13. Ibid.
14. Interview with Emil Payin, ethnic conflict advisor to President Yeltsin, Washington, fall 1994.
15. A single terrorist armed with a spade and two pounds of explosives is capable of temporarily shutting down the pipeline. One of Russian policy makers who understands this is Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, a former gas industry executive, who, incidentally is one of the supporters of a peaceful settlement of the Chechen problem.
16. Peter Rustland, "No Progress in Nagorno-Karabakh Talks", **OMRI Daily Report**, September 11, 1995.
17. **"Ethnic Violence in Transcaucasia"**, Hearing before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 103rd Congress, March 8, 1993, p. 8. Testimony of Ambassador Maresca, US Department of State.
18. In the Parliamentary elections of November 1995, the pro-Aliev party received over 60 percent of the popular vote amidst massive voting irregularities.
19. Husseinov's patron was former Azerbaijani defense minister Rahim Gaziev, closely connected to Grachev, Elizabeth Fuller, "Azerbaijan's June Revolution" **RFE-RL Research Report**, August 13, 1993, p. 27.
20. Elmira Akhundova "I neft tomu prichinot?" ("And Oil is the Reason for It?"), **Literaturnaya Gazeta**, October 10, 1994, p. 7.
21. Bremmer and Richter, "The Perils of 'Sustainable Empire'", p. 14.

Oil and Russian Imperialism in the Transcaucasus

Michael P. CROISSANT

Despite its supposed transition to a market-oriented democracy with respect for the sovereignty of its neighbors, Russia has engaged in numerous shady activities in the Transcaucasus since the breakup of the Soviet Union. The shadowy hand of Moscow was evident in the separatist rebellions in Georgia's South Ossetian and Abkhazian regions that led the Georgian government to request -- under duress -- the dispatch of Russian peacekeepers to both areas. Moscow also backed Armenia tacitly in its military campaign against Azerbaijan, leading to the occupation of twenty percent of Azeri territory by ethnic Armenian forces and contributing to chronic political instability in Baku. The ostensible aim of such actions was to weaken the three Transcaucasian republics and keep them from developing into truly sovereign states that could distinguish their own interests from those of Russia. By the middle of 1993, however, oil became the driving force behind Russian activities as Moscow began to focus on gaining a monopoly over the region's energy resources.

THE ELEMENTS OF RUSSIAN STRATEGY MEDDLING IN AZERBAIJAN

Azerbaijani President Abulfaz Elchibey stood poised to enact the greatest manifestation of his ardently anti-Russian, pro-Turkish world view by signing an oil contract with Western oil firms in the spring of 1993. The draft agreement provided for the exploitation of three Azeri oilfields in the Caspian Sea and the construction of a pipeline to carry the oil to Mediterranean Sea via Turkey (1). However, Elchibey was ousted in a coup d'etat in June just before the deal could be signed.

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In the spring of 1993, disgraced military commander Surat Huseinov established a popular following in the city of Ganja as an opponent of the Elchibey regime. On May 28, by prior agreement with Azeri authorities, Russian forces based in Ganja began their pull-out from Azerbaijan, and they left behind substantial quantities of arms, ammunition, and equipment (2). When Huseinov's men moved to seize the weaponry on June 4, a major clash ensued as Azerbaijani government forces stepped in (3). Huseinov's outrage at the attack, combined with his opposition to the Elchibey regime, led him to commence a revolt that by June 18 had driven the Azeri leader from power. Huseinov was named prime minister and head of both the military and the internal security ministry by the new president, Haydar Aliiev.

The hand of Russia was evident clearly in the events of June 1993. The withdrawing Russian forces left behind their weaponry no doubt with the full knowledge that a popular, anti-Elchibey military leader and his restive supporters were encamped in the same city. Moscow's tacit encouragement to Huseinov and his men had the desired effect: the same arms left behind by departing Russian forces at the end of May were used by the rebels in their revolt, which began conveniently just days later (4).

Among the first decisions of the new Azeri leader was to bring Azerbaijan into the Russian-dominated Commonwealth of Independent States and to put oil contract negotiations on hold (5). Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev hailed the decisions as "very timely and good", (6) no doubt because they signalled the return of Azerbaijan to the Russian fold. It appeared that Moscow's meddling had had the desired effect.

Aliiev's movement towards closer ties with Russia became more pronounced through the fall of 1993. Major Armenian advances led to the loss of the entire southwest corner of Azerbaijan, and the Azeri leader turned to Russia as the only power capable of brokering a cease-fire and dispatching disengagement forces to the region in time to save his regime. However, it soon became apparent that Moscow attached a pricetag to its role as peace-maker.

The initial price of Moscow's help vis-a-vis Armenia was the deployment of Russian military forces to Azerbaijan. Aliiev was presented in October with a proposal that sought the return of a Russian paratroop division to the country and the dispatch of Russian border guards along the Azeri-Iranian frontier (7). It was assumed also that Russian peacekeeping forces would be the long-term guarantor of any cease-fire in Nagorno Karabakh (8). By making Azerbaijan dependent upon a Russian military presence for its security, Moscow hoped to

position itself as the dominant actor in the oil-rich republic.

Although under growing pressure at home to take measures to arrest the Armenian advances in the southwest, Aliiev resisted Moscow's thinly veiled attempt to make Azerbaijan its protectorate. The Azeri leader staged a military offensive in the winter of 1993-1994 that brought some small territorial gains and bought him some breathing room vis-a-vis Russia. Aliiev used his slightly strengthened position to improve relations with Azerbaijan's only potential ally in the region, Turkey, and to reopen negotiations with a consortium of Western oil companies on the development and export of Azerbaijan's substantial oil reserves.

Aliiev's stubborn defiance of Russian designs was a major irritant for Moscow. Unable to impose a Pax Rus in Nagorno-Karabakh and engineer the return of Russian military forces to Azerbaijan, Russia's ability to establish itself as hegemon over the Transcaucasus and its energy resources was impeded substantially. Aliiev's rapprochement with Turkey and his decision to reopen talks with the Western oil consortium were thus met with great consternation in the halls of the Kremlin.

Realizing that the creation of a significant Western economic foothold in Azerbaijan would hinder greatly Russia's ability to remain the dominant power-broker in the Transcaucasus, Moscow set out quickly to undermine the Azeri oil talks. Russian Fuel and Energy Minister Yuri Shafranik was dispatched to Baku in November 1993 in an attempt to influence the oil contract negotiations in a manner favorable to Russia. Shafranik asserted, on the hand, that plans to export Azeri crude to the Mediterranean via a pipeline through Turkey should be shelved in favor of a northern pipeline to the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossisk. On the other hand, the minister proposed that the term of the fledgling oil contract be renegotiated to cover two oilfields rather than three while giving the Russian oil company Lukoil a twenty percent equity share in the development plan (9).

The logic behind Shafranik's proposals is clear. Whereas a pipeline through Turkey would have pulled Azerbaijan away from Russia, a pipeline over Russian territory would have given Moscow substantial leverage over Baku, making Azerbaijan's economic well-being dependent heavily upon Russia's goodwill. Moreover, making Lukoil a twenty percent partner in the consortium would have put Moscow in a position to influence the course of contract negotiations due to the fact that eighty percent of the Russian oil firm's shares are controlled by the Russian Council of Ministers (10). Finally, by restricting

the number of oil fields that could be exploited by the consortium, Russia aimed to limit the amount of Western economic penetration of the region.

Just as Aliiev was growing wary of Russian attempts to base military forces in Azerbaijan in the fall of 1993, the Azeri leader showed similar apprehension with the proposals put forward by the Russian Fuel and Energy Minister. Baku balked at Moscow's demand for a twenty percent share in the contract, and it rejected Shafranik's bid to reduce the consortium's jurisdiction to two oil fields rather than three. However, in a possible signal that Aliiev wished to avoid alienating Russia completely, Azerbaijan agreed to grant Lukoil a ten percent share, (11) and further consideration of a pipeline through Turkey was put on hold pending an examination of other options (12).

Aliiev's limited concessions regarding the oil issue did little to satisfy Russia in its drive to become the dominant power-broker in the Transcaucasus. Moscow launched an aggressive mediation effort in the summer of 1994 aimed at concluding a political settlement to the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute with Russia as its guarantor. Again, the price was made clear to Baku: the acceptance of a major Russian peacekeeping presence in the republic. Aliiev remained intransigent in the face of Russian demands, however, declaring to Moscow's Nagorno-Karabakh envoy that the peacekeepers would "have to tread over my dead body first" (13).

As Aliiev staved off Russian troop deployment demands, negotiations between the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR) and the Azerbaijan International Operating Company (AOIC) came to a head with the signing of a landmark \$ 8 billion agreement on the exploitation of three offshore Azeri oil fields on September 20, 1994. The so-called "Contract of the Century" promised to bring a massive influx of oil revenue and Western investment into Azerbaijan. Both Aliiev and his domestic opposition claimed that the deal would benefit Azerbaijan and strengthen its sovereignty and its ties with the West (14).

Despite the fact that Lukoil owned a ten percent share in the contract, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Grigoriy Karasin announced immediately that the ministry did not recognize the oil deal. Citing Soviet-Iranian agreements signed in 1921 and 1940, Karasin asserted that the Caspian Sea and its resources were the joint property of the states bordering upon the body of water. As such, it was claimed that Azerbaijan had no legal right to conclude a contract to exploit oilfields on the Caspian shelf without consulting with all the coastal states (15). Until such consultations were held and new ag-

reements were drawn up on the use of the Caspian's resources, Karasin proclaimed that Russia would not recognize the deal (16).

Because the Foreign Ministry's position clearly conflicted with that of the Fuel and Energy Ministry, a split seemed to exist within the Russian government over the desire to gain profit by participating in the oil deal and the desire to block the spread of Western influence in the former USSR. As a ten percent shareholder in the Western consortium, Lukoil was set to make billions of dollars in profits from the oil deal. For a country that claims to be strapped for hard currency, such would seem to have guaranteed the Russian government's support. However, the Foreign Ministry's non-recognition of the agreement suggested that the prevailing view in Moscow was to attempt to prevent the ultimate realization of the contract's terms.

Claiming that the fate of the Caspian shelf's resources was not to be decided unilaterally by any for the littoral states, Russia aimed to open the matter to debate that could be carried out on its terms, thus forestalling Western economic and political penetration of the Transcaucasus. A natural ally for Moscow in this endeavor was Iran, which also sought to keep Western influence out of the region and with which Russia had been cultivating an ominous strategic partnership.

COLLUDING WITH IRAN

After adopting the Russian stance that Azerbaijan's oil development plans were unlawful in light of the Soviet-Iranian agreements of 1921 and 1940 (17), Tehran joined forces with Moscow in an effort to undermine the September oil deal. At the behest of the two governments, a meeting was convened in Moscow in mid-October among representatives of the five Caspian littoral states -- Russia, Kazakhstan, Iran, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan. With the intent of updating the 1921 and 1940 agreements, the meeting's participants drew up a draft Treaty of Regional Cooperation in the Caspian Sea that provided for, among other things, the creation of a permanent body governing cooperation among the coastal states. Although the legal status of Caspian shelf resources was not discussed, the draft treaty stated that no single littoral state could exploit such resources without obtaining the prior consent of the others (18).

The collusion between Russian and Iran in the fall of 1994 was aimed clearly at delegitimizing Azerbaijan's oil deal and blocking the entrance of Western oil companies into the region. However, this approach misjudged both

Aliev's tenacity and the support he was likely to receive from the Western governments whose firms were participants in the oil deal. Azerbaijan chose simply to refuse to sign the new Caspian treaty and in doing so received the ready support of Washington, London, and Ankara (19). As if to remove any doubt of the republic's commitment to oil development, Azerbaijan's parliament ratified the oil contract almost unanimously on November 15 (20).

As Moscow enlisted the support of Tehran in an attempt to undercut the Azeri-Western oil deal, Russia also took veiled measures to undermine the Aliev regime. On September 30, a mere ten days after the oil contract was signed, two close associates of Aliev were assassinated within two hours of one another by unidentified gunmen (21). A revolt by special-purpose police units in Baku and Ganja followed, but it was crushed forcefully within days by government forces. Although a number of interior ministry officials were sacked for their involvement in the affair, Aliev targeted Prime Minister Surat Huseinov as the main conspirator.

Huseinov had been a vocal critic of both Aliev and the Western oil deal in the weeks leading up to the coup attempt (22) thus de facto aligning himself with the Azeri leader's opponents in Moscow. Moreover, Huseinov had launched the rebellion that, with Russian arms and encouragement, drove the anti-Russian Elchibey from power the previous June. Whether there was a modus vivendi between the Azeri Prime Minister and the Kremlin may never be known, but the timing of the attempted putsch and the opposition of Huseinov and Moscow to the policies of the Aliev regime suggests a Russian hand in the events of October 1994. Indeed, one unnamed Western diplomat asserted that "there's either a concerted campaign being waged (against Aliev) by Moscow or last week has been an incredible string of coincidences" (23).

In spite of the attempted coup of October 1994 (and another in March 1995) (24), Aliev has remained in firm control of Azerbaijan. Unable apparently to dislodge the Azeri leader or undermine the stability of Azerbaijan that is necessary for the realization of the oil contract, Russia again shifted the focus of its strategy toward ensuring a monopoly for itself over the means of export for Azeri oil.

PROMOTING A RUSSIAN PIPELINE

Due to its geographic position, Azerbaijan must rely on pipelines to carry its oil to market. The preference of Azerbaijan and the West has been to construct a pipeline from Baku to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan, thus

giving Turkey primacy in the export of Caspian energy resources. Such has been totally unacceptable to Russia, and it has attempted to promote instead the option of shipping Azeri oil via an already existing pipeline from Baku to the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossisk.

Moscow touted the Baku-Novorossisk pipeline widely as the only alternative that could be made available both quickly and cheaply. The cost of refurbishing the system was tagged at \$ 60 million, whereas the construction of a pipeline to connect Baku to either a Georgian or Turkish pipeline would run in the hundreds of millions (25). Moreover, it was claimed, the Russian line could be made ready before the end of 1996, when early amounts of Azerbaijani oil are due to begin flowing under the terms of the September 1994 contract.

Russia's genocidal war against the breakaway region of Chechnya is attributable at least in part to Moscow's maneuvering in the oil pipeline gambit. Because the Baku-Novorossisk line passes through the Chechen capital of Grozny, Russia saw an apparent need to crush Chechnya's bid for independence quickly in order to retain control over the region's extensive energy infrastructure. Although Moscow has been dragged into a drawn-out conflict in the North Caucasus, it has been quick to dispel any suggestion that the Chechen war will make an Azeri pipeline untenable. Oil production in Chechnya has reportedly been restored to its pre-war level, (26) and President Yeltsin has earmarked 300 billion rubles for the reconstruction of Chechnya's shattered oil facilities (27). Drawing a clear link between the Chechen war and the Azeri pipeline, Fuel and Energy Minister Shafranik noted that the restoration of Chechnya's oil production "shows that concern over the transportation of... oil from Azerbaijan via Chechen territory are groundless" (28).

In the summer and fall of 1995, discussions between Azerbaijan and the Western consortium came to a head regarding the route of one or more pipelines to carry early Azeri oil to market. Despite Moscow's attempts to promote a northern route through Russia, suspicion of Russian intentions led to emergence of a consensus that the most favorable option would be to ship early oil west to the Georgian Black Sea port of Supsa. Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze, intent upon receiving oil transit revenues from such an arrangement, backed a western pipeline despite Russian pressure. Soon after refusing to cancel plans for the pipeline, Shevardnadze was injured in an assassination attempt when a car bomb detonated next to his vehicle on August 29.

Shevardnadze and several of his associates tagged Russia as being the attempt on his life. The alleged culprit, Shevardnadze's own security chief, Igor Georgadze, fled to Moscow in the wake of the bombing (29). Georgia demanded the suspect's extradition from Russia, and the Russian, Prosecutor General's office issued an order for Georgadze's arrest on October 3 (30). However, the Russian Interior Ministry refused to extradite the man, and Georgadze remained at large in Moscow.

Russia's harboring of Georgadze given credence to Shevardnadze's claim that the hand of Moscow was responsible for the August assassination attempt. Russian designs to attain a monopoly over the export of Azeri oil hinged upon the rejection of a Georgian pipeline route. It was thus hardly coincidental that an attempt was made on Shevardnadze's life, soon after he refused to drop plans for such a pipeline, by a man who then fled to Moscow to enjoy the tacit protection of the Russian Interior Ministry.

Although the attempt to decapitate the Georgian leadership failed, events did not progress in a way completely unfavorable to Russia. Despite the preference of Azerbaijan and the Western consortium for a Georgian pipeline for the export of early Azeri oil, President Bill Clinton weighed in at the last minute in favor of a dual route pipeline option. Clinton met with Aliiev in New York at the United Nations' 50th anniversary celebration and reportedly expressed his desire for Azerbaijan and the consortium to adopt a western pipeline through Georgia as well as a northern system through Russia. Clinton's wishes were respected on October 9, when the consortium announced that it would adopt the dual route option for the shipment of early Azeri oil (31).

Although Moscow failed to prevent the two-route decision in the first place, it has taken steps to see that the Georgian route never comes to pass. Lukoil, the only Russian company in the Western consortium, has moved to buy up the totality of early Azeri oil using projected revenues from equivalent Russian oil sales through the Baltic states (32). By hoarding future oil, Russia hopes clearly to dissuade the consortium from investing the estimated \$ 200 million necessary to lengthen and refurbish the Georgian pipeline and thus to eliminate any alternative to the Russian route.

While the two-track decision for early oil was a victory for Russia, the crucial question of the route for a pipeline to carry the bulk of long-term Azeri oil has yet to be answered. Nonetheless, reports speculate that Azerbaijan and the consortium favor a permanent pipeline to run from Baku to the Turkish port of Ceyhan via Georgia. However, Russia, having won the first round in the pi-

pipeline gambit, has not remained passive as the Turkish route nears adoption.

PLAYING THE KURDISH AND GEORGIAN CARDS

In the months following the signing of the September 1994 Azeri oil deal, Russia stepped up its support of Kurdish separatists in eastern Turkey. A Kurdish conference was held in Moscow in late 1994 with the participation of the Kurdish Workers Party, or PKK (33), which has been conducting a bloody guerrilla campaign against the Turkish government for a number of years. In late October and early November 1995, a session of the self-proclaimed Parliament of Kurdistan in Exile, a body financed and led by the PKK, was convened in the Russian capital (34). The correlation between Russia's increased support for the Kurdish movement and the pipeline issue is clear: Moscow plans to foment the Kurdish rebellion in eastern Turkey, where the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline will transit, in hopes of preventing the pipeline's construction (35). Notably, the chairman of the Kurdish Parliament in Exile proclaimed in the wake of the Moscow session that "until peace is restored in Kurdistan, the Kurds will not allow the construction of a pipeline through their territory" from the Caspian Sea (36).

A second prong of Russia's strategy to render a Turkish pipeline stillborn emerged in early 1996. On January 18, a report surfaced that secret negotiations have taken place between Georgia and Russia on the construction of a pipeline to carry long-term Azeri oil to Novorossisk via the breakaway Georgian region of Abkhazia. Abkhazia has been de facto independent since its rebellion led to the dispatch of Russian peacekeepers to the region in 1994, and Georgia has remained intent upon reasserting sovereignty over the area. Moscow's behind-closed-doors proposal allegedly offers Russian help in restoring Georgian control over Abkhazia in exchange for Georgian cooperation on the pipeline (37). Perhaps in an attempt to prod Georgia into acceptance, Defense Minister Pavel Grachev threatened in February to withdraw Russian peacekeepers from Abkhazia barring movement toward resolution of the conflict, (38) thus presenting Georgia with the prospect of renewed separatist violence.

As the crucial question of the route for a pipeline to carry long-term Azeri oil is being discussed in capitals from Washington to Baku, Russia continues to attempt to position itself as the dominant actor in the export of Caspian Sea oil. What this portends for the region was made clear recently when a Russian commentator described a pipeline across Russian territory as "a valve which,

by turning it off, we can -- on completely lawful grounds -- bring any Caspian state to its knees and make it respect our opinion" (39).

CONCLUSION: OIL AND RUSSIAN STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

Russian activities vis-a-vis the oil issue reflect clearly an imperialistic element in Moscow's policy toward the ostensibly independent states of the Transcaucasus. Russia has used covert means perfected during seventy-five years of Soviet rule to manipulate regional events with the aim of forwarding its strategic objectives. A wealth of factual and circumstantial evidence indicates clearly that Moscow aims to attain virtual control over the great energy resources beneath the Caspian Sea. With such control inevitably comes empire.

The new "Great Game" unfolding in the Transcaucasus will determine to a large degree the future geopolitical makeup of Eurasia. The essential strategic question is this: Will the three Transcaucasian republics be allowed to develop into truly independent states integrated with the rest of the world, or will they remain locked into their two-hundred year subservience to Russia? With little opposition from the West, Moscow's moves have gone a long way toward providing an answer.

Footnotes:

1. "Turkey Claims the Oil Route", **The Middle East** (No. 223, May 1993), p. 9.
2. Elizabeth Fuller, "Azerbaijan's June Revolution", **RFE/RL Research Report** (Vol. 2, No. 32, 13 August 1993), p. 26.
3. **Turan**, 4 June 1993, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Central Eurasia (hereafter FBIS-SOV), #93-107 (7 June 1993), p. 80.
4. Elchibey claimed after his ouster that the commander of Russian forces in Ganja had not only supplied the mutineers with weaponry, but that he had also been "involved in drafting their strategic plans". The deposed president, however, did not present evidence to back his allegations. **Moskovskiye Novosti**, 8 August 1993, in FBIS-SOV, #93-149 (5 August 1993), p. 65.
5. **ITAR-TASS**, 1 July 1993, in FBIS-SOV, #93-126 (2 July 1993), p. 81; and "Azerbaijan Moves to Rejoin Ex-Soviets' Commonwealth", *New York Times* (13 June 1993), p. A4.
6. Quoted by **ITAR-TASS World Service**, 21 September 1993, in FBIS-SOV, #93-182 (22 September 1993), p. 6.
7. Daniel Snider, "Russia Vies to Halt Lengthy Karabakh War", **Christian Science Monitor** (19 November 1993), p. 33.
8. **Turan**, 7 September 1993, in FBIS-SOV, #93-172 (8 September 1993), p. 6.
9. **Turan**, 19 and 20 November 1993, in FBIS-SOV, #93-223 (22 November 1993), p. 70.
10. Elmas Guseinov, "Battle Over the Caspian Shelf Attests to Lack of Coordination Between Russian Government Departments", **Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press** (Vol. 46, No. 39, 26 October 1994), pgs. 26-27.
11. "Russia, Azerbaijan Oil Pact", **Wall Street Journal** (23 March 1994), p. A11.
12. "Azerbaijan-Turkey Oil Pipeline Shelved", **Facts on File** (Vol. 54, No. 2777, 17 February

- 1994), p. 108.
13. Quoted in **Hurriyet**, 5 June 1994, in FBIS-WEU, #94-110 (8 June 1994), p. 53.
 14. **Turan**, 20 September 1994, in FBIS-SOV, #94-183 (21 September 1994), p. 81.
 15. **Turan**, 21 September 1994, in FBIS-SOV, #94-184 (22 September 1994), p. 67-68.
 16. Bess Brown, "Russia Refuses to Recognize Caspian Oil Deal", **RFE/RL Daily Report** (No. 180, 21 September 1994).
 17. **Interfax**, 10 October 1994, in FBIS-SOV, #94-196 (11 October 1994), p. 18.
 18. Aldyn Mekhtiyev, "Chernomyrdin Has No Complaints Against 'Contract of the Century'", **Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press** (Vol. 46, No. 41, 9 November 1994), p. 26.
 19. Sanobar Shermatova, "Oil Fuels Russia's Caspian Cold War", **Moscow News** (No. 42, 21-27 October 1994), p. 4.
 20. Elizabeth Fuller, "Azerbaijan's Parliament Ratifies Oil Deal", **RFE/RL Daily Report** (No. 218, 17 November 1994).
 21. Bess Brown, "Top Officials Assassinated in Azerbaijan", **RFE/RL Daily Report** (No. 187, 30 September 1994).
 22. Elizabeth Fuller, "Azerbaijan's Prime Minister Dismissed", **RFE/RL Daily Report** (No. 191, 7 October 1994).
 23. Quoted in Chris Bird, "Rebels Reject Talks as Blast Rocks Baku", **Moscow Tribune** (5 October 1994), p. 2.
 24. In a virtual repeat of the events of October 1994, special-purpose police units began an armed revolt against the Azeri authorities on March 13, 1995 after being implicated in a criminal smuggling racket. A bloody eight-hour firefight in Baku brought the rebellion to an end at the cost of several dozen lives. Aliiev fingered former President Ayaz Mutalibov and ex-Prime Minister Surat Huseinov as the main conspirators, both of whom had fled to Russia following their downfall and were considered to have close ties with Moscow. **Azerbaijan Radio Televiziya Television Network**, 16 March 1995, in FBIS-SOV, #95-052 (17 March 1995), p. 90.
 25. **Turkish Daily News**, 2 February 1995, in FBIS-WEU, #95-025 (7 February 1995), p. 28.
 26. **Moskovskiy Novosti**, 10-17 December 1995, in FBIS-SOV, #95-003-S (4 January 1996), p. 23.
 27. **Interfax**, 24 January 1996, in FBIS-SOV, #96-017 (25 January 1996), p. 1.
 28. Quoted by **ITAR-TASS**, 10 November 1995, in FBIS-SOV, #95-218 (13 November 1995), p. 74.
 29. **ITAR-TASS**, 1 October 1995, in FBIS-SOV, #95-190 (2 October 1995), p. 71.
 30. **ITAR-TASS**, 3 October 1995, in FBIS-SOV, #95-192 (4 October 1995), p. 56.
 31. Blushan Bahree and Anne Reifenberg, "Russia Wins the First Round in Battle to Control Oil Flowing From Caspian", **Wall Street Journal** (9 October 1995), p. A8.
 32. "Caspian Watch #2: The Great Game is On - Will the Republicans in Congress Play?" **Center for Security Policy Decision Brief**, (No. 95-D 87, 1 November 1995).
 33. Kelly Couturier, "Discord Between Russia, Turkey Growing", **Washington Post** (4 December 1994), p. A44.
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 37. **Delovoy Mir**, 18 January 1996, in FBIS-SOV, #96-013 (19 January 1996), p. 70.
 38. **ITAR-TASS World Service**, 15 February 1996, in FBIS-SOV, #96-032 (15 February 1996), p. 11.
 39. **Nezavisimaya Gazeta**, 10 January 1996, in FBIS-SOV, #96-008 (11 January 1996), p. 54.

The Islamic Influence on ethnic nationalism in the North Caucasus:

The Cases of Chechenia and Dagestan

Bruno de CORDIER

Chechen warriors wearing green headbands with Quranic verses painted in it, braving a copy of the Quran and calling themselves 'Islamic suicide squads', Russian soldiers speaking of the Chechen resistance as 'mudjahedin', ... The war in Chechenia and the hostage takings in Budjonnovsk and Kyzlar often reminded of Iran and Afghanistan in 1979, but on the fringes of Eastern Europe this time. But to which extent does Islam fuels nationalist movements in this peculiar outpost of the Islamic world?

ISLAM IN THE NORTH CAUCASIAN FRONTIER

The North Caucasus is one of the most complex ethnic patchworks on the entire planet. Today, it comprises a fan of autonomous republics and regions on the southern flank of the Russian Federation. Those are, from east to west: Dagestan, Chechenia, Ingushetia, North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachai-Cherkessia and Adygea, who all together house a couple of dozens of ethnic groups (1). But talking of Islam, Chechenia and Dagestan are the most important ones. Besides having the largest population of the entire region, the areas of those republics have always been strongholds of militant Islam and the scene of stubborn resistance against both the Czars and Soviets. This historical context is most important, for it explains the present role of Islam in the region.

Do Chechenia and Dagestan have historical precedents of independence? If we limit ourselves to the modern meaning of the word (an independent state with well defined borders, a national flag, its own currency and army, own stamps...), there is no such precedence. The present day republics are merely Soviet creations, and do not coincide with a native state that existed sometime before. So what sort of society existed there before the arrival of the Russians?

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Like in Tajikistan and Somalia, Chechen and Dagestani society is based on the **ta'ip** or clan. Those numerous clans are represented in a council of elders, who traditionally assumed the highest authority. This was a relatively democratic system, especially as there was no Chechen or Dagestani nobility. Notwithstanding periods of tributary relationships to Kabard princes or Turkic khans, those clans were mostly lord and master in their respective settlements or auls. So there definitely is a tradition of **jama'at** or tribal independence, rather than a national one. This independence was backed by an economy based on agriculture, handicrafts and the occasional raiding of caravans and trade posts. Moreover, harsh living conditions in the mountains and forests and the need to protect tribal independence also shaped a warrior culture, most notably among the Chechens who were the most numerous native people in the region after the Cherkess (2). State authority and clear and fixed borders were an alien notion, which is typical for a frontier area. And this capacity of frontier shaped the historical identity of the North Caucasus. The region is a natural borderland and a crosspoint of trade routes between the Volga basin, Crimea and Iran, and the mountainous isolation combined with numerous conquests left a legacy of countless languages and ethnic groups. Nevertheless, due to common geographic surroundings, common modes of production, and the absence of national states, there definitely was something like a North Caucasian identity, even if this had hardly any repercussions on the consciousness of local communities. Nowadays, this identity is still noticeable in the predominantly rural and clanic character of these societies, as well as in common codes of honour and institutions like the **kanly** of vengeance practice, the **kunaklyk** or hospitality and the folklore of the respective nations (3). So how did Islam reach the North Caucasus? And how did it turn a nationalist ferment?

It were not the nearby Iranians but the Arabs who brought the creed to the region. In the wake of their conquest between 651 and 690, Islam was first spread among the Lezgins of southern Dagestan. Those lived around the Arab stronghold of Derbent, which became a quite important centre of Islamic scholarship. But it's not because Islam is (once more) an important factor in North Caucasian society, that it can claim to be an old tradition like in the Arab and Persian world. On the contrary: due to the accidented terrain and strong heathen and oecumenic traditions, islamisation went rather slowly, and it took until well into the eighteenth century before the whole of present day Dagestan and Chechnia were converted to the statements of the Quran, with

some Chechen **auls** being converted as late as 1895. This was largely the result of the efforts of Arab and Caucasian Sufi missionaries, who wandered through the region in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Sufism is a mystic form of Islam, with hazy origins tracing back to the eighth century. It aims at creating direct communication between Allah and the faithful, and is organized in often secret **tariqat** (brotherhoods) of disciples or **murids**, led by a spiritual guide called **pir**, **sheikh** or **murshid**. The brotherhoods are grouped into several Sufi orders like the Naqshbandiya, which is the largest one in the North Caucasus and very strong in Dagestan, and the more militant Qadiriya, which is well implanted in Chechnia. Another important feature of Sufism is its cult of saints and holy shrines or **mazar**. But one of its most extraordinary characteristics is, that it is very tolerant and even amenable to local pagan traditions. Hence Sufi rites show very often a local ethnic character, which explains immediately why it finally grew so strong among the stubbornly pagan Chechen and Dagestani tribes. For example, in more isolated parts of the Chechen countryside, the heathen practice of burying the dead in stone towers rather than in the soil (in order to bring them closer to heaven, away from the underworld), maintained itself within Islam. Some Chechen religious rituals show more similarity with extatic shamanist dances than with the rites of orthodox Islam, with crowds dancing themselves into trance on the hypnotic and exciting rhythm of skin drum and chants. And in Dagestan, traditional healers are another pagan element accommodated by Sufism. The tribal character of traditional Dagestani and Chechen societies explains partly why Sufi brotherhoods gained so much influence. Unlike the fellow Caucasian Kabardians and Ossetes, who lived more westward and had a more stratified society with a large nobility (4), the Chechens and Dagestani peoples had no aristocracy and a rather egalitarian system of village councils, alien to Russian interpretation of authority (5). Due to their eclectic and egalitarian character and their decentralised structure, the Sufi brotherhoods succeeded more easily in obtaining moral authority among the latter. And once the Chechens and Dagestani came opposed to the Russians, Sufi brotherhoods became a way of affirming their identity to the foreign invaders.

COLONIALISM AND ISLAMIC RESISTANCE

Notwithstanding earlier advances after 1556, the year where it defeated the Tatar khanate of Astrakhan, Russia launched a systematic offensive towards the North Caucasus only from 1783 onwards. In that year Azaq, the

capital of the Tatar khanate of Crimea, fell and this event opened the road for a direct advance towards the Caucasus. It were not so much natural resources as well as geostrategic considerations that attracted the Russians to the region though (petroleum, the main modern day asset of the region, had not the same economic importance as it has nowadays). Much more important was the fact that the North Caucasus formed a natural borderland with rival powers like Qajar Iran and Ottoman Turkey, and that its conquest affirmed the czar's rule over the freshly submitted Tatar khanate (6). Moreover, Russia's need for access to warm seas and the Iranian market also stimulated it to claim authority on the North Caucasian barrier. And in this context, Russia wanted to protect its trade routes to Persia against the raids of the mountaineers and the nomads of the southern steppes. Finally, the Russian advance into the Caucasus was sealed with the establishment of a stable border with Iran in 1823. But the achievement of the conquest of Transcaucasia did not mean that Russia had succeeded in conquering the entire Caucasus. On the contrary: large enclaves in the North Caucasus were still under native control, and it took the czars until 1864 and countless casualties before the Russian flag could also fly there. This is only to say that at that time, Russia saw itself confronted with fierce resistance in Dagestan and Chechenia, resistance with a clear character of Islamic Jihad or holy war. For in the wake of Russian advance, an increasing number of Russian colonists soon joined the Cossack vanguards who had raised **stanitsas** or fortified settlements in the fertile Caucasian piedmont. Thus they cut off Chechen and Dagestani mountaineers from their traditional provision lands and winter pastures in the basin of the Terek river. Furthermore, the newcomers appropriated themselves the best lands, and resettled parts of the native population in order to protect their settlements from native raids. This is believed to be the cause of the first large scale native revolt, a revolt led by the Chechen sheikh Mansur Ushurma, which lasted from 1785 to 1791 and had its ethnic support base among Chechens and, to a lesser extent, Kabardians and Kumyks. After a long guerilla campaign and bloody reprisals taken by the Russian army, the sheikh was eventually captured and died in captivity in 1794 (7). But this was only a prelude of things to come.

From 1824 onwards, after the discovery of petroleum and the full involvement of Russia and its periphery in the world-economy, the North Caucasus was confronted with thorough social and cultural changes. Native tribalism quickly eroded and gave way to a social system based on clans and free peasant communities or **uzden**. And in this context Islam, already well en-

croached in mountaineer society, established itself as an alternative social system, able to confirm native identity against Russian domination. Sufi brotherhoods enjoyed a large following: in 1917, for example, clerics made up to 5 % of the population of Dagestan, while the region had more than 2,000 mosques and 800 madrassahs or Islamic schools. And in Chechenia, some 60,000 men on a total approximate population of 345,000 claimed to belong to a Sufi order. In this sense, the **shariat** or Islamic law imposed itself more and more on **adat** or customary law, and Arabic became a sort of **lingua franca** (at least among the clergy and native intellectuals) in Dagestan, Chechenia and Cherkessia. Moreover, an ever increasing number of Russians established themselves in the Terek and Kuban basin. Initially, the Russian government granted large patches of land to meritorious military and Cossack vanguards. Large scale immigration occurred especially after the abolishment of serfdom in Russia in 1861, though. But even before that time, Russia knew a demographic explosion which brought its population from 18 million in 1750 over 68 million in 1850 to 124 million in 1897 (8). Needless to add that this caused further immigration and resettlement in the newly conquered territories, and that the native population felt alarmed and threatened by alien influx. In those circumstances, Islam proved to be the only but also most adequate binding agent between the numerous native nations and clans. And the Sufi tariqat also provided the ideology and the organisational structure to organise anticolonialist resistance. In the North Caucasus, the period between 1824 and 1878 is known as the days of **qazawat** or holy war against the Russians. In fact, it consisted of a major revolt between 1824 and 1859 (the 'great qazawat'), and a minor one between 1877 and 1878 (the 'lesser qazawat'), with several clashes in between. The 'great qazawat' was led by the Naqshbandi order, which could establish itself in Dagestan and Chechenia, thus creating strong religious bonds between both. The first imam with religious jurisdiction over both Dagestan and Chechenia was the Chechen sheikh Ghazi Muhammad, who called up the faithful to fulfill their Islamic duty of taking up arms against the 'infidel Russians'. So they did, but the brutal Russian reprisals contributed as much to the spirale of violence that disrupted the region for decades. For it was general Aleksei Jermolov, sent out to quell the revolt, who said:

"I want the terror associated with my name to be a far more effective protection of our borders than the largest fortress or the strongest army" (9).

Ghazi Muhammad eventually died in captivity in 1832, but he was suc-

ceeded by his disciples Hamzat Bej (who was assassinated in 1834) and the most legendary warrior priest Imam Shamil (who died on his turn in exile in Arabia in 1871). Imam Shamil was an Avar from Dagestan and brought the qazawat at its zenith between 1845 and 1859 (10). In this he succeeded to create a sense of unity between Caucasian peoples like his own Avars, Chechens (the bulk of his forces), Balkars and their close Karachai cousins, thus giving a precedent of North Caucasian Islamic nationalism. Nevertheless, despite fierce fighting causing heavy losses on the Russian side, technological disparity between Shamil's power base and Russian society was too big for him to be able to win the war. Dagestan and Chechenia eventually fell under Russian administration in 1859, but have always been the scene of Islamic unrest whenever an occasion occurred, for instance during Russia's war with Ottoman Turkey in 1877. This shows that Islam certainly has a tradition of acting as a nationalist ferment among the North Caucasian peoples (notably the Chechens and Dagestani) against alien domination. Moreover, it proved to be about the only binding agent in a quite fragmented society based on clan consciousness, rather than a national one.

The modern notion of nationality was only introduced after 1920, after the Soviets could consolidate their takeover in the region. In the run of a complex process (11), what was once mere vague clan territories became the different binational autonomous republics within the Russian Federation. Ethnic fragmentation and the strengthening of the nationality factor was most of all part of a strategy to break the position of Islam as a binding agent for native upsurge, much like it was in the nineteenth century. A local Soviet policy report from 1920 stated, for instance, that:

"The immediate task here is to tear the mountaineers away from the influence of (...) agitation and Islamism conducted by the mullahs. Direct confrontation with the mullahs therefore becomes basic policy" (12).

So the Cherkess nation, for example, was divided up over Adygea, Karachai-Cherkessia and Kabardino-Balkaria. Besides becoming a minority in their ancestral lands, they had to share their new homelands with immigrants and nationalities that came into being in the same way. The Karachai and Balkars, for another example, were actually one nation before they were split up over Karachai-Cherkessia and Kabardino-Balkaria. And the way the split between the Chechen and Ingush came into being, dates back from Czarist times. The Chechen and Ingush actually belong to the same nation. Speaking a language very closely related to Chechen, the Ingush mainly live in the south-

west of the republic, in the areas adjacent to Ossetia. Originally, they were a large Chechen tribe, who was promoted a people by the Russians in the late 1850s, in order to divide up the Chechen nation. For after being submitted by the Russians, the Czarist administrators recruited a native elite among the Ingush. And later on, the Joseph Stalin regime thus continued this policy of ethnic 'divide and rule'. This is only to say that the Chechenia and Dagestan mentioned so far, are not the present day autonomous republics which will be treated from now on. Their territories do overlap each other, but they are different entities: for modern administrative borders and the notion of nationally homelands were introduced by force, and added new tensions to atavistic feuds and historical claims. Which role did Islamic nationalism played in this new context then?

THE SOVIET LEGACY AND PRESENT SITUATION IN CHECHENIA

Chechenia-Ingushetia (as it was called until 1991) arose as an autonomous republic of the Russian Federation in 1936, and has an area of 19,300 square kilometers (7,350 square miles), about the size of the American state of New Hampshire. Its capital is the grimy and infamous town of Grozny (or at least what's left of it), and the girders of the republic's economy are its oil industry and agriculture. Chechenia was the first North Caucasian republic to secede from the Russian Federation in late 1991, and is currently paying the bill for this move. Compared to Dagestan, which is treated further on, the population of Chechenia is ethnically not too splintered up, at least according to North Caucasian standards. Amounting to 1.3 million people on the eve of independence, it then consisted of 55.2 % of Chechens, 12.7 % of Ingush, and 22.0 % of Russians. The Chechens are ethnologically a Caucasian people. They descend from the original inhabitant of the region and speak a distinct Caucasian with quite some Arabic influences. In fact, about a quarter of its vocabulary is derived from Arabic.

In order to assess Islamic nationalism in Chechenia today, one has to take the following events under Soviet rule into consideration. Shortly after its declaration of independence, Chechenia choose a green flag (symbolizing Islam) with an emblem of a grey wolf sitting a top of a mountain as its national symbol, and the Chechen president Dzhokhar Dudajev swore in on the Quran. And, most important, his regime also got the support of the Qadiriya order. In a society where the clan factor remains very strong, the support given by the

Qadiriya order enabled Dudajev, himself belonging to a small and traditionally relatively uninfluential clan, to give his regime legitimacy towards the majority of the Chechen clans. This shows that Islam and the attachment to the **jama'at** system affirm the identity of these mountaineers.

Actually, the fact that Islam succeeded to survive through seven decades of Soviet rule, in order to end up as a nationalistic ferment again, is a story on itself. In 1924, almost parallel to the agricultural collectivization, the Soviets launched a ruthless offensive against Islam in the region, in order to eliminate a potential source of dissent. Sufi brotherhoods were strictly prohibited, their spiritual leaders exiled or executed, the **madrassas** or Coranic schools closed, shariat courts disbanded and in 1928, the use of Arabic script in the Chechen language was banished to give way to Latin and then, in 1944, Cyrillic script. It is obvious that the Arabic script became the first target in the process of Sovietisation of the Caucasians. For Arabic script was a major girder of Islamic identity, and also the main cultural vector for Islamic scholarship. Nevertheless, due to their decentralised structure and their character of secrecy, the *tarikat* were able to continue their activities through underground shrines and small prayer assemblies.

Islamic nationalism got another strong stimulant during the deportations of 1944. In 1942 and 1943, the Germans, on their way to the oilfields of Azerbaijan and the North Caucasus, occupied parts of the Kuban and Terek valleys for about half a year. Few decent historical research has been made on the proportions of Caucasian collaboration with the Germans. But it is clear that the collectivization and anti-Islamic campaigns had left a huge boil of hatred against the Soviet regime among numerous nationalities, which the German tried to exploit in order to win local support. In the German occupied areas, for instance, mosques were reopened and collective forms disbanded. Also, Germany considered creating an Islamic North Caucasian protectorate. And during their five month occupation of the Caucasian piedmont that same year, German troops did use native auxiliaries to track down bands of Soviet partisans. But on the other hand, there were proportionally more Russians, Ukrainians and Balts involved in collaboration than Chechens, Ingush, Karachai and Balkars. The latter were nevertheless entirely deported to labour camps in Kazakhstan and Central Asia, while the first didn't suffer such reprisals. In fact, alleged collaboration was an exquisite pretext to get rid of the traditional "troublemakers" and the potential 'fifth column' of Turkey in the region. A very important detail is, that the Chechens were not only the most up-

roarious, but also the largest ethnic group of this strategic region. All this caused them to be considered as a serious threat to local Soviet rule. Eventually the Chechens, Ingush Karachai and Balkars were all rehabilitated and allowed to return home in 1956. But in the meantime, more than one quarter of the Chechen population had perished during transport and forced labour. In the collective memory of the Chechens, these deportations obviously left strong feelings of traumatic hatred against the Russians. And most important, it also strengthened the influence of the *tarikat*, who turned out to be the main cement through which Chechen identity and sense of community was saved during those exile years. For the Sufi clergy lived discretely among the people and were well placed to lead conspirational activities. Even in captivity, the Chechens did not resign to their fate: in 1945 and 1953, for example, the Soviet authorities had to face several strikes and revolts in the labour camps.

Moreover, Chechenia's strategic importance (most notably due to its proximity with Turkey, its petroleum industry and its function as a crossroad of pipelines), combined with Russian distrust for a rebellious and 'punished nation' yielded a stronger Russian domination of the republic than in Dagestan, as the following table goes to show.

Evolution of the portion of ethnic Russians in the populations of Chechenia-Ingushetia and Dagestan between 1926 and 1994

(in % of the population)

	1926	1939	1959	1970	1989	1995
Chechenia	2.6	28.8****	49.0*	34.5	29.1	6.3***
Dagestan	12.5	14.3	20.1	14.7	11.6	9.2**

* Russian majority due to the deportation of the native population (return not yet completed at that time).

** Decrease of Russians due to higher birth rates among natives.

*** Russian exodus after declaration of independence and forthcoming armed conflicts.

**** Period of collectivization and increasing oil production in the context of the five year plans.

Sources: Roger Caratini, **Dictionnaire des nationalités et minorités de l'ancienne Union Soviétique**, Larousse: Paris, 1992, s. 250-251. Brian Hunter (ed), **The stateman's Yearbook**, Macmillan: London, 1993, pp 406-407.

In addition, the following figures show how the economy, army and administration of Chechenia were dominated by ethnic Russians. This domination embodied an almost colonial society where the Russians mainly dwelled the cities, while the native Chechen were mostly rurally based. In the 1980s

ethnic Russians, although hardly one third of the population, occupied more than half of the Communist Party posts in the republic: of a total of 132 leading posts, 68 (including the most symbolic one of first secretary) were taken by ethnic Russians (13). Only in 1990, a Chechen was given the post of first secretary for the first and last time. Russian domination was even more obvious in the petroleum industry, Chechenia's economic key sector. There, not less than 70 % of the work force was Russian, while only 10 % were Chechens and Ingush (14). The legacy of a 'punished nation' cannot be more clear. Although Chechenia's oil represents only 1 % of the Russian Federation's production, the republic is an important refinery centre, and a crossroad of pipelines that supplies the industrial basins of southern Russia with energy. Its even more symbolic that the Chechen capital and pipeline junction of Grozny isn't even a Russian town. It grew out of a Russian fort build in 1818, and its name means 'the terrible' in Russian. And in 1989 about 80 % of its population consisted of ethnic Russians. Most ironically, the recent Russian bombings of the town thus merely afflicted fellow Russians.

One can conclude that the combination of a tradition of Islamic resistance, deep rancour against the Russians after the deportations, the almost colonial domination of the republic by ethnic Russians, the ideological void and economic decay after the demise of the Soviet Union and the strategic importance of the republic eased the way to Chechenia's secession and the forthcoming conflicts. Islam is an essential part of Chechen national identity, a part which was oppressed by the Soviet authorities for decades. But this shows also that the creed is submitted to, or rather integrated in ethnicity and anti-colonialist resistance, rather than being an achievement on itself. Chechen nationalists are not calling for a global Islamic revolution, but want their national independence in the first place. Islam also emphasizes the strong cultural barrier between the Chechens and their traditional Russian foes. But rather than being a catalyst for the current conflict, it regains a prominent role due to the course of the conflict. And because of Islam serving or rather embodying specific ethnic interests, the Chechen nation tends to converge with the **ummah** or community of believers at times.

That doesn't mean that the Chechen nationalists have no larger ambitions for the North Caucasus, though. They rightly argue that the mountaineers had a common identity crystallized around Islam and mountaineer culture, before the Soviets split them up into different nationalities. And those nationalities only have a chance of economic and cultural survival within a common entity.

Hence their ambition to form a North Caucasian republic and economic union, grouping all nations from Dagestan to Abkhazia, where its capital is to be located. This republic is to be governed by a North Caucasian Council, a sort of parliament representing the nationalities, not individuals or political groups. A shady version of both institutions, called the Confederation of the Peoples of the Caucasus or CPC was found in 1991. Although quite moderate in its political stances, the CPC mobilized Dagestani, Chechen and Kabard volunteer units to assist the Abkhazians when those were seceding from Georgia in 1993. And more recently, the CPC organized the recruitment of Dagestani, Kabard and Ingush units to assist the Chechens in their war against the Russian army (15). The North Caucasian republic idea is not a fallacy of a handful of extremist nationalist, but can show up with a historical precedent. In 1918, during the civil war following the fall of the Czar, a North Caucasian emirate was proclaimed by Islamic leaders and Caucasian nationalists led by sheikh Uzun Hadzhi, and even gained the diplomatic recognition of Germany, Ottoman Turkey and Austria-Hungary. But it was beset by both Czarist and Bolshevik troops after three years, integrated in the Soviet Union as the Autonomous Mountain Soviet republic, and finally carved up into pieces from 1921 onwards (16).

In theory, such a unique mountain republic experiment could be tried again, if Russia were not there to drive a wedge between the Caucasians. And that wedge is called North Ossetia. This autonomous republic houses a strategic road to Transcaucasia, and always was a regional Russian stronghold. The Ossetes are an Indo-European people who speak a language related to Iranian. Apart from that, they differ in another way from their neighbours, for they are mostly Orthodox Christians in a region dominated by Islam (17). In the past, the Ossetes proved to be more favourable to Russian rule than their immediate neighbours. This was due to their more stratified society with its coopted nobility. Hence they did not participated in the gazawat of the nineteenth century but, on the other hand, did formed a part of the late North Caucasian republic during the civil war, but this choice was mainly a consequence of the lack of alternatives caused by the political void. Anyway, the status and behavior of Ossetia is actually a test case in how far the Soviet notion of nationality affected the Caucasian identity. Meanwhile, territorial disputes inherited from Soviet arbitrariness, caused them to be in conflict with the Ingush. During the deportations, a considerable portion of Muslim Ingush lands were given to the Christian Ossetes and were later reclaimed by the In-

gush. This caused an ethnic conflict in the spring of 1992, in which over 1,000 Ingush were reported to be killed by the Ossetes. Moreover, about 60,000 more fled to nearby Ingushetia, which choose to stay in the Russian Federation after the independence of Chechenia in 1991. Russian troops were sent in to arbitrate, but are reported to have virtually choosed the side of the Ossetes (18). Russia, anxious to protect its natural southern border, will most likely try to stir up such social and religious cleavages, in order to drive a wedge among the mountaineers, and establish its old Ossetian allies as a regional stirrup (19). For still today, North Ossetia is one of the most loyal republics of the Russian Federation, and now serves as a sort of turning plate for the Russian military. A quite symbolic detail is, that the Ossetian capital of Vladikavkaz literally means ruler of the Caucasus' in Russian.

THE SOVIET LEGACY AND PRESENT SITUATION IN DAGESTAN

Dagestan is another autonomous republic, east of Chechenia, and must be one of the oddest places in the world. It came into being in the beginning of 1921, and has an area of 50,300 square kilometers (19,416 square miles), approximately the size of Scotland. It's capital is the damp Makhachkala, and the economy of the republic is based on varied agriculture and natural gas. Unlike Chechenia, Dagestan is still a full part of the Russian Federation. Defining the Dagestani nation is no piece of cake, simply because there is no such thing. Or is there? Dagestan, which litteraly means 'land of mountains', houses over a dozen of small and often tiny ethnic groups, ranging in numbers from a few thousands to a few hundred thousands (20). Some are hardly ever heard of, and are to be found nowhere else in the world. Of a total population of more than 1.8 million, the Caucasian Avars constitute the largest ethnic group with 32.1 % of the population. They are organized in fourteen tribes, who live in central Dagestan and speak distinct dialects, shaped by the isolation of the mountainous landscape. Although numerically dominant, the Avars do not from a distinct majority in their country. On the contrary: they have to share it with fellow Caucasian peoples like the Dargins (15.2 %), Laks (5.1 %), Lezgins (11.6 %) and Tabasarani (4.0 %), with the Turkic Kumyks (12.4 %), Nogays (8 %) and Azeris (4 %), and finally also with the Russians (9.2 %), only to mention the main groups. Except for the Russians and some Persian jews, all these nations profess Islam. At first sight, Dagestan has a potential for an all out ethnic

war which would make Bosnia look like a folkloristic neighbourhood quarrel. Nevertheless, no major ethnic conflicts or armed secessions broke out so far, which doesn't mean they never will.

But Soviet rule in Dagestan had a rather different character than in Chechenia. Although Dagestan did suffered as much under the campaigns against Islam of the 1920s and 30s, it endured no deportations after the war, partly because the German army never occupied Dagestan. Consequently, Russian presence turned out to be much more limited than in Chechenia: in the 1980s for instance, only 35 of 156 leading party posts were occupied by ethnic Russians, while the first secretary was a native (21). Yet this is still one quarter of power for merely one tenth of the population. Nevertheless, natives were (at least according to regional standards) lavishly represented on high level and symbolic party post. And on the long term, native party cadres paradoxally developed a potential as bearers of a new Islamic nationalism, partly because this group sees hardly any interest in the ethnic disintegration of Dagestan. On its turn, this is a consequence of the peculiar way Islam was treated in Dagestan.

After decades of fierce persecutions of Islamic faith, the Soviet authorities installed official religious boards in 1947. Thus they fulfilled an promise made earlier on, in order to win religious support for the war effort. Those boards were led by offically appointed spritual leaders, who were charged to acomodate religion and official rhetoric. For the Islamic faith, there were four such spiritual boards: one for Central Asia and Kazakhstan, another for Russia and Siberia, one for Transcaucasia and finally one for the North Caucasus, all led by a mufti or official religious leader. The latter board, which was even allowed to use Arabic as its cult language, got its headquarters in the town of Buinakht, not so far westward from Makhachkala. With most Chechen 'troublemakers' deported at that time, time was ripe to tolerate and canalise islam as a strictly personal matter. Anyway, the foundation of a separate religious board for the North Caucasus suggests a recognition of the specific character of Islam in that region. Nevertheless, due to popular distrust due to the links between the religous boards and the Soviet secret services, parallel underground Islam remained active, and from the 1970s onwards it even slowly infiltrated the official board. The latter can be explained in two ways. First, after a brief period of relative mitigation, there was once more an increase of repression against all forms of religious faith under the rule of Leonid Brezhnev, which lasted from 1956 to 1982. The government backlash even alarmed of-ficials religious leaders in such measure, that they felt as threatened as the un-

dergound clergy. Second, there was the struggle for power that occurred within the local Communist Party at that time. Dagestan is rich in natural gas, which is supplied to the newly independent Transcaucasian states and the industrial basins in southern Russia. Hence the republic has some economic potential. During the Soviet era, the presence of numerous native party cadres sharpened specific ambitions for more economic and political power within that group. This phenomenon is typical among official indigenous elites who are coopted in a system of colonial dominance (22). Moreover, in order to keep ethnic peace, Soviet party posts were assigned according to ethnic quotas for Avars, Dargin, Kumyk and Lezgins, who all have a rural base (23). The ambition to control Dagestan's resources and the forthcoming rivalry with urban Russian cadres, motivated native cadres to affirm their identity through Islam. Moreover, Islam could fill up the ideological void that came into being after the demise of the Soviet Union, as naked force is usually far insufficient to legitimate one's staying in power. Aside from this, there is also a strong fear of militant ethnicity among a considerable portion of Dagestani population. Asked whether Dagestan could become a second Lebanon, Dagestani government spokesman Rashid Gossajev stated:

"In Lebanon there was a war between different sides who were all persuaded that they could win it, even if that turned out to be a big mistake. But in Dagestan no one nurses such an illusion." (24)

There is an element of truth in his statement, for most Dagestani peoples are simply too small to have any chance for survival within their own separate statelets. But despite this, there definitely is a very dangerous ethnic cleavage, notably the disparities in ethnic distribution of wealth (the shortage of fertile land) and political power, along with demographic growth. Those fuel ethnic movements among the Lezgins, Kumyks, Dargins and Nogays to demand different degrees of cultural recognition or political autonomy. So far only the Lezgins, who live in southern Dagestan and northern Azerbaijan, have expressed secessionist tendencies. In both republics, the Lezgins belong to the poorest and most thoroughly Islamized ethnic groups, and would like to unite again with their kinfolk to organise their own development, especially now that the border between Dagestan and Azerbaijan became an international one. Such frictions, however, contain the danger that Islam can be abused as a mean to legitimize clan and ethnic interests, like is the case in Tajikistan, Somalia or Afghanistan.

In the eighteenth and nineteenth century, Islam proved to be able to unite a

large portion of the mountaineers beyond ethnic lines. But will it be able to embody and catalyse national unity in Dagestan? At first sight, it is supposed to. Because the main thing all the small ethnic groups have in common (apart from living in Dagestan) is Islam. With this quality, it can (and definitely will) replace Communism as an internationalist glue. The only question that remains is how it will do so. An Islamic revolution like in Iran is unlikely to happen, because it had specific causes not always present in Dagestani society. The jama'at tradition, for instance, is far stronger in Dagestan than it is in Iran. Most likely, Islam will sneak into all layers of Dagestani society through a symbiosis between the remnants of the local Communist Party apparatus and Islamic movements (25). Although strongly weakened and its rule replaced by an interim ethnic council, the Communist Party of Dagestan still has a 50 % support base. This is not due to popular sympathy though, but to the fact that its internationalist ideology overcomes ethnic chauvinism (or is at least supposed to). And it must be said that the ethnic division of political power during Soviet era was relatively fair in the republic. Nevertheless, the party apparatus, who has the experience and the means to rule, will have to concoct a new ideological profile and a new state theory. At the same time, Dagestan's elite is confronted with a whole fan of Islamic peoples who are reclaiming their cultural identity (26). Since 1990, for instance, about 20,000 people from Dagestan and 4,000 from Chechnia performed the haj or pilgrimage to Mecca, compared to only 3,000 from Uzbekistan (which has nonetheless seven times the joined population of Chechnia and Dagestan) in the same period. So the most obvious move is that the Dagestan Communist Party apparatus will Islamize itself, or seek an opening towards overtly Islamic parties like the Democratic Islamic Party of Dagestan. The choice is theirs, and the options are clear.

CONCLUSION: SMOULDERING JIHAD?

Despite historical links, present day Islamic nationalism in Chechnia developed along other lines than the one in Dagestan, thus having mutually different characters. In Chechnia, Islam is an essential part of Chechen national identity, and this capacity it yields the ideology to resist against 'infidel' Russian rule. In a way, Islam also emphasises the fundamental cleavages between the rural Chechens and the more urban Russians, between conquered natives and colonial masters. In Chechnia, Islam was also the main target of a long lasting

Soviet repression, and thus hardened itself as an ideology of resistance. In Dagestan, on the other hand, Islam is more a binding agent to obtain internal unity in a society that is merely an ethnic mosaic. Moreover, Islam was more infiltrated in party organs for the reasons we stated before. Although it is directed against Russian rule to a certain degree, its internal binding force seems more important. This explains partly why Dagestan has made no moves to secede from the Russian Federation so far. But where do the Caucasians have to turn to on the long term, jammed between a staggering Russian Federation anxious for its territorial unity and oil interest on one hand, and a quest for their social and economic rights and stolen Islamic identity on the other?

It seems that the war in Chechnia has strengthened Islam as a catalyst of ethnic nationalism in the North Caucasus. Just like happened in Bosnia and Afghanistan.

Footnotes:

1. In 1989, Muslim natives comprised 89 % of the population of Dagestan, 78 % in Chechnia-Ingushetia, 19 % in North Ossetia, 57 % in Karabdinio-Balkaria, 40 % in Karachai-Cherkessia and 23 % in Adygea. This represents a North Caucasian Muslim population of about 4.5 million people.
2. At that time, Cherkessia comprised the entire western part of the North Caucasus and a part of the Kuban valley. During the Russian conquest of the area in 1869, the number of Cherkess casualties and refugees to Ottoman Turkey grew so big, that the demographic balance shifted in favour of the Chechens.
3. Jane Ommrod, 'North Caucasus: fragmentation or federation?', in **Nations and politics in the Soviet successor states**, Ian Brenner & Ray Tarras (ed), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 448.
4. Kabard society for instance, was thoroughly stratified and split up in casts of free and unfree men. The free comprised the wali or tribal chiefs, the work or nobles, the pshi or princes and the lofokhotl or a sort of gentleman farmers. The unfree grouped the azat or small tenant farmers, the oq or serfs, the loganaput or temporary slaves and the unaut or plain slaves. See Chantal Lemerrier-Quelquejay, 'Cooptation of the elites of Daghestan and Kabardia in the sixteenth century', in **The North Caucasus barrier. The Russian advance towards the Muslim world**, Marie Bennigsen-Broxup (ed), Hurst & Co, London, 1994, pp 23-24.
5. Susan Goldenberg, **Pride of small nations. The Caucasus and post-Soviet disorder**, London: Zed Books, 1994, pp 191-192.
6. Marie Bennigsen-Broxup, 'Russia and the North Caucasus', in Marie Bennigsen-Broxup, op cit, 1994, pp 3-4.
7. Firuz Kazamzadeh, 'Russian penetration of the Caucasus', in **Russian imperialism from Ivan the great to the revolution**, Tarras Hunczak & Hans Kohn (ed), New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1974, p. 247.
8. Nadia Duik & Adrian Karatnycky, **New nations rising. The fall of the Soviets and the challenge of independence**, Toronto: John Wiley, 1993, p 209.
9. See note 7.
10. For more on the military course of this event, see Moshe Gammer, 'The conqueror of Napoleon in the Caucasus', **Central Asian Survey**, 12 (3), 1993, pp 253-265.
11. See Stephen Blank, 'The formation of the Soviet North Caucasus (1918-24)', **Central Asian Survey**, 12 (1), 1993, pp 13-32 for a detailed account.
12. Ibidem, p 17.
13. Michael Rywkin, 'Power and ethnicity: party staffing in the autonomous republic of the Caucasus in the middle 1980s', **Central Asian Survey**, 12 (3), 1993, p 348.
14. Susan Goldenberg, op cit, p 199.
15. Karel Bartak, 'Risques d'embrasement dans tout le Caucase. Sanglants paris de Boris Eltsine en Tchetchenie', **Le Monde Diplomatique**, 490, 1995, p 5.
16. Jane Ommrod, op cit, p 450.
17. However, about 19 % of the Ossetians are Muslims. Those live mostly in North Ossetia. During the war in Chechnia, the sympathy of those Ossetian communities tended more towards the Chechens (with even some Ossetian volunteers fighting against the Russians) than to their Christian kinfolk. Thus shows that religious solidarity sometimes prevails over ethnic links.
18. See Unrepresented Peoples and Nations Organization (UNPO), **Ingushetia and Chechnia. Report of the UNPO mission to the republic of Ingushetia and the Chechen republic Ichkeria**, The Hague: UNPO, 1995, pp. 19-22.
19. Karel Bartak, 'Vers une nouvelle decolonisation? Moscou dans le borbier caucasien', **Le Monde Diplomatique**, 469, 1993, p 16.
20. Some sources mention over thirty Dagestani nationalities. Everything depends on the meaning or definition one gives to 'nationality' or 'ethnic group' though. If, for instance, one considers the respective Avar tribes with their respective dialects to be ethnic groups, such an elevated number is easily obtained. A more concise approach limits the number of Dagestani nationalities to fourteen.
21. Michael Rywkin, op cit, pp 348-349.
22. Philip Roeder, 'Soviet federalism and ethnic mobilization', in **The Soviet nationality reader. The disintegration in context**, Rachel Denber (ed), Boulder, Westview Press, 1992, pp 153-155.
23. Brian Murray, 'Peace in the Caucasus: multi-ethnic stability in Dagestan', **Central Asian Survey**, 13 (4), 1994, p. 511 onwards.
24. Vitken Cheterian, 'Moscou veille sur sa frontiere sud. Les mille et une guerres du Caucase', **Le Monde Diplomatique**, 484, 1993, p. 20.
25. Marie Bennigsen-Broxup, op cit (1995), p. 20.
26. Marie Bennigsen-Broxup, 'Le Caucase du Nord: conflits ethniques ou crise coloniale?', in **Le Caucase postsovietique: la transition dans le conflit**, Mohammed Reza Djalili (ed.), Brussels, Editions Bruylant, 1995, p 19.

TURKEY and ARMENIA

PAST PROBLEMS and FUTURE PROSPECTS

THE BURDEN OF HISTORY

Paul B. HENZE

All the peoples of the Middle East are history-conscious. Armenians perhaps more so than most. They have an illustrious ancient history, closely intertwined with the history of all the other nations of the region. Unlike many of the others, however, they were unable to maintain a unified state after ancient times. Before the Turkish conquest of Asia Minor, Armenian principalities formed part of the Byzantine and Persian empires. During the Crusades many Armenians became allies of the Christian West, but others cooperated with Byzantium, Turkish princes, and other Muslims. Later, when all the Turkish princedoms were absorbed into the Ottoman Empire, Armenians formed an significant element of the population in parts of eastern and southeastern Anatolia, but seldom a majority. During most of its history Armenians flourished in the Ottoman Empire, occupied important commercial and administrative positions, and were considered among the Sultan's most loyal subjects. The Armenian Patriarchate in Istanbul was established at the initiative of Mehmet the Conqueror, who brought the Armenian Bishop of Bursa to the capital to head it (1).

Though they lacked a state of their own, the Armenians nevertheless quite early developed many of the characteristics of nationhood (2). Their adherence to Christianity gave them a sense of cultural unity, and their church promoted development of their language, their unique alphabet, and a deep sense of cultural awareness. Though by the beginning of the modern era most Armenians lived in territories forming part of the Ottoman and Persian empires, some had also migrated to distant regions -- Russia, Egypt, India, Italy -- and established prosperous communities and thriving cultural institutions. Thus, like the Jews, they became a diaspora nation. The Monastery of Echmiadzin remained the seat of the Armenian Apostolic Church, but fewer than 20 % of

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the inhabitants of the Khanate of Erivan were Armenians when Russia acquired it from Persia in 1828 (3). The situation was similar in Karabakh.

An accelerated process of movement of peoples followed the Russian conquest of the Transcaucasus and continued through the 19th century and into the 20th. Each Russo-Turkish war resulted in a wave of immigration into the Caucasus of Armenians from eastern Anatolia encouraged by Russia. By the end of the 19th century Armenians were concentrated in rapidly growing cities such as Tbilisi and Baku in larger numbers than in Erivan (4). In both the Russian and Ottoman empires Armenians experienced a cultural renaissance during the 19th century. Istanbul was as important as any city in the Russian Empire as a center of Armenian literary and political activity. Armenians were not only prominent in the commercial life of the Ottoman Empire, many became active in the professions and in cultural activities (5). Foreign missionaries, especially Americans, worked among Armenians throughout the Ottoman Empire and contributed to their politicization.

The whole history of Armenian-Turkish relations is rich and extremely complex. During the 20th century it has been oversimplified and distorted by both sides. It is an integral part of the history of Turkish-Russian relations since the beginning of the 19th century. With the disappearance of the Soviet Union, the opportunity is open for a re-evaluation of this history on all sides. It is not the highest priority at the present time for Armenians and Turks, however. Debate about the past needs to give way to two more urgent requirements: 1) adjustment to present realities, and 2) provision for mutually advantageous cooperation between the Turkish and Armenian republics in the future.

The burden of the past hundred years of Turkish-Armenian history does not have to be unbearable if both sides agree to recognize it as history. There is no gain in victimizing either contemporary Turks or Armenians for what happened in the distant or recent past, i.e. for the tragedies of the late 19th century and World War I or for terrorist actions and the murders of Turkish diplomats in the 1980s. Both peoples have enough to gain from reconciliation and cooperation to justify setting the past aside.

TURKEY AND ARMENIAN INDEPENDENCE

Turkey was one of the first countries to recognize Armenia's independence in 1991. It sent an exploratory diplomatic mission to Erivan even before the collapse of the Soviet Union. In spite of hostile currents in public opinion, Turkey's leaders have consistently adhered to the position that Armenia's in-

dependence must be recognized and supported. This position was taken in spite of the fact that the war over Karabakh had already started in 1988. Armenian persistence in pursuit of this war, the killing and displacement of tens of thousands of Azerbaijanis, and the occupation of sizable portions of Azerbaijan's territory beyond the boundaries of the Karabakh Autonomous Region, confronted Turkish leaders with a problem to which they had to react. They could not ignore public opinion. Therefore they suspended plans for diplomatic relations, kept the border closed, and prohibited transit through or over Turkish territory. Far harsher actions would undoubtedly have gained popular support in Turkey.

Turkish leaders were wise in refusing to let their actions be guided by extreme currents of public opinion. Drastic steps against Armenia would have made it much more difficult to effect the pragmatic reconciliation that has now begun.

THE DIASPORA AND ARMENIAN INDEPENDENCE

The Armenian diaspora has been valuable as a source of material aid and political support for Armenia both before and after independence. But diaspora extremists have at the same time caused Armenia great harm. The Dashnak Party, in particular, has behaved as if it had an entitlement to take possession of independent Armenia. Many highly politicized Armenians rushed from abroad and took prominent positions in Armenia, as if they had a greater right to them than Armenians who had endured life under Soviet communism. They intensified the militarization of the Karabakh campaign. They continued the demonization of Turkey that was carried to extreme lengths during the last decades of the Soviet Union. They encouraged territorial demands on Turkey and exacerbated Armenia's relations with Georgia. These diaspora fanatics fed their illusions on their success in manipulating the U.S. Congress to maintain an embargo against Azerbaijan while voting substantial aid for Armenia. This was, and is, short-sighted (6). Dashnak-led policies left Armenia with nowhere to turn for international support but to Russia. President Levon Ter-Petrosian realized the unwisdom of these policies very early but had to move carefully to free his government from Dashnak and other diaspora obstructionism. At the same time he had to cope with the consequences of severe economic decline. Armenia has lost at least 700,000 citizens through emigration during the past three years, more than 20 % of its population. There is a lesson to be drawn from this fact: Armenians will not endlessly endure pol-

icies that put abstract nationalistic aspirations above the welfare of the population. Those who can, and they often include many of the ablest people, will leave. The Dashnaks have been slow to recognize this fact.

President Levon Ter-Petrosian has the distinction of being the only leader in the Transcaucasus who has remained in power from independence onward. He is committed to governing Armenia for the benefit of the people who live there. He understands that Armenia, poor in resources as it is, has the capacity to become a Caucasian Switzerland if it capitalizes on the talents and skills of its people and takes advantage of the constructive assistance the diaspora can provide. During the past two years Ter-Petrosian has shown remarkable realism and courage under difficult and at times precarious circumstances in leading the country to a more rational position. This process was helped in 1994 by modest economic stabilization, including reduction of inflation, and unwillingness of the population to be manipulated into repeated destructive actions by political opposition groups. There was almost no response to the opposition's call for a nationwide general strike in November 1994 (7).

During 1995 Ter-Petrosian moved systematically to consolidate the authority of his government by curtailing and then banning Dashnak activity, by introducing a new constitution and gaining its approval by popular referendum, and by holding elections for a new parliament. In the process, Ter-Petrosian's governing Armenian National Movement resorted to extra-legal emergency measures and less than pure democratic procedures. While impartial international observers concluded that 5 July 1995 elections were "free but not fair", they were still comparatively mild in their criticism (8).

Ter-Petrosian emerged from this process with a workable constitution and an effective governing majority. The country has at last been freed from the endless political commotion that diaspora-inspired extreme nationalists and former communists generated. As in many other ex-Soviet countries, including Russia itself, there is considerable evidence that a majority of the Armenian population prefers civic peace, legal order, and economic stability to the confusion and degeneration that rampant political competition brought in the guise of democracy. From international human rights and democracy-monitoring groups the Dashnaks have managed to gain sympathy and expressions of support as an oppressed political movement. Given their history, this is ironic. Such criticism will have little practical effect. If, as extreme elements among them have always been inclined to do, the Dashnaks resort to increased violence and terrorism in Armenia and abroad, they are likely to lose

the sympathy they still enjoy in many quarters in the Armenian diaspora. Ter-Petrosian's suppression of the Dashnaks has had no practical effect on his international standing or on the flow of economic aid which, on the whole, Armenia has been utilizing effectively (9).

In spite of the fact that the Armenian National Movement grew out of the Karabakh Committee in which he was an activist, Ter-Petrosian has displayed cautious realism about Turkey since independence. He has also favored a peaceful settlement of the status of Karabakh, but not without change in the status of the region to the advantage of its now exclusively Armenian population. He has gone to considerable length to maintain the truce that was agreed to in May 1994. He has participated in international efforts to find a solution for the problem and met with Azerbaijani President Aliyev. His consolidation of his domestic position, especially the suppression of the Dashnaks, permits him to take initiative both toward a Karabakh settlement and improvement of relations with Turkey. Armenian withdrawal from portions of occupied Azerbaijani territory beyond the Karabakh region would demonstrate a concrete commitment beginning a process that could lead to settlement.

Turkey has welcomed moderation and gestures from Armenia toward rapprochement (10). Steps that Turkey has already taken have laid the basis for a sustained process of rapprochement between the two countries. Before we discuss these possibilities, let us take a brief look at the Armenian-Russian relationship.

RUSSIA AND ARMENIA

As Russia seized control of major portions of the Caucasus from the Persian and Ottoman Empires from the late 18th century onward, she found it convenient to pose as the protector of the two Christian peoples of the region, but with very different results over time. Those differences have become strikingly apparent since independence. Relations between Georgia and Turkey have been close and warm. Neither country has made claims against the other, though the predominantly Muslim population of Ajaria belonged to the Ottoman Empire until 1878. Medieval Georgia included large sections of northeastern Turkey and at least three million Turkish citizens in this region know they have Georgian ancestry. The Georgians in Turkey converted to Islam in the 16th and 17th centuries, however, and have always been loyal Turkish citizens. When the Soviet Union collapsed, people from both countries began to move freely across the Turkish-Georgian border to trade and renew

contact with relatives. Two new crossing points were opened in 1995 in addition to that at Sarp. As many as a million people a year cross and trade is increasing. Prospects for further positive development of Turkish-Georgian relations are excellent. Except for the demands Stalin made against Turkey at the end of World War II, Russia has not attempted to stir up tensions between Turkey and Georgia.

The Armenian story is very different. In every Russo-Turkish war in the 19th century, and in World War I, Russia tried to use the Armenians of Anatolia as a fifth column. Ottoman Armenians suffered grievously as a consequence, and so did Kurds and Turks in the region. During the Soviet period Moscow over and over again, openly and clandestinely, worked to exacerbate Turkish-Armenian tensions and sow hatred between the two peoples. Some of these bad habits have persisted since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

After the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires collapsed at the end of World War I, the successor states -- the Republic of Austria and the Turkish Republic -- officially abandoned all claims to their former territories in the Balkans (in the case of both Austria and Turkey) and in the Middle East (in the Turkish case). Their governments made no territorial claims and did not interfere in the politics of the successor states. Austrians and Turks as peoples lost all interest in acting as imperialists.

The same healthy development has not occurred in independent Russia. Russia officially claims special rights and privileges in what it calls the "Near Abroad". It engages in threats and intimidation against the now free states of the old Soviet Union. Moscow's greedy stance on the transport of oil from Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan is typical of Russian attitudes on many economic questions. It is a reflection of neo-imperialism. Probably only a minority of Russians actually want to be imperialists again and dominate other peoples, but many former communist party members and military men have not given up hope of restoring the Soviet Union. Politicians such as Zhirinovskiy talk about it continually and advocates atrocious actions such as napalming all the Chechens (11). Short of birthing the Soviet Union back to life, they want to be colonial overlords and exploiters again in the Baltics, in Moldova and Ukraine, and in the Caucasus and Central Asia. It is not at all clear that a majority of the Russian people share these aspirations.

For Moscow Armenia has been something of a special case since the demise of the Soviet Union. Moscow feels it is entitled to a special position in Armenia. It has sought -- and gained -- special privileges -- such as a 25 year mil-

itary base agreement and control of the border. It has argued that these are necessary to protect Armenia from Turkey. It has shown in many ways that it still has an interest in maintaining tensions between Turkey and Armenia. Among both Azeris and Armenians there are people who believe that the Karabakh crisis was intentionally fueled by Moscow to be able to keep some degree of control over both countries (12). And doubts remain among many of these people that Moscow actually wants a settlement of the Karabakh situation. There are undoubtedly varying opinions in Moscow. One of the most difficult problems any country has in dealing with independent Russia is that it is still a very loosely consolidated country. Its government is actually weak. Moscow does not fully control any of the Russian Federation's 89 regions, nor is it able to control all the branches of the central government: the army, the secret services, and the various institutions that oversee the economy. Some of these operate quite independently and often according to old Soviet attitudes and practices. The Russian government's control over private entrepreneurs and ex-nomenklatura capitalists is even weaker. Over criminal mafia types it has no control at all. None of the ex-Soviet countries is without its own free-booting elements who operate for their own self-interest. Armenians, even more than other Caucasians, were famous during the Soviet period for their ethnic network that extended over the entire Soviet Union. In the more open post-Soviet period it has expanded.

TURKEY, RUSSIA AND ARMENIA

If there were a danger of Turkish aggression, any Armenian leader would want protection from whatever direction he could find it. But Turkey has given no evidence of hostile intentions toward Armenia. Quite the opposite. Ter-Petrosian shows every sign of appreciating Turkey's restrained behavior and so do some of his key subordinates. As the president of an independent country he can have little interest in permitting his country to serve as the mere satellite of its former imperial master. There is every reason for Armenia to seek productive relations with all its neighbors: with Georgia and Azerbaijan, with Turkey and Iran, as well as with Russia. Even though Armenia has no Black Sea Coast, it has joined the Black Sea Initiative. It already receives a substantial portion of its imports via Georgian Black Sea ports. Trabzon is an even more natural outlet to the Black Sea for Armenia.

As long as Armenia does not function as a base for subversion against Turkey, Turkey has nothing to fear Armenia. Turkey's population is 20 times that

of Armenia. Turkey's economic capacity is far greater and it is well integrated into the European and world economy. Eastern Turkey can nevertheless benefit from opening the Armenian border to trade of all kinds and movement of people, just as it has benefited from the opening to Georgia. Proportionably the benefits to Armenia will be far greater than they will be to Turkey. A good economic relationship with Turkey is a guarantee of increasing prosperity for Armenia. It can accelerate Armenia's progress toward becoming a Caucasian Switzerland.

How does Russia fit into this situation? Does a Turkish-Armenian rapprochement work against the interests of Russia? If Russia wishes to adhere to outdated imperialist practices, yes. But for a truly reformed Russia, there can be no disadvantage, no danger. Armenian prosperity is in Russia's interest. Russia has enough destitute refugees already. The 700,000 Armenians who have left Armenia since independence, most of whom have gone to Russia, would be better off in their own country contributing to an expanding Armenian economy. Russia does not need them. Turmoil elsewhere in the Caucasus has generated at least a million other refugees in Russia. Neo-imperialism and nationalist chauvinism produce not only refugees, but economic stagnation and political confusion. There are Russians who understand this. They favor a constructive relationship with Turkey. Some even see in many features of Turkish experience examples which Russia can imitate.

Economic realities may be changing Russian perceptions of its true interests toward Turkey as well as softening the racist attitudes that some Russians have long held against this traditional enemy. Trade between the two countries has expanded steadily. Turkish consumer goods form a major component of this trade and provide a continual demonstration of the superiority of Turkish light and food industry over Russia's. Turkey has become a major customer for Russian natural gas. Turkish investment in Russia has increased. Most important of all may be the enormous amount of Turkish construction work under way in Russia. According to mid-1995 estimates Turkish construction projects in Russia have exceeded \$ 6 billion in value, employ 25,000 Turkish workers, and provide employment for far larger numbers of Russians. Major Turkish construction companies have undertaken projects all over Russia. They have built much of the German-financed housing for Turkish military men brought back from Eastern Europe. In Moscow itself they are building office buildings, shopping centers, and hotels. After the attempted coup in Moscow of September 1993, the Turkish companies Enka and Gama were hired

to repair the damage to the Bely Dom (White House), seat of the Russian Government. Ten thousand workers in three shifts, working around the clock, finished the job in three months, ahead of schedule, at a cost of \$ 35 million (13).

On the all-important question of oil, Russia appears to have much to gain from cooperation with Turkey in development of pipelines and transport of oil from Central Asia and Azerbaijan as well as from Russia itself. Instead of attempting to pressure Turkey to permit more tanker traffic through the Straits, or spitefully developing an expensive detour-route across the Black Sea to Bulgaria and then to a Greek port on the Aegean, Russia might serve its own interests better and encourage international cooperation at the same time by cooperating with Turkey in development of pipeline routes to Turkish Mediterranean ports. One of the great benefits to Armenia of a cooperative relationship with Turkey would be the opportunity to cooperate in pipeline construction for shipment of oil from Central Asia and the Caspian-and in the process ensure its own oil supply. If the unexploited oil potential of these areas is as great as it is believed to be, there is an opportunity for all the countries of the region to share the benefits of getting it out to world markets.

We read almost nothing of these constructive economic activities in newspapers and hear nothing about them from statesmen. But they may over time be much more important for the future than the declarations of officials and politicians in Russia who have not yet appreciated the true significance of the collapse of communist imperialism. A Russia dedicated to improving the lives of its own people can find no good reason for opposing the development of a mutually beneficial relationship between Turkey and Armenia, or, for that matter, between Turkey and any other component of the ex-Soviet Union, including Russia itself.

1996 could be a year of major progress toward creation of a productive relationship between Turkey and Armenia. It could also bring progress toward more constructive and mutually beneficial relations with Russia. If Russia regresses into neo-imperialism and turns its back on democracy and the free market, the Russian people will be the losers. They deserve better, for they have suffered sorely during the 20th century. The recent Duma elections demonstrate that Russians know how democracy works. They also demonstrate, unfortunately, there is great confusion in Russia about the future course the country should follow. Hopefully Russians will make use of the democracy they now have to choose leaders who will chart a safer course for them. Armenians

are fortunate in having a leader such as Levon Ter-Petrosian who has a realistic understanding of priorities for his country. Washington DC, January 1996

Footnotes:

1. Walter F. Adeney, **The Greek and Eastern Churches**, Reference Book Publishers, Clifton, NJ, 1965, pp. 548 ff.
2. Hugh Seton-Watson, **Nations and States**, Westwood Press, Boulder, CO, 1977, pp. 383-387.
3. George A. Boumoutian, "The Ethnic Composition and the Socio-Economic Condition of Eastern Armenia in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century", in Ronald Suny (ed.), **Transcaucasia, Nationalism and Social Change**, Ann Arbor, MI, 1983, pp. 69-86.
4. The Armenian component of the population of the territory that today constitutes independent Armenia also grew steadily during the century after Russian conquest through immigration from Anatolia and Persia. The Soviet Armenian Republic had the greatest percentage of its own ethnic group of any major component of the former Soviet Union. After the disorders of the late 1980s, with migration from Azerbaijan, Georgia, and other parts of the Caucasus, the Armenian portion of the population increased even further.
5. Mesrob K. Krikorian, **Armenians in the Service of the Ottoman Empire**, Routledge, London, 1977.
6. Armenian lobbyists have so far been able to force the U.S. Government to maintain an aid embargo against Azerbaijan. The State and Defense Department as well as the White House have consistently opposed it. The Armenian Lobby may lack the strength to maintain it, for, even with Greek Lobby support, lobbyists have not been able to manipulate the Congress to take actions against Turkey for its support of Azerbaijan.
7. "Transcaucasia between Anarchy and Despotism", **Transition**, "1994 in Review, Part II", Open Media Research Institute, Prague, January 1995, pp. 60-61.
8. See, e.g., the report of the leader of the European Parliamentary Delegation, Dumeni Columberg, in the **Neue Zuercher Zeitung**, 11 July 1995: "Als Beobachter der Wahlen in Armenien" (As an Election Observer in Armenia). He concluded: "I come to a more differentiated judgment than... the media. It must be taken into account that Armenia has no democratic tradition and no experience in conducting free elections. Since these were (the country's) first free elections, voters had difficulty adjusting to the new freedom of expression. Taking these factors into account, one can call the first parliamentary elections 'free'. Voters were able to exercise their right to vote without restriction. I regard this as an important step on the long and difficult road to democracy. Of course the constitution gives the president significant powers and to a great extent corresponds to the French presidential system. It offers the opportunity for further progress toward democracy and rule of law. We have good reason to support Armenia strongly in this effort."
9. Lis Fuller, "Armenia-Ruling Party Strengthens its Hold on Power", **Transition**, 20 October 1995, pp. 56-59.
10. Leyla Cambel, "Freundschaftssignale Erewans und die Turkei" (Friendly Signs from Erevan toward Turkey), **Neue Zuercher Zeitung**, 7 August 1995.
11. The appointment of Primakov as Foreign Minister is disquieting, especially in view of his advocacy of a close relationship with Saddam Hussein and his support of provision of nuclear technology to Iran.
12. The same is believed by most Georgians of the Abkhaz situation where the record of Russian interference is more openly evident.
13. Adam Smith Albion, "Send in the Turks", **Institute of Current World Affairs Letters**, Hanover, NH, August 1995.

TURCO-ARMENIAN RELATIONS

INTRODUCTION

Kamuran GÜRÜN

Following a decision of its parliament, Armenia which used to be a federal republic within the Soviet Union declared its independence on 23 August 1990. Therefore we assume this date as the beginning of interstate relations of Armenia.

However, there is another, though short period of an independent Armenia. This period started with the formation of the United Transcaucasian Socialist Republic by the Caucasian peoples, namely the Azerbaijanis, Georgians, Armenians and Dagestanis under tsarist rule. The life of the United Transcaucasian Socialist Republic lasted only until 26 May of the same year. At this date the union disintegrated. Georgia and Azerbaijan the same day, Armenia on 28 May declared their independence.

At the time WW I was not over yet and no state named Turkish Republic was in place. The newly founded Armenian state first established relations with the Ottoman Empire and later with the Ankara government.

Armenia's first independence did not prove to be long lasting. The Soviets made Armenia part of the Soviet Union in March 1922. In March 1936 Armenia acquired Soviet Socialist Union republic status.

Based on these two different periods, this paper will examine these two periods of Turco-Armenian relations separately. It may appear that it would be impossible to examine official (interstate) Turco-Armenian relations and unofficial (between the two peoples) Turco-Armenian separately.

However, an Armenian Problem which began to surface with the Reformation Declaration of 18 February 1856 and became internationalized with the Treaty of Berlin (13 July 1878) existed in the Ottoman Empire. This matter is perhaps more significant than official interstate Turco-Armenian relations. As I have examined this matter with all its aspects in my book titled "Ermeni Dos-

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yasi" (Ankara, TTK, 1982), I shall not touch upon this period in this article. I believe it is necessary to remind the reader about this approach.

The Ottoman Empire, which was a tiny principedom in 1299 became a multi-ethnic and multi-confessional empire which challenged the gates of Vienna, stretched over an area which included the whole of the Black Sea, the southern Mediterranean and the Arabian peninsula. It was inevitable that these various peoples with various ethnic and religious backgrounds which were never intended to be absorbed, assimilated or denied their identities or forced to convert to Islam by the Ottomans, would seek to become independent states when nationalism became such a popular ideology. The Great Powers which aimed to dismember the Ottoman Empire supported the efforts of these peoples to become autonomous or independent and this was an inevitable reality of international politics.

This reality has been experienced. Undoubtedly, the Ottoman Empire did not permit the various peoples to leave the empire voluntarily, instead it occurred after various wars and struggles. Finally, the Ottoman Empire had to come to terms with this fact.

There were two peoples who did not fit into the above definition within the Ottoman Empire. These peoples were the Jews and the Armenians. The Ottomans did not occupy land that belonged to these peoples, neither did it gave an end to their independence. To the contrary, when the Ottomans emerged on the historical scene neither of these peoples had their own country, nor were independence. They were dispersed throughout the empire but at none of any given area these peoples constituted a majority. Therefore claims of lands which supposedly belonged to these peoples are inconsistent with reality. In contrast, the Ottoman Empire facilitated them with Presence and welfare that they previously could not even dream of, it elevated them to more prestigious ranks than the Turks which constituted the essence of the state.

This is not an idea just forwarded here by myself but is a fact numerous documented in the works of their own intellectuals. Most of these documents had been included in the aforementioned work of mine - "The Armenian File". After the printing of this book I have been able to acquire more of these sort of documents and works which strengthened and supported my argument. One of these books belongs to an Armenian thinker named Eremya Çelebi Kömürçyan who lived between 1637-1695.

Kömürçyan's book was translated into Turkish by Hrand D. Andreasyan. It is an interesting book and I recommend it to those who have an interest in the

subject (1).

Unlike the other non-Muslim ethnic minorities of the Ottoman Empire the Jews lived in peace and without any problem from the foundation of the empire to the ruin and continue to live in harmony within the Turkish Republic.

However, the Armenians which were furnished with all conveniences lost their welfare and Presence due to foreign provocation (incitement); meddling of terrorist organizations manned by foreign nationals; last but not least upsetting to Turks mostly due to the intricacies of the Istanbul Armenian Patriarchate which aimed at revamping its recently lost authority and prestige. Consequently, a first period of rebellions occurred between 1882-1908 and during WW I most of the Armenians sided with tsarist Russia.

The Ottoman Empire did what all states did and would do in such a situation. It suppressed the rebellions and during the war, in order to establish the safety of its armies on the Russian front transported the locals of this area to the south.

The countries who fought against the Ottomans during WW I and the Armenian Church, but not the Armenian community of Turkey defined the transportation of locals as a so-called "Armenian Massacre". Following the Jewish Holocaust in WW II, the aforementioned transportation process has been projected as the first holocaust in history.

Currently this claim is still strongly supported by circles which have an interest in discomforting Turkey and the work of respected historians is simply disregarded. It is constantly overlooked that had the Ottomans aimed to eradicate the Armenians that this would not have been difficult to accomplish. Instead the Ottomans spent scarce resources for their transportation to the south during difficult war times.

As mentioned earlier I have examined this matter in full detail and with due impartiality in my book titled "The Armenian File". Even Armenian historians were not able to discard it as false but rather termed it as the "Turkish view". It can be argued that it is the "Turkish view" as the author is Turkish but my aim was merely to present the subject matter in an objective fashion.

The Turkish Republic is the continuation of the Ottoman Empire. However, the transition from the Ottoman Empire to the republic did not come about by a coup d'état or a constitutional amendment. The foundation of the republic did not only materialized as a result of a struggle against foreign occupation but also entailed a struggle against the Sultanate in Istanbul. Therefore, the continuity should be conceived in terms of the people of Turkey.

In such circumstances the Turkish Republic did not have to assume responsibility for any event that took place during the Ottoman era.

It is still in memory how Russia criticized Turkey for accepting the debts of the Ottoman Empire. The Turkish Republic could have declared that "the Armenian Problem of the imperial era and any decisions taken by the governments of the imperial era have no relation whatsoever to it". In addition, it is difficult to support the performance of the unpopular government of the time which brought about the death of 2.5 million Turks by entering WW I and left the country in virtual ruin. Consequently, there are a good number of people who share this perception.

The only reason for not declaring a break with the imperial past is the simple fact that these claims are false. In point of fact : the honest attitude of Turkish authorities and Turkish historians vis-a-vis history is adequate to reveal in which direction that truth lies.

It is also a fact that following the Lausanne Treaty Armenians residing in Turkey again found peace and no discriminatory practices occurred. In contrast, remembering that after the end of WW II some European countries engaged in purges without trial against enemy collaborators resulting in thousands of deaths reveals the irony of some who try to accuse Turkey with hatred against Armenians.

After this short review I shall examine the history of Turco-Armenian relations.

THE FIRST PERIOD

The Russian Revolution began with the 8 March 1917 Petersburg rebellion. However, it was the night of 7-8 November when the Bolsheviks were in control of the situation. Until that date Russia participated in the war under the command of Kerensky.

When the Bolsheviks assumed power on 15 November 1917 first they declared that all nationalities living in Russia are equal and sovereign and that they could leave Russia and establish their independent governments should they wish to do so.

Russia asked from the Central Powers to negotiate an Armistice on 26 November 1917. The Russo-Ottoman Armistice talks began on 4 December 1917 in Erzurum and were finalized on 18 December 1917. The main provisions were to freeze both armies and the prohibition of new military concentration.

Peace talks began on 20 December at Brest-Litovsk. While the peace talks were in progress a "Decree No. 13" signed by Lenin and Stalin was issued (2). The decree could be summarized as an order to armed Armenian forces to take control of Turkish territories in the east and evacuate the area.

Following the Armistice the Russian army was virtually dispersed and left the area to the Armenians. When the Ottomans found out about Decree No. 13 they moved their armies forward and regained Erzincan on 13 February and Trabzon on 24 February.

While the forward operation was continuing the peace agreement was signed on 3 March 1918. With this agreement Russia agreed to the pre-1877/78 War borders in the east and the evacuation of the area within 6-8 weeks.

In the mean time, as mentioned above, the United Transcaucasian Socialist Republic was founded on 23 February 1918 and declared its independence.

Following this development the commander of the eastern armies of the Ottoman Empire - Vehip Pasha invited the representatives of the newly created republic for talks to Trabzon. What he had in mind was no separate agreement with them but to establish good neighborly relations based on the principles agreed with the Russians.

The Caucasian delegation came to Trabzon on 8 March 1918. The Ottoman army was continuing its forward operation and continuing to regain territories left to them under the Brest-Litovsk Agreement.

The Armenians and to some extent the Georgians did not want to accept the provisions of the Brest-Litovsk Agreement. They thought that they could stop the Ottoman offense by force. For this end, the Armenian National Parliament convened in Gümrü (Alexandropol) in April and took the decision to continue to the war.

The advancing Ottomans retook Erzurum on 12 March, Sankamış on 5 April, Van on 7 April, Batumi on 14 April and finally Kars on 25 April. When Kars was retaken by the Ottomans the Caucasian Republic Parliament convened and agreed to accept the provisions of the Brest-Litovsk Agreement and new talks began on 11 May in Batumi.

Peace talks started in Batumi but the war was still in progress. In order to counter the British forces in Iran, the Yakup Şevki Pasha forces asked on 14 May the Gümrü-Culfa road to be cleared. When he could not receive any reply to his request he occupied Gümrü and defeated the Armenians by Karakilise.

Disagreements over accepting peace or continuing to the war among the

Caucasian republics; Georgians' flirts with the Germans and Azerbaijan's consistent objection to the continuation of the war resulted in the disintegration of the republic on 26 May. The same day Georgia and Azerbaijan declared their independence as Armenia followed them on 28 May.

Following the last two battles the Armenians were compelled to ask for peace and consequently a peace agreement was signed on 4 July 1918 in Batumi. Accordingly, Nakhichevan was left to the Ottomans and thus contiguity with Azerbaijan was established.

While the war with the Caucasian states came to an end WW I was still continuing. In Batumi the Ottomans promised the Armenians to assist them to make peace with the other Central Powers. For this reason, whether at the Sèvres or Lausanne talks Aharonian and Hadisyan which surfaced as representatives of independent Armenia were accepted to the Ottoman court and met with Sultan Vahdettin on 6 September. Aharonian's telegram dated 9 September 1918 about his encounter with the Sultan to Kachaznuni, the then-Prime Minister of independent Armenia is quite significant.

Hikmet Bayur's aforementioned book provides the full text of the telegram on p. 250. An excerpt of the telegram reads :

"Following the Sultan's Friday procession to the mosque we met the Sultan on 6 September (...). We expressed that the Armenian nation will never forget the fact that it was the Ottoman government who first contemplated the foundation of an independent Armenia and that the Armenian government will do everything in its power to keep and upgrade good relations between the two countries".

The Ottoman Empire which was defeated in WW I signed the Mondros Armistice on 30 October 1918. The Ottomans agreed to withdraw to pre-war borders with the Armistice. The territories from which the Ottomans withdrew in the east were first occupied by the British. Later, the British transferred these territories to Armenia and Georgia.

We accept the date of 19 May 1919 as the beginning of the history of the Turkish Republic and the National Liberation Struggle. Therefore, in the real sense Turco-Armenian relations should be examined after this date.

Unfortunately, this period between the two countries was marked by war. The Batumi Peace Agreement and the subsequent declarations of Armenian delegations which came to Istanbul were soon forgotten and abandoned. Armenia engaged in hit-and-run operations against Turks, not only at territories left to them by the British but also at the border villages which were on Turkish territory.

The Paris Conference which convened to determine peace provisions with the Central Powers, was trying to carve out an independent Armenia on the territory which was formerly left to the Russians via secret agreements. However, the Bolshevik Russians were not interested in such deals and abandoned the area (3).

I am not going to dwell on the details of this period. I am only going to give one example of information conveyed by the Armenians to the Paris Peace Conference while Armenian border offenses were continuing.

Aharonian who was mentioned earlier was sent to the peace conference in Paris to represent Armenia. His letter to the French Prime Minister Clémenceau dated 11 September 1919 reads :

"Mustafa Kemal's regular armies and Turkish Tatar bands have begun to encircle the Armenian Republic. Our forces had to evacuate the Nakhichevan vilayet following bloody battles. Mustafa Kemal's two divisions are attacking Sankamış and Kağızman. Due to the Turkish offense Armenians in Kars and emigré Armenians in the area are fleeing toward Yerevan. It is only a matter of time before the Turks occupy this area." (4)

Lieutenant-General James G. Harbord who was assigned to examine the possibility of an American mandate over Armenia on the ground arrived to Erzurum 15 days after the writing of this letter. The general's report which can be found at the U.S. Senate archives under the title **"Report of the American Military Mission to Armenia" (No. 266)** includes the following :

"... We received disturbing reports about organized Turkish raids along the former Turkish-Russian border well before our departure from France. We traveled along the Turkish border from the Black Sea coast to Iran but have not seen anything that could confirm those reports. The Turkish army is not located along the border. Its structure has a thin framework; the country reflects the lack of both military and civilian human resources."

It is obvious that both of these excerpts can not be true.

The Mondros Armistice did not include Istanbul in the regions that were to be occupied. However, on 16 March 1920 the Entente Powers occupied Istanbul. On 20 August 1920 the Sèvres Treaty became public. This treaty, which left a tiny part of Anatolia to the Turks and envisaged an independent Armenia was accepted by the Istanbul government but was totally rejected by the Ankara government. Aharonian also signed the Sèvres Treaty.

To curb Armenian raids decisively the Ankara government acted only after the news of the Sèvres Treaty and started the Eastern Operation on 28 September 1920.

Kachaznuni who was mentioned earlier wrote about this operation :

"... We were not afraid of war because we knew that we could win. Just as ignorant and inexperienced men would exhibit insensitivity we had no idea about Turkish power and no measures were taken on the border. Contrary, as if we were throwing down gloves we occupied Oltu. We were the ones who wanted war. While the war had begun along the border, the Turks proposed to negotiate peace. We rejected it as if it was insignificant. (...) The war resulted with our decisive defeat. Our army which was well-fed, well-equipped and well-dressed did not combat and constantly withdrew, it left its positions, emptied their guns and dispersed to the villages".

The Turks signed a peace agreement with the Armenians on 3 November 1920 who were now asking for peace. Turkey thus retook areas from which it had previously withdrawn due to the Mondros Armistice. The Entente Powers which were trying to found an independent Armenia did not move their fingers.

When Soviet Russia and Turkey signed the Moscow Agreement on 16 March 1921, Russia asked Turkey to sign a new agreement with the Caucasian Republics. Hence, Turkey's current borders were confirmed on 13 October 1921 through the Kars Agreement. I also would like to quote the Armenian Foreign Minister Muravyan who spoke at the beginning of the Kars Conference as follows :

"We are not here with enmity and we are not here to bring disputed matters which were inherited from nationalistic governments. We do not have such an aim. No, what is occupying our minds are not those matters and not hostile feelings. We are only admiring the courageous struggle of the persevering Turkish community. We have a sincere desire (intentions) and we certainly believe that a people who is determined to defend its homeland will be victorious while its enemies will be defeated".

As indicated Turkey signed three peace agreements with independent Armenia; first on 4 June 1918, second on 3 November 1920 and the third agreement was signed on 12 October 1921. While the first two agreements are invalid the third still remains in force.

Despite the Kars Peace Agreement, Aharonian and Hadisyan asked to participate in the Lausanne Conference. Although this request was not accepted neither Armenia nor the Soviet Union reacted to this refusal.

Until 1990 occasionally some Armenian claims were forwarded but as Armenian independence came to an end these were contemplated as being motivated by the Soviets and therefore not deemed within the realm of Turco-Armenian relations.

THE SECOND PERIOD

The Armenian Parliament took the independence decision on 23 August 1990. Armenia also organized a referendum on independence on 21 September 1991. The turn-out rate was % 95 and % 99.31 of voters supported Armenian independence.

When Armenia first declared independence during its short first period the first state to recognize its independence was the Ottoman Empire. I am not sure which state recognized Armenia's independence first this time but Turkey recognized Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia on 16 December 1991.

Armenia was in a difficult economic situation when it declared independence. Turkey delivered various kinds of humanitarian aid to Armenia. The wheat demand of the Armenian people was supplied by Turkey for some time. Turkey showed all kinds of convenience to foreign assistance which passed through or over Turkey. Armenia was invited by Turkey as founding member to the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization on 25 June 1992. Indeed, even the transfer of energy to Armenia was discussed.

However, Armenia's approach to the Karabakh conflict has obstructed the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Later Armenia's active participation in military operations in Karabakh and the occupation of the Kelbejar area proved to be counterproductive to Turkey's efforts to develop cordial relations with Armenia.

Turkey announced in April 1993 that it will not allow its territory to be used for any kind of shipments (including humanitarian assistance) directed to Armenia. Because, Turkey believed that all shipments to Armenia were aiding Armenia's war efforts in Azerbaijan and Karabakh.

On 12 May 1994 a cease-fire was signed between Azerbaijan and Armenia. As it appeared to hold in Karabakh and some constructive developments occurred in the Minsk Group a new air of optimism came about.

Following these developments Turkey consulted Azerbaijan and decided to re-open air corridor H-50 which connects Turkish air space to Armenia and international air traffic.

Undoubtedly, apart from the Azerbaijan and Karabakh conflicts the most significant element in Turco-Armenian relations is the historical heritage.

The author, who devoted long years to the research of history and particularly diplomatic history staunchly defends his belief that history can neither be denied nor distorted.

I do not know how many people are still alive who experienced what Ar-

menians call "genocide" and Turks "rebellion or treason to the fatherland, or as sometimes referred to the Turkish massacre. However, during that period and following it numerous books, memoirs were published in many languages. Most importantly official state archives of states who were in various degrees related to the matter are at the disposal of researchers. If desired, mass graves of murdered Turks at territories occupied by Russians and Armenians during WW I are still at place and can be located.

History can be distorted for a short period of time but such forging would not hold for long. It is extremely disastrous to distort history. For instance, an "Ems Telegram" brought about war between Germany and France in 1870. But it is inevitable that the truth will finally be revealed.

Today it is a commonly agreed upon fact that it were missionaries who came to convert Gregorian Armenians in Turkey who sowed the seeds of hatred. Even British authors declared that in order to get the U.S. to enter the war by the side of the United Kingdom, books published by the Masterman Bureau founded in London during WW I were based on false and distorted stories. It is public knowledge that due to this blatant propaganda effort some still think that Turks are black-skinned. The massacre claim is one of these inventions of the imagination.

However, all of this is history. If interstate relations were to be based only on history, then all nations on this planet would be in an endless feud and state of war.

Despite the distressing events that took place, in Turkey and among Turks there is no unforgettable hatred or any revived revanchism against Armenians or an independent Armenia. Armenians living in Turkey are living proof of this fact.

The author sincerely believes that those who continue to exploit the emotions of diaspora Armenians and some Armenian circles in Armenia are not Armenians but rather states who have an interest in troubling Turkey.

In addition, although they no longer have a role in the exploitation of Armenian emotions, some great states, which appear to support anti-Turkish claims, have pages of history which involve much more serious and less forgivable guilt. Knowing these crucial facts, their blaming of Turkey can only be explained by domestic politics concerns. Until now, Armenians have not benefited from the domestic politics games of such countries and they will not do so in the future.

The reason for opting for such a long introduction which explained how

unproblematic Armenians used to live in the Ottoman Empire until the Reformation Declaration was just this.

As far as I have been observing, Armenian President Ter Petrosyan and his Armenian National Movement base their approach to Turco-Armenian relations on current facts rather than on the pages of history. This approach also reflects Armenia's desire to develop Armenian independence without the bastion of a third state based on the principles of mutual interest and respect.

There is no need to underline that this is an extremely wise and correct attitude. It is impossible to argue that the Dashnak Party's view which claims that "Armenian independence can only be materialized with the inclusion of all Armenian lands and only through the support of a third state" and the activities of like-minded diaspora Armenians will bring happiness and Presence to Armenia, that it will contribute to the development of Armenia.

Therefore I thought that banning the Dashnak Party in 1994 was a truly right decision for the account of Armenia.

I also recognize that Armenia's declaration that it will not be a refuge for the PKK, its sentencing of Turkish secessionists who were trying to smuggle arms into Turkey as a continuation of these wise policies.

There is nothing more natural than the establishment of close and secure relations between two neighboring countries. I hope that Turco-Armenian relations will soon come to this stage.

23 November 1995

Dipnotlar:

1. Erenya Çelebi Kömürçyan, *İstanbul Tarihi, XVII. Asırda İstanbul*, Translated by Hrand D. Andreasyan, I.U. Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınları No. 506, Kutulmuş Basımevi 1952]
2. For original text see Y. Hikmet Bayur *Türk İnkılap Tarihi III*, section 4, Ankara, TTK Yayınları, 1982, p. 121
3. The events of these days can be examined in further detail by reading the works of Kazım Karabekir Pasha's "*İstiklal Harbimiz*" (Our Liberation War), British major in charge of following the implementation of the Armistice provisions A. Rawlinson's "*The Adventures in the Near East*" and the American military intelligence officer of the U.S. Istanbul Consulate Robert Dunn's "*World Alive*".
4. (The original of this letter is in official French archives *AAEF-Levant 1918-29 (Arménie)*, Volume 7, folio 99)

NATO'S ENLARGEMENT RUSSIA AND TURKEY

Olga BEKAR

With the dissolution of the USSR and the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, the existence and functions of international security organizations which were established after the Second World War became a debatable issue. Against the hot conflicts in the Middle East, Caucasus and Europe emerging after the Cold War (i.e., wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Nagorno-Karabakh and in the Persian Gulf), such organizations as NATO and the UN that succeeded to protect the international security and stability for forty years were inefficient. Hence, NATO as the basic European security organization was forced to transform its fundamental purpose of existence and to change its structures. Within this framework, the discussions on NATO's enlargement towards the East became the basis of the central debate on the new European security architecture.(1)

NATO, in 1949, was primarily established to keep the Russians out of Europe, the Americans in it and Germany under control. As a result of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Germany's integration into the European Union after its re-unification, NATO lost a considerable part of its purposes of existence. Nevertheless, the Alliance still has two important tasks: the preservation of post-Cold War European balance of powers and regional stability; and the continuation of the presence of the United States within the continent. NATO is facing within this new period three important problems to be resolved primarily:

- a) to contribute to the preservation of stability between Germany and Russia in the region;
- b) to resolve newly emerging conflicts and crises in Europe.
- c) To continue with the American military presence.(2)

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To provide regional stability between Germany and Russia, Western officials, especially Americans forwarded the idea of NATO's enlargement.(3) The basic rationale of that idea is the protection of stability in Eastern and Central Europe and preparation against possible aggression from the East. The first initiative materialized by the establishment of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) which, in fact, is open to all European countries. Its basic duty was to serve as a forum of cooperation where security problems of post-Cold War Europe were supposed to be handled. Indeed, NACC have had a great contribution to the establishment of a dialogue among countries having different political regimes for forty years by realizing meetings, seminars, visits and courses. As a result of this experience, the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program was developed at the NATO Summit in January 1994.

PfP is an initiative aiming at strengthening relations among Eastern and Central European countries, CSCE members and NATO and at contributing to the development of security and stability at the whole of Europe. The main part of cooperation has been realized in the military sphere. Besides this, however, it has also targeted to strengthen the ability of joint actions.(4) Additionally, PfP helps the member countries of the Alliance to clarify their stances on the issue of NATO's enlargement.

11 of 27 countries that signed the PfP applied to NATO for full membership. However, it is very difficult for NATO to admit these countries without losing its basic mission. During its life of 46 years, only 4 countries were accepted to the Alliance. Moreover, due to the expenditures that these countries will have to make to reach NATO standards and obligations because of full membership, the admittance can be quite problematic.(5)

On 28 September 1995, NATO published a report on the enlargement of the Alliance that had proven that the member countries were absolutely in support of enlargement.(6) However, the report could not make clear why the Alliance should enlarge. While stipulations that possible members would have to fulfill were noted, questions like who would be admitted and when remained unclear.

In most of the research until today, the main points of enlargement have been focused on Russia's reaction. However, this is an issue relevant to the peoples and parliaments of member countries of NATO, on the one hand, and the statesmen and peoples of Eastern and Central European countries that applied for full membership, on the other. The subject matter is of particular interest to Russia, the United States and Germany because of their stat-

us in the international arena. That the discussions on this initiative are merely limited to Russia's reaction, will lead to some misleading consequences on and possible results of enlargement.

NATO'S ENLARGEMENT IS A STEP IN THE WRONG DIRECTION (7)

The notion of a cooperation area stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok is a wrong one. The signs of divisions new of the East and the West are appearing today. While the newly emerging democracies of Eastern Europe and the Baltics are moving toward the West, the former Soviet republics are pulled toward Moscow. Considering that fact, a new European security system has to be established. Problems in the spheres of social security, migration, economic welfare, environmental issues, unemployment, the spread of nuclear, chemical and high-tech conventional weapons are common to all Europeans. NATO alone, is not an answer to these problems. Not only foreign and national defense ministers, but also ministers of health, social security and environment should be included to this process. This, however, requires the involvement of the European Union because this type of an embracing consultation can be best provided within that organization.(8)

NATO enlargement, on the other hand, may feed into Russian anxiety that the West is trying to dominate its former foe. As a result, Russia may opt to increase its defense expenditures and the role of the military may become much more influential within the Russian political spectrum. Cooperation which is essential in the improvement of non-proliferation and conventional agreements may become burdensome. Moreover, due to the increasing influence of military-industrial complex, Russia may increase its weapons production.

Insisting on both NATO enlargement and disarmament will merely mean strengthening Russians' perception that the West signifies a military threat to their country.(9)

The discussions on which country should be admitted has the potential to divide the Alliance. Because admission decisions require unanimous approval of member countries, the admission of new members can lead to some political considerations and, at the final stage, may result in the rejection of some memberships.

All countries of Central / Eastern Europe may want to enter the Alliance. Therefore, enlargement may not be limited to three or four new members. If

NATO approves the membership of these three countries (Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic), the Alliance may find itself involved in ethnic-conflicts which may bring in one or more future allies in Central Europe. On the other hand, none of these states have common boundaries with Russia nor are under a direct, actual threat from Moscow. According to the ceilings of the CFE, Russia has located the great part of its forces in the East of the Ural Mountains. Western defense and intelligence experts believe that currently Russia does not have the capability to launch an attack against the West. Russia can only reach this capability within one year which is sufficient enough for NATO members to take the necessary measures. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are down-sizing their armed forces today and none of them bought any military equipment last year. This is not typical of a country that perceives a military threat to its survival(10). Moreover, these countries have consultative committees provided either by the NACC or PfP program. The admission of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and may be of Slovakia during the first stage, means exclusion of Rumania, Bulgaria, the republics of the former Yugoslavia, Albania, Moldova and Ukraine. This means a new division in Europe. Additionally, countries admitted to membership may be willing to use their membership to further their national causes (i.e. via their right to veto) in any dispute with a previously problematic neighbor - now a non-member of NATO. Consequently, two blocs will emerge: one group consisting of states newly admitted to the Alliance and another group of states sandwiched between an unhappy Russia and the former(11).

What will NATO gain from the membership of these countries? Objectively speaking, not much. The admission of Central European countries to NATO could effect the structure of the Alliance. Issues like command and control mechanisms, equipment, training and language could cause important problems on the conduct of joined operations between NATO and the former members of the Eastern Bloc. Moreover, these admissions could damage the functionality and standardization of the Alliance based on its 40 years of experience. Such difficulties could be overcome at high costs but only in considerable time(12).

How will the necessary costs be met if these states join NATO? The cost of enlargement is estimated around \$ 20-50 billion(13). Rand expert R. Asmus argues that the expense of the admission of the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Slovakia will be around 40 billion \$. A similar study conducted by the Budget Committee of the U.S. Congress stated that enlargement during 1996-

2010 will cost \$ 60.6-124.7 billion(14). Considering the difficult economic conditions these countries are facing today, the costs of admission to NATO membership demands a significant amount of self-sacrifice.

The decisions on NATO enlargement require unanimity of 16 member countries. Thereafter, the admission should also be ratified by the parliaments. This is a long process. Greece's admission to WEU lasted about two-and-a-half years. Moreover, it will be quite difficult to achieve a 2/3 majority in the U.S. Senate(15). Indeed, it is unclear whether there is a consensus about enlargement among member countries. Norway, for example opposes it. Norwegian generals said that NATO should not expand at the expense of Russian reaction which will be detrimental to the Alliance(16). This illustrates that some of the member countries may oppose security assurances given to Central/Eastern European countries because of their unstable future.

The development of relations between NATO and Russia is more significant than enlargement and should not be sacrificed for the sake of enlargement.(17) Reliable NATO-Russian cooperation is essential for the establishment of a common security structure in the European continent. Russia and North Atlantic Alliance have to cooperate in handling the problems confronting European security as if the non-proliferation agreements(18).

During the Bosnian crisis NATO-Russian cooperation within the framework of IFOR indicated how effective such joint action could be in resolving disagreements among Eastern / Central European countries. Hence, NATO enlargement is not the only option.

NATO EXPANSION AND REGIONAL COUNTRIES

Germany is the first country to benefit from a possible NATO expansion. In NATO-candidate countries such as the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Slovakia, German is spoken, although in variable degrees. Throughout history these countries have been in Germany's sphere of influence. Under these circumstances, NATO expansion signifies a guarantee to the security of Germany because it will contribute to stability on its eastern borders. German defense minister Volker Ruhe clarified Bonn's stance on NATO's enlargement as follows (19):

"The opening of the Alliance to the East is in our vital interests. One does not have to be a strategic genius to understand this. I have often been surprised how little our debate on this issue has been guided by a clear analysis of German interests. A border of stability and security-unstable east of us but stable here, prosperity this side of the border,

poverty on the other—such a situation is not sustainable in the long run. It is for this reason that Germany's eastern border cannot be the eastern border of NATO and the EU. Either we will export stability or we will end up importing instability.

A survey about NATO expansion among leading German statesmen has indicated that 92 percent of the participants were in support of enlargement. (20) German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and foreign minister Klaus Kinkel, however, stressed their reservations about rapid NATO expansion (21). Contrary to the administration, German public opinion is divided on the issue. According to a public survey of June 1995, only 1/4th of the participants believe that German security needs would be met with enlargement while 37 percent of respondents fear it would mean increasing responsibilities for Germany. While 33 percent indicated they support enlargement, 25 percent was opposed to it. 42 percent of respondents remained undecided (22).

The Clinton administration forwarded the idea of NATO's enlargement and upheld it until today. (23) Indeed, the three concrete initiatives that provided the basis of expansion were accepted under the pressure of the United States: First, the PFP program in October 1993; second, the notion of enlargement at the NATO Summit in January 1994 and finally, the preparation of a NATO-initiated study about enlargement in December 1994. Nevertheless, a consensus could not be reached within the administration and among the experts whether the Alliance should enlarge. (24) Particularly American Democrats are opposed to the notion of expansion. (25)

One of the influential members of the American Congress, Sam Nunn has harshly criticized the idea of NATO enlargement. He stressed that not a single explanation could be made about why the American security umbrella should be extended up to East Europe until today. (26)

Supporters of NATO's enlargement in the administration and Congress are those who have been facing the pressure of ethnic lobbies such as the Czech, Polish and the Baltic lobbies. (27)

The Ukrainian foreign minister Hennadiy Udovenko stated that his country has not been opposed to NATO's enlargement unless the NACC and PFP are not sacrificed for rapid enlargement. (28)

The crucial question confronting European security in the 21st century is to find an appropriate place for a "European Russia" in the European security system. Discussions on NATO's enlargement towards the East, on the other hand, constitutes the basis of the new European security architecture. Rooted in Moscow's historical relationship with Europe, Russia fears to become iso-

lated from European security arrangements. Because Germany and the Soviet Union, the two great powers of the time were left outside, the post-World War I security system had lost its significance just after it was initiated. In relation to Russia's current situation, this failure of the past should not be repeated. France's admission to the European security system of post-1815, despite its defeat by the Napoleonic wars was one the reasons that that system had lasted so long.

If NATO's expansion causes a serious conflict between Russia and the West, this is going to be the biggest mistake of American foreign policy concerning Europe since the Second World War (29).

In August 1993, during his visit to Poland, Russian President Boris Yeltsin announced with his Polish counterpart Lech Walesa that the Russian Federation would not oppose Poland's admission to NATO. However, a month later, he informed Western leaders with a letter that Russia was against the enlargement (30).

Russians are opposing NATO's expansion due to strategic, as well as psychological reasons (31). Following the abandonment of communism, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the withdrawal of Russian soldiers and finally, switch to a market economy, Russians are curious to find an answer to the following question: What else wants the West us to do? (32) A famous foreign policy expert of Russia, Sergei Karaganov said: "In 1990, we were told quite clearly by the west that the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and German unification would not lead to NATO expansion. We did not demand written guarantees because in the euphoric atmosphere of that time it would have seemed almost indecent-like two girlfriends giving written promises not to seduce each other's husbands." (33). An officer of Border Guards made the following statement: "We have retreated a thousand miles without firing a shot, and you are still advancing. And all the while you accuse Russia of aggression. When are you going to stop? When Russia's frontier is in Ryazan" (34).

Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozirev announced that the two factors that will challenge democracy in Russia are economic collapse and NATO's enlargement. Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, on the other hand, stated that if NATO expands, they would reconsider their stance on the agreements concerning tactical nuclear weapons and START-II (35).

During the Bosnian crisis, worthy cooperation has been realized between the Russian Federation and NATO. According to the agreement signed between the two parties, Russia consented to join the international peacekeeping force, but Russian soldiers will not be under the direct command of NATO (36).

This cooperation may be a good example for future European security arrangements(37).

Russian reaction to a NATO-initiated study about enlargement stemmed from the fact that it had not clarified the deployment of nuclear weapons on the territories of would-be members of NATO. (38) Russia strongly opposes the deployment of such weapons close to its borders. Indeed, while Germany's membership to NATO after its reunification was recognized, the ban on the deployment of nuclear weapons and American forces on these territories was agreed upon. Moreover, the deployment of nuclear weapons on Scandinavian territory, namely Norway, Denmark and Iceland was prohibited during the Cold War.

According to some high rank Russian officials, if NATO guarantees not to line up its forces and military infrastructure along these territories, Russia will not oppose NATO expansion(39). Sergei Karaganov, a reknown Russian foreign policy expert, confirmed that the semi-military zone of 1.500 km between NATO and the Russian Federation is beneficial to Russia. Furthermore, he stressed that the needs of East European countries would be better served by the enlargement of EU, rather than NATO(40). NATO's expansion up to the western frontiers of Russia would simultaneously mean that anti-Western forces will gain influence within Russian society(41).

In the Summer of 1995 Russian experts prepared a study to determine Russian policy options vis-a-vis NATO enlargement(42). In this study, it is argued that NATO enlargement was put forward because of the West's inability to support Eastern Europe economically. If the Eastern Europeans would join NATO, the security considerations of these countries would be met at the expense of Russia's own security. Furthermore, it was underlined that by enlarging NATO a security system without Russia would be established, whereas without Russia and NATO no effective and proper security system could be established in Europe. It would be misleading to assume that NATO does not constitute a threat to Russia with its existing structure and that a Russia-NATO cooperation could develop as the Alliance expands.

Russian experts put forward the following policy options against a would-be NATO expansion while any of them will damage Western security(43):

- The transformation of CIS into a military alliance;
- The disapproval of START-II;
- Reconsideration of the military doctrine and foreign policy approach;
- The withdrawal from CFE (44).

In order to reach a climate of permanent cooperation with Russia, first, a network of bilateral relations between Russia and NATO should be expanded by exploiting all opportunities within the framework of PfP, rather than expanding NATO first. Such a development would be better in terms of European security considerations(45).

Unfortunately, the West could not clarify until today how Russia could strategically benefit from NATO's enlargement.(46)

With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the withdrawal of Soviet forces, Central and Eastern European countries have come to recognize their military insufficiency to protect their own borders. Military forces of these countries are, in fact, very small in scale. Furthermore, the increasing instability in neighboring countries, the war in the former Yugoslavia, as well as the rising number of immigrant workers and refugees in the region have had an impact on the application of these countries for memberships of Western security institutions, particularly of NATO. However, the basic problem these countries are confronted with today is not their security considerations, but their miserable economic conditions(47).

A public survey about NATO expansion, conducted by the United States Information Agency in 1995(48) has shown that many of the countries which applied for NATO membership were unwilling to fulfill the necessary conditions. Among them only Poland seemed to be determined to accomplish these stipulations, especially that of sending forces to defend other states. According to the survey, the possibility of popular approval for NATO membership in a referendum was very slim. In case of rejection, only Poland would feel itself ostracized from the West. Such surveys made clear that the obligations for NATO membership were not publicly discussed in these countries.

On the other hand, the surveys of OMRI and Eurobarometer of 1994 and 1995 confirm the arguments mentioned above. 35 percent of the participants from Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and the Czech Republic whom all signed agreements of partnership with the EU answered the question "Where do you see the future of your country?" as within the EU. Due to the obvious economic advantages, both for Central and Eastern Europe, there is a favorable tendency toward the EU, rather than NATO. 1/3rd of the public and more than half of the elite have stated that their country would never join NATO, while only 1/3rd of both think that the membership could be realized within ten years(49).

The main problematic in these countries became related to what extent ci-

vilian, democratic control they will be able to establish on their own armed forces. Inter-state tensions and bilateral problems as well as ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes are other factors that can shadow the stability in the region. Among Hungary, Romania and Slovakia, there are disagreements over minority rights. There is a territorial dispute among Ukraine and Romania. A considerable amount of Russians live in the Baltics. Russia and the Baltic states have also some territorial disputes. Furthermore, some Western specialists argue that the Baltic states are not in a position to defend themselves against Russia. Bulgarian authorities believe, instead of NATO, cooperation with the Russian Federation is much more beneficial for Sofia. Due to important internal problems, Albania has not been able to become a candidate for the PFP program. Belarus is opposed to NATO membership. Ukraine and Moldova have preferred to remain neutral concerning the enlargement issue. Romania faces substantial ethnic and territorial disputes with neighboring countries. Slovakia has some internal problems and the ruling elite is uncertain about NATO membership. Unlike Poland and Slovakia, Hungary has not common borders with a NATO member, hence, its membership is partly tied to Slovakian and Slovenian membership(50).

The second anxiety regarding the membership of Central and Eastern European countries is related to whether these countries could raise their defense capacities up to NATO standards. The cost of modernizing the Polish defense structure is very high. Poland's annual defense expense is \$ 4.8 billion. Warsaw spends \$ 1.5 billion to develop its defensive infrastructure. As of the year 2000, Poland's defense expenditure will make up 3 percent of its GDP. Furthermore, capital investment is expected to increase from 12 percent to 30 percent. Such targets are very impressive, but to reach them, first inflation has to be reduced approximately to 20 percent and second, the miserable defense infrastructure has to be improved(52). In addition, civilian control over the military is far from complete in Poland. From a military point of view, Poland's admission to NATO means guaranteeing East German security, hence, it will be in the interest of united Germany(53).

The central question regarding the Czech Republic is, despite its capacity to do so, whether it is going to pay the price for membership. With a rate of 7.5 percent inflation and a budget surplus, the Czech Republic spends annually \$ 1 billion, in other words, 2.5 percent of its GDP, for its defense. This ratio is one of the lowest of Europe. The Czech army consists of only 65,000. The problems Czechs have been facing since the end of the Cold War are or-

ganized crime and mass immigration but they cannot be solved merely by military means(54).

CONCLUSION

As an alternative to NATO's enlargement, the West may offer membership to the Western European Union (WEU) which, in fact, is effectively serving as Europe's own defense institution and as the European pillar of the North Atlantic Alliance. Additionally, WEU functions as a forum of political cooperation and of security discussions with Central and Eastern European countries(55). Indeed, these countries have also applied for EU membership and Moscow announced that it would not oppose WEU's expansion(56). It is of crucial importance that WEU offers a much stronger security guarantee than the fifth clause of the Washington Agreement to its members(57).

Hans van den Broek who is responsible of EU's relations with Eastern European and former Soviet countries stressed that the admission of such countries as the Czech Republic and Poland to NATO before the EU would cause some problems. According to his opinion, the rational way to embark on is their initial admission to the EU, to be followed by their membership to NATO(58). In any case, the membership to EU will contribute to the membership of NATO without creating further divisions in Europe.

Instead of NATO, membership to EU will be the most important external factor that will shape the internal developments of these countries. EU membership will contribute to regional stability during a period of political and economic transformation and will impede the emergence of an anti-Western type of nationalism. Admission to EU will automatically provide WEU membership(59). Thus, these states will get security guarantees from major European states which, at the same time, are leading NATO members.

To provide stability in Central and Eastern Europe, WEU has more means at its disposal than NATO. NATO is not able to handle political and economic problems of ethnic origin. By reducing trade restrictions and offering economic aid, the EU can contribute to their economic developments and thus, may be able to prevent ethnic conflict in East Europe(60).

Instead of NATO, the enlargement of the EU which can make the WEU more effective; strengthening the operational cooperation between NATO and WEU; and, finally, the creation of a special relationship between the Russian Federation and NATO will be a more appropriate security strategy for the European continent(61). Stability in Europe cannot be preserved merely by the

admission of a few Eastern European countries either to NATO or to EU. Indeed, European security depends on Russia's position within the European security system and the preservation of the United States as a military power on the continent(62).

IMPLICATIONS FOR TURKEY

Turkey has been a reliable NATO member - forward wing country on NATO's southern flank against Soviet expansionism. Throughout the Cold War, Turkey's military relations and security policies, except the Cyprus intervention in 1974, were shaped within the framework of NATO, in other words in line with Western and American policies. After 1991, however, Turkey was no more able to formulate its foreign relations according to the norms of the bipolar international system. Contrary to Western European countries, its security needs have been enormously increasing. Within this new period, the country faced considerable security challenges emanating from the Balkans, the Caucasus, as well as from the Middle East (as the Gulf War, the developments in Northern Iraq, the war in Nagorno-Karabakh between Azerbaijan and Armenia, aggressive and hostile policies of Greece and Syria and the war in Bosnia.)

Furthermore, Turkey was left outside the European integration process of the post-Cold War era. Its application for full membership seems to be quite unrealistic because it has been excluded from EU expansion plans. Instead of full membership, Turkey was nominated for associate membership to the WEU. Subsequently, the only international organization in which Turkey has had an effective role, and is a full member of, in Europe is NATO. NATO signifies an indispensable security organization in an era of increasing regional instabilities for Turkey. The allocation of NATO resources for enlargement expenditures, the impairment of command and control structures established in 40 years, and mutual security guarantees to countries having bilateral and inter-state problems are not desirable developments for Turkey.

Turkey's thesis should rest on supporting the enlargement of the EU and WEU, namely the inclusion of Central / East European countries. It is in Turkey's interest that institutions to which it is not a full member and will not become a full member in the foreseeable future (EU and WEU) spend their resources for enlargement processes. It will be beneficial for Turkey to become one of the few countries not to be included in these institutions in Europe. Due to its geopolitic location, Turkey would feel less alienated in the event of an

aforementioned EU and WEU enlargement. Because, in expanded Europe, the West cannot afford to alienate Turkey. Furthermore, Turkey's northern neighbor, Russia, too, is opposed to the enlargement of NATO. If Turkish policy approximates Moscow's line, the implications of this proximity might be the improvement of Turco-Russian relations which have been, contrary to economic relations, somewhat cool. In comparison with the Cold War era, post-Cold War relations between the Russian Federation and Turkey have gained a special significance for Ankara. The emergence of a new division in Europe where Russia would find itself on the opposite side, would not serve Turkey's interests. Western concessions given to Russia in exchange of NATO expansion should not allow Russia to act as it wishes in its *near abroad* or to exceed CFE limits. Such concessions will be detrimental to Turkey's national security interests. All in all, unless Turkey obtains full membership to the EU and WEU, NATO's enlargement is contrary to Turkey's interests(63).

Footnotes:

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10. Michael E.Brown, "The Flawed Logic of NATO Expansion", **Survival**, Vol.37, No.1, Spring

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11. Jonathan Dean, "Losing Russia or Keeping NATO: Must We Choose", **Arms Control Today**, June 1995.
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Ukraine Under Kuchma

The Politics of Balance, Decisiveness and Reform

"Ukraine"

Suat KINIKLIOĞLU

means borderland, and indeed Ukraine has been a borderland for much of this millennium. (1) Despite the fact that Ukraine has not fully rooted itself in our maps of consciousness this young country is one of the most significant actors in Eurasia and will continue to be so. Ukraine has successfully completed its first democratic transition of power through the presidential elections of 1994. Since the election of Leonid Kuchma as president important developments have taken place in Ukraine's relations with Russia, its security policy and economy. This article will examine developments in the aforementioned areas following the election of President Kuchma.

RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA

A CRITICAL JUNCTURE AT UKRAINE'S INDEPENDENCE

The first aim of Ukrainian foreign policy was "to put Ukraine as an independent actor under international law on the global map." (2) The greatest threat to Ukraine's legitimacy in the international arena is its old big brother and new neighbor - Russia. The emphasis on sovereignty and "inviolability of borders" in Ukrainian foreign policy stems from Moscow's inability and unwillingness to digest Ukrainian independence. "I have many friends in top positions in Moscow" says Andrei Makarenko, Ukraine's deputy foreign minister, "After the third glass of vodka they always ask me the same question : what do you need this independence for ?" (3)

"Russian policy makers across the political spectrum ... cannot resist the temptation to treat Ukrainian independence as a temporary aberration. In fact, Russia's ambassador to Kiev went so far as to urge East Europeans not to invest in embassies in Kiev since those will soon again be

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consulates in a unified state." (4)

The emergence of an independent Ukraine is a blow to the Russian national self-image, and, indeed perhaps the largest contributor to the crisis of identity that is befalling Russia. (5) "Alexander Solzhenitsyn, by no means on the extreme right of Russian politics, described Russia's borders with Ukraine and Kazakhstan as *Leninist folly* which should be redrawn. The tearing off of Belarus and Ukraine from us is just the same division of Germany after the war...Historically, it must not endure", Solzhenitsyn argued." (6)

In order to understand the Russian *idée fixe* and Russian perceptions of Ukraine it is necessary to open a parentheses here. As Ilya Prizel of Johns Hopkins University rightly noted Ukrainian independence poses three main threats to Russia's ethnonational identity. First of all, the Russian Empire (at least in its Slavic context) is a part of the Russian national identity. To concede that Kyiv (Kiev), 'Russia's mother city', 'Yaroslav the Wise,' and so on are all foreign entities is a loss of national symbols difficult to assimilate under the best of circumstances. (7) Second, the loss of Ukraine and Belarus and hence the physical removal of Russia from the European mainstream is a severe blow to Russia's self-image. Finally, since many, even among the elite in Russia, only vaguely differentiate between Ukraine and other parts of Russia, the secession of Ukraine is perceived as a harbinger to further disintegration of the Russian Federation, especially in regions where the population is non-Slavic and the potential for greater economic progress outside the federation is great. (8)

"It is due to the psychological impact of this baggage that Russian policy toward Ukraine is not a "realpolitik" policy toward a neighboring country of fifty-two million and an important trading partner. (9)

What about Ukrainian perceptions toward Russia ? Undoubtedly, Ukrainian perceptions and tensions have been shaped by the past. Alexander J. Motyl's following remarks eloquently explain the psychological dimension of Ukrainian perceptions :

"Ukrainians have an overwhelming preoccupation - Russia. It is their foremost foreign policy concern, and their primary source of negative identity. Indeed, for most Ukrainians, it is their major, if not only, problem. So powerful an obsession has deep historical roots. For several hundred years Ukraine has been the colony and Russia, the empire; Ukraine, the province, and Russia, the metropolis; Ukraine, the countryside, and Russia, the city; Ukraine the borderland, and Russia, the center. Ukraine has traditionally defined itself with reference to, and against, Russia : Ukraine is that which Russia is not." (10) (italics added)

As Russia's political spectrum moved toward a more nationalist/neo-imperial direction after 1993 tensions between Kyiv and Moscow increased. In addition, the inability to sign a friendship and cooperation agreement between Ukraine and Russia after four years of Ukrainian independence deprived the two countries from a foundation on which relations could be based. Following the election of President Kuchma many analysts predicted that Ukraine would move closer to Moscow. Contrary to Moscow's, and the world's expectation for that matter, Kuchma did not prove to be as pro-Moscow as was previously claimed. Although Kuchma is a more suitable president than Kravchuk from a Russian point-of-view, it has been a mistake to project Kuchma as "pro-Russian" during the election campaign. (12) After all, Kuchma has to take into account that the intelligentsia in Kyiv and the foreign ministry is more pro-Western and pro-European rather than pro-Eurasian. (13) Igor Turyanskiy, Ukraine's ambassador to Ankara elaborated on the matter:

"As you know Kuchma won the elections on a pro-Russian ticket. But now a lot of political observers are happy that he did not fulfill his promises given both to the Ukrainian people and the international community." (14)

During the Kravchuk era Russian-Ukrainian relations oscillated for long between a state of "a dangerous security vacuum with the potential for conflict" and "an uneasy post-colonial relationship as exists between London and Dublin." (15) However, with the election of President Kuchma Russo-Ukrainian relations moved onto a more realistic plane. Kuchma's policies reflect his understanding of domestic dynamics and balances and he has been able to reflect his domestic successes to relations with Moscow. With the support of a more receptive international community Kuchma has been able to formulate prudent policies which are less decorated with flashy anti-Moscow statements typical of the Kravchuk era. While showing willingness to move toward more integration with Russia and the CIS, Kuchma underlined his opposition to political and military integration. In short, Ukraine is willing to remain within the CIS "as long as it can take advantage of a common market and does not take any responsibility." (16) This is because Kyiv's intelligentsia believes that they "have the historic opportunity to become a pro-Western non-imperial Slavic state in Central Europe". (17)

Relations with Russia have been evolving around the issues of the inviolability of Ukraine's borders, the future of Crimea, Russians in Ukraine, the Black Sea Fleet and Kyiv's energy debts to Moscow. Particularly, the inability to sign a friendship and cooperation agreement that would confirm the in-

violability of Ukraine's borders has proven to be a major stumbling-block between the two states. Talks in 1992 ended unsuccessfully and broke off due to disagreements over the issues of dual citizenship and land claims. President Yeltsin's planned visits to Kyiv were canceled at numerous times due to disagreements over the wording of the agreement. (Yeltsin's last visit to Kyiv - planned for April 1996 was also postponed to an undetermined date) Hence, the general framework of bilateral relations could not be shaped. Also, Ukraine's increasing inability to pay its energy debts brought about tensions in bilateral relations as Kyiv became extremely troubled when Moscow leveled gas prices with world prices.

Ukraine and Russia finally were able to initial a friendship and cooperation agreement in February 1995. (18) Although touchy issues such as dual citizenship, the leasing period for Sevastopol and Kyiv's energy debts were not addressed, the agreement's wording on the issues of "territorial unity" and "inviolability of borders" were on Ukrainian terms. Although, the treaty was dismissed as premature by some analysts, the real significance of the treaty lies in halting the further deterioration of relations between the two countries. (19) Also, with this agreement, it appears that the Russian leadership recognized a new status quo in its relationship with Ukraine. (20) As Yuri Sergeyev spokesman for the Ukrainian foreign ministry indicated in January 1996; "Russia has come to realize that Ukraine's movement towards independent development is irreversible." (21)

THE BLACK SEA FLEET

There is no other issue between Kyiv and Moscow that caused more tension than the Black Sea Fleet problem. Ukrainian Vice Prime Minister Marchuk stressed in November 1994 that the fleet issue constitutes the most important obstacle facing the signing of a friendship and cooperation agreement between the two countries. (22) This is primarily because the fleet issue is more about the recognition of Ukraine's independence, the Crimean problem and Russia's strategic position in the Black Sea than the actual division of the fleet. Among else the Crimean problem is inextricably interwoven with the fleet issue and therefore is the most difficult to be solved. Ukraine's former Defense Minister Radetskiy's following remarks attest to the complexity. "If the question of the Black Sea Fleet were resolved, according to Radetskiy, it would defuse the Crimean crisis by half." (23) Indeed, "the tragi-comic saga of the rusting Black Sea Fleet with it tussles over flags, oaths and lines of command,

has been, from the start one which had little to do with military requirements and much to do with political prestige." (24) As the fighting history of the fleet ended in the 1853-1856 Crimean War, it would be difficult to construct a convincing military rationale on strategic grounds for the CIS or Russia to have a large fleet in the Black Sea, an area of dubious global of maritime importance. (25) "Consequently, initial claims by the CIS High Command that the Black Sea Fleet was required to counter the American Sixth Fleet or NATO in the Mediterranean Sea smacked more of traditional cold war rhetoric than any real basis in contemporary strategic thinking." (26) At heart, of the fleet issue is Russia's desire to get a strategic foothold in the Crimea. "It should not be forgotten that most of the Soviet conventional forces on Ukrainian territory - up to three-quarters of a million men at the time of independence - were divided up by Moscow and Kyiv with surprisingly little friction in the first half of 1992." (27)

At the beginning of the fleet issue both sides claimed respectively to be the sole owner of the fleet. With the 1992 Yalta Agreement the two sides decided to put the fleet under dual command (Russian & Ukrainian) instead of CIS command until its final division in 1995. In June 1993 Yeltsin and Kravchuk agreed to a % 50-50 division of the fleet but this agreement was immediately shadowed by a Russian Duma decision to declare Sevastopol a Russian city. (28) When both sides met again at Massandra in the Crimea in September 1993, Russia's economic leverage over Ukraine forced Kyiv into a major concession. (29) Ukraine, manifestly unable to pay its energy debts to Russia, agreed to sell its part of the fleet to Moscow. Moscow encouraged by its success went a step further and demanded the leasing of Sevastopol for 99 years and division of coastal infrastructure. This development provoked the Supreme Rada which noted that "recent events may cause the situation to deteriorate further and may even bring about the secession of the Crimea from Ukraine". (30)

Tensions rose again when Ukrainian special forces raided a naval base in April 1992. Hence, the two sides agreed to the % 50-50 solution once again. Accordingly, Kyiv was to hold on to % 30-35 of its share and sell the rest of its share to Moscow. Russia's insistence on total control over the city of Sevastopol and leasing almost all naval bases for 99 years caused the deadlock to continue throughout 1995. In this respect, the Kuchma era did not bring any tangible results on the fleet issue. It appears that Russia would have to lease naval bases at Sevastopol from Ukraine but what is not certain yet is the issue of where the Ukrainian part should be based. (31) Also, Russian Defense Min-

ister Pavel Grachev's announcement that a part of the Black Sea Fleet should be given to Georgia added to the complexity of the issue. (32)

Agreements between Moscow and Kyiv served more to delay the problem rather than solving it. It appears that the fleet issue is difficult to solve as both side's interests are diametrically opposed. All in all, it is likely that the fleet issue will continue to strain Russo-Ukrainian relations and will constitute the most serious threat to the territorial integrity of Ukraine. As the fleet issue is inextricably linked with the Crimean problem its fate will inevitably have an impact to Turco-Russian relations as well. It should be noted that resolution of problematic issues between the two countries has so far occurred through an evolutionary process rather than by any instant agreement. In all likelihood that is how the Black Sea Fleet issue will be resolved. (33) That is if the incoming tsar will not be disposed to roll back the whole process once he is in office.

THE CRIMEAN PROBLEM RUSSIAN SECESSIONISM HELD OFF ?

In relation to the Crimean problem Kyiv fared relatively better under Kuchma. Before we can examine the recent developments on the Crimea it will be useful to recount some facts concerning the peninsula.

Ukrainians which comprise approximately % 23 of Crimea's population have not been able to form an organized political force. This is due to the heavy Russification of Ukrainians in the Crimea. Although their ethnic origins may be classified as Ukrainian their political behavior is in tandem with the Russians of the Crimea. Furthermore, all-Ukrainian parties are weak in the Crimea because of local suspicion that they are too close to the nationalists in Kyiv. (34) Hence, the only force capable of countering Russian secessionism is the Crimean Tatar movement and Kyiv's policy toward the Crimea has certainly shown an appreciation of this fact. Besides, the Crimean Tatars have always enjoyed good relations with the Ukrainian national movement. The nationalist umbrella movement Rukh, and leading nationalist parties established direct links with the Meclis (Medzhlis) as far back as 1989-90. (35) Newly organized Ukrainian civic groups and political parties, especially since the election of President Meshkov, have made a conscious effort to align the Ukrainian ethnic minority with the Tatars to try and prevent Russian-speaking Ukrainians from giving their support to Russian nationalists and separatism. (36) As Prazaukas

(1995) indicated;

"For the Ukrainian government, the Crimean Tatar community is an asset for containing Russian irredentism and, potentially, as a factor stimulating the participation of Turkey in the development of the peninsula." (37)

In other words, Kyiv is seeking to engage Ankara in order to counter Russian irredentism and is thus expecting economic and technical aid to the Crimea. (38) For instance, Ukraine's foreign minister reportedly has written to his Turkish counterpart to ask Turkey to lend support to possible measures by his republic to prevent secession by Crimea. (39)

Despite Ukraine's balancing policies developments in the region continue to cause concern in Kyiv. Particularly, the implementation of Russia's "Monroe Doctrine" since 1993 and Moscow's neo-imperialist foreign policy line brought about considerable unease in Ukraine. (40) For instance, the following remarks of Supreme Soviet Chairman Marakutsa of the self-proclaimed "Transdnister Republic" feeds into Kyiv's sensitivity on the Crimea;

"Transdnister was an inalienable part of the Russian state's southern region, [which] also includes Crimea, Odessa Oblast, and a number of other [Ukrainian] oblasts, [and is] known as Novorossiya." Terming it 'ancestral Russian land' . . . The Dniester republic's sovereignty is obviously not an obstacle to its accession to Greater Russia . . . We are realists and understand that the matter is not to be settled today." (41) (*italics added*)

In light of these remarks it is not difficult to understand why Ukrainian elites stress the principle of "inviolability of borders" at every international platform.

Simultaneous with the Tatar return to their ancestral homeland the question of allocating resources to the Crimea gained significance. Ukraine has pretty much been the only source that allocated resources to the Crimea. (42) The main reasons behind Kyiv's assumption of fiscal responsibility are as following;

- To strengthen Ukrainian sovereignty over the Crimea,
- To support the Crimean Tatars who constitute an element of balance against Russian separatism on the peninsula,
- To fulfill its international obligations *vis-a-vis* its minorities and thus gain international support,
- To solidify Turkey's support.

Ukraine's calls to Russia and Uzbekistan to contribute to the resettlement of the Crimean Tatars have been received by deaf ears. More plausibly guilty states, Russia and Uzbekistan are reluctant to commit any funds, lest it should imply an admission of their liability for the events of 1944. (43) Apart from

Turkish assistance no meaningful aid came forward for the Crimean Tatars. (44) However, there is much to be done by the Turkish government as well (such as the housing project announced by President Demirel in 1994). (45) In light of the dire conditions of the Crimean Tatars (more than half of the 250.000 Tatars have no water or electricity in their homes and no paved roads) aid to the Tatars is not only a humane consideration but also assumes significance in relation to ethnic peace and political stability in the Crimea. (46) Ukraine's motivations behind being the sole contributor to the Crimean Tatars' plight is rooted in Kyiv's efforts to underline its sovereignty over the peninsula and its recognition of the Tatars' strategic position. However, despite these considerations Kyiv's elites are increasingly voicing their displeasure about being the only contributors of funds to the Crimean Tatars. (47) (Considering the economic burden of the 1989 exodus of 300.000 Turks from Bulgaria to Turkey the displeasure is understandable) (48) The Crimean Tatars plight is enormous and conditions are appalling indeed. (49) Furthermore, anti-Tatar statements by Russians in the Crimea (i.e. claiming that Tatars are responsible for the increase in organized crime) are not conducive to ethnic peace. (50) Russian discrimination against Tatars, such as controversial (and daring !) statements which try to justify the 1944 deportations of the Crimean Tatars are also unfortunate and not constructive for inter-ethnic relations in the future. (51)

The Crimean Tatars' "small number being compensated by efficient organization and a high degree of political mobilization, the community has become a significant force in Crimean and international politics." (52) Their weight and legitimacy in Crimean politics does not derive from their numbers but from being an indigenous people and their success at maintaining unity among themselves. (approx. %10 of Crimean population is Tatar) (53) Russians, unhappy about these developments are anxious that the ethnic composition of the peninsula could change at their expense. Hence, they increased their anti-Tatar campaigns in the Crimea. (54) In tandem with these practices the migration of Karabakh Armenians also deserves due attention. (55) It appears worth examination to what degree this migration is encouraged by Russians and what if any conveniences are being facilitated by the Crimean authorities.

Leonid Kuchma proved to be more decisive and effective against Crimean separatism than his predecessor. By initiating a timely intervention in the Crimea Kuchma capitalized on Crimean domestic squabbling and took firm con-

trol of the Crimea in 1995. Capitalizing on Russia's messy embroilment in Chechnya and on Crimea's increasing weariness of its feuding leaders, Ukraine got the upper hand in its dispute with Akmesit (Simferepol). Furthermore, Kuchma scored points with western Ukrainians by his firm approach toward the Crimea and thus broadened his political base in the country. Although, Yeltsin and the Foreign Ministry has officially been distant toward Russian separatists one does wonder to what degree Moscow's response to Kuchma's moves would have been had Russia not been entangled with the Chechen affair. After all;

"few in the Russian elite have fully accepted the legitimacy of Ukraine's independence, and fewer still have reconciled themselves the loss of Crimea, nevertheless, Ukraine's statehood is increasingly treated as a *fait accompli* that cannot be fully reversed." (56)

As Ukraine's territorial integrity is of paramount importance to Europe and Eurasia Kuchma's moves and Kyiv's subsequent control over the peninsula is particularly welcome. Following Washington's abandonment of Russo-centric policies (or "Talbotism") and adoption of a more balanced approach toward the region, Crimea's significance has deservedly acquired a more rational conception. (57) Kuchma won on his timely gamble and put Akmesit (Simferepol) again under Kyiv's control. As many things, Crimea's fate in the Kyiv-Ankara-Moscow triangle is dependent on who will move into the Kremlin in June 1996. It would be speculative to argue that Kyiv's current control over the peninsula is permanent. The Crimea will remain a problematic peninsula and thus a contentious issue between Russia and Ukraine for the foreseeable future.

THE BALTIC-BLACK SEA AXIS

In March 1993, two of Ukraine's national-democratic parties (Rukh and Congress of National Democratic Forces - KNDS) held a joint meeting. During this meeting it was suggested that Ukraine break with the CIS and that Ukraine should play a worthy part in the creation of "Baltic-Black Sea coalition". (58) When Russia's "Atlanticist" elites were either removed from decision-making or simply switched sides relations cooled between Kyiv and Moscow. Subsequently, Ankara and Kyiv moved closer to each other. The rapprochement between Ankara and Kyiv was accompanied by growing strains in Russo-Turkish relations. (59) The "axis discourse" intensified in this kind of a setting. President Demirel's visit to Ukraine and Moldova in 1994 underlined Ankara's stance on the axis issue as Demirel proposed the creation of

a security belt which included Poland-The Baltics-Ukraine and Turkey. (60)

Talk of a "Baltic-Black Sea Axis" which was to include the Baltic states, Poland, Belarus, and Ukraine was being discussed since 1993. During this discourse Turkey was not included to it by western strategists (at least not on paper). (61) In light of Kyiv's stress on the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSECO) it has been speculated that Ukrainian strategists contemplated the addition of Turkey to the axis. However, it is also a fact that there is much confusion about the axis in Ukraine itself. In addition to the Baltic-Black Sea Axis, Ukrainians have been entertaining the "Central European Security and Cooperation Zone", the BSECO and other schemes. For instance, Andriy Sobolyev, senior consultant at the Department of Military Events of the National Institute of Strategic Studies indicated that; "Ukraine is not interested in the creation of various new military-political blocs like NATO-bis, the Baltic-Black Sea bloc, or the CIS Collective Security bloc...". He defended the forming of a "single influential and effective organization that would include Russia". (62) On the other hand, President Kuchma expressed his support for a "Baltic-Black Sea economic cooperation zone". (63) Nevertheless, Taras Kuzio, a respected Ukraine specialist noted that the Baltic-Black Sea Axis has been less pronounced by Kuchma and that in comparison with Kravchuk he is less enthusiastic about it. (64) According to Igor Turyanskiy, Ukraine's ambassador to Ankara the axis idea is not new. However, he stressed that working within the framework of the BSECO should be a priority. "We should reach out to the Baltic end of the axis only after the targets pronounced in the June 1992 declaration have been reached" he noted. (65) On the other hand, Ukraine's possible role in a *cordon sanitaire* was supported in a *Kiyevskiy Vedomosti* article in the following manner;

"It cannot be said that the role of most important component in a potential *cordon sanitaire* against Russia is an entirely comforting option for Ukraine. But in the immediate historical perspective it is the best of a bad lot. After all, the role of "buffer" between the two military-political groupings or, especially, the 'southwest outpost of the CIS' in opposition to NATO, is far worse." (66)

While strategists were toying with the idea of a Baltic-Black Sea Axis recent developments in Belarus had a direct impact to the future of the proposed axis. The 1994 election of Alyaksandr Lukashenka resulted in Minsk pushing toward closer ties with Moscow. Belarus consented to the conversion of itself into a "zone of exclusive interests" of Russia in exchange for real or imaginary benefits from "reintegration" with this state. (67) Thus, Belarus became *de fac-*

to a Russian colony. (68) Kuzio (1995) interpreted the latest developments as Belarus "returning to the status of a Russian *gubernia*". (69) The loss of Belarus - within the context of the "axis discourse" - meant a tremendous setback *vis-a-vis* the future and feasibility of the axis. (70) The "reintegration" of Belarus had significant implications for Ukrainian and regional security. As Kuzio rightfully illustrated;

"Plans for a Baltic-Black Sea axis or even Central European Zone of Security and Cooperation are badly damaged by the loss of Belarus from the list of potential members. Ukraine is now cut off from the Baltic republics by Russian-dominated Belarus." (71)

One implication of "Belarus's returning to the status of a "Russian protectorate" was that it contributed to Ukrainian fears of encirclement (Dniester Republic, Crimea, and demands for changes to CFE limitations in the northern Caucasus) and heightened Ukrainian and Polish insecurity *vis-a-vis* Russian intentions." (72) "Second, economic and monetary union between Belarus and Russia will harm the latter's domestic reform program and place greater stress on reintegrating the remainder of the former USSR, major factors why Yevgeny Gaidar resigned from the Russian government in January 1994." (73) In addition, Russian plans to establish military bases in Belarus could become a military threat to Ukraine's northwestern flank. (74) Belarussian President Lukashenko's statement at a recently concluded summit of CIS leaders that "an abrupt NATO expansion will cause his country to locate Russian nuclear warheads on its territory" only served to reinforce Kyiv's security concerns. (75)

Poland's approach to the axis is also of prime importance. After all Poles and Ukrainians were at odds for 600 years. "While there is anxiety in Warsaw that Ukraine may feel increasingly isolated and, thus, either turn inward or follow Belarus's lead back into the Russian fold, the dominant view in Warsaw remains that, while Poland has a practical motive as well as a moral obligation to help bring Ukraine into the international mainstream and avoid its international isolation, Poland is willing to do so only to the extent that it will not complicate its links either to the EC or Russia." (76) For this reason, when President Kravchuk asked his Polish counterpart about the formation of a Baltic-Black Sea bloc President Walesa agreed to study the proposal "without enthusiasm". (77)

Algimantas Prazaukas' remarks about the Baltic-Black Sea Axis" - probably written before the formal "reintegration" of Belarus - reflect a balanced assessment of the Baltic-Black Sea Axis:

"Due to differences of size, history, culture, and external orientation, the western littoral does

not form an entity in any sense, and a stable alliance of these states (e.g., the Baltic and Black Sea states federation) is highly improbable. This, however, does not exclude certain collective security arrangements in the event of an imminent external threat to all the states of the region simultaneously if there is no prospect of assistance from other quarters." (78)

Ankara viewed Ukraine and before its recent turn toward Moscow - Belarus as strategic partners. However, Turkey is not the only country who exhibited interest in the would-be axis member countries. When Belarus and Ukraine gained independence, China was also eager to foster relations with both countries to help thwart Russian hegemony in Eurasia. However, as time went by Belarus's russocentric policies have dampened China's interest in Minsk. Besides, China's interest in the region is not a one-side affair. Ukraine reciprocated to Chinese overtures quickly and on an official visit to Peking then-President Kravchuk called China a "strategic partner". (79) Chinese interest in Belarus waned as the country's leaders gave China little incentive to be generous in its trade policies toward Minsk. The election of Lukashenko and May 1995 referendum which "voted Belarus" back into Russia were in contrast to Kyiv's steadfast stance against Moscow. China improved economic relations in direct relation to their weight and policies as a counterbalance to Russia in Eurasia. Hence, Ukraine's prestige rose markedly in comparison to Belarus. To Beijing, Minsk hardly matched Kyiv as a counterbalance to Russian dominance and the same investment that China poured into Ukraine was not allotted to Belarus. China's trade is economically not significant for Peking but is not so for Kyiv which became China's second-largest CIS trading partner, after Russia. (China is Kyiv's biggest non-CIS trading partner and ranks third in the overall list after Russia and Turkmenistan). (80) Trade volume between the two countries totaled \$ 200 million in 1992, \$ 580 million in 1993, \$ 837 million in 1994 and 90 percent of it consists of Ukrainian exports to China. (81) Belarus's trade with China amounted to a mere \$ 30 million in 1994 attesting to Peking's selective trade policy *vis-a-vis* these countries. Given Kyiv's sensitivity over the inviolability of borders, it is not surprising that Ukraine is upholding China's position on Taiwan. (82) "Both China and Ukraine have historically been in conflict with Russia and thus understand each other's security concerns. The communiqué released during Kravchuk's visit to China spoke of their joint 'struggle against hegemonism and diktat in international relations'." (83) In order to understand the importance Kyiv is giving to its relations with Peking it is useful to examine the "Spy Incident" of January-February 1996. In this incident three Chinese citizens were caught with important documents be-

longing to a missile production plant in Dnepropetrovsk and the Ukrainian media kept the issue alive for some time. However, the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry saw to it that the incident would not cause any harm to its relations with China. The ministry dismissed the incident as a "misunderstanding", the Chinese nationals were sent back and it was stressed that the incident "would not hamper Ukrainian-Chinese relations which are a priority of Ukraine." (84)

Despite their minor status and impact in international relations, China has also pursued close ties with the Baltic states. Undoubtedly, China's desire to develop and maintain relations with the Baltic states is not solely based on economic incentives. (85)

The uncertainties surrounding the whole discourse about the Baltic-Black Sea Axis will probably continue. From a Turkish perspective the future of a would-be axis is significant. Ankara, who wants to counter Russian influence and expand with more confidence in the region has to keep a careful eye on developments in Eurasia. In light of the Belarussian turn to Moscow and lessening probability of a viable axis, Ankara should seek to solidify its bilateral relations in the region. However, Ankara must assume more initiative. Ankara and Kyiv could assume a leadership role in developing cooperation projects with Poland and the Baltic states. The thrust of these initiatives should not be Washington, Brussels or London but Ankara and Kyiv. As post-Cold War balances are increasingly taking shape, it is neither country's interest to remain passive in an area that clearly constitutes their rightful geo-political space.

THE ECONOMY IS THERE LIGHT AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL?

When the Soviet Union collapsed in December 1991, many observers assumed that Ukraine would carry out a smoother transition to capitalism than would Russia. Unfortunately, a much-quoted Deutsche Bank study "The Soviet Union at the Crossroads" caused many to believe that Ukraine would be better off on its own than many other newly independent republics. (86) However, Ukraine performed far worse than Russia economically and experienced hyperinflation in 1993. (87) As a result, the economy declined and living standards fell radically. Until recently the question if Ukraine will be able to remain independent arose and was indicative of the dire economic conditions the country went through. (88) Throughout the Kravchuk era a Russian-type "shock therapy" approach to economic reform has not found acceptance with-

in the Kravchuk team. (89) Thus, under Kravchuk Ukraine had become a notorious laggard in the sphere of economic reform. (90) According to Ukrainian experts reasons behind the slow progress was due to the absence of four factors;

- the political will to pursue reform aggressively;
- technical knowledge of how to implement reform;
- a cadre of officials able to act on such knowledge;
- substantial foreign assistance, especially for monetary stabilization. (91)

The deteriorating living conditions in the country were as much due to the lack of the implementation of a reform program as the lack of comprehension of Ukrainian elites of the true nature and dimensions of both the crisis and its solutions. (92) The knowledge of economics, law, and foreign languages was particularly scarce, but these were vital skills for the transition to a market economy. (93) A *The Economist* report of May 1994 truly reflected the miserable state of the economy. It argued that Ukraine's "party of power" had "achieved something that many might thought impossible : to invent an economic system that is more inefficient than the command economy of the old Soviet Union." (94) The Kravchuk era's gradual approach to reform proved costly for Ukraine as a severe economic crisis gripped the country in 1993-1994. Hinting at Kravchuk's slow-go policy, Ukrainians were joking that their former president was so good at "avoiding responsibility that he could walk between raindrops without getting wet." (95) Hence, when Kuchma spoke to the Supreme Rada introducing his reform program he underlined that the issue was "to fend off the threat of a national disaster..." and argued that "the exhausting period of transition from a command economy to a market-based, socially oriented economy cannot be stretched in time indefinitely." (96) By 1994 the state of the economy was seriously threatening Ukraine's young and fragile independence. (97) A RAND conference organized in 1994 concluded that the "paramount problem challenging Ukraine's security, derived from the deplorable state of the Ukrainian economy and the need for effective economic reform." (98) *The Economist* noted that failing to initiate an economic reform program soon "Ukraine might as well hand the keys to General Lebed - or whoever becomes Russia's new president." (99)

The "deplorable state of the Ukrainian economy" not only brought about a closer examination of economic variables but also invited a focus on the ethnic dimension of the state of the economy. This is because post-independence economic development followed a differentiated pattern in Ukraine. The east

and southeast of the country is host to a obsolescent heavy industry and this is where most of the 11 million ethnic Russians live. It was here where the sharpest decline in GDP occurred and where the population was hit hardest. (100) As it happens more often than not in these kind of conditions displeasure with economic conditions acquired ethnic overtones. Such displeasure was symbolized in the coal miners strike in the Donbass region which started in the summer of 1993. To the chagrin of Ukrainian experts, Western analysts keep inquiring about an "ethnic problem" in Ukraine. (101) However, to its great credit, as Russian analysts also acknowledge, "the Ukrainian government has pursued a non-ethnically based concept of citizenship, aimed at accommodating the large Russian and Russian-speaking population in the country." (102)

Behind Ukraine's economic failure during the Kravchuk era was not only macroeconomic mishandling but also the rather unrealistic belief that a sudden and decisive break with Russia was possible. (103) The elementary dependence on Russia as the focal point of the former centralized entity USSR still continues. (104) This dependence is signified in Ukraine's dependence on Russian energy - be it gas or oil. So much so that, as indicated during the Black Sea discussion, it has immense non-economical consequences. For instance, when Moscow cut off gas supplies to Ukraine in the middle of the winter because of its failure to pay Kravchuk and his team found themselves in a quite embarrassing situation. (105) As Rainer Lindner summarized;

"The economic ties with Russia as a supplier of raw materials and energy has political consequences. Moscow has repeatedly exploited this situation to put political pressure on Minsk and Kiev." (106)

Kyiv's trade volume with Moscow is incomparably larger than its trade with any other country. Although Ukrainian specialists yearn for a European future of their country economic realities on the ground give reason for other recipes. "Ukraine faces a wall in its west with only five border crossings to four East European countries. It takes three to seven days to cross the border to Hungary with a truck, while 1,500 Ukrainian roads traverse the open Russian border" which bring the market to Ukraine from the east. (107) In light of these facts it is obvious that, for Ukraine, a sudden and decisive break with Russia is really not on the cards yet. (108) Hence, "on both a rhetorical and practical level, Ukraine had already come to realize in 1993-94 that the putative 'return to Europe' would be neither quick nor unequivocal, and had been forced to pay more attention to the CIS, Ukraine's southern neighbors and po-

tential trading partners in the developing world." (109) The electoral victory of Leonid Kuchma meant a decisive break with the "regression from one of the more promising to one of the most backward of the former Soviet republics" for Ukraine. (110) After assuming his post, Kuchma set out to achieve three basic political objectives :

- a mandate for reform and a solid political support base;
- a weakening of the opposition and the removal of obstacles to his goals by political means and constitutional changes;
- a system of mechanisms for implementing his economic reforms. (111)

Kuchma, described as a daring leader is possessing a combination of virtues that long eluded his predecessor : a commitment to reform; a team of competent, clever young advisers; and a bold economic reform plan." (112) President Kuchma's firm and responsible leadership played a crucial role in the initial success of the reform program.

"Other grounds for success include the emergence of a strong reform team, the utilization of sound economic advice, good collaboration with the IMF and the World Bank, a comprehensive radical reform program, substantial international financing, working relations with the parliament, strong popular support, and the absence of serious international tensions." (113)

Popular support for Kuchma's policies have risen steadily since he was elected with 52 percent of the vote in July 1994 (114). Particularly, his timely and decisive moves on the Crimea and his willingness to implement a reform package broadened his support base in western Ukraine which experienced a radical opinion reversal (115). The coal miners strike in the Donbass also came to an end as participation fizzled with each passing day and the strike was finally suspended in February 1996 (116). Most importantly, Kuchma has been able to keep the Supreme Rada on board by making an effort to keep them engaged with the program, often going to the Rada himself and speaking on major policy issues (117). Finally, Kuchma shrewdly linked radical reform to the question of Ukraine's survival as a sovereign state (118).

The continuation and implementation of the economic reform program is of utmost priority to the country's national unity and security. Although the program has been watered down in mid-1995 to help win center-left support it is crucial that the overall momentum be maintained. However, the long-term success of the program depends on large scale privatization. Privatization is the weakest link in the reform program and is lagging behind. Besides, serious fiscal retrenchment and the possible introduction of a new currency will have

to follow. (119) Moreover, "all Ukrainian elections between 1989 and 1994, including that of Kuchma himself, had demonstrated that anti-market and, for want of a better word, Russophile sentiments in Ukraine were widespread and that the 'democratic' opposition was not always unambiguously pro-market and pro-Western." (120) Therefore, it should be noted that Kuchma also does not have large deposits of popular support to spend.

CONCLUSION

The 1994 presidential elections marked a new era in Ukraine's young history as an independent country. These elections marked a constructive start to democratic traditions as Ukrainian democracy had withstood an important test by undertaking its first democratic transfer of power. With Kuchma in the ascendant, Ukraine's previous emphasis on nation-building and international recognition somewhat shifted toward domestic politics and particularly the economy. The Kuchma era witnessed significant developments in the realms of economic reform, relations with Russia and the Crimea. Particularly, Kuchma's bold reform program not only improved the country's lot internally but also mended Kyiv's image internationally. Also, the Kuchma era was marked by Washington's appreciation of Kyiv's geo-strategic importance. Apart from Kuchma being less openly anti-Moscow than his predecessor his personal relationships with top officials in Moscow has helped him to establish healthier relations with the all important eastern neighbor. His timely and decisive actions in the Crimea has added to his political support base in the country and proved that he is not only a decisive but also an astute and patient politician. While Ukraine is looking more confident to the future today the amount and extent of problems facing the country are still immense. However, Ukraine has been able to escape of becoming the subject of articles which question its viability as an independent country. Currently, Kyiv is a much more stable and confident country under President Kuchma than it was just two years ago. In conclusion, it is the most sincere wish of this author to see Ukraine, one of the youngest and most significant actors in Eurasia, to take its rightful place in the international community and contribute to peace and stability in the region.

This article was concluded on 14 April 1996

Footnotes :

1. Alexander J. Motyl, **Dilemmas of Independence - Ukraine After Totalitarianism** 1993 [New York, Council on Foreign Relations Press] p. 24
2. Taras Kuzio, **Ukrainian Security Policy**, 1995 [London, Praeger Publ.] p. 54
3. "A Country Survey : Ukraine", **The Economist**, 7 May 1994, p. 14
4. Ilya Prizel, "Ethnicity and Foreign Policy in Ukraine", **National Identity and Ethnicity in Russia and the New States of Eurasia**, 1995 [New York, M.E. Sharpe] ,p. 118

5. Ibid, p. 118
6. Taras Kuzio, "The Crimea and European Security", **European Security**, Winter 1994, p. 757
7. Ukrainians asked the international information network OMRI in March 1996 to use Kyiv instead of Kiev in its daily Internet reports. This author will use Kyiv throughout this article and thus comply with the phonetically correct spelling.
8. This chapter has largely been borrowed from Ilya Prizel, "Ethnicity and Foreign Policy in Ukraine", **National Identity and Ethnicity in Russia and the New States of Eurasia** 1995, pp. 103-128
9. Ibid, p. 118
10. Alexander J. Motyl, **Dilemmas of Independence - Ukraine After Totalitarianism**, 1993 [New York, Council on Foreign Relations Press], p. 99
11. See Matthew Kaminski "In the Shadow of the Russian Bear", **Financial Times**, 25-26 November 1995
12. Interview with Ukraine specialist Taras Kuzio, 18 March 1996. Also see Ustina Markus "Shoring Up Russian Relations", **Transition**, 28 April 1995, pp.55-58
13. Interview with Ukraine specialist Taras Kuzio, 18 March 1996
14. Interview with Ukraine's ambassador to Ankara Igor Turyanskiy, 13 March 1996
15. John Morrison, "Pereyaslav and after : Russian - Ukrainian relationship", **International Affairs**, Vol. 69, No. 4, October 1993, p. 703
16. Alexander Rahr, "Zukunftsperspektive Slawische Union" **Internationale Politik**, November 1995, p. 15
17. Ibid, p. 14
18. Ustina Markus "Shoring Up Russian Relations" **Transition**, 28 April 1995, p. 58
19. Ibid, p. 58
20. Ibid, p. 58
21. "Kiev hopes to Intensify Relations with Moscow" **INTERFAX**, 3 January 1996, in FBIS-SOV 4 January 1996
22. Ustina Markus "Shoring Up Russian Relations" **Transition**, 28 February 1995, p. 58
23. Taras Kuzio, "The Crimea and European Security", **European Security**, Winter 1994, p. 750
24. John Morrison, "Pereyaslav and after : Russian - Ukrainian relationship" **International Affairs**, October 1993, p. 693. Kuzio 1995. also points to the emphasis of the leasing of Sevastopol instead of the actual division of the fleet. , p. 104
25. Taras Kuzio, **Ukrainian Security Policy**, 1995, p. 104
26. Ibid, p. 104
27. John Morrison, "Pereyaslav and after : Russian - Ukrainian relationship" **International Affairs** October 1993, p. 693
28. For a detailed inventory of the fleet see Taras Kuzio, **Ukrainian Security Policy**, 1995 pp. 92-94. Some Turkish documents peculiarly qualify the fleet as "one of the most powerful navies in the world". Morrison notes that Russians perceive Sevastopol as a "city of Russian glory" and the cradle of Russia's naval traditions. See Morrison 1993, , p. 693
29. John Morrison, "Pereyaslav and after : Russian - Ukrainian relationship" **International Affairs** October 1993 pp. , 694-695
30. Taras Kuzio, **Ukrainian Security Policy**, 1995, p. 104
31. Ustina Markus "Shoring Up Russian Relations", **Transition**, 28 April 1995, p. 58
32. "Grachev in Georgia" **OMRI Daily Reports**, 2 April 1996
33. Ustina Markus "Shoring Up Russian Relations" **Transition**, 28 April 1995, p. 58
34. Andrew Wilson, **The Crimean Tatars : A Situation Report on the Crimean Tatars for International Alert**, 1994, p. 33
35. Ibid, pp. 19-20
36. Taras Kuzio, "The Crimea and European Security" **European Security** Winter 1994 p. 740
37. Algimantas Prazaukas, "The Influence of Ethnicity on the Foreign Policies of the Western Littoral States" **National Identity and Ethnicity in Russia and the New States of Eurasia** ed. Roman Szporluk , p. 175
38. TICA, the Turkish International Cooperation Agency is opening a coordination office in Akmesit Simferepol. which is to coordinate projects aimed at Crimean Tatars in May 1996.
39. Duygu Sezer Bazoğlu cites Haluk Geray's report "Kiev'e Ankara'dan Destek Geldi" **Cumhuriyet**, 24 May 1994 p. 9. ,p. 159
40. See Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, "Russia's Monroe Doctrine : Peacekeeping, Peacemaking or Imperial Outreach ?" in **Canada Among Nations**, pp. 231-265
41. Vladimir Socor, "Transnistria for a Greater Russia" **RFE/RL Research Reports**, 8 June 1994. For a demographic examination of the Russian -Ukrainian conflict and map of Nov-

- rossiya see Roman Laba, "The Russian -Ukrainian Conflict : State, Nation and Identity" **European Security**, Autumn 1995, pp. 457-487.
42. Interview with Ukraine specialist Taras Kuzio, 18 March 1996. For the financial burden that Kyiv is facing due to its commitments to the Crimea see **Krymskaya Gazeta** 27 December 1995 in FBIS-SOV 5 January 1996. According to Asst. Prof. Hakan Kırımlı of Bilkent University there are serious doubts whether funds allocated by Kyiv is actually spent on the Crimean Tatars. Allocated resources are spent by the Committee of Nationalities and Deported Citizens of the "pro-Russian Crimean government which is spending it disproportionately on non-Tatar nationalities such as Greeks, Armenians etc.
 43. Andrew Wilson, **The Crimean Tatars : A Situation Report on the Crimean Tatars for International Alert**, 1994, p. 25
 44. Interview with Osman Kurtseitovich Adamanov, chairman of the State Committee of Crimea for Affairs of Nationalities and Deported Citizens, **Krymskaya Gazeta** 27 December 1995 in FBIS-SOV 5 January 1996. Accordingly, Kyiv allocated 900 billion karbovantsy approx. \$ 4.5 million - as of March 1996. in 1996-1997.
 45. A Turkish diplomat indicated during an interview that the feasibility study of the housing project was completed but no construction firm has been awarded the project yet.
 46. These figures are based on a U.N. Development Program report. See **International Herald Tribune** 11 January 1996, p. 2
 47. Interview with Ukraine specialist Taras Kuzio, 18 March 1996
 48. Although the Turks from Bulgaria example is somewhat different, it is useful for Turkish readers as it puts the financial obligations involved into perspective.
 49. See James Rupert, "Tatars Return to an Inhospitable Home in Crimea" **International Herald Tribune**, 11 January 1996, p. 2
 50. Crimean Vice Prime Minister Demydenko tied increasing organized crime to the return of Crimean Tatars. See "Statement on Rising Anti-Tatar Sentiments" **INTELNEWS**, 5 January 1996 in FBIS-SOV 5, January 1996
 51. See "Statement on Rising Anti-Tatar Sentiments" **INTELNEWS** 5 January 1996 and **Flag Rodiny** 19 December 1995, in FBIS-SOV 5, January 1996
 52. Algimantas Prazaukas, "The Influence of Ethnicity on the Foreign Policies of the Western Littoral States" **National Identity and Ethnicity in Russia and the New States of Eurasia** ed. Roman Szporluk, p. 175
 53. As of March 1994 there are 14 Kurultai deputies in the Soviet comprising % 13 of the Soviet. The 14 figure is a quota allocated to the Crimean Tatars out of a total 98 deputies. Asst. Prof. Hakan Kırımlı claims that exact numbers of population should be approached with caution.
 54. For estimates of the ethnic composition in 2020 see Kemal Gafarov, **Sürgünden Dönen Halkların Reentegrasyon Projesi** 1994 unpublished study, TICA.
 55. Ibid, p. 14
 56. Ilya Prizel, "Ethnicity and Foreign Policy in Ukraine" **National Identity and Ethnicity in Russia and the New States of Eurasia** ed.. Roman Szporluk 1995, p. 122
 57. For an article stressing Crimea's importance for European security see Taras Kuzio, "The Crimea and European Security" **European Security** Winter 1994 pp. 734-774. For a Ukrainian critique of America's Russo-centric outlook to the region see Ivan Z. Holowinsky "The Ukrainian Quarterly's Efforts to Confront America's Russo-centric Mentality" **The Ukrainian Quarterly** Vol. L, No. 4, Winter 1994, pp. 364-370
 58. Oles M. Smolansky, "Ukrainian-Turkish Relations" **The Ukrainian Quarterly**, Vol. LI, No.1, Spring 1995 pp. 14-15. Following the meeting *Rossiiskaya gazeta* quoted "competent sources" to the effect that 'secret consultations had taken place recently between the leaders of Turkey, Ukraine, Moldova, and the Baltic countries. Their purpose was to 'create a powerful bloc capable of completely cutting Russia off from active cooperation with Europe and depriving it of its dominance in the Black Sea region."
 59. Ibid, p. 15
 60. **Cumhuriyet**, 2 June 1994. Although the scheme sounded somewhat extravagant by Demirel's inclusion of Israel, Egypt and even Saudi Arabia, the convergence of interests of the Baltic States-Poland-Ukraine and Turkey could provide a promising security and cooperation arrangement.
 61. See Oles M. Smolansky, "Ukrainian-Turkish Relations" **The Ukrainian Quarterly**, Vol. LI, No.1, Spring 1995, pp. 14-15
 62. Andriy Sobolyev, **Narodna Armiya** in FBIS-SOV, 2 January 1996
 63. "Ukraine: Kuchma on Dissolution of USSR, NATO Expansion", **INTERFAX** in FBIS-SOV 12 February 1996
 64. Interview with Ukraine specialist Taras Kuzio, 18 March 1996
 65. Interview with Ukraine's ambassador to Ankara Igor Turyanskiy, 13 March 1996

66. Aleksey Pidlutskiy "Ukraine at the Intersection of Two Roads : Belarussian and Polish", **Kiyevskiy Vedomosti** in FBIS-SOV 5 January 1996
67. Ibid
68. Following the signing of the "reintegration" agreement between Minsk and Moscow 20.000 protesters marched in Minsk in April 1996. See **OMRI Daily Reports**, 2 April 1996
69. Taras Kuzio, **Ukrainian Security Policy** 1995 p. 79
70. Ibid, p. 80. Belarus's option for reintegration has turned the country into a "corridor model" which threatens to turn the country into a transit territory for Russian supplies and a minion of Russian politics. For a detailed analysis see Rainer Lindner, "Domestic and Foreign Policy Conditions behind Structural Changes in the Ukraine and Belarus" **Aussenpolitik** IV/95 p. 375
71. Taras Kuzio, **Ukrainian Security Policy**, 1995, p. 80
72. Ibid, p. 80. There are voices against the fiscal logic of entering into monetary union with Minsk such as Yegor Gaidar. See **OMRI Daily Reports**, 5 April 1996
73. Ibid, p. 80
74. "Kiev Reaction to Lukashenka Statement on NATO, Nukes" **INTELNEWS**, 24 January 1996 in FBIS-SOV 24 January 1996. Lukashenka's pro-Moscow policies has brought about serious objections in the country. On 2 April 20.000 protesters marched in Minsk. See **OMRI Daily Reports**, 3 April 1996
75. Algimantas Prazaukas, "The Influence of Ethnicity on the Foreign Policies of the Western Littoral States" **National Identity and Ethnicity in Russia and the New States of Eurasia** ed.. Roman Szporluk, p. 183
76. Ilya Prizel, "Ethnicity and Foreign Policy in Ukraine" **National Identity and Ethnicity in Russia and the New States of Eurasia** ed.. Roman Szporluk, p. 113
77. Ibid, p. 113
78. Taras Kuzio, **Ukrainian Security Policy**, 1995., p. 84
79. Ustina Markus, "To Counterbalance Russian Power, China Leans Toward Ukraine" **Transition** 22 September 1995, p. 35
80. Ustina Markus, "To Counterbalance Russian Power, China Leans Toward Ukraine" **Transition** 22 September 1995, p. 35
81. In light of China's trading traditions and the nature of Ukrainian-Chinese trade it is obvious that Peking has strategic considerations in mind. Also, officials from both countries expressed their wish to expand bilateral trade volume to \$ 3-4 billion. Ibid, pp. 34-36
82. Ibid, p. 35
83. Taras Kuzio, **Ukrainian Security Policy** 1995., p. 85
84. "Ukraine : Spy Incident Will Not Affect PRC Relations" **INTERFAX**, 5 February 1996 in FBIS-SOV, 6 February 1996
85. For China's relations with the Baltic States see Saulius Girnius, "Unusual Courtship" **Transition**, 22 September 1995 p. 37
86. Analysts like Alexander J. Motyl and Anders Åslund agree that the 1990 Deutsche Bank study "The Soviet Union at the Crossroads" had a misleading impact on understanding the Ukrainian economy better. For a detailed examination see Anders Åslund "Eurasia Letter : Ukraine's Turnaround" **Foreign Policy**, Summer 1995 p. 125
87. Anders Åslund "Eurasia Letter : Ukraine's Turnaround" **Foreign Policy**, Summer 1995 p. 125
88. For a critical assessment see Olgan Bekar, "Can Ukraine Remain Independent?" **Eurasian Studies**, Summer 1994 pp. 72 - 93. For instance, Russian liberals such as Yegor Gaidar had come to use "Ukrainianization" as shorthand for the dangers of backsliding on reform.
89. For an argument supportive of a slow and gradual approach to economic reform see Alexander J. Motyl, **Dilemmas of Independence - Ukraine After Totalitarianism** 1993 pp. 126 -148
90. Andrew Wilson, "Ukraine Under Kuchma" **Russia & Successor States Briefing Service** 1995 [London, Catermill Publ.] p. 16
91. F. Stephen Larrabee & Allen Lynch, **Russia, Ukraine and European Security - Implications for Western Policy** RAND Conference Proceedings 1994 [Project Air Force Ebenhausen] p. 13
92. As Åslund underlined, "...the scarcity of economic expertise led to an uninformed public debate...few understood the need for macroeconomic stabilization." Åslund, p. 126
93. Anders Åslund "Eurasia Letter : Ukraine's Turnaround" **Foreign Policy**, Summer 1995 pp. 126-127
94. "A Country Survey : Ukraine", **The Economist**, 7 May 1994 p. 4
95. Ibid, p. 4
96. Anders Åslund "Eurasia Letter : Ukraine's Turnaround" **Foreign Policy**, Summer 1995 p.

97. For a detailed analysis of the economic reform program see Andrew Wilson & Igor Burakovsky, **Political and Economic Transition in Ukraine**, 1996 [London, Royal Institute of International Affairs]
98. F. Stephen Larrabee & Allen Lynch, **Russia, Ukraine and European Security - Implications for Western Policy** RAND Conference Proceedings 1994, p. 11. Also, in a February 1992 public opinion poll 40 percent of respondents cited domestic difficulties as the main threat to the country's security.
99. "Slipping Back?" **The Economist**, 25 November 1995, p. 38
100. Russian and Ukrainian experts at the RAND conference argued, that the real problem facing Ukraine, is not, as widely thought, ethnic tensions between Russians and Ukrainians, but a differentiated pattern of economic development in eastern and western Ukraine. Also see "A Country Survey : Ukraine", **The Economist**, 7 May 1994, p.8
101. F. Stephen Larrabee & Allen Lynch, **Russia, Ukraine and European Security - Implications for Western Policy** RAND Conference Proceedings 1994
102. *Ibid*, p. 12
103. Ukrainian experts noted that the state of the Ukrainian economy was bad but not catastrophic. Actual standards of living in Ukraine are much higher than either the dollar equivalents of per capita income or the state of the statistical economy would indicate, reflecting a symbiotic relationship between town and country and a thriving underground economy. *Ibid*, p. 12
104. Rainer Lindner, "Domestic and Foreign Policy Conditions behind Structural Changes in the Ukraine and Belarus" **Aussenpolitik** IV / 95, p. 371
105. For the extent of Russian pressure exerted via Gazprom see Chrystia Freeland & Matthew Kaminski "In the Shadow of the Russian Bear" **Financial Times** 25-26 November 1995. In this news Kuchma reportedly stated that "What Gazprom wants is to own everything in Ukraine - especially they want the gas pipeline, our gas storage facilities, and many of our strategic factories. We must not give them the opportunity to acquire these things".
106. Rainer Lindner, "Domestic and Foreign Policy Conditions behind Structural Changes in the Ukraine and Belarus" **Aussenpolitik** IV / 95, p. 371
107. See Anders Åslund, "Eurasia Letter : Ukraine's Turnaround" **Foreign Policy** Fall 1995, p. 141
108. *Ibid*, p. 141
109. Andrew Wilson, "Ukraine Under Kuchma" **Russia & Successor States Briefing Service**, 1995, p. 11
110. Chrystyna Lapychak, "Back On Track" **Transition** 15 March 1996, p. 43
111. *Ibid*, p. 44
112. *Ibid*, p. 43
113. Anders Åslund, "Eurasia Letter : Ukraine's Turnaround" **Foreign Policy** Fall 1995, p. 142
114. Chrystyna Lapychak, "Back On Track" **Transition** 15 March 1996, p. 44
115. According to a poll sponsored by the Washington-based International Foundation for Electoral Systems and carried out by the Kyiv Sociological Institute Kuchma's national approval rate in Ukraine reached a dramatic 72 percent. The same poll indicated a big turn around in his rating in western Ukraine.
116. For details of the strike see Chrystyna Lapychak, "Ukraine predicted 'Social Explosion' Fizzles" **Transition**, 22 March 1996, pp. 60-61
117. Anders Åslund, "Eurasia Letter : Ukraine's Turnaround" **Foreign Policy**, Fall 1995, p. 135
118. Kuchma argued that despite formal independence has been achieved real independence was not because of its large arrears to Russia. For more detail see Anders Åslund, "Eurasia Letter: Ukraine's Turnaround" **Foreign Policy**, Fall 1995, p. 135
119. Andrew Wilson, "Ukraine Under Kuchma" **Russia & Successor States Briefing Service** 1995, p. 16
120. *Ibid*, p. 16

COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE TURKISH REPUBLICS

B. Zakir AVŞAR

On the threshold of a new century, the changing political face of the world introduced the seven independent Turkish republics having ties of language, religion, and culture. The changing world also showed that the current communication channels between these Turkish republics and the Turkish communities living autonomously in many countries were insufficient and needed to be developed. The problems confronted at first by the new Turkish republics founded within the borders of the former Soviet Union, the Turkish communities living in the former Union, and Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, stem from the current profound difference in dialect between the Turkish communities. These communities spoke two dialects before the 1917 October Revolution and easily communicated with these dialects. Before the October Revolution, Çagatay and Anatolian Turkish were spoken, there was no difficulty in communication, books published in Istanbul, Taşkent, and Kazan were read easily everywhere and there was profound political, social and cultural communication. However, upon the union of the Turkish communities and republics within the former USSR after 70 years, it was seen that there was a deterioration in the communication ties not only between Turkey and the Turkish communities and republics, but also between the latter. Within the Soviet period, as a result of the attempt to create different nations and, in this way, to spoil the unity of the Soviet Union, language lost its identity of a "common" element to every nation and turned to a number of different languages. Indeed, differences in the alphabet and reading were created that made it difficult to read a book in regions other than the Turkish region where it was published. On the other hand, within the same period, Turkey experienced an alphabet revolution. Thus, the Latin alphabet was introduced in place of the Arabic alphabet, and the "language" started to experience a weakening of the influence of Arabic and Persian.

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Today, starting from the union of the language and alphabet, such projects as the writing of history and literature course books, and the education of 10 thousand young persons from the Central Asian Republics and Azerbaijan in the various universities of the big cities in Turkey were materialized. These people were to establish the unity of the Turkish republics with the modern world. Among the examples to be given in this cultural communication framework are the 100th anniversary celebrations of Orhun Monuments, the celebration of 21st March Newroz Holiday, and the 1000th anniversary celebrations of Manas Epic.

However, with the development of relations, it was seen that there was also a wide gap in communication relations between the Turkish republics. Many Inner Asian and Caucasian speakers who participated in the "Cooperation in the Communication between Turkish Speaking Caucasian and Inner Asian countries" conference (26-27 November 1992, Ankara) complained about the communication monopoly upon their countries. Due to this, the representatives were able to say that the presentation of the Fergana, Karabakh and Almaty events to the world defied truth and with their countries' interests (1). Indeed, the friends that we occasionally see and that live in Central Asia or the Caucasus say that they are able to follow the Serb-Bosnia War, which, for years caused a lot of bloodshed in the Balkans and which is one of the greatest dramas lived by human history, from news from Moscow. They say that in the news, they hear of the Bosnians as being cruel and of the Serbs as being innocent. They add that they become aware of the truth only when they come to Turkey (2). The words of the Turkmen representative in the above mentioned meeting are very interesting and will be beneficial in being expressed here to emphasize the importance of cooperation in communication. Thus, in relation with the tragic events Azerbaijan experienced at the beginning of the 1990s, the Turkmen representative spoke as follows: "A lot of events have taken place in Baku. None of us heard of these events and none of us were informed. The correspondents were distorting the news coming from Moscow. Consequently, none of us know of these events" (3).

Confronting Turkey that claims to be an example to these countries and that wishes to continue its good relations with them within the framework of friendship, there are such countries as Iran and Saudi Arabia that also want to be an example to these republics and that even want to "export revolutions" to them. Such countries as Iran and Saudi Arabia attempted, by making use of various means of communication, to influence the new Turkish republics that were going through a period of transition and that wanted to establish good relations with their neighbours and the world republics. Iran's establishment of "the 8th Shiite Imam" of Samen Ol-A-Eme that broadcasts with a very strong

transmitter near the Turkmenistan border, and its signing treaties with Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan radio-TV organizations and news agencies are a consequence of these attempts (4). Even the writer of these lines has witnessed Saudi Arabia's renting of the national stations of these countries for its broadcasts.

In this article in general, the concepts of communication, communication sources and the current communication structure between Turkey and the Turkish republics will be examined. Moreover, by touching on the communication sources within the current structure, their malfunctioning sides will be mentioned. In addition, a number of suggestions will be put forward for the effectiveness of the communication sources of Turkey and the Turkish republics.

THE CONCEPT OF COMMUNICATION, AND MASS COMMUNICATION

Ünsal Oskay defines the very general concept of communication as the effectiveness of the people who find the means to continue their existence in the same natural conditions, who have produced various pieces of knowledge, who use this knowledge according to specific methods of labour divisions, and who aim at welding different segments of society into a common high level by creating various values and beliefs in order to justify the differences resulting from the different divisions of labour among them (5). On the other hand, Ergun Turgay identifies the communication concept with correspondence. Furthermore, he draws our attention to the fact that often the concept is identified with such mass communication means as radio, television and the newspaper (6). The "communication" concept to be analyzed within the framework of this article refers to the communication established by mass communication means.

Nevertheless, it is seen that communication -- whether realized in its general sense or through mass communication means -- is based on three factors. These factors are a source that sends what is communicated, a number of people that receive and understand what is communicated, and what is communicated, i.e., the message itself.

At times, the source is one person, and at other times, it is a newspaper, an agency, or a radio or television station. In the case of the source being such mass communication means as a radio, television, newspaper, or magazine, a structure related with an association comes to mind.

The persons who are targeted in the process of communication are called target masses (destination). In the communication process another important

factor is the channel. The atmosphere in face-to-face communication, the cable carrying the changes in the electric current, the ions in the air, and frequencies on the radio and television are all channels. Likewise, the newspaper and magazine in the form of a product are also channels.

The source, to reach the person or persons targeted, first enters in a code the knowledge, the feeling and the information to be carried by the message by means of a communication channel. This is done by selecting words, pictures, and symbols. These need to be entered in a code in a way that preserves their essence. If this is not done, in place of the feeling or information wanted to be communicated, very different messages are understood (7).

COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE TURKISH REPUBLICS

Turkey started communication at the interstate level by being the first country to recognize Central Asian Turkish Republics and Azerbaijan after the proclamation of their independence. However, the first steps towards mass communication started with the broadcasts of the Voice of Turkey radio station -- established in 1967 -- in Russian, Azerbaijan Turkish, and English. The aim of the radio station was to cater for the language needs of Central Asia and the Caucasus. In this one-sided communication process, Turkey tried to represent this geography by being the voice of the independent world (8). As to the first step after independence, it is the start of the broadcasting of Eurasian TV that was established on 27 April 1992 as a unit dependent on TRT Television Office (9). On the following days, in place of Turkey's one-sided communication attempt, with the need for the formation of many-sided communication sources, the first steps of the "News Agencies Union of the Turkish Speaking Countries" were taken. This Union was organized on 26-27 November 1992 in Ankara, with the cooperation of TICA and UNESCO (10). Once again, within this framework, the formation of the "Union of the Eurasian Press" was decided on with the conference on the "Role of the Press in the Meeting of the Turkish Republics" (11). The decision was reached on 20-21 October 1993.

In addition to these, such projects as joint film and cinema productions, joint projects for the Eurasian station, joint attempts concerning television education, a relationship between private television stations in Turkey and TV stations broadcasting in the other Turkish Republics, and joint press publication were created. While some of these projects were materialized, some of them were not.

Moreover, such good examples of cooperation as the Council of Turkish World Writers and the Occasion of Turkish World Poetry were seen among cooperators.

COMMUNICATION VIA RADIO AND TELEVISION

The Voice of Turkey broadcasts everyday in Russian to North-West Asia between 20.00 and 21.00, and from 31 metres and a frequency of 9675 kilohertz; it broadcasts in Azerbaijan Turkish to Azerbaijan everyday from three different wavebands; it broadcasts everyday in English to Central Asia between 15.30 and 16.30, and from 31 metres and a frequency of 9630 kilohertz. It is interesting to note that besides Azerbaijan Turkish, the radios do not broadcast in the dialects of the Central Asian Republics. It is important to state here that for the expectations of the public opinion in these countries to be answered, it is necessary for Turkey to start broadcasting with the dialects used in Central Asian Turkish Republics. There are growing complaints that there should be an enrichment of the content of radio broadcasts with more news programmes, and that there should be an "introduction to the development of Turkey in political, social, cultural, economic and technological fields along with education, health and tourism" in order to form a positive public opinion about the Turkish Government and Turkish society. Moreover, complaints exist that there should be greater care in the preparation of general broadcasting plans in view of such principles as "the need to help public opinion be informed of...Turkey's foreign relations."

With Eurasian Television, a broadcasting policy has been thought of with the aim of enabling the Turkish countries and communities having a common language, culture, race and history to come closer, and of realizing cooperation and solidarity. Moreover, emphasis has been placed on the television station becoming the joint station of all the Turkish republics. The goals of Eurasian Television are expressed on TRT General Broadcasting Plan as follows:

Help will be provided for:

Article 3. the development and reinforcement of technical cooperation and cultural relations in economic, industrial, and trade activities with the feeling of togetherness and solidarity between Turkish republics and communities,

Article 4. the continuous handling of such human thoughts as democracy, the superiority of the law, human rights, and a life of peace. The consequent shortening of the process of democratization in the republics,

Article 5. the enabling of togetherness regarding language and culture in the countries and independent regions where people of the same race as the Turks live. The raising of an awareness of motherland, nation and flag in Turkish societies.

The broadcasts of Eurasian Television are materialized through the signals carried to the stations in the Turkish republics by means of satellites sent from

stations in Ankara. The broadcasts are being distributed at these stations by the countries' national television network. However, it is observed that these broadcasts are not sent outside the capitals and that the technical infrastructure of the Turkish republics does not enable the broadcasts to spread over the whole country (13).

Eurasian Television broadcasts directed towards the Turkish republics are being made during the week according to Turkish time between 06:25 and 22:30 and at the weekend between 09:55 and 22:30. Almost 16 hours of all these broadcasts cannot be made by the republics besides Kyrgyzstan. These broadcasts are being made in Uzbekistan for 1.5 hours (on some days they cannot be made), in Turkmenistan for 4 hours, and in Kazakhstan for 3 hours after 23:00. As to Azerbaijan, it is giving TRT programmes in place of Eurasian TV programmes (14).

The difference in the hours of beginning and ending of the broadcasts between the republics spoils the wholeness of the broadcasts. As an example, the Hoca Ahmed Yesevi Programme that is shown at 15:00 according to Turkish time cannot be watched in Kazakhstan (15).

Some private Turkish television stations have made various attempts to both establish private stations with the Turkish republics and to produce programme and film projects. Among these, Samanyolu TV has rented television stations in Crimea and Azerbaijan and is continuing its broadcasts. Besides, Samanyolu is preparing a documentary directed towards Crimea and Azerbaijan and is continuing with its attempts to rent stations from the other Turkish republics (16).

TGRT, another private Turkish station, has attempted to rent stations. However, due to their high cost, it has prepared package programmes specially for Kazakhstan (17).

Moreover, a private Turkish station called Channel 6 has made an agreement with Kazakhstan TAN TV. However, this television has not made the broadcasts of the channel as it wished.

NEWSPAPER-MAGAZINE PUBLICATION

Joint newspaper and magazine publication projects between the Turkish republics and Turkey have been mostly produced with Turkey as a source, and have greatly materialized. Today, Zaman newspaper that is being printed for all the Turkish republics is functioning as a bridge to communication by publishing news both about Turkey and all the Turkish republics.

It is important to note that even TICA's Eurasian Studies magazine directed towards the Turkish republics and published in their dialects, is a joint communication activity.

NEWS AGENCIES UNION OF THE TURKISH SPEAKING COUNTRIES

The first steps of the News Agencies Union of the Turkish Speaking Countries (NAUTSC) that we will approach as one of the first attempts at producing an important communications network between the Turkish republics, were taken between 26-27 November 1992 at the Conference of Cooperation in Communication held in Ankara.

The rules and regulations where NAUTSC's goals were made known were signed by Turkey, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Among these goals were the provision of news exchange among member countries, the development of telecommunication facilities, the reinforcement of professional relationships and solidarity, the protection of the mutual rights of the members, and the provision of the mechanism of news exchange by the members' own dialects (18).

The first general council of the Union was held in Ankara on 8-9 April 1993. It was decided that the joint bulletin of the Union should consist of news in the dialects of the member countries. This decision was agreed upon not only by the founder member countries but also by the representative of Uzbekistan that was not among the founders. In addition, at the 1st general council meeting it was decided that for 4 years the centre of the Union should be Ankara where the General Secretary's agency is located.

The 2nd general council of the Union was held in Bishkek between 11 and 12 May 1994. At the meeting it was decided that effort should be made by Anatolian Agency (AA) to sell the news bulletins and news to international news agencies (19).

As to the 3rd general council, it was held in Girne, Cyprus, between 11 and 12 February 1992. At this meeting, such issues as the increase in communication relations among news agencies, the development of news exchange, and the ability to find solutions to financial and technical matters were dealt with. On the other hand, at the meeting, it was decided to enable member countries to benefit free of charge from the AA and TICA offices in their countries for the proper functioning of the news system between member news agencies (20).

When we look at the sources of Anatolian Agency that is the current leader and secretary of the Union, we see that while there is a flow of news to the member republics from Turkey, there is not enough flow of news from these countries to Turkey (Table 1).

Although Anatolian Agency sends an average of 90-100 news each month to these countries in their own dialects, it is observed that from these countries

Table 1: The Flow of NAUTSC News Between May 1994 and November 1995

Agency	Incoming Information	Out going Information
Turkey	248	1388
Azertag-Azerbaijan	-	970
Kaztag-Kazakhstan	-	695
Kirgizbakar-Kyrgyzstan	-	266
TAK-TRNC	82	1388
Türkmenpress-Turkmenistan	179	836
Uza/Uztak-Uzbekistan	-	920

Source: Anatolian Agency

there is a flow of news only from Turkmenpress of Turkmenistan and TAK Agency of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Moreover, no explicit data has been obtained on the assessment of the news selected from the daily news bulletins of Anatolian Agency and the news sent to TRNC and Uzbekistan in Turkish and to the other countries in their own dialects (21).

The inability of the News Agencies Union of the Turkish Speaking Countries to reach the expected goals, and the inability to take concrete steps in the matters dealt with at the general council meetings stem from the financial difficulties that the Turkish republics now confront and that we believe are temporary. Apart from financial difficulties, another reason why NAUTSC cannot achieve the expected efficiency and success is the deficiency in such technical material as telephone, fax, and modem. Moreover, there are the human sources that are inexperienced in the international circulation of news and inefficient in the display of the required performance.

JOINT ACTIVITY AND VOLUNTARY COMMUNICATION ASSOCIATIONS

The representatives of the communication associations of the Turkish republics came together on 20-21 October 1993 in Istanbul at the conference of "the Role of the Press in the Meeting of the Turkish Republics." During this conference, the idea that the Eurasian Press Union should be established was approved and the goals of the union were stated as follows:

"To exchange information among the press agencies that undertake the responsibility to acquaint the Turkish republics and communities, to enable the continuous improvement of the image of Turkey and the Turkish republics in the media in Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Turkish republics, and to realize cooperation and solidarity in communication" (22).

However, none of such very important suggestions as the conference that

was expected to be held each year, the European Press Union whose rules and regulations were said to be decided on in April 1994, a consequent joint publication, cooperation among press organizations, and a joint press award were realized.

The Union of Turkish World Writers was established with the attempts of the Union of Turkish Writers. The former took the initiative in holding the Turkish World Poetry Occasion in Turkey, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan. Moreover, this union distributed the joint poetry awards given in the name of the great poets of the Turkish World. Clearly, this attempt, which has become a tradition, contributes greatly to mutual cultural communication among countries (23).

Upon the attempts of the Owners of the Works of Turkish Science and Literature Profession Union, which is once again a council of Turkish writers, the first of the Council of Turkish World Writers was held in 1992 and the second in 1994. Both the councils were held in Ankara. Among the participants were journalists, writers, and poets from the Turkish republics and communities. The councils reached such decisions as the need for the writers of the Turkish world to adopt joint attitudes, and the need to take quick steps towards establishing a Turkish world public opinion. Moreover, the decision arrived at in the second council was the establishment of the Organization of Turkish World Education and Culture (OTWEC) (24).

CONCLUSION

Immediately after Azerbaijan and the Central Asian Turkish Republics gained their independence, the attempts at cooperation of mass communication have not until now produced the desired results. A majority of the reasons that account for the inability of the attempts to develop are economic. In our opinion, the most important reason for NAUTSC not to be of the desired quality despite the excitement of its supporters at its foundation and their pointing out to its need, lies in these economic problems. It should be noted here that NAUTSC is the most important element in the cooperation of mass communication started among the Turkish republics, and that it is desired to function on a horizontal communication model. The reason for this inefficiency is seen to be the fact that the NAUTSC offices of some of the republics are deprived of the necessary technical infrastructure, that telephone communication is expensive, and that there is not enough paper to place in the fax machine (25). This inefficiency has not been wholly solved even though TICA granted the news agency representatives the right to benefit from the available offices in these countries. Another problem of the offices of NAUTSC outside Turkey is the absence of sufficiently experienced personnel

in the flow of international news.

We have already mentioned, with respect to TRT Eurasian broadcasts, the difficulties encountered in the broadcasting times and in the appearance of the broadcasts on television after the broadcasts are no longer shown by satellite. However, the most important problem in addition to all these is the content of the broadcasts and the understandability of the language used. Some of the Eurasian television spectators that we interrogated talked about programmes that do not correspond with their broadcasting times, about the content of programmes, about the insufficiency of the programmes made about their countries or in their countries, and about there being times when they cannot understand the programmes as the language generally used is Turkish spoken in Turkey. One cannot but understand how right these criticisms are when one considers the desire for the Eurasian station to be the joint TV station of the Turkish World. This desire persists even though the centre of the station is Turkey.

It is seen that there is fruitful cooperation with respect to newspaper and magazine publication. However, if the variety of the information needed by the Turkish public opinion related to the Turkish republics is taken into consideration, it would be useful if the newspapers and magazines increased the news and information they gave about the Turkish republics.

TELEVISION BROADCASTS

As mentioned above, the Eurasian station has been thought of as the joint TV station of the Turkish republics. It is for this reason that Turkey should not be one-sided in the preparation of the broadcasts and that it should enable all the preparations to be made by a joint organization with the representatives of the Turkish republics.

The foremost issues that came out in the researches made about the content of the messages communicated via the TV station may be cited as follows:

1. Dealing with the epics that have a joint cultural value (i.e., *Köroğlu*, *Oğuzhan*, *Ergenekon*, *Manas*, *Bozkurt*, and the like),
2. Dealing with the persons that have devoted themselves both to the Turkish culture, scientific life and art, and to humanity (i.e., *Ahmed Yesevi*, *Ibn-i Sina*, *Ali Şir Nevai*, *Fuzuli*, *Yunus Emre*, *Mevlana*, *Kaşgarlı Mahmut*, *Ali Kuşçu*, *Mahdum Kuli*, *Abay*, *Genceli Nizami*, and the like),
3. Dealing with issues related with the Islamic religion,
4. Dealing with important events between Turkey and the Turkish world, and with military and political developments in the international field,
5. Trade and economic activities, and
6. Programmes for the young.

One of the current problems of Eurasian broadcasts is the narrowness of the area of broadcasts. With respect to this problem, it is seen that there may be such precautions as the renting by Turkey of one of the available stations of the Turkish republics or the development of its broadcasting area using different transmitters. The problem is going to be solved by itself and the countries are going to increase the time they devoted to these broadcasts when the station is converted into a "joint broadcast making" goal and when a broadcast content is established by forming a new broadcast organization.

It is obvious that this joint channel will gradually be watched more with the dramas, documentaries, music and other programmes produced in the Turkish republics. It is natural that in order for this joint channel to materialize, the necessary infrastructure needs to be created. This infrastructure does not only consist of the "Joint Broadcasting Council." In addition to this council, there is a need for the establishment of a Eurasian TV bureau, the responsibility of this bureau for the flow of news, and the creation of a forum that does programme research and production.

NEWS AGENCIES

It is seen that until now the News Agencies Union of the Turkish Speaking Countries (NAUTSC) has not been able to provide what has been hoped for. This union has experienced three general councils. It is believed that its importance has been grasped by all the countries from the speeches made in all its council meetings and from the promises made. However, despite all this, there is much dispute over why this union has not been as fruitful as expected.

Thus, the NAUTSC should as soon as possible acquire an identity that reaches the desired goals that were stated at the outset. For this purpose, it is necessary to start from the education of the NAUTSC officials of the Turkish republics that do not have enough experience with respect to the flow of international news. A method that will reduce late progress will be to start everything anew with this personnel that can receive intensive training and that can later on be given an opportunity to do training for some time in the Anatolian Agency in order to acquire news agency experience. The temporary financial difficulties of the Turkish republics confront us as another reason for the NAUTSC's failure in meeting expectations. These difficulties will be overcome for the NAUTSC by means of its marketing the news and bulletins that it receives in the international flow of news.

As far as we see, the NAUTSC's flow of news is realized through two stages. Every country writes its own news in its own dialect and this news comes to Ankara which is the centre of the NAUTSC. Then, the news that comes to the agency is translated to other dialects, and becomes a "finished product."

As it is seen, the first stage involves accumulating news, and the next stage involves processing the news. At the first stage, those that accumulate the news make a news copy of the processed news, i.e., events, speeches, and conferences; these copies are sent to the NAUTSC's centre. At the second stage, after the work of the news editors, text readers, and translators, the news becomes ready to be given to the reader/spectator.

With the publication of the joint bulletin of the NAUTSC and the distribution of this bulletin to the Turkish republics, the member countries of the NAUTSC may give greater support to the union.

JOINT VOLUNTARY ESTABLISHMENTS AND PROFESSION UNIONS

It will be beneficial if such organizations as the Union of the European Press and the Union of Turkish World Writers were supported and such relationships as the Council of Writers and Poetry Occasion were continued. The Turkish film, music, culture, art, and folk festivals and competitions should be held by means of such voluntary unions. Moreover, joint awards in the branches of journalism, poetry, art and profession should be considered within the framework of these activities.

The projects of connecting the Turkish republics to the Internet via TICA are continuing. In addition to this, attempts have been made to establish a Turkish world information bank and to transfer information between the Turkish world libraries and universities. However, a concrete result has not been obtained from these projects. We hope that these efforts will continue with the same eagerness and enthusiasm as at the outset.

Footnotes:

1. **Türkçe konuşan Kafkasya ve İçasya Ülkeleriyle Türkiye Arasında İletişimde İşbirliği Konferansı** [Conference of Cooperation between the Turkish Speaking Caucasian and Inner Asian Countries and Turkey (26-27 November 1992, Ankara), Ankara: TICA, 1993.
2. Zahir B. Avcı. **Türkiye'nin Yeni Türk Cumhuriyetleri ile İlişkilerinde İletişim Araçlarından Yararlanma Konusunda Bazı Tespitler**, (Some Findings about Turkey's Benefiting from the Means of Communication in Its Relations with the New Turkish Republics), report presented to the Prime Minister, Ankara, 1994.
3. "Türkçe konuşan" op cit, p. 53.
4. **Anatolian Agency Bulletin**, 29 May 1992; **Zaman gazetesi**, 30 May 1992.
5. Ünsal Oskay, **İletişimin ABC'si**, (the ABC of Communication) (İstanbul: Simavi Yayınları 1992) 15.
6. Turgay Aykut-Ergun Polatoğlu. **Kamu yönetimine giriş** (Introduction to Public Relations), (Ankara: TODAİE, 1988). p198.
7. Ünsal Oskay. **İletişimin ABC'si**, p.19-21
8. Mehmet Akif Erbaş, "Dış yayıncılığımız ve Türk dünyası" (Our external publication and the

Turkish world), Unpublished proclamation text presented at the council of the Solidarity, Friendship and Cooperation of the Turkish State and Communities (İzmir, 1995).

9. Gürkan Elçi. **"Radyo ve televizyon, Avrasya yayınları kuruluşları arasında işbirliğinin geliştirilmesi, yayınların değerlendirilmesi ve ortak yayın olanakları"** Radio and Television, the Development of Cooperation between Eurasian Publication Organizations, the Appraisal of Publications and Joint Publication Opportunities)
10. **Türkçe konuşan Kafkasya ve İçasya ülkeleriyle Türkiye arasında iletişimde işbirliği konferansı**, (The Conference of Cooperation Between Turkish Speaking Caucasian and Inner Asian Countries and Turkey) (26-27 November 1992, Ankara), Ankara: TICA, 1993) p.25.
11. Bekir Erdem. "İletişim alanında ortak projeler ve işbirliği çalışmaları" Joint Projects and Cooperation Work in the Field of Communication. Unpublished proclamation text presented at the council of the Solidarity, Friendship and Cooperation of the Turkish State and Communities (İzmir, 1995).
12. Gürkan Elçi. op cit.
13. Ibid.
14. Mehmet Ali Özpolat. **"TRT Avrasya televizyonu yayınları ve genel bir değerlendirme"** (TRT Eurasian Television Broadcasts and a General Appraisal). Unpublished proclamation text presented at the council of the Solidarity, Friendship and Cooperation of the Turkish State and Communities (İzmir, 1995).
15. Ibid.
16. Bekir Erdem, op cit.
17. Ibid.
18. Records of a personal interview with Mr. E. Ekrem Karaismailoğlu, the general manager of Anatolian Agency, Ankara, 10 Dec. 1995.
19. The 2nd General Council Result Report made in Bishkek, Source: **Anatolian Agency**.
20. The 3rd General Council Result Report made in Gime, Source: **Anatolian Agency**.
21. Anatolian Agency NAUTSC Monthly Activity reports.
22. The Result Report of the Conference of the Role of the Press in the Meeting of the Turkish Republics (İstanbul, 20-21 October 1993).
23. **Türkiye Yazarlar Birliği 1994 Yılı, (The 1994 Yearbook of the Union of Turkish Writers)**. Ankara, 1995.
24. 1. **Türk dünyası Yazarlar Kurultayı** (Ankara, 23-25 Ekim 1993), tartışmalar ve Bildirgeler (the Council of Turkish World Writers (Ankara, 23-24 October), Discussions and Reports), (Ankara: İlesam, 1992).
25. Unpublished report on NAUTSC activities prepared by Anatolian Agency, Ankara, 1995.

A SAD EPISODE FROM AZERBAIJAN HISTORY: THE PROBLEM OF JOINING KARABAKH KHANATE TO THE RUSSIAN ADMINISTRATION

INTRODUCTION

Zekeriya TÜRKMEN

The Karabağ problem currently confronts us as one of the most important problems in the Caucasus. This problem concerns the Turkish Republic in the same way as it does Azerbaijan. This is because the geography shared by both countries closely concerns the vital benefits of both. Moreover, it preoccupies both world and Turkish public opinion (1).

Karabakh is a very old Turkish settlement area. With the beginning of the spread of the Russian Czardom to the South from the XVIIIth century on, the Southern part of the Caucasus also became exposed to this threat in the XIXth century. As is known, the geography of South Caucasus has been ruled by the Ottoman Empire for many years. Thus, there is a need to examine the Ottoman sources in the investigation of the history of this region.

As to the population of Karabakh until the 1980s the majority of its population was formed by Azeri Turks. The Armenians, from this year, made the population of Karabakh stable with the help of the Russians and formed the majority by making the Turks in this region a minority. Indeed, if one looks at the census of 1979, there are 123,076 Armenians against 37,264 Turks in Karabakh where the total population is 162,200 (2).

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THE PROBLEM OF JOINING KARABAKH KHANATE TO THE RUSSIAN ADMINISTRATION

The Russians stretching the length of the Hazar coast in 1722 went as far as the Caucasus via **Sirvan**. This led the Azerbaijan khanates to ask for the help of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, the Ottoman State sent forces headed by Köprülü Abdullah Pasha (3). Consequently, a great part of Nakcivan, Merend, Tebriz, Karabakh and Azerbaijan was once again joined to the Ottoman Empire. When the Ottomans, who reached an agreement with Russia in 1724, withdraw their forces from the Russian region, Nadir Shah began to invade Azerbaijan. Some time later, the Ottoman Empire entered this war due to the problem of Iran and Causasus. It is observed that after his invasion of Azerbaijan, Nadir Shah tried to establish authority with his own men by suppressing the native khanates in the region. However, it cannot be said that Nadir Shah and his successors were successful in attaining complete authority in the region. In the meantime, the Armenians in the region were trying to turn circumstances to their advantage. The quarrels between the khanates in Azerbaijan enabled the Azeri nobles to take action. Meanwhile, the Armenians were trying to persuade the Russians to go to the Caucasus. The Russians, on the other hand, were trying to use the Armenians against the Turks in their politics. It was extremely advantageous for the Russians that the Armenians were Christians. Hence, considering religious conflicts, it was possible to benefit from the Armenians (4).

Thus, Czarist Russia began to attack Transcaucasus from the XIX th century on word. It tried to draw the khanates in the region to its side and to dominate them. The Russians who first conquered Georgia sent forces to the khanates of Azerbaijan. For the conquest of the khanates of Transcaucasus, the Russians brought Prince Sisianov to the head of the forces under the title commander in chief. In 1803, Sisianov began to occupy Gence Khanate and on 2 January 1804 he occupied the centre of the khanate. After conquering the centre of Gence Khanate, Gence, the Prince changed its name to *Elizabethpol* in honour of the Russian Czarina Elizabeth (5). The Russians put such great pressure on Gence that in the words of an Azerbaijan historian Mahmut İsmayil, "whoever called the city by the name Gence, had to pay one manat." Thus, uttering the name that had been used for centuries was a sufficient reason for paying this fine.

The progress of the Russians in Caucasus in this way caused the Ottoman and Iranian Governments great anxiety. On the other hand, the Russians descending to the South of Caucasus did not please England and France. These two countries provoked the Ottoman Empire and Iran against the Russians so that the Russian forces would be ousted from South Caucasus. Iran reacted positively to such provocation. The Shah proclaimed war in 1804 with the intention of placing Russia to the North of the Caucasus. Worried that Karabakh would be invaded by Iran in the Russian-Iranian war, the khan of Karabakh, İbrahim Halil Khan, sought the help of Prince Sisianov. In return, he promised to remain faithful to Russia. As to General Sisianov, he promised that he would see İbrahim Halil Khan as a khan if the latter accepted his power over him. Despite all this, the Khan was hesitant. However, if he did not want help from Russia, his defeat by Iran was inevitable. Thus, as in the Turkish saying, "he who falls into the sea tightly holds the snake," İbrahim Halil Khan saw the Russians as the best of the worst. During this time, the Khan defeated the forces sent to Karabakh by the Shah of Iran. Worried that this defeat would draw the Shah's attention, the Khan sought other means to overpower the Shah. However, finding himself in political solitude and not being able to find another way out, he was compelled to resume negotiations with Sisianov. On 14 May 1805, a treaty was signed between İbrahim Halil Khan and Sisianov with respect to the acceptance of the power of Russia over Karabakh Khanate. This treaty was also accepted by a relative of the Khan of Karabakh, the Khan of Şeki Khanate, Selim Khan. This relative lived on the **Kürekcay** (Kura) coast. Şeki Khanate was for the present away from external danger. However, there was chaos in its internal affairs. One week later, even Şeki Khanate joined the Russian domination. According to the treaty made with Russia, the Karabakh and Şeki Khanates were to give 7-8000 manats to the Russian czar every year and settle the Russian forces in their own khanates. Moreover, although they were to run their internal affairs independently, they had to ask for the consent of Russia in their external affairs.

One month after the joining of the Karabakh and Şeki Khanates to Russia, Iranian forces attacked Karabakh. This led to war between Iran and Russia. General Sisianov was killed when he captured the Baku Khanate. After the death of Sisianov, the Russian soldiers headed towards Baku through the Caucasus. In the meantime, Iran went to Karabakh and besieged Şuşa Fortress. Upon the siege of Şuşa by Iran, İbrahim Halil Khan sent his family to Hankend. The military force of the Czar became suspicious upon this. Headed by

Major Lisanevic, they followed the Khan to Hankend and brutally killed him with all his family, including the little ones in the cradle. This led to a revolt against the Russians in Şeki. The Şeki Khan ousted the Russian forces from the territory of the Khanate. During these events, the Russian forces entered Karabakh, drove away the Iranian forces, and joined the Baku Khanate to the Russian administration. To escape from the Russian pursuit, the Khan of Şeki took refuge in Iran after some time (6). Thus, the Russian Czar, following the political and military activities it put into practice within the years 1803-1805, completely included Karabakh Khanate into its own territory. Later, present day problems were created due to an increase in Armenian migration and the conversion of the Turks into a minority in Karabakh.

The text of the agreement on "The Karabakh Khanate's Transfer to Russian Administration", dated 18 May 1805 was first published in Tbilisi in 1868 both in handwriting and in print. When Armenian incidents in Karabakh and Armenian in the region increased the Azerbaijani Printing Committee initiated the publication of its Russian copy, its English and Azerbaijani Turkish translations in 1992.

DRAFT of TREATY

IN THE NAME OF GOD ALMIGHTY

We, i.e., İbrahim-khan Shushinsky (of the city of Shusha) and Karabaksky (of the khanate of Karabakh) and General of infantry of All Russia's troops Caucasian inspection on infantry and others Prince (knyaz) Pavel Tsitsianov with the full power given to me by his Emperor's Highness to dearest and greatest Sir Emperor Alexander Pavlovich took up with the help of God the matter of granting everlasting citizenship of All Russian Empire to İbrahim Khan Shushinsky and Karabakhsy with all family, posterity and possessions of his.

The Treaty was concluded, confirmed and signed with the following articles.

ARTICLE 1

1. İbrahim Khan Shushinsky on my behalf, on behalf on my heirs, successor abdicate any vassalage and whichever title it might be any dependence from Persia or any other state and in this way I declare the fact to the whole world that I don't consider myself and the successors of mine of having any power. The only power we recognize is the Supreme Power of His Emperor's Highness All Russia's great Emperor and his greatest heirs and successors of All Russia's Emperor Throne. I promise to keep faithfulness to the throne like faithful slave and to which I have to swear on Koran in accordance with the custom.

ARTICLE 2

His Emperor's Highness on behalf of his openhearted promise he gives his word of honour and reassures with his Emperor's word of honour for himself and for his successors that favour and care towards İbrahim Khan Shushinsky and Karabakhsy and will never cease to exist.

To prove this fact His Emperor's Highness gives the guarantee to keep the whole possessions and successors intact.

ARTICLE 3

To repay the openheartedness of Ibrahim-khan Shushinsky and Karabakhsky to recognize the supreme and sole power of All Russia's Emperor over himself and his successors this article states that he, the Khan and later his elder son and each elder successor when accepting the khanate has the right to receive Emperor's confirmation on the khanate from the Governor of Georgia.

It consist of the deed (official document), official state seal. While receiving it the new Khan is to take the oath to be faithful to Russian Empire and to recognize the supreme and sole power of Russian Emperor over himself and his successors. The form of the oath is enclosed in this Treaty. The present Ibrahim-khan Shushinsky and Karabakhsky took the oath in presence of Governor of Georgia and general of infantry prince Tsitsianov.

ARTICLE 4

I, i.e., Ibrahim-khan Shushinsky and Karabakhsky to prove that my intentions towards my and my successors' faithfulness to All Russia's Empire and recognition of the Supreme and sole power of the highest possessors of the Empire promise not to have any relations with neighbouring possessors without preliminary consent of Governor of Georgia. And when the envoys from them come or the letters are sent I promise to send the most important ones to the Governor and demand the solving of the questions from him and the ones with less importance to be reported and discussed with the person representing the Governor at my place.

ARTICLE 5

His Emperor's Highness accepts the recognition of his supreme and sole power over the possessions of Ibrahim-khan Shushinsky and Karabakhsky with good will and promises: 1) to treat the peoples of these possessions with the same honour as his own faithful citizens without sorting them out from those inhabiting the vast Russian Empire. 2) To preserve continuously the honour of Ibrahim-khan, his house, heirs and posterity in the area of Shusha khanate. 3) To give all the power of internal governing, court and persecution, income and its possession to Ibrahim-khan. 4) In order to guard Ibrahim-khan, his house and his possessions I promise to send troops (500 persons) with cannons, headquarters and officers and in case of greater defence the Governor of Georgia will have to increase the number of troops due to circumstances to defend militarily the possessions of All Russia's Empire.

ARTICLE 6

I, i.e. Ibrahim-khan Shushinsky and Karabakhsky in response of my faithful diligence make commitment: 1) At the beginning and later on to store up the necessary quantity of wheat and corn by reasonable price determined by the Chief Governor because its supply from Elisavetpol is rather difficult or even must be stated as impossible. 2) The above mentioned troops should be provided with houses to stay in Shusha Fortress. They should be selected by the will of the Commander. They should be supplied with reasonable quantity of firewoods. 3) To make the Elisavetpol bound entrance into Shusha fortress comfortable and to build the road suitable for arba passing. 4) It would be convenient for the government to build up a road from Shusha Fortress in the direction of Djevad. The workmen must be paid the salary determined by the government.

ARTICLE 7

His Emperor's Highness showing his goodwill and kindness to his majesty Ibrahim-khan kindly

presents his banner with the state Emblem of Russian Empire which is to be kept with him a symbol of khanate and power. Nobody except the khan has the right to carry it to war as it was presented by his Emperor's Highness.

ARTICLE 8

I, i.e Ibrahim-khan Shushinsky and Karabakhsky having His Emperor's Highness permission to spend my usual income make the commitment to pay contribution into the exchequer treasury of His Emperor's Highness in Tifliss 8.000 chervonets (gold piece coin) a year, to pay it in two halves. 1st half on February 1st and the second half on September 1st beginning with the 1st payment of 4.000 chervonets. Confirming the concluding this treaty by his Emperor's Highness and according to Asian tradition, besides the oath to faithfulness I pawn my elder son's Mamed-Hassan-Aga's son of the second Shukur-Ullah to stay forever in Tifliss.

ARTICLE 9

His Emperor's Highness kindly expressing his mercy as a taken of faithfulness guarantees his Majesty khan's grandson 10 roubles of Russian money a day.

ARTICLE 10

This Treaty is concluded for ever and is not to be subjected to any changes from now to forever.

ARTICLE 11

The confirmation of this Treaty by His Emperor's Highness with the state sealed deed (official document) must be presented within 6 months after its signing or sooner if possible. In confirmation of that the undersigned parties signed these articles in the camp of Elisavetpol region near r. Kura in summer of 1805 A.D. (Mohammedah 1220) on May 14th.

Acts collected by Caucasus Archeological Commission. Vol 2, p. 705 Tifliss 1868.

CONCLUSION

In 1804, after the collapse of the Gence Khanate, the other khanates were joined to the Russian imperialism by means of various Russian stratagems. The Karabakh Khan, Ibrahim Halil Khan, had to reach an agreement with the Russians on 14 May 1805. According to the agreement, the Karabakh Khanate had to pay a certain tax, and allow a Russian garrison to remain in the centre of Karabakh, Şuşa. In return, the Karabakh Khanate was going to remain independent. As Ibrahim Halil Khan knew this to be a kind of slavery, he sought every opportunity for independence. As a result of the death of the commander of the Russian forces, General Sisianov, in Bakü in 1806, a general revolt started in Azerbaijan. In order to turn this to his advantage, Ibrahim Halil Khan decided to oust the Russian garrison. In the meantime, even the Iranian forces had risen against the Russians. However, Ibrahim Halil Khan's attempt to oust the Russian garrison had been made known to the garrison's commander in Şuşa. Upon this, the commander Lisanovic, in a raid in June

1806, had the Khan and his entire family killed (7). With Gülistan Treaty in 1813 Russia completely dominated Karabakh.

It was not only in South Caucasus but also in Central Asia that the Russians followed the same policy. In other words, in these regions they occupied the Turkish cities one by one and then put into practice their policy of assimilation.

Footnotes:

1. Cemalettin Taşkıran, *Geçmişten günümüze Karabağ meselesi* (The Karabakh Problem from the Past to the Present), Ankara 1995, p. VII.
2. Taşkıran, p. 14.
3. Abdullah Pasha is the son of Sadrazam Köprülü Fazıl Mustafa Pasha and the son-in-law of Şeyhülislam Feyzullah Efendi. He held various offices in the Ottoman Government. He died near Bogaverd in a war with Nadir Shah in 1735.
4. Akdes Nimet Kurat, *Türkiye ve Rusya* (Turkey and Russia), Ankara 1970, p. 203.
5. Mahmut İsmayil, *Azerbaycan Tarihi* (History of Azerbaijan), Baku 1993, pp. 207-208 (published in the Cyrillic alphabet).
6. For more information, see İsmayil, pp. 210-211.
7. Taşkıran, p. 68.

Book Review

RUSSIA AND AZERBAIJAN: A BORDERLAND IN TRANSITION

by of Tadeusz Swietochowski,

Columbia University Press, 1995, pp. 290.

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A COUNTRY AT THE CROSSROADS: AZERBAIJAN

The last centuries of human history bear witness to the generation of havoc and carnage by the breaks up of world empires and super powers which ruled a vast area of land with inhabitants of different ethnic, religious and national backgrounds.

Towards the end twentieth century the Soviet Union has totally disintegrated and suddenly disappeared from the international scene in a relatively short time. As mentioned, history recorded the gradual decline and final fall of great empires of the past. The collapse of the Soviet Union differs from other old empires.

The Soviet Union had an abrupt end to its reign. The Soviet Union has inexplicably turned to be an ultimate oblivion without experiencing prolonged loss of vitality.

Swietochowski's book concentrates specifically on Azerbaijan taking the last two centuries of this unknown land under close examination. As the title of book **Russia and Azerbaijan: A Borderland in Transition** suggests, the author deals with a divided people in a divided land between north and south. Swietochowski uses archival sources, official documents and numerous books and articles written in various languages while informing his readers about a land and its people which only a handful number of people would know where Azerbaijan is before the downfall of the Soviet Union.

As Swietochowski's work informs us Azerbaijan has been a continuous concern to Turkey, Iran and the Russian Empire during the course of centuries. The influx of Oghuz Turkic tribes to the region in the eleventh century has brought a significant proportion of Turkic-speaking inhabitants which resulted in gradual replacement of the Persian language by Azeri Turkish language. The history of Azerbaijan is one of mixtures and complexities, changing hands to

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Turks by coming under their Muslim rule in mid-seventh century then succumbing to Mongol invasion in the thirteenth century. At the end of the fifteenth century it has become a power base for Safavids with the coming of Shah Ismail to power during which the religious map of the region was changed by the imposition of Shi'ite branch of Islam. The treaty of Gulistan in 1812 enabled Russians to play a long a lasting role in Azerbaijan which explored the Sunni-Shi'ite tension among Azeris by using Shi'ite volunteers (p. 10) against Turkey in 1828-1829 and against Shamil's anti-Russian jihad in Daghestan.

Russian imperialism proved to be very effective in the oil rich Azerbaijan (p. 19) which received almost no Russian investment until mid-nineteenth century. Russians have extracted huge amount of oil on an unparalleled scale in Baku and while in 1898 Baku's oil production surpassed that of the United States, after 1905 this region has ceased to be a major factor in oil market as a result of irreversibly damaging production and accordingly exhaustion of resources.

The book under review asserts that Azerbaijani identity is marked by the values to which people of this land surrender (p. 60) as Rasulzade, a leading Azeri intellectual, is quoted to have put it explicitly "With regard to language we are Turks, Turkism is our nationality. With regard to religion we are Muslims. Every religion creates among its followers a particular civilization, and this civilization generates some form of internationalism. As Muslims and Turks we are a part of the International of Islam". Swietochowski argues (p. 108) that Russians devised a policy of dismantling the bedrock of Azeri identity by promoting "the millat over the umma identity, of the secular, rather than the Islamic foundations of communal life, and of fragmentation rather than of the Muslim unity." The brutal and pervasive campaign to deconstruct Islamic identity and to replace it with secular and atheist identity resulted as observed by Swietochowski (p. 116) in abandoning "the visible manifestations of Islamic identity, such as the observance of the five pillars of Islam..."

Swietochowski also unfolds the history of Azerbaijan under the control of Iran in the south. As part of accelerated assimilation policy Azeri Turkish was banned at the schools on the grounds that Azeri Turkish "could corrupt a proper persian accent." Swietochowski notes (p. 170) that "Azeri was thus reduced to the status of a spoken idiom with a stigma of social inferiority attached to those who use it. To insist that Azerbaijan had its own national language was politically dangerous, and a writer arrested by the secret police was forced to deny in front of television cameras that such a language existed."

The assimilation policies were further accelerated during 1960s and the government's Persianization effort at the grass-roots level intensified. Swietochowski draws comparisons (p. 173) between Russian controlled north and Iranian controlled south Azerbaijan. He argues that "the suppression of Azeri identity in Iran had certain parallels albeit different in scope and character, in the Soviet Union. Despite all the assimilationist policies in Iran, Azeris managed to retain their own peripheral ethnic identity as expressed by the successful boycott of constitutional referendum on 2 December 1979.

The startling collapse of the Soviet Union enabled the expression of Azeri identity on their own independent soil. Moreover, the old Azeri-Armenian conflict, remained under the ashes during the Soviet rule, surfaced again in 1988. The Moscow administration once more resorted to force to put down sentiments of independence and the revival of religious and cultural identity of Azerbaijanis in the early 1990s which claimed the lives of many civilian Azerbaijanis. This tragic military intervention that took place in Baku was approved by the United States State Department and the Western media showed a biased reaction and made no references to the hundreds killed by the Russian army's onslaught.

Swietochowski's articulate analysis of last two hundred years of troubled Azerbaijan ends with an insightful touch on the recent developments and their far reaching implications for domestic and international politics. The scanning of twentieth-century Azerbaijan reveals the marking of President Haidar Aliyev on the design and shape of domestic politics.

Swietochowski's valuable and informative book addresses significant themes in the history of Azerbaijan and furnishes the reader with an insight about a country that lies at the crossroads of Turkish-Russian-Iranian geopolitical and geocultural triangles.

CHRONOLOGY

TURKEY

- In the last five years there have been imports of 2.9 billion liras in CIS countries in terms of border and coastal trade. In return there have been exports of 1.1 billion liras to these countries. (Gunaydin, 23 January 1996)
- Turkey-Turkmenistan Strategic Cooperation Conference which was organized by the Turkish International Cooperation Agency (TICA) was held in Ankara and Istanbul among 18-20 December 1995. The relations between Turkey and Turkmenistan were evaluated from various dimensions by the officials from both countries. The speakers in the conference drew attention to the existing ties of brotherhood between the two countries and they stressed that the most important element for the improvement of these ties is to increase the studies on a common language and to continue with the studies on a common terminology. (Eurasian File, no.49, January 96/2)
- TRT-1 Broadcasts are being watched as of January 1, 1996 in the whole of Azerbaijan due to the agreement reached between TICA and Azerbaijan Communication Ministry and the company of Azerbaijani State Teleradio Broadcasts. (Eurasian File, no.50, February 96/1)
- On January 25, 1996 "Agreement of Protocol on Economic, Commercial, Educational, Cultural and Environmental Issues" was signed between TICA and Tatarstan Agency for Improvement of International Cooperation of the Russian Federation. (Eurasian File, no.50, February 96/1)
- Turkey ranked second among the countries from which Russia imported goods. Tanzer Guven, the commercial attaché of the Turkish Embassy in Moscow, stated that, excluding the unofficial trade which is termed as "suit-case trade," Turkey ranked second, after Germany, in exporting goods to Russia. (Gunaydin, 11 February 1996)
- The memorandum of agreement relating to the transport of natural gas and the protocol relating to the improvement of relations and cooperation was signed yesterday between President Suleyman Demirel and the Turkmen President Saparmurad Turkmenbasi. (Zaman, 13 February 1996)
- The project agreement was signed between Turkey and Turkmenistan in Ankara that envisaged giving Turkey, on a case-by-case basis, 15 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year until the year 2020. (Cumhuriyet, 14 February 1996)
- An agreement was signed between Turkish Association of History and Russian Academy of Sciences that enabled the Turkish historians to use the Russian archives regarding Turkish history. (Zaman, 26 March 1996)

AZERBAIJAN

- Russian Prime Minister V. Chernomyrdin and Azerbaijani President H. Aliyev signed a package of bilateral agreements regarding the export of early oil production from the Russian port in the Black Sea. The agreement comprises the export of Caucasian early oil production, up to 5 tonnes, to the world market through the Russian oil pipeline. (OMRI Daily Digest, 19 January 1996)
- International Development Agency gave \$ 65 million credits to Azerbaijan for 35

years without any interest to support the stability program and economic reforms. (Eurasian File, no.48, January 96/1)

- Azerbaijan Ministry of Justice prohibited the activities of three organizations on January 30, 1996. These organizations are: Democratic Youth Organization; established by the former head of OPON, R. Dzhevadov who was recently assassinated, Labor Party; the activities of which are said to be directed by the former President A. Muttalibov, and Gardashlyg (Brotherhood) Association. (OMRI Daily Digest, 22 February 1996)
- An agreement regarding economic, scientific-technical and cultural cooperation was signed between the Republic of Kalmykia and Azerbaijan. The agreement has the same qualifications as the one between Azerbaijan and Astrakhan Oblast that was signed a week ago. (OMRI Daily Digest, 22 February 1996)
- Azerbaijan President H. Aliyev went to Tbilisi for a three-day official visit. Aliyev and his Georgian colleague E. Shevardnadze signed 15 friendship and cooperation agreement. A declaration was also issued regarding the achievement of peace, stability and cooperation in the Caucasus. (OMRI Daily Digest, 11 March 1996)
- An agreement was signed the other day in Moscow regarding the transportation of the early oil production of the Caspian Sea. According to that agreement, the Caspian Sea oil will be transported through the existing pipe line from Baku to the Russian port Novorossiysk. (Hurriyet, 20 January 1996)
- It was announced that the United States has lifted the embargo on Azerbaijan through amending Article 907 that hindered delivering humanitarian aid to this country. (Zaman, 3 February 1996)
- It was announced that the total amount of Azerbaijani oil reserve was 3.5 billion tonnes and the number of oil fields that are not opened to expertise was 145. (Dunya, 12 February 1996)
- The agreement regarding the transportation of Azerbaijani early oil production through Baku-Supsa (Georgia) oil pipe line which is one of the two routes, was signed in Tbilisi. (Aksam, 9 March 1996)
- Fifteen agreements were signed between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan in various fields. (Gunaydin, 19 March 1995)

COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES (CIS)

- According to AFP's statement on 29 December 1996 based on the statistical data of January-November 1995 that was received from CIS Committee on Statistics, there is a 4% decrease in Russia's total domestic production whereas there is a 5% increase in the same field of Armenia. Decrease in total domestic production was 17.4% in Azerbaijan and 12% in the Ukraine. According to the report, industrial production in the CIS countries dropped by 6.1%. While high inflation rate remains to be a problem, Azerbaijan was the country where the inflation rate in November was the lowest, 2.5%. Tajikistan, on the other hand, was suffering the highest inflation rate, 56.9%. Annual inflation rate in the year 1995 had been 60.3% in Kazakhstan and 76.8% in Uzbekistan. According to official sources, there are 2.9 million unemployed people in the CIS countries. Whereas the lowest unemployment rate is in Uzbekistan (0.3%), Armenia has the highest unemployment rate (8.0%). (Eurasian File, no.51, February 96/2-OMRI Daily Digest, 2 January 1996)
- Britain has created an investment fund for Central Asia. The fund comprises 7 years and is expected to vary among \$ 30-60 million. Priority will be given to Uz-

bekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia's Irkutsk region. 20% of the net income of the fund will be distributed to other CIS countries. (Eurasian File, no.48, January 96/1)

- The German government approved to give 2.3 billion DM (1.5 billion \$) export credits to Russia and the other CIS members. The credit will be distributed as follows: Russia will receive 1.5 billion, Ukraine 300 million, Uzbekistan 200 million. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan will receive 100 million DM each. (OMRI Daily Digest, 6 February 1996)

KAZAKHSTAN

- President Nursultan Nazarbayev signed the decree concerning the formation of the Constitutional Council that will replace the Constitutional Court. The Council will undertake the function of the Constitutional Court to ensure that the laws of the country are consistent with the constitution. Although the Council is an independent governmental organ, the President will be the Chairperson of the Council and he will have the right to assign or remove up to two members of the 7 member Council. In the future the Council will incorporate the former Presidents in its body. (OMRI Daily Digest, 10 January 1996)
- Iranian Vice-Prime Minister H. Habibi made an official visit to Kazakhstan. On 15 January 1996 bilateral agreements were signed between Habibi and Kazakh President Nazarbayev regarding cooperation in the fields of economy and energy. (OMRI Daily Digest, 16 January 1996)
- Asian Bank of Investment and Development gave \$ 100 million credit to Kazakhstan to support agricultural reforms. The Bank also provided for \$ 1.5 million \$ technical aids. (Eurasian File, no.48, January 96/1)
- European Bank of Development and Reconstruction decided to give Kazakhstan \$ 2 billion to finance its projects in the year 1996. Supporting the reforms of the Kazakh Government the Bank decided to finance 22 projects. (Eurasian File, no.49, January 96/2)
- In Kazakhstan the total grain harvest that was 18 million tonnes in 1994, was 10 million tonnes in 1995. (Eurasian File, no.49, January 96/2)
- Georgian Minister of Foreign Affairs M. Ukleban and his Kazakh colleague K. Tokayev signed an agreement concerning transportation, economy and trade during Ukleban's visit to Almati on 10 January 1996. (Central Asia Newsfile, vol.4, no.2 (40), February 1996)
- According to the information provided by the Ministry of Labor, the unemployed people in the official records have reached to 203.000 people this year multiplied by 1.8 compared to 1994 figures. (Eurasian File, no.51, February 96/2)
- Due to the last agreement signed between Kazakhstan, Russia and Oman, Kazakh oil in the Tenghiz region will be transported through the construction of a pipeline that will end in Russia's Novorossisk Port. (OMRI Daily Digest, 12 March 1996)
- The President of the Russian Federation, B. Yeltsin signed a decree that will eliminate customs barriers with Kazakhstan. Thus, Kazakhstan joined the customs union that already existed between Belarus and Russia. (Dunya, 4 January 1996)
- An oil agreement was signed between Iran and Kazakhstan regarding export of Kazakh oil. Iranian Vice President H. Habibi announced that the agreement has been reached regarding the export of Kazakh oil to the Gulf countries. (Cumhuriyet, 19 January 1996)

KYRGYZSTAN

- After the talks held between the Prime Minister of Kyrgyzstan, A. Jumagulov and the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, V. Chernomyrdin, a series of commercial agreements has been signed on 10 January 1996. Jumagulov announced their readiness to join the existing customs union between Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan. (OMRI Daily Digest, 11 January 1996)
- 29.400 people have immigrated from Kyrgyzstan in the first 9 months of 1995. In the same period last year this number was 58.700. (Eurasian File, no.48, January 96/1)
- According to the statement of the Central Election Commission of Kyrgyzstan, 1.828.000 voters went to the polls in the 24th December Elections. While President Akayev was reelected with a degree of 73.6% in favor, the votes for A. Masaliev remained by 16% and those for M. Serimkulova only by 2%. (Eurasian File, no.49, January 96/2)
- On 9 January 1996, the Georgian Foreign Minister M. Ukleba came to Bishkek. After the talks with his Kirghiz colleague R. Otunbayeva, an agreement was signed regarding cooperation on political, economic, commercial and cultural issues between the two countries. (Central Asia Newsfile, vol.4, no.2(40), February 1996)
- According to international sources, 94% of 96% total electors who went to the polls approved the draft constitution prepared by President Akayev in two weeks after he was reelected. The new constitution enabled the President to strengthen his position by giving more powers like the authority of appointing all the high rank officials except the Prime Minister. (OMRI Daily Digest, 12 February 1996)
- The State Property Fund of Kyrgyzstan announced that the number of privatized companies increased three times in comparison to 1994. With 703 in the year 1995, the total number of privatized companies reached 5.893. (Eurasian File, no.50, February 96/1)
- According to the information obtained from the Russian media and National Statistics Committee of Kyrgyzstan, the annual inflation rate was 31.9% in 1995. While the food prices increased 43.7%, the prices of general consumption goods increased 7.2%. The prices in the service sector, on the other hand, also rose by 28%. (Eurasian File, no.51, February 96/2; OMRI Daily Digest, 18 January 1996)

UZBEKISTAN

- Uzbek President I. Kerimov and his Turkmen colleague S. Niyazov signed an agreement package on 16 January 1996 during Kerimov's visit to Chardzhou. According to the information given by the Zaman newspaper on the same day, the Presidents also managed to reach a conciliation on the previous problems including border disputes and the sharing the waters of the river Amu Derya. (OMRI Daily Digest, 18 January 1996)
- Russian Foreign Minister Y. Primakov held talks with his Uzbek colleague A. Komilov and Uzbek President I. Kerimov on 22 February 1996 where regional security issue was the main concern. Additionally, an agreement was signed regarding the question of migration. (OMRI Daily Digest, 23 February 1996)
- The trade volume between Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan has reached \$ 232.5 million in the first 10 months of 1995 by the reciprocal export and import of 30 goods. (Eurasian File, no.51, February 96/2)
- There has been a considerable increase in the foreign trade volume of Uzbekistan

in 1995. Today, Uzbekistan is trading with 80 countries. Its trade with countries from the West and East Europe in general, South Korea, United States, Hungary Turkey and United Arab Emirates in particular constitutes 62% of its foreign trade volume (In comparison to 1994, this ratio rose by 2.5 times). In 1995 its trade with Turkey, South Korea and Italy increased two times and with Germany 2.5 times in comparison to the last year. The most increase, however, has been realized in its commerce with Switzerland. The overwhelming ratio of its exports composed of cotton and raw materials like metals except the iron. Whereas footage including wheat was less imported than the previous years, the import of transportation elements increased two times. (Eurasian File, no.51, February 96/2)

TURKMENISTAN

- An agreement was signed between the President of Uzbekistan Niyazov and his Iranian colleague Rafsanjani concerning issues on petrol, natural gas, agriculture and construction of a dam on the river Hari. (OMRI Daily Digest, 24 January 1996)
- On 16 January 1996 an agreement regarding the border protection of both countries was signed between the Uzbek President Kerimov and the Turkmen President Niyazov after the talks in Chardzhou. Additionally, cooperation on trade and finance. (Central Asia Newsfile, vol.4, no.2(40), February 1996)
- On 20 January 1996 a Turkmen delegation headed by the foreign minister B. Shykhmuradov made an official visit to Iran. Talks were held with Iranian President Rafsanjani about cooperation in trade and economy and exchange of views was realized with Armenian foreign minister V. Papazia on trade and banking. Finally, an agreement was signed regarding trade, transportation and banking among the three countries, namely Iran, Armenia and Turkmenistan. (Central Asia Newsfile, vol.4, no.2(40), February 1996)
- According to the statements of State Statistics Institute of Turkmenistan, between January-October 1995 Turkmenistan managed to establish commercial relations with 53 countries. This meant an increase in comparison to the last year. The foreign trade volume rose 2 billion \$ where the export of raw materials and other goods comprised 1.5 billion. 70% of the exports and more than 80% of the imports have been realized with CIS countries. During the same period the ratio of Turkey was 9.45, of Switzerland 5.9, of Pakistan 3.4, of Hong Kong 1.4, of Italy 1.3 and of the United States 1.1 percents in exports amounts of Turkmenistan. Among the 39 countries of the import agenda of Turkmenistan, Japan has the highest ratio, 2.22%. The shares of other countries are as follows: Switzerland 1.9%, the United Arab Emirates 1.6%, Germany 1.5% and Iran 1.3%. (Eurasian File, no.50, February 96/1)
- According to 1995 census, the population of Turkmenistan is 4.483.000. The women comprise 2.258.000 of that number and the urban population is 2.020.000. (Eurasian File, no.52, March 96/1)