

EURASIAN STUDIES



2

Summer

1996

Turkish - Ukrainian Relations
Nataliya MHITARYAN

KYRGYZSTAN
The Road To The Future
Turar KOICHUIEV

Executive - Legislature
Reunion in Kazakstan
Najam ABBAS

Muslim Political
Movements in Russia
Zülfiye KADİR

Attempts to Restructure
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Turkey
Turan AYDIN

TATARSTAN
&
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Instruments of Soviet Control
in the Central Asia
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- Full acknowledgement should be given to all materials quoted from or based on this publication.
- "Eurasian Studies" is a quarterly journal published by the sponsorship of Turkish International Cooperation Agency.

• Subscription and inquiries:

TICA Publication Department
Kızıltırmak Sokak No: 31
06640 Kocatepe - Ankara / TÜRKİYE
Tel : [90.312] 417 27 90
Faks: [90.312] 417 27 99
E-mail: olgan @ tika.gov.tr

- Printed by Yeni Forum Corporation
Tel: (312) 467 12 80 Fax: (312) 467 85 40
- ISSN 1300-1612

EURASIAN STUDIES

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TURKISH-UKRAINIAN RELATIONS

Natalia MHITARYAN

The relations between Ukraine and Turkey have a deeply rooted past. These relations at times have reached significant dimensions and at times have not been very significant. Muslim and Slav cultures have been living together for centuries in Ukraine which is a Black Sea country. This togetherness has enabled the states and people around the Black Sea to enter a constructive relationship. In 1649, the first official treaty was signed between Ukraine and Turkey. Within the framework of this treaty, with the instructions of the Ottoman Emperor, the Cossacks of Ukraine were given the opportunity to do maritime trade and navigation in the Black Sea. (There was also a need for help to free Zaporozhje and Crimea regions from pirates) (1). In the same period, a Ukrainian representative council was established in Istanbul.

Via Zaporozhje and Crimea, the dominions of Turkey, a lot of trade has been done with the Ottoman Empire and the countries and people in the North of the Black Sea. Thus, trade, economic and political relations have been established between neighbouring countries. According to the famous historian Litvin, a caravan trade joined by more than 1000 peoples started in the XVIth century between Kiev and Bahçesaray. Generally wine, fish, meat, honey, fur and precious stones were traded. Salt was imported and in return the famous Ukrainian oil was exported. Ukrainian oil was greatly liked in Istanbul, and surpassed its English and Dutch rivals. Besides the fact that this oil called "Kaf" was produced in Poltava and Chernigov regions, no other information on it has been obtained. In the middle of the XVIIIth century it reached a monetary worth of 6000 gold and silver (2).

A great part of the Ottoman Empire's need for cereals was satisfied by Ukraine. After the Russians dominated Southern Black Sea, cereal exportation from Ukraine to the Ottoman Empire continued for another 40 years.

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Within the period of the Russian Empire, "Port Franko," the free economic region in Odessa in the years 1819-1857, and Ukraine became an important trading centre in the Northern Black Sea region. As in the other cities of trade, this played an important role in the development of Odessa. This is because the good-quality wheat produced in this region and sold rather cheap found consumers from the ten countries among which was Turkey. Our wish is that this age-long trade custom would continue by ending past errors.

The most important period for the relations between Ukraine and Turkey has been the years 1918-1920. Within the years 1918-1920, a new independent Ukrainian Government "People's Republic of Ukraine" was established. In 1919, with the assembly of the representatives of the states of Ukraine, Belarus, Don and Kuban in Odessa, the first step was taken to establish the Union of the States of the Black Sea Region. Ukrainian diplomats continued their active work on the notion of the Southern Black Sea Economic Cooperation. Their aim was to provide each state with equal rights in order to enable it to act independently in every field within the framework of the cooperation (3).

Within this period, a Ukrainian representative council was established in Istanbul. Turkey was the first country to recognize the People's Republic of Ukraine. Turkey established a Turkish representative council in Ukraine and Ahmet Muhtar Bey and Counselor Ahmet Ferit Bey were appointed representatives.

Ukraine's first ambassador in Turkey, M. Sukoflin, adopted a policy contrary to the interests of Ukraine. The next ambassador, A. Lototskiy, attempted to solve the following problems that were of significance in that period: to enable the military abroad to return home, to solve the problems of the ships belonging to the Black Sea fleet, and to settle religious matters and trade relations with Turkey. A. Lototskiy, in an interview in "Ifgam" newspaper in September 1919, emphasized the importance of Turkish-Ukraine relations in the following way: "economically, Ukraine and Turkey are in need of each other. Ukraine is going to import tin, nickel, sulfur, marble, fur, tobacco, silk, vegetables and fruit from Turkey and in return is going to export such commodities as flour, sugar, salt and coal."

A. Lototskiy drew attention to the advantages that Turkey's geographical position created between the trade relations of Turkey and Ukraine, especially decreasing the cost of communication. Moreover, he drew attention to the settlement of transfer matters between the two countries with the establishment of banking and other financial institutions (4).

The problems within the relations of the two countries since the 1920s

continue today.

In that period a new step was taken towards opportunities for friendship and cooperation between Ukrainian Socialist Republic and Turkey, and a treaty of friendship was signed between the two states in 2 January 1922. This treaty that supports the political cooperation of Turkey and Ukraine, also provides an opportunity for the active improvement of the cooperation in commercial-economic, scientific and technological fields. A characteristic of this treaty is that it has no time limit. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who became the President after the proclamation of the republic in Turkey and who was the contemporary president of the national assembly, made a speech on 3 January at the ceremony of the treaty. He said, "if we look at the geographical position of the two countries, we will see the Black Sea in between. If we assume the Black Sea non-existent for a moment, we may call Turkey and Ukraine neighbouring countries. Friendship is of great significance for both countries" (5).

Ukraine, under the USSR, continued its cooperation with Turkey in commercial-economic and other fields. The Ukrainian East Commerce Chamber founded in 1925 played an important role in the exportation of agricultural machines, plywood, sugar and butter to Turkey. The Ukrainian Commerce Chamber released a special bulletin entitled "Ukraine's Commerce with the East." Ukraine's Odessa port on the Black Sea played an important role in the commercial relations of USSR and Ukraine with the Middle East and Turkey. For example, in the 1920s, 41 % of the imports of Turkey from the USSR was made via Odessa (6).

After the Second World War, especially in the 1960s, Ukraine's economic potential improved under the USSR. In the mid-1960s, Ukraine produced 7-10 % of the world's steel, cast iron, tractors, coal and sugar (7). In the same period, the USSR, within the framework of the treaties made with Near East and African countries, assigned Ukraine the task of contractor with the purpose of establishing enterprises in these countries. Ukraine was thus going to send experts to the countries. At the end of the 1970s, the factories in Ukraine provided Turkey and the other countries in the Near East and Africa with construction materials. Ukraine brought experts from abroad to educate its own personnel. Under the supervision of the USSR, with the aim of providing the technical support of various industrial enterprises, a technical protocol was signed in Ankara in 1965.

Under the USSR, the economic and trade relations between Turkey and Ukraine continued until the 1980s. However, both countries, independently from the USSR, continued their relations via foreign commercial organiza-

tions.

After the collapse of the USSR and the gaining of the independence of Ukraine, the economic and commercial relations between Turkey and the former USSR have to a great extent been retained. Ukraine has for the second time made an attempt to turn towards the South. Turkey is Ukraine's economic associate. In the post-Soviet period, due to its geopolitical and geostrategic position in the Black Sea, Ukraine's interest in the same subjects as Turkey, and Turkey's interest in the Ukrainian market, the Balkans and Crimea enable the establishment of cooperation between the two countries. Ukraine's need for an associate in the Middle East, for the reforms made by greatly experienced Turkey in the field of economy, and for the encouragement of its large market contribute to this establishment. Turkey continues to show special interest in Ukraine by means of its attempts in the Black Sea Economic Cooperation.

The Black Sea Economic Cooperation was established before the collapse of the USSR by the attempts of the president of the Turkish Republic, Turgut Özal. The cooperation aims at integrating the Black Sea region to the world economy, and enabling the countries that are on the coast of the Black Sea to benefit more from traditional relations with countries in Asia, the Near East and Middle East. Moreover, the cooperation aims at enabling the countries on the Black Sea coast to gradually enter the market economy with the help of many-sided economic cooperation.

The project suggested by Turkey at first aims at the development of infrastructural studies that are possible by means of the provision of wide scientific-technical opportunities. Moreover, the project aims at the realization, in participating countries, of economic modernization that enables the rational exploitation of natural resources. This situation leads to a need for the construction and restoration of roads, the application of new techniques in the telecommunication system, and the restructuring of airports. Wide scope has been given to contemporary telecommunication studies that is of great significance for international commercial and economic cooperation. In March 1991, a treaty was signed between Ukraine and the Turkish Republic on the solution of various problems and on telecommunications. Around the same date, the Ukrainian Minister of Communications paid a visit to Turkey and during the visit made studies on the subjects of the treaty (9).

However, although the Black Sea Cooperation Project has rich natural resources, we must underline that it presents Ukraine as a country that does not sufficiently benefit from its agricultural potential.

One of the subjects of prior importance in the project has been the protection of the environment in the Black Sea region.

In 12-14 March 1991, the Turkish President Turgut Özal paid his first official visit to Ukraine. In his contact with the Ukrainian Government, he expressed his pleasure in the establishment of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (10).

In February 1992, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Treaty was signed by the ministers of nine countries. In 25 June 1995, the state representatives of Albania, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Bulgaria, Greece, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, Romania, Turkey and Ukraine signed the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Treaty. The Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization has been established with the aim of benefiting from traditional relations and the geographical position of participating countries, and integrating the Black Sea region into the world economy. In addition, on condition that the principles of the treaty are not infringed, the Organization has remained open to other states.

The treaty aims at active economic cooperation with the participation of the countries in order to develop in the fields of industry, agricultural rural work, transportation, telecommunication, medicine and tourism. Moreover, the treaty handles such subjects as trade exempted from tax, the private sector, free investment conditions, exchange of technological innovations, the protection of the environment in the Black Sea, the development of the projects appealing to societies, and the development of economic-trade cooperation.

It is important to underline that Turkey has not only signed the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Treaty but has also gone a long way in the development of property and capital, the improvement of infrastructures, and the establishment of a capital and a foreign trade bank in the Black Sea region. In 31 August 1992, Turkey invited the representatives of the participating countries to Istanbul. The Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization Council was formed and Turkey undertook the secretariat of the Organization on condition that its centre was in Istanbul. The basic aims of the Council are the determination of the available opportunities and the formation of the cooperation projects on the basis of these opportunities. The Council has enabled the establishment of The Black Sea Commercial Investment Bank. In addition, the Turkish Republic has taken some steps towards the realization of the list of points in view of an improvement in cooperation in the fields of transportation, telecommunications, energy, and customs (11).

The "İstanbul" and "Boğaziçi" Declarations of the participants of the Black Sea Cooperation show that Ukraine plays an important role with the countries of the Black Sea in many fields in reaching the highest level in its cooperation.

The Parliament, bearing in mind the principles of the Black Sea Cooperation Organization, will enable the development of friendly relations between parliaments and members of parliament, and the mutual support of participants in international organizations.

It has been decided that the work of and the foundation of the organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization will be carried out under the leadership of the Turkish Republic. That Turkey, in possession of potential economic wealth, has commodities of quality to leave behind many of its rivals in the world market, is making European firms uneasy. Nevertheless, it is impossible to accept the claim of Western critics that Turkey has tried to become a member of the Black Sea Economic Organization in order to guarantee itself in case of the rejection of its full membership right to the European Community. Turkey's attempt to become a member of the Black Sea Cooperation only results from its aim to benefit from the opportunities that the geographical position of the region in question provides. Turkey's attempt at membership also results from its aim to present the resources in the region to the world market. On the other hand, Turkey wishes to be a leader in Central Asia with respect to economics and politics. We believe that Turkey will be able to fulfil this aim in a short time.

Ukraine attempts to play an active role in its participation in the activities of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation. Ukraine's attempt will be realized with the support of the parliament and the President, and the participation of young businessmen and the investing environment.

We would like to state once again that Ukraine and Turkey wish to actively cooperate with each other in all the work to be carried out within the framework of the Black Sea Economic Organization, especially in the fields of economy and trade. For this purpose, a meeting was held in the summer of 1993 with the participation of the Turkish Foreign Economic Relations Board, Turkish Chambers Exchange Union, Turkish Businessmen and Industrialists Union, and other such institutions. After the meeting, a special bulletin concerning the common Turkish-American business circles in the Black Sea region was released. The Turkish Foreign Economic Relations Board studied the current economic position of Ukraine in order to realize foreign investments in the country in the areas of privatization, industry, and energy industry. The Council also released a bulletin with respect to this subject. The bulletin also studied

the economic potential of Kiev, Odessa, Crimea and other regions.

In the bulletin it has been recorded that the agricultural and industrial fields of the Kiev region are developed. Heavy machines, chemical industry implements, furniture, ceramics and sugar are among the main exported goods. The data in the bulletin concerning the mineral and machine construction industry, chemical industry, electrical industry, light industry and food industry in Crimea have drawn the attention of more than fifty countries. Besides, it has been emphasized that the region has great commercial opportunities in the agriculture, wine, milk and canned food industries.

The agricultural Odessa region has experienced important improvements. It has been noted in the bulletin that the geographical position of the Odessa region provides great advantages to the region, that the Odessa harbour is in connection with almost 600 harbours of more than 100 countries in the world, and that it is in possession of wide shipping facilities. The exportation of 67 % of industrial products is being made via Odessa, and more than 145 companies have economic relationships with foreign firms.

The advantages provided by the geographical position of Odessa, Odessa's advantages in trade and economy, and the frontier relationships established in the past between Odessa and Turkey may be shown as the basic reasons why Turkey sees Odessa as important as Crimea.

Owing to the wish of Tatar society, driven out of Crimea during the period of Stalin, to return to the place that they regard as their motherland, and to Ukraine's geopolitical and economic importance, today Turkey gives special attention to Ukraine. Crimea's history, and cultural and religious closeness play an important role in the strengthening of relations between Ukraine and Turkey. When Süleyman Demirel became the President of the Turkish Republic, Crimea National Assembly congratulated him. In his message which he sent as an answer, Süleyman Demirel stated that he would do his best for Crimean Tatars and Turkish society to get closer to each other and for their relationship to be reinforced.

One of the foremost problems of Ukraine today is the return of Crimean Tatars to their country and their settlement there. A majority of Crimean Tatars become unemployed and live in difficult conditions. In Crimea the unemployment rate increases day by day. Although it is not responsible for the exile of the Tatars, Ukraine has had to confront these problems all by itself.

The Turkish Republic pays close attention to the problems of Crimea and strives to provide for all the needs of Crimean society. The Turkish President Süleyman Demirel, in a visit to Ukraine on 30 June-1 May 1994, explained

that Turkey was going to construct 1000 houses and social activity centres for Crimean Tatars in Crimea. Certain steps have been taken towards the realization of the project in question (12). Ukraine appreciates the help given by Turkey to Crimean Tatars to return to their country (13). Ukraine also appreciates the help given by the Commonwealth of Independent States for the same purpose.

As to bilateral economic relations, Ukraine has obtained wide perspectives on the subject after gaining its independence. Turkey is in third position among the countries to which Ukraine exports. The value of the commodities exported is \$ 323,122 thousand while that of the commodities imported is \$ 25,048 thousand (14).

Whereas in 1993 the volume of external trade was \$ 203,5 million, in 1994 this figure rose to \$ 317 million. In the first half of the 1995s, the figures of 1993 were surpassed and approached two thirds of its value in 1994. Consequently, there was a remainder of more than \$ 160 million.

If we examine the trade relations between Ukraine and Turkey, we will see that Turkey, apart from China, comes before the other 40 Asian countries. During the period of post-independence, as its volume of exports to Turkey has always been 6-10 times more than that of its imports, trade between Ukraine and Turkey has been advantageous to Ukraine. For example, in 1993, Ukraine's imports from Turkey was \$ 18,2 million while its volume of exports was \$ 185,3 million. In 1994, its imports were \$ 34,2 million while its exports were \$ 282,8 million. In the first half of 1995, its imports were recorded at \$ 23,6 million while its exports were recorded at \$ 184,7 million. Ukraine's import rates from Turkey have in order been 0.45 %, 0.48 %, and 0.49 %. As to its export rates, they have been 3.32 % and 2.74 % (15).

That transportation (maritime transportation that plays an important role in transportation to Turkey) facilities are inefficient and that there are problems in packing hinders the trade between the two countries.

Turkey is in need of the importation of optical devices, cars and heavy machines, electrical and household appliances, gas installation systems, and ships and aeroplanes. Ukraine has the opportunity to construct the above devices. If we take into account the geographical closeness of the two countries, we will see that Turkey can buy these devices from the Ukrainian market.

As to Ukraine, it is in need of importing agricultural products from Turkey. In the Ukrainian markets the products that are demanded the most are citrus fruits (in ratio of Ukraine's general purchase), products in the making of cakes and desserts (10.8), and leather and leather products (39.6 %) (16). The

trade relations between Ukraine and Turkey are maintained in view of the potential opportunities and demands of the two sides, and with the aim of completing each other. It is sufficient to say that Ukraine holds up as much as 16.1 % of Turkey's total trade (17).

The improvement of the trade relations of the two countries started in May 1994 following the visit paid by Mr. Süleyman Demirel, the President of the Turkish Republic, to Kiev. In the contacts between the two parties, such subjects as the development of economic cooperation between the two countries, the protection of the ecological balance around the Black Sea, the solution of the problems in the usage of energy sources, communication, and the attainment of cooperation between Turkey and Ukraine were discussed (18).

Cooperation within the economic and cultural fields started with the treaty signed in 1995 between the president of the Odessa region, Nikolay Bogoyavlenski, and Kastamonu Governor, Özdemir Hanoglu. The treaty is in favour of such subjects as the flow of information between trade and industrial chambers, the uninterrupted work of airlines, the mutual invitations of businessmen and the representatives of institutions, and the improvement of tourism relations.

On 13-14 September 1995, with the participation of the governors and the mayors of the Black Sea region, a "round table" meeting was held with the attempt of improving the cooperation not only between the Black Sea Economic Cooperation countries but also that between Turkey and Ukraine. The meeting discussed the problems concerning the infrastructure of cities and the relations between Black Sea countries (19).

The ambassador of the Turkish Republic in Ukraine, Mr. Acar Hermen, expressed his thoughts in the issue of "Veçerniy Kiev" on 27 November 1995 in the following way:

Economic relations determine the relations between our countries. The metal, manure, and agricultural products exported to Turkey are worth \$ 400-500 million. On the other hand, Turkey exports to Ukraine citrus fruits, textiles, medicine, leather and leather products, vegetable oil, cake and dessert ingredients. I believe that after the economic crisis in Ukraine is overcome, the volume of exports from Turkey will increase and the volume of exports and imports will be equalized.

Ambassador Acar Hermen mentioned the 1700 military house project "Turkish City" in Kiev, a project that is among the many projects that are going to be realized or that have been realized by Turkey in Ukraine. Besides, in Kremençuk region, Turkish companies are constructing rubber refinery factories, and are busy with the restoration of the houses in Odessa and Poltava regions. On November 1995, in the seminar held in Ankara by businessmen,

the development of the cooperation of the two countries in the field of economy and the benefiting from the opportunities were two of the major subjects that were handled (20). In the seminar that lasted for three days, 40 participants had the opportunity to examine the relations related with trade, economy and customs between Turkey and Ukraine. In the frequent bilateral negotiations, the businessmen of both countries brought concrete solutions to many of the problems concerning trade and economic relations.

The International Black Sea Club was held responsible for the development of not only the cooperation between the countries within the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, but also of that between Ukraine and Turkey. The Club was founded three years ago with the efforts of about 20 mayors from various countries of the Black Sea. For the next four years, the Mayor of Odessa, Eduard Gurvist, was found suitable as the head of the Club (21).

Treaties concerning local aviation, sea transportation, war with organized crime, foreign investments and trade cooperation were successfully realized.

Official authorities in Kiev understand the need for the solution of political and other problems that trouble Ukraine and Turkey. The most important problem is the Black Sea fleet and the military activities in the region. Today, the sail of the warships that are on the Black Sea is only possible via the Straits of İstanbul and Çanakkale. In Black Sea there is a fleet consisting of 800 ships. This military force that is around its territory troubles Turkey. Ukraine, which has a similar anxiety, is open to all kinds of treaty that are in favour of the freeing of the Black Sea from military forces (22).

Turkey's other problem concerns the Straits. Ukraine can go to the Mediterranean and the oceans only via İstanbul and Çanakkale. Passage from the Straits is being done following the Montreux Treaty of 1936. According to this treaty, in the period of peace, ships can pass freely. The geographical situation, and especially the narrow structure of the Strait of İstanbul, make the passage difficult. Moreover, on both sides of the Strait, there are settlements with high populations. These conditions naturally lead to problems in such fields as the environment, traffic, and municipality services. For example, when petroleum is transported to Turkey or Ukraine via the Straits, great problems are confronted. Mr. Igor Turyanski, the ambassador of Ukraine in Turkey, has expressed his thoughts on this subject in the following way: "Ukraine understands the subjects that make Turkey anxious and that become all the more difficult today. Both sides adopt a suitable approach in their foreign policies" (23).

One of the economic problems that Turkey has solved is the development

of the agricultural sector. Today, Turkey meets the need for its food consumption and presents its food to the world market. We must also note that only 20 % of Turkey's land has been found suitable for agriculture. Thanks to privatization and the development of small industries, great improvements have been recorded in the country's economy. The Turkish Government encourages not consumption but production. Today, Turkey is considered to be among semi-developed countries with respect to its economy.

Ukraine, in the solution of its economic problems, takes Turkey as an example in view of the problems the latter has faced. It is natural for a developing country to be faced with various problems. Ukraine believes that it is necessary to profit from the experiences of neighbouring countries that bear fruitful results not only in the agricultural sector, but also in the establishment of small organizations and the benefiting from energy sources. 15 years ago, to obtain its energy sources, Turkey had to spend a sum amounting to 120 % of its exports; however, this was impossible. (Turkey, like Ukraine, was annually producing almost 4-5 million tons of oil and 10-15 million tons of coal).

At present, Turkey is not experiencing any problem related with energy. The value of the energy sources imported by Turkey is only 17-19 % of its total volume of exports (24).

Ukraine faces such new problems as investment and new technology. Turkey has solved these problems by establishing relations with the West. This direction of Turkey, in our opinion, is extremely appropriate. We believe that there is a need for reforms in a very short time. However, some Ukrainian authorities do not take Turkey seriously in this regard.

The cooperation between Turkey and Ukraine is only possible with the closeness of the people of the two countries. This very important task must be realized with the help of the government and the official institutions of both countries. Following the need for such help, the Ukrainian-Turkish Association was established on 23 November 1990 under the Director of Ukrainian Social and Cultural Affairs.

With the Ukrainian-Turkish Friendship and Cooperation Treaty signed on 4 May 1992, a new step has been taken towards the closeness of both countries (25).

The next stage is to put the treaty into practice in real life. It is doubtless that such attempts are to the advantage of the people of both countries.

The two neighbouring countries, Ukraine and Turkey, are interested, within the framework of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization, in the same subjects in their bilateral and multilateral relations. Moreover, as men-

tioned earlier, "Turkey gives full and concrete support to Ukraine in its foreign economic policies" (26).

FOOTNOTES:

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KYRGYZSTAN: THE ROAD TO THE FUTURE

THE KYRGYZ: WHO WE ARE

Turar KOICHUIEV

Recently, the notion of the mentality of people has been widely discussed as the most significant part of the development of society. What is mentality? Is it a particular property or an aggregate of properties that characterize the originality of people? What is mentality conditioned by? Is it conditioned by the genetic nature of people, historical or cultural traditions or the particular environment and conditions into which people are put? On the other hand, is it conditioned by the structure of society, religion or world outlook?

According to the English-Russian dictionary of philosophy, "mentality" means mental and intellectual faculties; intellect. According to the French-Russian dictionary of sociology and politics, "mentalité" is a way of thinking; frame of mind; orientation of the mind; the mind; mental faculties; mental development; mental level; thinking; cast of mind. According to the German-Russian dictionary, "mentalitat" is a cast of mind; way of thinking.

If mentality is understood as the mind and mental faculties, then people may be classified as clever and not clever and as having good, medial and bad mental faculties. By nature all people are born with equal abilities. However, during their historical development each individual may to a large extent develop the abilities given by nature in order to achieve a high mental development.

If mentality is understood as a way of thinking and a frame of mind, then it concerns mostly purposefulness of mind. However, it is difficult to distinguish one nation from another. For instance, each nation wants to lead a more prosperous and a happier life. However, there also exists the influence of such external factors as circumstances, the environment and historical condi-

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tions. Thus, while one nation may always be at war and be continually engaged in conquest, another nation may always be defending itself. Again, while one nation may always have to survive by fighting against its enemy, another nation may be leading a peaceful life. Indeed, the more civilized a nation is, the higher are its goals. This certainly influences the trend of mind and the frame of mind, and understanding the trend of mind is determined by the common wish of all humankind to lead a better life. The frame of mind and the way of thinking react to external factors by intuition or the natural instinct of self-preservation.

If mentality is understood as the way of thinking and the cast of mind, then it reflects the "hardening" and "training" of the mind. The way of thinking and the cast of mind are not the products of intuitive reflexes, but the products of a conscious response to the influence of some factors. They are also the products of training, upbringing and self-preparation for life. With their help, one can find out some discriminative peculiarities of different nations, depending on the historical conditions of their survival, and the conditions in which they made themselves.

In all the above explanations of mentality, one can distinguish the approach towards a nation as to the natural subject, but not the social one.

If what is meant by mentality is intellect, then the method of approach to people as to a social subject is obvious here. Intellect is a wide notion, where the mental and spiritual quality of people is shown. This quality is not given free by nature, but it can be formed by the people themselves during the process of their historical movement to civilization.

Intellect shows not only the mental and spiritual quality of people, but also their ability. This latter case is due to the increasing rate of knowledge, technology, education and culture in the modern civilized world. A whole complex of factors influences the formation of intellect. These may be called the components of mentality.

Some intellectuals consider the Manas – the Kyrgyz historical sacred object – as the pivotal component of the Kyrgyz people's mentality. No matter how history is reflected, a historical event or person can neither be a natural nor a determining component of mentality. This is because both components show only concrete events or the qualities of a concrete person, whereas mentality obviously includes the non-transient virtues of the people that serve not as a recollection and decoration, but as "work." On the other hand, the Manas can and does influence the spiritual development and originality of the Kyrgyz

people's mentality.

Of course, there are virtues of non-transient meaning in history, but they are lost on account of historical cataclysms. Now one can and must find an object to touch, to learn and to revive. Consequently, the lost virtues may once again rise to the level of a component of mentality. One can take from history only that which is characteristic of the past and that which was in sufficient quantity in the past. One can compare what is saved and what is lost and what is of value for today and tomorrow. From this point of view, the history of the people is also a component of mentality, but not as a separate historical person or an event or a legend.

Today, Kyrgyzstan has become independent but is still too poor to become a prosperous state. It should first of all determine its spiritual potential that will enable it to stand, to endure and to create.

Natural conditions gave the Kyrgyz a generous possibility to live comfortably in the past, if not to pay any attention to other public conditions and factors influencing their life support. Bountiful nature gave enough for the few Kyrgyz before the migration of other ethnic groups to the Kyrgyz Land.

Intensive mass migration of different ethnic groups from tsarist Russia and then from the other republics of the USSR, including Russia, began in the Soviet period. Consequently, a larger population began to live on the relatively small and compact Kyrgyz territory, and the high birth rate of the native population caused its abrupt growth. Gradually, the conditions of economic growth were practically exhausted. The problem of ensuring a high level of life dictates the necessity of a full use of such intensive factors as science, knowledge, technology and education. Carelessness that reigned for centuries cannot be indicated as a mentality component, so it is necessary to raise such new qualities as dynamics, energy, aspiration and survival. The one-sided economic specialization of the Kyrgyz in the past led them to be mainly occupied with cattle-breeding in agriculture. Their participation in agriculture is limited. Their more active participation in agricultural labour would enlarge the possibility of increasing their profits, would provide a more stable materialistic condition, and would inculcate scientific methods of management.

This is because agricultural labour demands more knowledge, experience and culture. The Kyrgyz are not qualified enough in branches of industry. Instead, they are cultural workers such as teachers, doctors, and humanists in science. However, there are few of them in natural and technical sciences. As can be seen, professional instability is one of the shortcomings of the Kyrgyz peo-

ple's mentality.

As to the appearance of the writing of the Kyrgyz, it may be accounted for by the quick adaptation of the Kyrgyz to modern civilization. The Kyrgyz had their own writing in ancient times. This writing was based on Runic graphics. It spread to Central Asia in the VI th to XII th centuries. There are many writings of this period in Bishkek Republic museum.

The Tatar and Mongol expansion destroyed the ancient Kyrgyz state and the ancient Kyrgyz writing was lost. The penetration of Islam brought Arabic graphics and the Kyrgyz with other Turkish people began to use Arabic writing. This writing was called "chagataisky" (or simply "Turkish"). It was used in official correspondence with Kyrgyz manaps (landowners) in Kokand Khan-dom. At the beginning of the XX th century (1911-1913), the first three books in the Kyrgyz language appeared – poems by Moldo Kylych, the story of Shabdan and the story about Kyrgyz by Osminaly Sydykov. However, literacy was not widespread.

Although the post-October period was beneficial for the Kyrgyz in their adoption of modern European culture and education, it also did harm in the partial introduction of modern civilization in Marksism-Leninism interpretation.

In spite of this, the perception of the Kyrgyz, with the help of the culture and education they adopted, will enable them to remove a narrowness of understanding and to master knowledge about man, society, culture and nature. Moreover, nowadays, nearly all the young and grown-up people in Kyrgyzstan are literate. This literacy is an important determinant of Kyrgyz mentality.

The trouble is that the education in the former Soviet Union was not regarded as a continuing process. People who finished their school and went to work at a factory forgot about education. Many specialists neglected their education after graduation from institutions of higher education. Thus, the general literacy of the population is only on a primary basis, on the basis of which the educational level will be regarded as a component of Kyrgyz mentality.

Modern study of languages in the former Soviet Union was very unsatisfactory. There were few people who finished school and graduated from institutions of higher education with a good mastery of foreign languages with one of the foreign languages on a curriculum.

Nevertheless, experience shows that the Kyrgyz had the ability to learn a foreign language (especially Russian). Language is not an inherited quality like the features of a face, peculiarities of character and the whole biological organization of man. Society influences language which, in turn, influences so-

ciety being a means of application and communication in different spheres of the lives and activities of people.

Becoming an independent state, Kyrgyzstan is now open not only to the North but also to the whole world. The wish to learn a foreign language plays a major role in this broadening of horizons.

Soviet power, even within the limits of the totalitarian regime, gave the Kyrgyz people, although formally, a definite form of state organization and played a positive role in the social and economic development of the Kyrgyz.

A feudal way of life and autonomy of economic connections did not bring unity to the Kyrgyz. Consequently, Kyrgyzstan became dependent on other states surrounding it, especially Russia which had a higher level of social and economic development than other countries. Soviet power, even within the limits of the totalitarian regime, gave the Kyrgyz a definite form of state organization. Thus, it played a positive role in the social and economic development of the Kyrgyz. However, as the state system of the republic was formal, there was not internal and spiritual unity of the Kyrgyz. Unity appears with the political rebirth and sovereignty of a state. Finally, today, Kyrgyzstan is a politically independent state. Political independence has been painful but it has enabled the Kyrgyz to approach unity.

Patriotism, unity and a sense of national dignity have to become important components of the "mentalitet" of the Kyrgyz.

In a totalitarian multinational state, where not all the republics are independent, and where the Soviet people work in the direction of wiping off national originality and such notions as patriotism and national unity, the significance of a sense of national dignity is lost. If the people of the former Soviet Union want to keep their own image in the modern world, it is very important to revive a sense of unity; otherwise, the living principles of young society are lost by regionalism and hostility between tribes.

A benevolent attitude to other peoples and ethnic groups, and adherence to cooperation, compassion and cordiality are the distinctive qualitative features of the Kyrgyz. These qualities are of vital importance both in entering the world association and in securing civil harmony in the Republic of Kyrgyzstan itself and inter-republic confidence in world relations.

It should be realized that a historical process of forming a multinational population has taken place and that it will be a misconception to support that a population speaking another language will be made to leave and that only the Kyrgyz will remain. Some ethnic groups still have their own history in to-

day's Kyrgyzstan. Another history has not been imposed on them. Economic and cultural facilities are intended to be available for all citizens without any ethnic discrimination.

Existence of other ethnic groups fill up the niche in the professional structure of Kyrgyzstan which has not been occupied because of the definite professional one-sidedness of the Kyrgyz. Thus, other ethnic groups contribute to the rise of the economic and cultural potential of Kyrgyzstan. Exposure to different ethnic groups introduce the Kyrgyz to different norms, rules and traditions. It also enables them to acquire a sense of patience and confidence.

As historians inform, there is not much mention of the characteristics of the Kyrgyz national psychology in the information about the ancient and medieval Kyrgyz. Nevertheless, the earliest of Middle Asian manuscripts mention their bravery. From Chinese medieval sources it is learned that cowardice among the Kyrgyz was punished by law. The independent Persian authors mention the war-like nature of Kyrgyz tribes. Being of the Mongol organization in Tyang-Shang, Kyrgyz tribes were called the "forest lions of Moghulistan."

Thus, one of the stable characteristic psychological features of the Kyrgyz is their individual bravery and firmness. Now, one has to prove the firmness in a "peaceful struggle" to solve economic problems and revive the democratic Kyrgyz nation.

Besides their bravery and firmness, another common national psychological feature of the Kyrgyz (noted by medieval sources) is their respect for the property of the community. Indeed, Russian sources have noted the absence of thieves in Kyrgyz villages for centuries.

Moreover, medieval sources note the serious attitude of the Kyrgyz towards wisdom. Literary men were respected by the Kyrgyz. Thus, the Soviet propaganda could do nothing against the authority of Synchy and poet Kylych.

Under the ancient and maintained traditions of life, the Kyrgyz have no sense of rationalism in life. One cannot fully speak about people's mentality without such qualities as rationalism and love of labour. Thus, where did the absence of rationalism and love of labour bring us, the former Soviet people? Consequently, we are unable to provide for ourselves.

Foreigners, either out of politeness or sincerity, tell us that we have a strong and a great spirit. They are right if we can remember our history. But who are we today? How can we have a great spirit if we consider it as an honour to receive humanitarian aid? One can consider that great spirited peo-

ple are those who are able to materialize their greatness of spirit at a decent well-to-do level of life.

Of course, we could partly lay the blame once again on the existing regime. This is because the economic crisis deepened more and more, especially after the disintegration of the USSR.

The majority of the former Soviet Union's population was looking for the reason for economic disorders, and drawbacks in planning and economic management. They did not take into consideration the fact that the system itself was doomed. People believed in the details of socialism. When perestroika went off the frame of ordinary reforms, it ended up in the liquidation of the system of the ruling party and the government. People were not prepared for such a final and they could not fully realize it. They lost their ideals and looked onto the future with doubt. One cannot imagine a nation's mentality without faith, hope and self-confidence. All this is based upon a certain economic and cultural foundation.

One of the main characteristics of the Kyrgyz is their being a community type society. During the totalitarian regime when initiative and independence were not encouraged and everything was dictated by the authorities, and when life was subdued to coercion, the state could not use this community for the benefit of its people. The community having economic, political and civil freedom is a factor of self-affirmation and prosperity, when people voluntarily unite to achieve common goals that concern each of them separately and along with the rest. It is necessary to take into account this community factor when forming different state and non-state structures and methods, and the way they function.

Do the Kyrgyz have a full mentality like any other nation of the former USSR? The totalitarian regime which suppressed a natural impulse to act, which estranged people from the original national cultures, which closed the doors to all human civilizations, and which accustomed the Kyrgyz and the other Soviets to obedience and maintenance, did not promote the forming of a full mentality of either the Kyrgyz or that of the other peoples of the former Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union broke up not only because the system turned out to be depraved or an economic crisis took place or a political split occurred, but because the Soviet people did not have a complete sense of mentality.

The collapse of the Soviet Union also lies in the agreement in Beloverskaya pusha. The ruling clique made this agreement and nobody asked the people.

Democracy cannot be established by non-democratic methods. And now, before it is too late, it is necessary to find the civilized forms of existence, to move to real democracy by democratic ways, and to build together neither a Soviet, nor a capitalist, but the common-to-all-mankind home.

Moreover, all the Soviet people have to prove their ability to return to life and occupy a deserved place among the other people in world history. They must define their mentality, taking into account their traditions, culture and history. They must cultivate in themselves intellectual and other human qualities.

If today one compares the representatives of the former Soviet Union with world standards, then one sees that they are semi-workers, semi-professionals, and semi-intellectuals. And here, the Russian does not differ from the Kyrgyz or the Kyrgyz from the Kazakh or the Kazakh from the Ukrainian. This is "the communist similarity."

To regenerate feelings of national respect, patriotism and unity should become the spiritual defined basis, which gives birth to healthy national ambitions, and, thereupon, to intellectual take-off, professionalism, industry and the desire to make life better.

And may be light-heartedness in life, which was so characteristic of the Kyrgyz in the past, will be the beginning of cultivating such a quality as modesty in consumption and requirements, and an influence on the creation of a spiritual economy.

Thus, the components of the mentality of a nationality in general can be classified as certain features characterizing its capability, social qualities, and psycho-emotional characteristics. The components of capability are professionalism, culture, and education. Social qualities are a sense of national dignity, patriotism, unity and openness to other people. As to psycho-emotional features, they are nationalism, pragmatism, maximalism, pedantry, diligence, economy and modesty.

Of course, all the components of mentality belong to all nations. They define a nation's way to prosperity and happiness. One should try this way.

POST-SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA: THE CHOICE OF WAY

The break up of the USSR and the choice of an independent way for the development of Central Asian republics arouse the sympathies, respect and trust of the world community on the one hand and lead to unsolved economic and social problems on the other hand. The need for moral and economic support is felt in decisions of mutual collaboration.

1. Entry into the World Association

Post-Soviet Central Asia as a centre of new independent states obtained international recognition and held its position in the world political and economic association. But what will be the nature of this position? Active or passive? Dependent or independent? Authoritative or imperceptible?

In spite of a rather short period after the declaration of independence, the intensive political affairs allow one to underline the definite distinctive periods of the entry of post-Soviet Central Asia into the world association. Certainly, we can forecast the possible stages of the intensification of this process in the future.

The first stages belong to the period after the disintegration of the USSR when the new independent states were formed. These stages are the official recognition of the USSR by many states and international organizations, the recognition of the doom of the totalitarian regime, the support of the democratic radical reforms and respect of the nation's rights for self-determination.

The characteristic feature of the second set of strategies is that the world states and authoritative international organizations first have begun to study us attentively and properly. Who are we? What are we able to do? What are we expected to be in the future? Certainly, they cannot help being interested in our history, culture, economy and geopolitical position between European, Asian and Oriental countries.

Of course, today our economic position is unable to draw anyone. Humanitarian help has been received and free technical economic help has taken place. The wish of the world community to help us to survive, to overcome the economic crisis, to stimulate the economy and to raise the nation's living standard has proven beneficial.

How did the new independent states appear in the territories of the USSR? They came into existence as a result of the dissolution of the totalitarian system that had exhausted itself. A search for another form of state, political and social order would not have led to democratic changes.

Being a member of the world political association, the states of post-Soviet Central Asia show their political activity in regional problems in particular. The position of every state is considered attentively by other states. They are interested in the political position of the new states of Central Asia, because these positions define the directions that had been chosen by the states.

The economy predetermines the state of dependence of the new states of Central Asia in the world association. Nowadays, this dependence is difficult

to deny. The states depend not only on the CIS – on Russia in particular – but also on large "far-abroad" states and international organizations that help us. The movement to new independence is in view of the improvement of the economy and stabilization of the political situation.

Authority of the Central Asian position will mainly depend on how logically the preservation of stability in society and that of democratic reforms can be carried out. The world community is anxious about their ability and eagerness to carry out the democratic reforms. The ability to get along with the neighbour and to provide civil and inter-ethnic concord at home is the most important component of the authority of any country of the world community.

The world community treats us to some extent as needy people. However, this treatment cannot go on forever. The longer our economic and social crises continue, the more the world community is likely to doubt our capability. Consequently, their aid is likely to decrease. It is then that our independence will be at stake.

It is important to learn to work according to world standards, fully realizing the rules of the world market economy. A "manifestation" of capability would be an impact for developed countries and international economic organizations to treat us not as needy people but as an equal economic and political partner. Thus, we will be more respected and international organizations will be more interested in us.

The new independent states of Central Asia possess unique and sufficient resources, personnel, and scientific and intellectual potential to be worthy economic partners. Post-Soviet Central Asia, in its geographical and political position regarding the European, Asian and Near Eastern countries, can play the role of a "bridge" with the ability to conduct an open positive policy with each of the countries, and to promote wide connections between them. Politically, the role of a "bridge" causes international trust and respect, and serves as the political guarantor of the states' security. The economic profit of the "bridge" role is obvious. However, to carry out this role, post-Soviet Central Asia must realize structural reconstruction in economics and develop infrastructure. The economics of the "bridge" must be a special one, with a highly developed sphere of all possible services, trade bank system, network of depots, trade agencies and offices, and production of consumer goods of a wide variety. Moreover, it must have a competitive export production. Post-Soviet Central Asia has all the unique opportunities to play the role of a "tourist bridge" as well.

The third stage of entry into the political and economic world community differs because of the fact that we have been accepted to various international world, regional, political and economic organizations, that states and business circles gradually join certain economic treaty relations, and that real economic cooperation begins working. The third stage will develop intensively as soon as our economics start to recover.

It should be noted that the distinguished stages of the post-Soviet Central Asia's entry into the world community have no fixed time limit.

The most important factor in the recovery of the economics and the strengthening of the position of post-Soviet Central Asia in the world community is a close integration of the new Central Asian states' economics and their political union. Otherwise, the role of each of these states will not be so considerable when compared with the union of Central Asian states. Our entering the world community and winning respect depend on the moment we succeed in solving internal economic problems and guaranteeing ethnic agreement.

The preservation and strengthening of ethnic agreement must be our basic policy. The serious internal problem in the way of this preservation and strengthening is "tribalism." In the period of state formation and the breaking of the communist command structures, when one could watch political instability and economic crises, such a phenomenon as "tribalism" appeared and developed. This is a very dangerous phenomenon that threatens national unity and that can bring civil war. However, it still has become, unfortunately, a tragic reality in some places. It is only by ensuring national unity that political stability will be attained and economic crises will be prevented.

The new states of Central Asia have close, deep and wide economic ties -- though these ties are partly broken today -- with all the republics of the former Union. An entire breaking of these ties would mean economic suicide, because it is impossible to find a substitution of equal value in a very short time.

Of course, the new states of Central Asia will restore their economic ties with the states of the CIS and other foreign countries in new political and economic terms. They will do this by taking into consideration the real economic situation and seeking after more effective ties and partnership of equal value.

Having won political independence, the new states of Central Asia will try to ensure real economic sovereignty to obtain new priorities in economic con-

nections with foreign countries.

Being each other's nearest neighbours, the new states of Central Asia must inevitably adjust long-term and reliable economic relations with each other. The quicker they realize this truth, the more chances they will have to establish partnership with other states.

The role of the great economic partner of the new states of Central Asia is reserved for Russia whose resources as a supplier and whose demands as a consumer are enormous.

Territorial proximity, mutual opportunities of economic exchange, and a joint use of productive forces stipulate the prior economic relations with China, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Mongolia and India.

Making use of the conditions, resources and factors of the new states in Central Asia, which are not only of regional but also of international significance, will enable the states to develop their economic ties with leading highly developed industrial countries such as the USA, Japan, Canada and South Korea.

In order to become a member of the world community, the new states of Central Asia have many things of interest to other countries. These are various mineral resources, rich energy and agricultural resources, raw materials, conditions for tourism, man power potential, original ethnic culture and traditions, and a conventional geographical position between the North and the South and between the East and the West at the junction of Europe and Asia.

The economic revival and prosperity of the new states of Central Asia, due to the efforts and support of the world community, will become one more piece of evidence of the power of the human mind, creative labour, democracy, civilization, and mutual understanding between nations and states.

2. The Inheritance

What is the inheritance of the former Kyrgyz, Kazakh, Tajik, Turkmen and Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republics -- the republics of the former Soviet Central Asia? Here we need the right approach and impartial analyses of the whole Soviet history both with and without nostalgia.

By 1991, when the disintegration of the Soviet Union took place, all the republics of Soviet Central Asia had significant economic, scientific, technical, human, social, and intellectual potential. They had relatively qualified and professionally trained working personnel with the population having rather high standards of education. Their economy today consists of various types of me-

chanical engineering (agricultural, automobile, tractor, aircraft, electro-technical, tool production, computer machines), ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, hydro-power engineering, coal mining, oil, gas, chemical and food industries as well as agriculture, cattle-breeding (being in the lead), grain farming, cotton growing, and production of food and vegetables.

In the national economy of the USSR, the Soviet Central Asia made up a great economic region with its own image, having made a valuable contribution to the economy of the country. Nevertheless, it generally lagged behind the more developed republics in efficiency due to its history and improper division of labour. Central Asia was generally looked upon as a source of raw materials. The Centre made efforts to develop the economy of Central Asia and to improve its structure and efficiency. However, these efforts were not enough for a radical change in the historical specialization of Central Asia as a source of raw materials. On the other hand, the full demolishing of this region as a source of raw materials would be wrong.

The Centre was accused by Russia of paying little attention to its development. It was held that huge funds had been pumped into the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan at the expense of Russia. Both Russia and the republics brought accusations against the Centre of being robbed. But where did the Centre invest its money if it offended everyone? It did not have its own territory or its own population. The territory and the population of the country consisted of the territories and population of the republics. Consequently, all the capital accumulated in the Centre was invested in the economy of the republics and their territories. Moreover, it was used to solve the problems of employment and the material well-being of the population of the republics. Russia held the first place in being aided by the Centre. Thus, there were no reasons for being offended.

On the other hand, there were grounds for the republics to have a claim on the Centre as it formed the so-called "union subordination economy sector." This sector took precedence over the whole economics strengthening the state monopoly, making the economy immobile and ineffective, and promoting its militarization. It did not face the consumer, and did not contribute to the development of his personal interests. The economic model itself turned out to be doomed to failure.

Nevertheless, it would be unjust to regard the Soviet economics in Central Asia only as an evil. The Soviet period is just the time when the industrial potential of Central Asia has been formed and highly assessed by foreign experts.

One can hardly believe that the progress in Central Asia could be more impressive if there were quite another regime in place of the Soviet power for 74 years. But this is only supposition. The countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America have been attached to the market economy for 74 years, but they have not progressed further than the Central Asian countries in their development.

It should be admitted that the republics of the former Soviet Union on the "day" of their independence had a powerful industrial potential in support of their sovereignty. On the same day, the former Soviet Union came with an ineffective economy in a state of crisis. Nevertheless, the deformed and wasteful economy was able to stand the competition in the world market and to face the consumer.

At present not a single republic of the Soviet Union is able to function economically in isolation because of their deep and irrational all-Union specialization of production. Such a policy has exerted influence on the economic situation in Central Asian countries in the form of a high birth rate and a rapid growth of population.

Nowadays, the economic links between the former Soviet republics are being destroyed. Mutual economic pressure is under way now. The delivery of goods has nearly stopped. Industrial capacities have stagnated. Political ambitions and emotions, and false national interests of the heads of the republics prevail over the logic of mutual benefit, while it is clear that the more a country is reserved within its limits, the more it loses. It is through joint research and regulation of national problems that it is possible to protect national interests. However, it is very difficult now to find adequate economic partners outside the former USSR.

Besides, the mentality of the people inhabiting Russia and the USSR on the whole is both different and has much in common. The "much in common" is based on the general economic, political, scientific-technical, and cultural spheres that had been formed for centuries.

During the collapse of the USSR, the situation was such that the power passed over from a centralized leadership of the command system to the disposal of the Union Republics. Practically, one and the same political forces are in power though they have already gone (after August 1991). Some of them have even been prohibited. All of them adhere to the same principles, conduct and actions.

What was the reason for such a political performance? It is known that un-

der the Soviet regime and the Communist Party, people were inclined to such changes as democratization of political life and economic reforms. Some timid steps were already taken in this direction. Here, the congress of the people's deputies played a very active role besides the pre-election campaign in considerably promoting the waking up of public consciousness.

The congress of people's deputies showed the political and state structure of the USSR to be rusty, which brought its development to deadlock. The congress revealed critically thinking great personalities who assured the congress and society of an "urgency of changes." Among the personalities were A. Saharov, Stalin, Popov, Tichonov, Afanasev, Sobchak and others, many of whom became great politicians later.

In some of the republics of the former Soviet Union, there are communist parties. They are reformed. The reformed parties are not the successors of the former communist parties but they have the communist ideology and they can select their personnel from among the communists. Some of the communist parties are people's democracy party in Uzbekistan, and the democracy party in Turkmenistan. Does the communist power have any authority in society and does it enjoy society's confidence? Is the opposition strong or weak? What is the economic situation? What kind of social party does it support? These questions could be followed by this question: how strong is the position of the leaders of the new independent states of Central Asia?

Nazarbaev managed to win authority and trust both in politics and international and interstate relations thanks to his matter-of-fact decisions in the economy and politics. The opposition in Uzbekistan is the shadow now. In Turkmenistan, the opposition is silent as if it never existed. However, in Kazakhstan, it is constructive.

The abrupt aggravation of economic development in the country, the inability of the authorities to find a way out of it, and an inconsistent economic policy led to the loss of society's trust in state and government structure and in the Communist Party. Practically, the previous authority gave their power without any resistance and the USSR was peacefully liquidated.

A question arises here as to whom was the power was given. There were not any sound political forces to enjoy great support in society. Thus, during the power "transfer," the authority structures enjoyed their condition established in the former USSR republics. Many former communists became the first democrats. There were no political forces to define the purpose and the choice of ways to find the development. Thus, there must be a new political

power and aim. Moreover, there is a need for the definition of a choice of development and a consolidated society.

3. The Choice of Way

Today, not any republic of the former USSR has defined its own ways of development.

Political and economic reforms in the previous republics of Soviet Central Asia were reforms. That is why practically in all the republics the bureaucrats were saved. Social activity in all the republics was different. In Russia and Ukraine the activity was great; however, it was backed by different strata of intelligence grouped in the organization and movement of social-political parties.

The workers were limited only by economic strikes. There were no political activities by students. Political and social powers that supported the collapse of the USSR used such communist slogans as "freedom," "sovereignty," "social rights," "democracy" and "human rights."

All these powers have settled their economic problems successfully due to great resources and economic potential. They now render a great amount of social support to the community. They are very careful in conducting the economic reform but this has nothing to do with conservatism. It is the evaluation of current possibilities. Policy is aimed at the creation of a new economy not through the elimination of the previous one but through the addition and creation of a parallel economy that contributes much to the way out of economic prices. That is the way of the independent development of the republic. The president of Kazakhstan, Nazarbaev, speaks as follows: "Strategy of the development of Kazakhstan as a sovereign state gave its own understanding of the conceptual model of Kazakhstan's development, which means the 'creation of an open society of a democratic and peace loving state.' " Then, Nazarbaev provides an insight into the "conceptual model of Kazakhstan's development":

- a) to have a strong presidential republic with the rights and liberties of an individual, these rights and liberties including civil peace and security.
- b) to learn about the developed market economy with various forms of property.
- c) to have a hard social direction that grants everybody equal rights and the possibility to use these rights.

As Nazarbaev stresses, in Kazakhstan there will not be modern socialism but a simple democratic society with its varying market economy. And in a so-

ciety where there are laws, will and consciousness dominate.

In his interview, president Karimov emphasized the main principles of the particular ways of the development of Uzbekistan. First of all, the priority of economics must be placed emphasis on. Secondly, the government is becoming the main reformer but not any team consists of the most talented academicians and practical workers. In a transition period when one society is leaning and a new one is building, the government must release the control lever. The third principle is to keep within the law. The fourth is a strong policy. Nazarbayev links the main changes in economic management strategy with the strengthening of the role of the government in regulating the economy.

The main strategies of the economic policy are the creation of the socially oriented economics, the support of national business understandings, the realization of the rapid economic development strategy, and pragmatism in choosing economic and political partners.

The civil war in Tajikistan has been brought to an end by the efforts of Tajikistan's forces, Russian reconciling efforts and actions of the CIS republics (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan). The republican leadership has changed. Obviously, it is too early to speak about political stability.

Political scientists, however, note that Rahmonov's actions are remarkable for their common sense. The republic faces the hard task to revive the liveless economy.

A. Akaev managed to become president in the wave of political conflict. He was not connected with the party leadership and assumed power without his own party. In general, this is a unique case. Before August 1991, Akaev had not been supported specifically by the communist party. On the contrary, he was oppressed by the party. After August 1991, he abolished the party. He did not want an aggressive opposition party.

Economic limitations and the economic crisis prevented Akaev from reaching effective results in the struggle against inflation, and in reviving the economy and solving social problems.

The political and economic situation in the former Soviet Central Asia depends to a great extent on the attitude of Russia. The economic and defence interests of Russia and Central Asian countries are closely interconnected. Therefore, one can agree with the opinion of K. Pleshakov that "the optimum variant would be to preserve the CIS in Central Asia. The lack of its influence may result in a number of conflicts which may exceed those in the Caucasus

and here it is important to remember that our priority is not democratization but stabilization." However, the conclusion that Pleshakov has arrived at causes trouble. Do democratization and stabilization oppose each other? Will it suit Russia if authoritarian regimes secure apparent social stability by force and democratic regimes are left out?

It is correct to say that "international relations in the territory of the former USSR are of paramount priority for Russia in comparison with all other trends of foreign political activity." It is significant for Russian leadership to always remember this.

How do journalists and political leaders view the choice of Central Asian development? A. Dubnov ascertains that "in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan communism being rejected, another radiant way has been found. The leaders of nations have emerged. They have taken the nations' fate into their strong hands. One of them is already assuming sacred qualities. Like a deity he grants his people natural gas and pure water and the grateful people call divisions and avenues by his name."

One may call these societies by any name, i.e., modern feudalism, Asian absolutism, and the like. However, one will easily agree that it is tactless to discuss human rights in these capitals.

In Dubnov's opinion, "the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the formation of the national states there, are accompanied by various processes — from as yet relatively successful attempts to move along the way of building a democratic society in Kyrgyzstan to the bloody and cruel war threatening the very integrity of the state." The same situation applies to human rights, i.e., from "relatively good" in Kyrgyzstan to "nothing to be said about the rights" in Tajikistan. Nevertheless, there are some common problems. They are characteristic not only of Central Asia. One of them, the major, was formulated long ago, i.e., the priority of human rights or the rights of a nation? As a reaction to this problem, it was pointed out that if the priority of human rights is not recognized in society and is not raised to the rank of the state national policy, then there will be tension not only among but also between nations. The most acute problem in Central Asia is raising the level of material well-being. However, today, because of the deep economic crises, the halt of production capacities and the rise of prices, the living standard of all the levels of the population has fallen. The only way out is to raise the educational standard, the cultural level, and the professional training for a wide range of professions. It is only through these means that one can ensure national revival and Central

Asian Renaissance.

Thus, what way of development did the republics of the former USSR choose? All of them as model pupils say democracy, freedom, right, independence and national sovereignty. Almost all of them are for a strong presidential power and a professional parliament. Moreover, practically all of them admitted the predestination of totalitarian socialism. However, none of them declared the turn to capitalism. In addition, practically all speak about a democratic lawful state and a market economy.

Therefore, what do the former Central Asian countries choose as a way of development? Is the way capitalism or a mixture of socialism and capitalism? Perhaps, they choose neither socialism nor capitalism and not even social-capitalism. To be in the framework of the structural approach to the types of society, there is no other alternative but to choose only one way of development. However, to throw away the structural approach and take a civilized one, then it is logically natural for quite different ways of development to appear.

Then, if one proceeds from the ideology chosen by a society, one can speak of democratic, fascist, racist and nationalistic ways of development or types of societies. However, if one distinguishes societies by the forms of state systems, one can speak of monarchical, presidential or people's self-government.

The choice of the social way of development of societies is determined by their ideology. The ideology of socialism and the ideology of capitalism outlived themselves. The socialist ideology turned out to be just as doomed as the bourgeois one because society outlived that ideology. The fascist, racist and nationalistic ideologies are antihuman and antiethnic. The ideology of humanism, on the other hand, unites people and has a human nature. That is why democratic society is a constructive way of social development. It supposes political, economic and spiritual freedom, many structures in the economy, political pluralism, and priority of human rights.

The choice of the material and spiritual way of development of a society involves a civilized approach that enables the society to answer the question, "in what way do we develop?"

As to the choice of the third way of development, particularly the way of independent Kyrgyzstan, it is mentioned by T. Koychuev and A. Brudnyi in their work, *Independent Kyrgyzstan*. This way is that of science and education.

4. From Humanism Ideology to State Ideology

Humanism ideology asserts economic, political and spiritual freedom, legal equality, and international agreement. Certainly, people differ in their status and financial position. However, they have the right to choose their own way of life. They are free and equal. No one forces the other and no one has more rights than the other. The state guarantees this freedom and equality.

But how hard it is today for the population to have a real understanding of human values and ideals. The absence of a constructive ideology in the post-Soviet period led to political aggression, economic crises, a fast "melting" of spirituality and morality, and growing criminality.

Looking at this hard transitional period of today, some people, known as clever and active, hastened to call our time as a period of "foolishness." This is an emotional reaction. This is because it is through difficulties and mistakes that society passes on to a new historical period of renewal, to the epoch of democracy and humanism, and to the epoch of freedom and rights.

We can express the principles of state ideology in the Kyrgyz republic with such slogans as "people in Kyrgyzstan united and invisible," "the world is great but we are in this world too," "our policy is a policy of open doors," "old friendships are irreplaceable; take care of them," "my freedom is my responsibility" and "the law commits me, the law defends me."

The responsibility of the press, TV and radio for the public must be stronger today in the face of political, economic and moral crises. The media must direct their work firstly to the consolidation of people. Secondly, they must form a constructive approach to the socio-economic processes going on as well as to the political processes. Thirdly, they must help society search for the way out of the economic deadlock and retain the standards, order and discipline of citizens. Fourthly, they must aid society in forming constructive interaction between social forces, economic subjects and state structures. Last, but not least, they must aid society in forming constructive opposition.

Some parties and newspapers state that they are opposed to the government and the president. The president is elected by a nation-wide referendum and confirmed by the parliament and government. The executive power, called upon to realize the socio-economic policy approved by the public and parliament, is an obvious opposition to the president and government. As a matter of fact, it is an opposition to the constitutional power. However, opposition cannot be eternal and an end in itself.

If one does not change one's attitude towards the opposition despite the

change in the authority, there appears doubt in the seriousness and constructiveness of such an opposition. That is why it is necessary to distinguish constructive opposition from the destructive one. Today, a sound opposition could play its positive role if it contributes to the consolidation of society and its people, and to the joint search for the way out of crises.

Developing the state structure without including any modifications, a statesman carries out a policy that is a direct continuation of that of his predecessor. In fact, he should contribute to its realization in accordance with the requirements of his time and, if necessary, he should make the policy more effective and acceptable.

When the state is undergoing reforms, 3 years are not enough for a statesman to realize the whole state policy. During these 3 years, he will only be able to found a legislation and state administrations, work out a programme of development, and begin realizing the policy.

Thus, more than 3 years are necessary to estimate the duration and activity of a statesman. Let us try to estimate the time needed. The process of hard struggle against the economic crisis is underway. While the economic crisis is deepening, material conditions are worsening. Is it really possible to stop the crisis and to stabilize the economy? No, it is not. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the low level of development, broken economic relations within the Soviet Union, the absence of the Union budget, and the formation of the new economic structure form the problems that prevent the solution of the economic crisis. One cannot expect the first president to find the way out of such a crisis because his period is connected with the hard struggle to overcome the crisis and realize measures aimed at softening the consequences of the crisis. Therefore, it is not yet time to estimate the duration and content of his work.

Nowadays, the most important national and state problem in the economic, social and political sense is the development of the formation of a nation. Thus, the nation can become capable of providing itself with a decent living condition. However, to solve this problem is impossible without a hard-working and able person. Such a person should not only be a worker, but also a man of property who maintains and increases his own capital. Productivity is not simply a concrete process but a sphere of human activity showing in its development a fall or rise in the capability of the human community. It is the capability of people that determines the level of the material conditions and the economic independence of nations. In the history of any people there are turning points and great events when people undergo great changes. For in-

stance, the proclamation of the independence of the Kyrgyz republic was a great event for the people of Kyrgyzstan as well as the other countries of Central Asia.

The young Kyrgyz republic has chosen the democratic way of development that is consolidating all social layers and ethnic groups in a single whole. The profound reconstruction of economics and its orientation to the market, concession of economic freedom to owners, and the creation of a multilateral economy woke up the economic impulse in Kyrgyz society. The Kyrgyz now comprehend a new social and economic process and create a new economic consciousness. This process is not short but difficult enough. However, despite the difficulties, the state must invest its means in education and science, health care and culture, and experiments and qualification. This is because only a healthy, educated and cultured society full of modern knowledge and high skill has the opportunity to secure economic and spiritual prosperity.

EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATURE REUNION IN KAZAKSTAN

Najam ABBAS

In a period of just four years since independence, Kazakhstan now has its third parliament. The Supreme Soviet which was inherited from the Soviet times resigned enmass in early 1994, whereas the second parliament was termed illegitimate in March 1995 by the country's supreme court for election irregularities. The present parliament has been formed after considerable changes in the constitution, election laws, parliamentary regulations and introduction of institutions like the Constitutional Council. Consequently, the country now have a legislature reduced both in size and weight.

The author offers facts and figures on the social, demographic, ethnic and professional background of the parliamentarians which suggest that a considerable number of present legislators has been recruited from the executive and is thus expected to appease rather than oppose the government. Information on parties with sizeable representation in the legislature is provided. With 30 % seats in senate and 39 % in the Mazhilis, the Peoples Unity Party has vowed to back reforms conducted by the Nazarbayev government. Armed with such assurances, President Nazarbayev has asked the legislators to back his reforms and declared that if they work in a friendly manner, the parliament will live longer. The paper looks at the significant political developments recently taking place and at the objectives and priorities of the new leadership which has appeared on the domestic political scene. It takes note of their views concerning issues like scrutinizing budget, government expenditure and explores whether there will be room for any opposition.

The author mentions that the cool response and indifference to the election process was not due to the cold weather alone and cites several possible

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reasons behind the out of touch campaign. The paper takes a look at the coverage of election issues by Kazakhstan's media and tries to find reasons for their restrained attitude. It is observed that notably the state media carried several reports in the polling and ballot counting procedures during the December 9 Mazhilis elections. Just before the parliament's inaugural session, the Chief Election Commissioner declared that possibility of parliament's dissolution, however remote that be, cannot be ruled out altogether. The extent to which candid coverage was given to violations of regulations during elections may be interpreted as an attempt to raise the question of parliament's legitimacy in future if the need might be. The executive subjected the legislature to significant overhauling and downsizing. Moreover the mechanics of new regulations worked to produce a parliament which will not be in a position to put up any tough opposition so the government can steer clear of any obstructions, political, legal or other. Despite all these safety measures, the government is in no mood to subject its democratic arrangement to any risk. If the legislature fails to comply with the predetermined course of action, the government has clearly indicated that it will resort to certain other options.

With the change of calendar recently, Kazakhstan has put up a democratic face. That's why once again words like the senate, parliament, legislators, speaker etc. are heard more frequently. Now, both the state and private media make mention of new persons and institutions figures who have appeared on the domestic political scene. The last week of January witnessed significant development in Kazakhstan's domestic politics. President Nursultan Nazarbayev opened the first session of Kazakhstan bi-cameral legislature and addressed the joint sitting of the Senate and Mazhilis where he asked the legislators to back his reforms and work friendly, so that Parliament can continue for longer period (1). Baigeldin Omirbek, a veterinarian from the south, was appointed the senate's chairman while the Mazhilis elected pro-reform economist Marat Aspanov as its speaker. He hails from the north western oblast of Aktubinsk (2).

Days before inaugurating the Parliament, Nazarbayev met with leaders of the three leading parties represented in the parliament and discussed the country's future parliamentary course with them. After the meeting Ahan Bijanov of Peoples Unity Party Kazakhstan told reporters that his party will back the reforms introduced by the President (3).

The President appointed Yuri Kim as Chairman of the country's Constitutional Council and nominated six other legal experts to serve in the country's

newly formed trouble-shooting team to regulate Executive - Legislature relations (4). According to Article 72 of Kazakhstan's constitution, at the initiative of the President, Chairman Senate, Speaker Mazhilis, at least one fifth members of the parliament and the Prime Minister, the Constitutional Council can decide, in case of a disagreement, the question of rightness of conduct of elections and holding of a national referendum. The Council examines the laws adopted by the parliament before they are to be signed by the President. It also examines all treaties prior to their ratification from various constitutional aspects. The Council gives official interpretation of the norms of the Constitution and also gives conclusions in case the majority of the Mazhilis takes a decision to bring an accusation and carry out its investigation against the president for his actions in case of committing a high treason. The Constitutional Court alongwith the Supreme Court will give their respective conclusions about the observance of the established constitutional procedures in such cases (5).

Kazakhstan's senate started its business after forming four committees on -1- Finance, 2- Legal Affairs, 3- Foreign Relations, Defence and Security and 4- Regional Development early February. The newly appointed Chairman Senate, Omirbek Baigeldiev, 57, hopes that the senators will gain experience while working as an independent law making body and drawing from the experience of the government as well as the former Supreme Soviet and learn from their predecessors' mistakes on the other. Baigeldiev said that Kazakhstan has passed through a turbulent period as democracy underwent a pause for some time (6).

SCRUTINIZING THE GOVERNMENT

As to the whether the senate will scrutinize activities of the government and the prime minister, Chairman Senate Baigeldiev says that the senators did not feel the immediate need to do that urgently since both the government and the senate had common aims and objectives to fulfil (7).

Similarly, Chairman of Mazhilis or Lower House of Kazakhstan's parliament Marat Ospanov, who has studied Economics at Moscow's Plekhanov Institute of Economics and at Kazakhstan National State University, says he is against setting up commissions to scrutinize government spendings. "We don't need laws which do not work or undermine some work." There is a department in Finance Ministry which is qualified to do such job, says Ospanov, and adds that the purpose should be to have check in a civilized way and not to apply

political gridlocks on the government. In Ospanov's opinion, the idea of establishing a parliamentary committee on government spendings was "much ado about nothing." Let the court decide these matters if there are any violations on case to case basis, he proposes (8).

Ospanov says that he is conscious of the turbulent period through which the country and its people had passed and therefore prefers that the Mazhilis made a cool headed start. "If we begin well, we'll continue well." He hopes that in due course, the new parliament will become effective and have more democratic attributes. In his first press conference as Speaker, Ospanov went to lengths to prove that, unlike the previous parliament, the new Mazhilis was not a burden on the economy and was determined to concentrate on its assigned obligations (9).

LOADED WITH A LONG AGENDA

What are the government's expectations from the legislature? In his inaugural speech President Nazarbayev expressed hopes that the parliament will be engaged in carrying out the needful legislation. The legislature is required to provide a new penal code, family laws and labour laws for the country and adopt resolutions to allow developments of viable legal system, said the President. This is why Speaker of Mazhilis declared that during the forty working weeks of the present year, the government intends to introduce 58 drafts for the parliament's discussion apart from those issues which the parliament may choose to raise itself (10).

Ospanov declared that the present parliamentary corps will correct mistakes made in the past. Elaborating his point, he referred to the previous parliament as "a legislative body which thought nothing about the state's priorities" and only thought of taking more powers. "They didn't pay any attention on strengthening the political institution, didn't do any law making. How were they then justified to claim for more authority and respect? Ospanov inquires. On the contrary, the Mazhilis will be allowed to engage in positive activities such as to draft regulations, to discuss and to do legislation, he said. "We will be working to find a common language and fulfil the duties instead of waving the red cloth" to unnecessarily infuriate the raging bulls.

"We do not claim any special status. We are a state service just like other services, and that is why the deputies have voluntarily given up perks enjoyed by their predecessors" said the Mazhilis Speaker.

Ospanov pointed out that the Mazhilis will work with the senate side by

side. "We don't want to be drawn in us-against-them kind of matches." He said the preference was to allow both houses to complete their prescribed term without conflict (11).

ANY ROOM FOR OPPOSITION?

In response to a question whether there will be any opposition in the parliament, the Mazhilis chairman said that such a need usually rises when parliaments are formed through multi-party elections. Where the majority party forms (or sides with) the government and becomes the ruling party while others who differ with their policies take a separate stance forming an opposition. Until we make appropriate preparations to reach that stage, putting up an opposition is like erecting "a theatre of absurdity" or to quote Shakespeare, "much ado about nothing." Ospanov hoped that the present parliament will work as a catalyst for the formation of a multi-party system so that, in future, when we need we will have the possibility to do party politics (12).

It may be reminded that in his earlier days Ospanov has served as the secretary of the communist party branch at the Aktubinsk Medical Institute where he taught for 18 years (13).

PARLIAMENTARIANS' COMPOSITION AND PROFILE

According to details and overall statistics issued by Kazakhstan's Election Commission, there are a total 107 members in the country's new parliament. These include 40 persons elected to Senate and 67 who have won membership to the country's lower house of parliament or the Mazhilis. According to official sources 79.84 % votes were polled in the elections.

There are two seats in the senate for each of the country's 19 oblasts. Seven other seats were filled by individuals nominated by President Nursultan Nazarbayev in late January mostly legal experts to make up for the deficiency. Prior to that the two senators from the legal profession were Chairman of Kustanai oblasts Bar Council Sergey Zhalibin and Public Prosecutor from Zhelezinsk district, Ernek Zhumabaev. According to political commentator Vera Avaliani "there are fewer jurists but more people with background in philosophy and sciences," in the senate. The Senate was elected through indirect elections in which 5314 out of 5669 members of Maslihat (local councils) from all districts of the country polled votes.

Serving officials who have now become senators included adviser to the president and now Chairman Senate Omirbek Baigeldiev, the administrator of

Zhezkazgan Oblast, Administrator Aktau city besides Commissioners from nine districts. The eldest among senators is the 68 years old writer Ivan Sheglikhin elected from Almaty city, while Erlan Koshanov from Zhezkazgan oblast who was born in 1962 is the youngest.

The number of members representing political and professional organizations represented in the Mazhilis is as follows: there are 24 members from Peoples Unity Party of Kazakhstan (PNEK), 12 from Democratic Party Kazakhstan (DPK), from Farmers Union 7, Federation of Trade Unions 5, Youth Unions 3, Engineers Association 3, and Communist Party Kazakhstan (KPK) 2. Parties represented by one candidate in the Mazhilis are Peoples Congress of Kazakhstan (HKK), Peoples Cooperative Party, Kazakhstan Renaissance Party, Nevada-Semi Movement, Kazakhstan Advocates Union, Social fund For Poores Welfare, Aktubinsk Workers Club and Kazakhstan Organizations Union. There are 14 presently categorized as independents (14).

PNEK claims that three other independent candidates are their party affiliates, others too make similar claims. Thus, the Peoples Unity Party Kazakhstan has emerged as the leading political party in both houses of the country's parliament as it has obtained 26 seats in the Mazhilis and 14 seats in the senate (15).

LEGISLATORS FROM THE EXECUTIVE

Among the 27 members from PNEK some have served senior posts in the government like Deputy Minister for Housing and Construction Kobes Akylbaev, Chairman Foreign Investment Committee Marat Ospanov and his deputy Myrzageldy Kemelov, Karatai Turysov, Chairman National Committee on Tourism, Ludmila Zhuvanovna. They also include eight who held higher officials in regional administrations at district and oblast level. They are Maria Zhuriktaeva, Shahezat Turibaev, Rysty Zhumabekova, M.D. Kopiev, K.A. Ablyakimov, A.Y. Laurentov, Vasily Osipov and Vladimir Merenkov (16).

The break down of the 107 successful candidates is given below.

Ethnic Affiliation: According to ethnic affiliation there are 70 Kazakhs, 32 Russians, besides two Ukrainian and one Korean, one Uighur and one German among the 107 elected members in both houses.

Professional Affiliation: As per present occupation these 107 include: 23 directors of organisations, 11 government officials, 34 from local councils, 2 from law enforcement agencies, 13 are scientists, academics, 5 of them represent cultural sphere, 2 are engaged in Trade Union activities, 2 from the

armed services, four represent economic and engineering services. There are six individuals who are presently not working anywhere (17).

FEMALE PARTICIPATION IN THE PARLIAMENT

By gender, there are 95 male and 12 female members in the two houses of the parliament. A notable feature is surprisingly low level of interest shown by women specially in senate election. It may be recalled that all over the country, just four women submitted their papers for the senate elections out of which only Zaure Nurmukhanovna was elected as the lone female senator of the country. She also happens to be one of the youngest senators with 33 years of age. In the December 5 elections, only one lady. After the 31 January by-elections, the number of lady senators rose to four (18).

The lists of the seven individuals nominated by President Nursultan Nazarbayev in late January included Birganym Altimova, ex - Minister for Youth, Tourism and Sports and Zenaida Fedotova, Incharge Renumeration, Presidential Apparatus. Inclusion of two women seems to make up for "under-representation of women," a fact also admitted by Senate Chairman Omirbek Baigeldiev. In the Mazhilis, there are nine women. It is interesting to note that all three candidates elected from Akmola oblast are women and all of them contested from various political platforms. The one from legal profession is the Chairman of Turgai Oblasts Bar Council, Rosa Kuanysheva. In the Mazhilis, "there are not enough people with background in legal affairs" wrote parliamentary correspondent Gulnara Rakhmetova (19).

On the eve of Kazakhstan's election to the lower house, "Kazakhstanskaya Pravda", the official organ of the Cabinet of Ministers announced that the government has fulfilled its promise and has made all necessary preparations for holding elections, "now the decision was in the hands of the people." (20). "The government was spending a huge amount of money. Much is at stake," said a senior official (21). The message was that it upto the politicians and the electorate to express their will. The government's appeal to participate in electioneering was not responded warmly. It was not the country's cold weather alone which dampened the enthusiasm of supposedly all concerned.

MEDIA'S TREATMENT OF ELECTION ISSUES

As election campaigning drew to a close, more reports appeared in the country's press expressing dissatisfaction over low level of political canvassing carried out by the candidates. "Electioneering did not heat up," (22) "Cam-

paigning Not Visible," (23) "Is it a silence before the storm?" asked the third (24). This is how newspapers have commented on the election campaign as it concluded in Kazakhstan.

It is not so that the press is averse to the political process, actually there was so little activity to report about. Most part of the disappointment felt at the official end was articulated by Yuri Kim, the then chairman of Kazakhstan's election commission. As the election date drew closer, Kim increasingly voiced his displeasure over the passive - if not altogether indifferent - attitude of the candidates. Kim said that the campaigning in the country failed to make any visible impact in the masses. Talking to the media, Kim said that adequate funds were allocated from the state budget for each candidate to conduct his or her election campaign through the official media. Every candidate could spend them for having 15 minutes time on television, ten minute air time on radio and to publish 200 lines in a standard newspaper column. Kim however expressed his disappointment over the campaign conducted before polls (25). Expectations that the candidates will express themselves more rigorously shortly before the polls did not prove true. Kim was of the impression that in general, candidates remained confound in self-imposed restrictions themselves so as not to over step any limitations (26). This is reflected from the low profile coverage to political issues. Not only the political contestants but even the analysts and commentators exercised self constraint.

The newspapers in general preferred not to cause any stir as they were rather over cautious not to over step any limits specified or otherwise. Most newspapers published on the day of senate elections did not give any news about it. On its front page, the daily "Express - K" ran a full length article on diseases one can catch from pets like dogs as its leading story on page one (27).

In its weekly issue "Novoe Pokalenie's" cover story was about life and works of composer Gaziza Zhubanova. Similarly, leading articles in two weekly newspapers, "Kovchog" (28) and "Gorizont" (29) in their issues published on election eve were about a local body builder who has won a prize in Singapore. In general, the country's electorate did not display any noticeable activity during the pre-election campaign. One reason can be the lack of understanding of the fact that what changes have been made in the composition of the legislature and how they can affect the peoples' interests.

A survey poll released by Giller Institute just a few days before senate elections showed for 61.3 % respondents it was a surprise to learn that the country's leg-

islature will now be composed of two chambers (30).

The state media dubbed the election – its second in four years since independence – as a legal exercise to form a "professional parliament." (31). Official sources giving the affiliation of the candidates highlighted the fact that out of total 285 candidates 128 were independent. "At this stage of transition," said President Nazarbayev on election day, "we chose to abandon the system of party lists" He drew attention to Russia's political situation and dubbed it "as a matter of regret." He drew attention to Russia's political situation and dubbed it "as a matter of regret." In his view "it is not good to create chaos in such difficult conditions." (32). Reflecting on the role expected from the legislature President Nazarbayev said that the parliament must not oppose but cooperate with the government which is drafting a legislative programme.

Reports pertaining to improprieties in the polling and ballot counting procedures during the December 9 elections to the Mazhilis appeared not only on the private media but notably on the official media too. "Khabar", the National TeleNews Agency showed clippings from a press conference by K. Omarbekov who found that the names of all candidates except one were already crossed out as he went to cast his ballot in constituency No. 26, Karaganda oblast. The report carried a clip where Anatoly Antonov, representative of Socialist Party of Kazakhstan said that there have been violations of voters rights. The Imam of the Makanchinsk district's mosque was "requested" to lobby for Naubat Kaliev among local elders who regularly visit the mosque. Kaliev, director of Samipalatinsk's Pedagogy College was the candidate backed by the regional administration (33).

Independent Tele – Radio Company "M" operating from Kazakhstan's capital Almaty announced that it has collected visual evidence and surveyed neutral observers and voters and have compiled information on irregularities committed during elections. "I don't believe anybody about anything," said a respondent voicing distrust among voters. A voter interviewed on TV indifferently stated: "We do not bother about names or faces, as former communists we just follow instructions concerning whom to support". Another participant in the talk back programme said that voters were completely unaware about who there candidates were (34). "Grey, faceless people were fielded in the elections," says philologist S. Gazizovna. "The man on the street hardly knew who was his candidate and what were his objectives," she added (35).

In another programme *Inform-Bureau* shown on private TV channel "Totem", a reported visited those hospital wards were sick people including those

seriously ill have reportedly casted their ballots. Among the patients interviewed a bed ridden old lady said she did not have any idea who were the candidates or whom she voted for. "We were just asked to struck a list of names off the list." (36).

According to another report on TV 'M', observers said they felt as if the polling officers were not fully aware of the polling regulations more than ensuring that over 50 % vote. Commenting on State Department's statement (37) that the "parliamentary elections constituted an important, if flawed, step forward in Kazakhstan's continuing journey towards democracy – programme host S. Duvanov said that how can we consider it to be a step towards democracy, rather, it is a big step backwards. The programme was concluded with the remarks that in these elections the regulations were not fully observed. The exercise to observe compliance of regulations was of decorative nature and infact meaningless (38).

Election Commision of Kazakstan announced that complaints concerning polling violations were filed from Smipalatinsk and Karaganda oblasts etc. An enquiry Commission was set up which thoroughly examined all such cases. Eventually it was pointed out that those were isolated incidents which did not reflect the overall picture (39).

The degree of candid coverage given to violations of regulations during elections may be interpreted as an attempt to raise the question of parliament's legitimacy in future if the need might be. In his last press conference in the capacity of Chief Election Commissioner, Yuri Kim, said that the possibility of parliament's dissolution can not be ruled out altogether (40).

APPENDIX

Members of the 1996 Parliament

Box 1

Age & Professional Breakdown of Deputies

By age	Number	By Profession	Number
25-30 years	2	Engineers	34
30-40 years	8	Pedagogues	27
40-50 years	60	Agriculturists	17
50-55 years	17	Politologists	8
56-60 years	15	Lawyers	6
Over 60	5	Journalists	2
		Economist	15
		besides, there is one philosopher, an architect and an actor	

Box 2**The breakdown of seats contested and won in by political parties and social movements during December 1995 elections**

<u>Party</u>	<u>Candidates fielded in Mazhilis</u>	<u>won in Mazhilis</u>	<u>in senate</u>
Peoples Unity Party Kazakhstan	38	24	14
Democratic Party of Kazakhstan	22	12	12
Federation of Trade Unions	21	5	-
Peoples Cooperative Party	15	1	-
Farmers Union	13	7	-
Peoples Congress Party	8	2	-
Kazakhstan's Communist Party	9	2	1
Union of Kazakhstan's Youth	8	3	-
Kazakhstan Revival Party	7	1	-
Socialist Party of Kazakhstan	-	-	1

All Tables compiled from information released by Kazakhstan's Central Election Commission.

The Changing Face of Kazakhstan's Legislature

<u>Party</u>	<u>Number of Candidates won</u>	
	<u>in '96 Mazhilis</u>	<u>In '94 Elections</u>
Total Deputies	67	177
Peoples Unity Party Kazakhstan	24	34
Democratic Party of Kazakhstan	12	
Federation of Trade Unions	5	10
Peoples Cooperative Party	1	
Farmers Union	7	4
Peoples Congress Party	2	9
Kazakhstan's Communist Party	2	
Union of Kazakhstan's Youth	3	1
Kazakhstan Revival Party	1	
Socialist Party of Kazakhstan	-	8

Ethnic Composition of the Legislature

	<u>in '96 Elections</u>	<u>In '94 Elections</u>	<u>Supreme Soviet</u>
Total Deputies	107	177	253
Kazakhs	68	103	196
Russian	31	49	103
Ukrainians	2	10	24
Germans	1	3	14
Uighurs			

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MUSLIM POLITICAL MOVEMENTS IN RUSSIA

Zülfıye KADİR

ISLAM RETURNS TO THE RUSSIAN POLITICAL STAGE

Today, there is approximately 22 millions of Muslims living within the borders of the Russian Federation. As Alexandre Bennigsen said, Muslims of the former Soviet Union is the fifth Muslim power in the world after Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh and India. Russian Muslims were the first Muslims to be conquered by a Christian power (1).

During the Soviet period Islam has been completely eliminated from the public life: mosques, *medreses* and other religious establishments had disappeared dramatically. Entire religious life in the Soviet Union was kept under strict control of the government, while any slightest manifestation of the national and religious consciousness among the non-Russian people was considered as flagrant nationalism and fundamentalism.

Today, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Islam returned to the political stage of Russia. Religious renaissance led to the creation of the organizations along the religious lines. The rise of religious consciousness and nationalist sentiments paved the way towards the unity of the Muslims of the Russian Federation on an ethno-religious based political platform. The first Muslim party was the Islamic Renaissance Party (IPV, Russian abbreviations), established in 1990. It claimed to express the interests of all Muslims in the Soviet Union. The ultimate goal of IPV was the creation of Muslim fraction in the USSR Supreme Soviet, similar to that which existed in the Duma until 1917. At the early 1991 IPV became the popular party among the Muslims and had established numerous branches in many Central Asian Republics and the Caucasus (2).

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the idea of national self-determination, that overwhelmed national republics, renewed interest in Islam

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in Russia. In Tatarstan after the proclamation of independence, many newly-emerged political parties and movements, such as *Ittifak*, the *Iman Youth Islamic Cultural Center*, *Saf Islam Group*, proclaimed Islam as a part of Tatar ethnic identity, stressing its importance in national revival. Union of Muslims were established in Chuvashiya and Bashkortostan. Various Muslim political organizations were formed in the North Caucasus, particularly in Dagestan and Chechnya, where the Islamic Democratic Party and the Islamic Way Party were entrenched (3). General Islamic revival is clearly indicated in statistical figures: in Dagestan the number of Mosques increased from 27 in 1988 to 5 000 in 1994. In Tatarstan in 1988 there were only 12 Mosques, in 1995 this number increased to 300 (4). The Congress of the Muslims of the Volga Area held in October 29-30, 1994 adopted an appeal to the President of the Russian Federation to consider Islam as a part of Russia's own history (5). The Russian society treated Islamic Renaissance leniently but without enthusiasm. In the minds of the ordinary Russians Islam had been associated with backwardness, fundamentalism and even terrorism. But, in spite the all, Islam is considered by its followers as a part of national culture and as a way of life. This gives Islam special, compare to other religions, status.

Although the awareness of Islamic heritage has been growing in all Muslim regions, the republics did not show any serious inclinations to mobilize politically on religious lines. The idea of the consolidation of separate Muslim communities into one single political force came to the agenda in 1995. On the eve of the general elections to the State Duma the new parties, with the primary goal to participate in elections as Muslim political parties "defending political, social, moral and economic rights of all Muslims living in the Russian Federation", were established. Today there are two officially registered Muslim parties on religious lines, operating in Russia.

ALL-RUSSIAN SOCIO-POLITICAL MOVEMENT "THE UNION OF MUSLIMS OF RUSSIA"

The first party the *Union of Muslims of Russia*, was set up on 31 May 1995 and officially registered as a political party in June 1995. The *Union* describes itself as a secular party which does not support a fundamentalist program. The political aim of the "Union of Russian Muslims" is to obtain "equal proportional representation of the Muslim people in the federal organs and in all spheres of public and political life." The highest executive organ of

the party is the Congress (conference). In its First Party Congress, held in Moscow from 1-3 September 1995, 250 delegates from 63 different regions of Russia took participation (6). The Chairman of the party Abdulvakhit Niyazov, is known in the political circles as a pro-Yeltsin figure. Although, the *Union of Muslims of Russia* claims to be the direct successor of the pre-revolutionary *Muslim Union Party*, which operated in Russia between 1905-1917 and had its own fraction *Ittifaki Müslimin* (Muslim Fraction) in the State Duma, the political demands of the *Union of Muslims of Russia* are very abstemious when compared to its predecessor. The major points of its political agenda address to the cultural and economic issues such as extensive economic assistance to the Muslim businessmen, encouraging investments to the Muslim lands, recognition of the major Muslim religious days as official holidays.e.t.c.. (7).

The *Union of Muslims of Russia* does not address to the important political and national issues. It is not expected to constitute any serious threat to political stability and territorial integrity of the Russian state: its political line is build on the full cooperation with the Russian authorities. On the pages of its program the *Union of Muslims of Russia* by all means reveals its proximity and loyalty to the Russian state and its governmental structures (8). In the preamble of its programme reads that the *Union of Muslims of Russia* will "do everything in its power for the consolidation of all Russian Muslims for the common political and economic interests of Russia." Further it continued: "the Union stands up for one united Russia, for the unity of all Russian Muslims, for the unity of the word and deed" (9). One of the first decisions taken in the founding conference of the *Union of Muslims of Russia* was "that of all the existing (presidential) candidates, the most probable and best from the point of view of the Union of the Muslims of Russia is the current President (10). The political demands of the *Union of Muslims of Russia* are expressed in very general statements such as "to seek the extensive political and economic rights for the Muslims living in the national republics and regions of the Russian Federation.... To seek adoption of a state programme of spiritual revival where the interests of Islam as the traditional faith for many peoples of Russia would be taken into account." (11). The program does not provide for a concrete way to achieve foreseen goals.

In the program documents of the pre-revolutionary *Muslim Party* great importance was attached to such serious issues as the federative structures of Russia, political and cultural autonomy of the Muslim areas, extension of cul-

tural and religious rights of the Muslim population, unification of all Muslim education throughout the Russian empire, abolishment of compulsory military obligations and creation of national army (12).

In the first All-Russian Muslim Congress many Muslim deputies spoke out against the federal structure of Russia on the ground that it will lead to the separation of the Turkic people. One of the Resolutions of the All-Russian Muslims Congresses held in Moscow and Kazan in 1917 reads:

"Territorial federalism will not resolve national question. Instead of one national problem, it will create as many as the number of the regions-subjects of the federation. If the federal division is to be realized, Muslims of Russia will lose ties with each other. Hundreds of thousands of Muslims, who will find themselves in the Russian provinces, will be subjected to russification. Territorial federalism will disunite the political forces of the Russian muslims, and will culturally dissociate different groups of one Muslim community. Cultural isolation will result in the cultural enstrangement of the different Turkic people from the non-Turks" (13).

Pre-revolutionary Muslim Union stressed not only purely religious issues, but it was also deeply concerned about the preservation of the Muslim-Turkic identity by means of cultural autonomy: "...The settlement of the national problem can be realized through the granting of national-cultural autonomy to the Muslims and the creation of the National-Cultural Muslim Parliament, elected on the basis of universal suffrage by equal and secret voting....

...Medium of Education in the primary schools must be the mother tongue of the local dialects. Teaching of the common Turkish language must be compulsory in the secondary schools, where in the high schools the language of instruction must be only Turkish.If the number of Muslim boys in the schools of other nations reaches three, they must be taught their native language and Divine Law at the expence of the state and local authorities..." (14).

The political slogans of the *Union of Muslims of Russia* are far from such radicalism. Only in its cultural program the party mentions the concept of cultural autonomy of national and religious communities living in non-Muslim regions of Russia. At the moment of its creation many political analysts thought that the *Union of Muslims of Russia* was formed exclusively with the aim to gain seats in the Russian Parliament -or, at least, to assist well-known Muslim politicians to win office, so they could represent the interest of Russia's Muslim minority more effectively. But the Union's initial activities showed the opposite. After the failure to receive enough support to be placed on the ballot in the December Parliamentary elections, the Union of Muslims of Russia appealed to its supporters to give their votes for the Chernomyrdin's Party "Our Home is Russia" (15). In the recent Presidential elections the situation was

similar. The Union rejected to support Aman Tuleyev, the only Muslim candidate in the recent Presidential elections, launched instead active propaganda campaign in support of Yeltsin's candidacy (16). On its turn Yeltsin and his team created "favourable conditions" for the propaganda activities of the *Union of Muslims of Russia*. These actions produced serious doubts about the real intentions of the *Union*. All democratic forces and nationalist parties criticized Yeltsin and his prime-minister for the reactionary, hard-line policy toward Chechnya. In protest to the Union's support for Yeltsin, Party's Secretary Mukatdas Bibarsov resigned from the organization (17).

In spite of some unclear moments in its political platform, in practice, the *Union of Russian Muslims* is a very active and fast-growing organization. The number of its regional branches is on increase. The *Union of Muslims of Russia* has officially appointed its own experts and consultants, to various Parliamentary Commissions and Committees. Direct involvement in legislative structures, gives the *Union of Russian Muslims* the opportunity to participate in law-making procedures. On March 1, 1996 in the city of Derbent the Union of Russian Muslims held a regional conference on the problem of the Russian-Azerbaijani border line, which divides 800,000 Lezgin people into the territories of two states. In this conference representatives of the South Dagestan delegated full authorities to the Union of Russian Muslims to negotiate on the name of the Lezgin people about the legal status of the present borders with the Russian and Azerbaijani authorities (18). Today Moscow uses the problem of the Lezgin people and a "desire of the Lezgin people living in Azerbaijan to unite with its kinfolk in Russia" as a trump card to push Azerbaijan towards closer economic ties with Russia. Taking into account the high level of religiosity of the Lezgin people it seems that the Russian government found a good mediator for its state policies in the person of the *Union of Muslims of Russia* ...

ALL-RUSSIAN MUSLIM SOCIO-POLITICAL MOVEMENT "NUR"

Another Muslim political party that stands on the religious platform is "Nur", the all-Russian Muslim Socio-Political Movement. "Nur" was established on June 16, 1995 (19). It is the second officially registered Muslim political organization which has the legal right to participate in elections. In general, political platform of the "Nur" movement is similar to that of the Union of

Russian Muslims. Within its general political program "Nur" has also legislative, military, economic, educational, cultural ethical and ecological sub-programs. Besides the local branches, "Nur" has under its premises the "Organization of Muslim Women and Youth", which is responsible for cultural and educational programs and deals with such issues as health care, sports, problems related with birth rate and motherhood. When compared to the Union of Russian Muslims, "Nur" is a rapidly-growing organization; as today it has already - established more than 60 regional branches in the Republics. The Board of Chairmanship of the Party is composed of 13 people, who are delegates from the various regions of Russia. The highest consultative organ of "Nur" is the Council of Elders (Sovet Stareyshin), as a symbol of wisdom and Muslim traditions (20). In the recent elections to the State Duma, "Nur" gained 0.69 % votes and took the 22th place among the 47 registered political parties which have participated in the election in Russia (21). For the newly-established religious party of the confessional minority it is not so bad. The chairman of the party is Vafa Yarullin, a young religious figure, (not yet well known in the Russian and local political circles), was elected after the resignation of the party's former chairman Akhmed Yakhin, who was accused for his assistance to a Liberal Democratic Party's Deputy (22). In the Russian presidential elections, contrary to the Union of Russian Muslim Party, "Nur" supported the candidacy of the liberal reformist Grigoriy Yavlinsky (23). In the political program of the Party it is said that "Nur" does not violate state interests of the Russian Federation. It is loyal to the state mechanisms of the Russian Federation except for, the violations of human right, genocide and any state policy that provokes national tension and oppression of ethnic minorities. The Program contains specific measures concerning religious education, business, revival of cultural traditions, creation of special funds for the Muslim students. One important point in the program of "Nur" is related to the use of military force in the settlement of the regional and national conflicts (24). In the light of this article, "Nur" protested the military involvement of the Russian forces in Chechnya (25). "Nur" supports the idea of the establishment of the organized courses for the pre-conscription trainees in the places of the compact residence of the Muslim population. It also supports creation of exclusively Muslim military units within the Russian army employed only by the Muslim personnel, so that the Muslim soldiers will be enhanced to fulfill their religious duties (26).

One of the advantages of the "Nur" movement is that it has also sym-

pathizers from the ethnically-based parties and nationalist movements in the national republics. Religion has worth in the eyes of the nationalist parties, because it helps to bind people together and gives them a feeling of solidarity. In the elections to the State Duma, "Nur" proposed approximately hundred candidates from the different districts of Russia. Two active members of the national movement of Tatarstan, writer Aydar Khalim and singer Vafire Gizatullina were also proposed as candidates to the State Duma from the "Nur" Party (27). Although Tatar nationalist party *Ittifak* boycotted the election to the State Duma on the ground that "the highest legislative organ of the oppressor state had done nothing for the improving the life of the Tatar people", and appealed to the Tatar people not to participate in the elections, for those who wanted to participate in the suffrage, *Ittifak* proposed to support the "Nur" party (28). In the interview to the "Altın Urda" newspaper, singer Vafire Gizatullina, the candidate from the "Nur" Party, said that some nationalists accuse them for treason against the idea of independence of Tatarstan. "For us independence of Tatarstan has always been the primary goal, but today under the current circumstances it is hardly possible, so we decided to struggle for the welfare of the Tatar people from the federal power echelons", said Vafire Gizatullina in the interview (29).

For the time being nationalist movements in the autonomous republics welcome aspirations of the Russian Muslim Parties for their contributions to the cultural and spiritual revival of the Muslims. But this trend may continue only up to a certain point. Although Islam plays an important role in the spiritual mobilization of the people, it does not assert serious political goals. In a macro-scale political views of the ethnically based parties and the all-Russian Muslim movements may clash. These two Muslim parties consider Russia as a sole guarantor of the legal and political rights of the Muslims, whereas nationalist parties seek ultimate independence from Russia. Some uncertain points concerning the real aim of formation of the Muslim parties also leave room for various speculations so, it is unlikely that in the long-run nationalist parties will mobilize people under the banner of the pro-governmental Muslim movements (30).

CONCLUSION

Taking into account the fact that today there are 20 million of non-slavic inhabitants still living in Russia, Yeltsin and his team spend enormous political efforts and money to prevent the Russian Federation from further disintegration and collapse. To create the illusion of economic and administrative parity of the Muslim minorities with the dominant Russians, the Russian government may use all tricks and political manoeuvres. For Russia it is better to

see its Turko-Muslim subjects represented in its governmental power structures, than to let them secede....

Just recently, in May 1996, *The Union of Muslims of Russia* and the "Nur" Party decided to unite their power in a single organization to be named the *Union of Muslims of Russia*. The Unification Agreement was signed in the capital of Dagestan Makhachkala (31). Two weeks earlier, on April 13, 1996, the Imam of the Saratov city Mosque Mukatdas Bibarsov a bright religious leader, and former General Secretary of the *Union of Muslims of Russia*, formed a new independent Muslim party named "Muslims of Russia" (32)

All these recent developments show that the religious "maturity" and political culture of the Muslims of Russia is high enough to form political associations and seek parliamentary representation. But one important question rises behind all these endeavours - how great is the power of these Muslim organizations to influence the Muslim electorate just through the "confessional lines"?

Although officially Islam returned to the masses, Muslim population is deeply integrated into the Russian society. Despite the fact that Islam remains the main unifying bond between various Muslim nations in Russia, there is no strong sense of belonging to one *Umma*. Russia is a huge territory, and under the current political circumstances it is early to place high hopes on the prospective role of Muslim representation in the Russian state power structures....

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ATTEMPTS TO RESTRUCTURE BOSNIA - HERZEGOVINA AND TURKEY

Turan AYDIN

The Aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was an aggression against people, property and nature. Literally nothing was spared from brutality and vandalism. More than 200 thousand people were killed, over 2.2 million, which makes for more than one half of the total population, were expelled abroad or displaced internally. More than 50 thousand persons suffered permanent disabilities.

Just the physical destruction and damage to buildings has been assessed to total over USD 80 billion. More than 40 % of the total number of housing units have been destroyed, while only some 20 % remained undamaged. The entire economic infrastructure of Sarajevo and 65 % of all industry in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina have been either completely devastated, or damaged or looted.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, not a single railroad for links with neighboring countries is in use, while roads and bridges are also destroyed. The only bridge on the border towards Croatia is the floating bridge set up by IFOR.

The telecommunications and radio-television signal transmission networks, which represent an indispensable precondition for pre-election activities, have been completely disabled. Recently established links, both within the country and with the outside world are exceedingly fragile. Our economy was murdered before the eyes of the world.

Before the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, more than 1.1 million people had been employed. Nowadays Bosnia and Herzegovina has the highest unemployment rate in the world. Only 1 % of the population is employed in production or providing services for the market. I

Only for these most essential needs, in order to employ only 700,000 people, our needs are about USD 16 billion. For only the most critical infrastructure, health care and education, the World Bank has estimated the needs at USD 5.1 billion. That is the amount we expect to raise at the forthcoming pledging conference.

Dr. Hasan Muratović
Prime Minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina

* Turan Aydın is a regional Coordinator for CIS and Balkans Countries in the Foreign Economic Relations Board in Istanbul.

The peace treaty signed on 14 December 1995 by the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the entities which constitutes it, the Federation (the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina made up by the Bosniaks and the Croats), and the representatives of the Republika Srpska ended the four-year war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. On the other hand, it also gave rise to many questions concerning the future of the country.

Each part of the peace treaty that is formed of 11 parts aims at solving the problems accumulated in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Moreover, each part gives authority to various institutions.

The supervision of the implementation of peace has been given to the IFOR (i) (NATO Implementation Force) established within the framework of the treaty and consisting of 60,000 people settled in Bosnia. The authority of this force has greatly surpassed that of civil forces in many respects.

The IFOR undertakes the supervision of the borders between the communities. On the other hand, such subjects as regional stability and the elections are given to the authority of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Moreover, such subjects as the constitution, judgement, the protection of national monuments (along with the UNESCO), and the work of public services (along with the EBRD) are given to the authority of the sides of the treaty. While the supervision of the implementation concerning human rights and civilians is left to the authority of the UN High Representative, the subject concerning refugees is left to the authority of the UN Refugee High Commission and the subjects concerning security are left to the authority of the UN International Police Force.

The Dayton agreement

The following are the main points of the agreement:

- Bosnia is to remain a single state, referred to as Bosnia and Herzegovina, within existing international borders;
- the state has a constitution, with a government responsible for foreign policy, foreign trade, immigration, international and inter-entity law enforcement, inter-entity transport and communications, air traffic control and monetary policy;
- the state is divided into two "entities", the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Republika Srpska (RS);
- elections, supervised by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), to be held within six to nine months for the presidency and legislature of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and also for the Federation and the RS. Everyone listed on the 1991 census and, at the time of elections, aged over 18, to be allowed to vote in their

(i) The IFOR is formed of 20,000 American, 13,000 English and 10,000 soldiers from countries from the NATO and outside the NATO. It is headed by a US general.

original place of residence unless they choose to vote elsewhere;

- the right of all Bosnians of either entity to free movement throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina;
- establishment of Joint Commissions for Human Rights (including an ombudsman appointed by the OSCE), Refugees and National Monuments. These to be transferred to government in five years unless it is agreed that they continue to be independent;
- deployment of a NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) for 12 months, with a remit to ensure the implementation of key aspects of the agreement, including the withdrawal of all RS and Federation (ie Bosnian army and Croat Defence Council) forces to the boundaries agreed between the RS and the Federation, with a 2-km wide demilitarised area along the dividing line, ensuring that the ceasefire is not broken, withdrawal of all foreign forces from Bosnia and Herzegovina within 30 days, withdrawal of heavy weapons and forces to barracks within 120 days;
- the termination of the mandate for UNPROFOR, but with some UNPROFOR personnel and equipment being assigned to IFOR;
- the October ceasefire line to be adjusted in a number of ways, the most important being for all but two suburban districts of Sarajevo, and a corridor to Gorazde to be within the Federation, for certain areas west of Banja Luka, which had been taken by government and Croat forces in September, to come within the RS, for the town of Doboj to come within the RS (this provoked the resignation of the president of the Federation, Kresimir Zubak, since Doboj had a large Croatia population), and for the RS to be allocated a corridor between its eastern and western sections, but with its width, and the status of the town of Brcko, to be subject to arbitration within a year;
- all parties, including the RS, the Federation, Croatia and the FRY, to cooperate with the international investigation and prosecution of war crimes by the War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague. Those indicted for war crimes who do not comply with the tribunal's orders are not to hold or stand for elected office;
- most sanctions on FRY to be suspended but subject to reimposition in the event of lack of cooperation with the War Crimes Tribunal;
- a UN Security Council resolution to lift the arms embargo on all countries of former Yugoslavia, but with no imports of any arms allowed for 90 days and of heavy weapons for 180 days and with permanent limits for the Federation, the RS, and also for Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on their total stocks of armaments; and
- a High Representative as chair of a Joint Civilian Commission, including representatives of the parties, the IFOR commander and representatives of civilian organisations, to facilitate civilian aspects of the peace agreement, including a programme for the reconstruction of infrastructure. Carl Bildt, the former Swedish prime minister, was appointed on December 8, 1995, as the High Representative.

The implementation of the political aspects of the peace treaty gives rise to many arguments. Among these, perhaps the most important are that the IFOR force mandate is inefficient and that it is restricted by 12 months. Moreover, an other argument is the expectation that after the withdrawal of this force, the conflicts between the ethnic forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina will start anew. Especially, the wish of the US administration to withdraw the American troops as soon as possible from Bosnia leads to great anxiety among the Boshnaks.

That the presence of the USA in Bosnia depends on the presidential elections in this country leads the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina, foreign observers and foreign investors to wait with anxiety.

The idea that with the withdrawal of the American troops, peace in Bosnia will be provided by a military force formed predominantly by French and English troops is not found convincing enough.

Starting specially from the thesis that the Serbs are unbeatable, prevent to France and England for a long time international intervention to Bosnia and their becoming a reason for the increase in the dimension of the human drama in Bosnia-Herzegovina(ii). Moreover, these factors have led the English and French military forces to be known among the public opinion as "Serbs with uniforms."

The second great problem of Dayton Treaty is that although it brings peace, it restricts the authorities of civil institutions in many fields, and provides international foundations with greater authority in political and economic fields than the civil authorities in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Consequently, this naturally prevents the strengthening of the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The working and future of the federation established between the Boshnaks and the Croatians are among the factors threatening Dayton Treaty. In addition, that the local elections are to be held in June (1996) and that the general elections are to be held in September (1996) cause the sides to decide against a cooperation. The politicians have had difficulty in explaining the cooperation that they intended to make until recently with their rivals. This prevents the work for restructuring.

The Restructuring of Bosnia-Herzegovina

One of the most important regulations brought by the peace treaty constitutes the decisions regarding the restructuring of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The plants in Bosnia, predominantly an industrial country and the im-

(ii) When the US had the first ideas to intervene, the number of deaths in Bosnia-Herzegovina was limited to 10,000 people. However, the lateness of the intervention led to a rise in the number of deaths to 150,000 and the number of refugees to 1.5 million people.

portant centre of former Yugoslavia in metallurgy, machinery production, mining and the forest industry, were greatly destroyed in the war.

While in 1994 electricity production in the country decreased by 90.6% and coal production by 92% compared to 1990, total production went down to 10% of the level of production in 1990. As to total industrial production, it remained at 2% of the level of the production in 1990 (3).

Basic Economic Figures in Terms of Years

	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995*
GDP(Indeks)	100	-	-	-	27
Income per capita (\$)	1,900	-	-	-	486
Inflation (%)	114	73,100	44,000	780	-10**
Export (Million \$)	2,120	495	7	164	295

* The 1995 figure comprises the Federation region

** The region where the Muslim population lives

Source: **Information for Investors, Bosnia and Herzegovina.** (EBRD: London, 1996) 5.

During the war, 45% of the industrial capacity of the country was became productive, energy production had decreased, and transportation and cooperation units, and about 300,000 houses were damaged.

In order to prevent all this and in an attempt to renew the economy of the country, it has been accepted that priority for responsibility for restructuring, as seen in the plan in international conferences, should be given to the authorities of Bosnia-Herzegovina. For example, in the results of the Peace Implementation Conference held in London on 8-9 December 1995, this principle was specially placed emphasis on (4).

Nevertheless, it was decided that the sources needed for restructuring should be obtained by donor countries and that the work should be done under the leadership of the World Bank and the EU.

When the current economic activities in Bosnia are evaluated, it is seen that despite the principles that are accepted, the authorities of the government are restricted and that the initiative is wholly in the hands of international organizations.

The Bosnian Government, when determining the fate of its projects that are modest in value (iii), the fate of the great infrastructural and industrial projects is determined according to the special conditions of international financial

(iii) For example, among the projects that are financed by the World Bank only those that are of value below 5 million dollars are wholly under the authority of the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

foundations and donor countries. This puts off foreigners who can make investments in the country. Moreover, after Dayton Treaty, the fact that innumerable businessmen committees which invaded Sarajevo gave greater importance to contact with international foundations rather than the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina is an indication that in this country there exists the problem of finding an authority to settle matters with.

There is considerable rivalry between businessmen of various countries regarding restructuring in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Especially, a part of the countries of the EU are very assertive with respect to the undertaking of the projects here. Consequently, they benefit from their superiority in being a representative among international foundations in Bosnia. Moreover, they prevent the use of the financial opportunities of the EU by countries not a member of the EU.

The First Donors' Meeting in Brussels on 21 December 1995 was held with the purpose of determining the ways to fulfil the primary investment needs and the necessary finance of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It determined the basis of the aid programs that international financial foundations were to implement with respect to Bosnia. In addition, it determined the aid to be provided in 1996. The restructuring programme aimed at being realized during the years 1996-1999 was determined as in the table below and the participants promised an aid of 600 million dollars.

The Restructuring Programme of Bosnia-Herzegovina between the Years 1996-1999		
Sector	Million Dollars	Percentage
Improvement of the water system	380	7.5
Energy		
Electricity	530	10.4
Coal	84	1.7
Gas	192	3.8
Central heating	87	1.7
Communication	698	13.7
Telecommunication	567	11.1
Agriculture	330	6.5
Industry	400	7.9
Education	275	5.4
Health	540	10.6
Housing	600	11.8
Mine deaning	210	4.4
Total	5,093	100.0
Source: <i>Bosnia and Herzegovina, Priorities for Recovery and Growth</i> , Discussion Paper No.1, World Bank and the EBRD Report for the First Donors' Meeting, 8.12.1995, p.3.		

After the First Donors' Meeting, the World Bank started to implement various projects that it made for Bosnia within the framework of the Trust Fund. As to the European Bank of Restructure and Development (EBRD), it started to obtain finance for communication, energy, and transportation.

The fund of 30 million ECU that is to provide a finance for projects between 300.000 and 3.000.000 ECU, projects that especially the EBRD plans to make in order to channel foreign private sector investments into Bosnia-Herzegovina, will be an important step towards the strengthening of the private sector. This is because foreign investors who want to play a role in the restructuring and management of many institutions that can be renewed by a capital of 1 and 5 million dollars, may now partially finance their investments with the fund of the EBRD.

Even the political risk insurance fund of 50 million dollars made by the World Bank, although inadequate in amount, is a very appropriate attempt.

After the First Donors' Meeting, within the time that passed until the Second Donors' Meeting on 12-13 April 1996, only 2/3 rd of the 600 million dollars first promised by the donor countries and foundations was put to use. Besides, the fact that the countries which promised help did not keep their promises led to disappointment in Bosnia. Furthermore, it was observed that within the mentioned period, especially the EU countries, along with the donor countries, instead of implementing effective and longer term programmes, thought of how to quicker use the jointly created finance.

50 countries and 20 international organizations representatives that participated in the Second Donors' Meeting promised an aid of 1.2 billion dollars. Thus, with the promise of 600 million dollars at the first meeting, the finance of 1.8 billion dollars aimed for the year 1996 was attained (5).

Of the 1.8 billion dollar aid promised at the donors' meeting held twice, 347 million dollars was obtained from 15 EU countries, 435.8 million dollars from the US (individually 281.7 dollars), Japan and Canada, 101.20 million dollars from Islamic countries, and 140.47 million dollars from other countries. Among Islamic countries, Saudi Arabia was in first position with 50 million dollars and Turkey in second position with 26.5 million dollars. Among other countries that provided financial aid, Russia, Norway and Switzerland were the leading countries with 50 million dollars, 40.8 million dollars and 33.5 million dollars respectively. Besides, various organizations pledged 832.78 million dollars in aid.

Among the organizations, the EU was in first position with 367.1 million dollars, the World Bank in second position with 330 million dollars, and the EBRD in third position with 100 million dollars.

As seen in the table below, the EU countries and the EU provided 38.4%

of the financial aid and credit in 1996 with a total contribution of 714.12 million dollars.

If we think in the light of the EU countries having started off from the thesis that only the firms of their own countries could benefit from the aid they provided as a country and that only 15 EU countries could benefit from the aid they provided from the EU funds, we can see that there are limited opportunities for firms that want to do business with the finance outside their own country. (On the other hand, even Eastern European countries benefit from the aid provided within the framework of the PHARE programme).

A large portion of the countries outside the EU – with Japan as an important exception -- provide financial aid only for the firms of their own countries. As to international organizations outside the EU, they first open their projects to the donor countries.

While on the one hand, the collection of the above mentioned funds is an important problem, on the other hand, that only the donor countries have a say in the use of these funds, restricts the rights of the Bosnian authorities in the field of the restructuring of the economy.

During the period of Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina was in possession of important metallurgical and machinery production plants because it was a inner republic in Yugoslavia. These plants have played an important role in the working of the industrial plants in Serbia during the period of Yugoslavia.

The Contributions of Various Countries and Organizations to the Restructuring Programme to Be Implemented in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1996

Group	Contribution (million dollars)	Percentage
EU Countries	347.02	18.68
Holland	101.4	
Italy	63.65	
Germany	39.25	
England	38.70	
Others	104.02	
USA, Japan, Canada	435.87	23.46
USA	281.70	
Japan	130.00	
Canada	24.17	

Islamic Countries	101.20	5.44
Saudi Arabia	50.00	
Turkey	26.50	
Others	23.70	
Other Countries	140.47	7.56
Russia	50.00	
Norway	40.78	
Switzerland	33.54	
Others	16.15	
International Organizations	832.78	44.83
EU	367.10	
World Bank	330.00	
EBRD	100.00	
Development Bank	15.00	
Others	20.68	
Total	1.857.34	100.00

Source: collected from the reports of the World Bank

Today, we see that not only the relations between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia but also the economic relations between the federation part of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska have completely ended. The only relationship that continues is the traffic of stolen goods between the mafia-like institutions on both sides of the frontier. On the other hand, the important industrial plants of Bosnia have been established by Tito for the industrial plants in Serbia as a means of obtaining industrial input. This leads to a conflict between some authorities in Bosnia and international finance organizations.

While international organizations suggest that the collected funds should be used with the aim of renewing the country's infrastructure, they see the development of Bosnia as an outcome of the progress in the private sector and of the creation of a system that enables the smooth functioning of this sector. Consequently, the organizations support the transfer of the part of the aid aimed at encouragement to the private sector. As to Bosnian authorities, they give priority to the renewal of both infrastructural projects and industry, specially to the renovation of plants that are to export. Even the managers of regions like Tuzla that produce industrial products to the plants in Republika Srpska, Serbia and Croatia, await support from international foundations with respect to the renewal of these enormous industrial plants and the creation of

new work opportunities.

The mayor of Tuzla, Selim Baslagic, in his explanation to *The Financial Times*, states thus: "Since 1945, Tuzla has been an important source of energy, raw materials and products for Serbia. Besides, we were producing 70% of the table salt in the whole of former Yugoslavia. We want to renew these relations and make investors leave Serbia." (6)

On the other hand, the renewal of the economy of Serbia depends on the necessary importation of industrial products from Bosnia-Herzegovina. That the factories in Bosnia do not work ends the opportunity of Serbia to renew its economy. At the same time, the renewal of economic relations is perhaps the only available means for the reinforcement of peace. The wish of many multinational companies to do business in Yugoslavia besides having business plans in Bosnia-Herzegovina, may be effective in the renewal of some relations. On 15 November 1995, the lifting of the embargo imposed on Yugoslavia and afterwards, the attainment of peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, turn such companies as Alcatel (a French company following a project worth 200 million Francs), Siemens and Toyota to Serbia (iv).

Despite all this, foreign companies are not expected to make investments in Bosnia with their own capital until the elections planned in Bosnia. Due to this, the lateness of international organizations in the provision of necessary sources, and their denial of any discretion to Bosnian authorities lead to many negative consequences.

Turkey in the Restructuring Attempts in Bosnia-Herzegovina

Turkey that provided every kind of humanitarian and financial aid to Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that joined the international peace force in Bosnia with one brigade, opened Bosnia-Herzegovina a credit account of 80 million dollars at Exim Bank. Part of this account, 26 million was to be given to Bosnia in 1996. This 26 million was later on converted into a gift. Moreover, Turkey undertook to coordinate the Aid Mobilization Group (AMG) established within the framework of the Islamic Conference Union. However, as seen in the above table, the contribution of the members of this Group to the restructure attempts in Bosnia-Herzegovina is still quite symbolical. It is also seen that the Islamic Development Bank is not sufficiently used. Within the framework of the mission it has undertaken, Turkey should increase its work regarding Bosnia.

(iv) The brochure that introduces the English company that is going to organize in Belgrad in October 1996 the International Commerce and Infrastructure Fair, shows the exports of Yugoslavia in January-October 1995 is 2.4 billion dollars and the imports is 3.2 billion dollars. Moreover, the brochure states that in the next 5 years in Yugoslavia infrastructure projects of 8 billion dollars will materialize.

TICA opening an office in Bosnia-Herzegovina and helping the businessmen aiming to invest in Bosnia, the Union of Turkish Contractors opening an office and applying for membership to the consultant company, the IMG, which has a say in the affairs of the EBRD and the World Bank in Bosnia-Herzegovina, are important steps for our businessmen who are to do business in Bosnia. The IMG is a basic consultant company that has been established by some EU countries. Its centre is in Geneva and its activities have continued in former Yugoslavia since 1992. It provides technical service to the UN, the EBRD and the World Bank with respect to projects. That the Turkish do not work and that the French and the Italian form the majority in the IMG has been a great problem for Turkish investors. The undertaking of Turkish consultants to work in the IMG will end the unjust rivalry among the businessmen of Turkey and some EU countries. (v)

Established within the FERB, the Turkish-Bosnian Herzegovinian Business Council, although a very new Business Council, has done active work in recent months. As a result of the contact with the World Bank and the EBRD, Turkish businessmen were introduced to the business opportunities in Bosnia, the members of the business council visited Sarajevo in May 1996, and the council had its foundation meeting. During this visit, two Turkish companies (vi) established with Bosnia's third biggest bank, Central Bank the joint bank called the First Turkish-Bosnian Bank (vii).

Furthermore, in such fields as civil aviation, and the food and leather industries, treaties have been signed between Turkish and Bosnian companies concerning the establishment of joint companies or representative relations. Almost 40 Turkish companies have handed in to Bosnian and international foundation authorities the documents necessary to apply for the bids in Bosnia.

The basic problem of Turkish companies in pursuit of business is finance. That specially some EU countries do not have a constructive approach, and the thesis that the representatives of the EU and EU countries in Bosnia that Turkish firms cannot undertake the projects financed from funds coming from the EU, is an understandable policy stand after the Customs Union between Turkey and EU. This consequence, in turn, leads to the need for Turkey to put pressure on the EU to benefit from the EU structural funds aimed to be used

(v) The work of this company is financed by the Humanitarian Aid Organization of the EU, ECHO.

(vi) Kar Group of Companies and Çarmyky Holding

(vii) This bank is the first foreign bank in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

to such regions that are our neighbours as PHARE, TACIS, JOPP and INTER-REG. The ability of Turkish companies that can benefit from these funds only by means of joint partnership with an EU country company is the natural right of Turkey that cannot obtain an observable economic right from being a member of the Customs Union. It is in fact the EU countries that have benefited from the Custom Union as Turkey has opened its market to goods from the EU. Turkey has had to adopt to the limitation policies of the EU against third countries outside the EU within the framework of the adoption of Joint Customs Tariff. If Turkey can benefit from these structural funds, it will be able to do business under equal conditions with the firms of countries that are EU members in third countries.

It is difficult to understand why France, which gave less political support than expected and which provided only 9.29 million dollars in aid for Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1996 for the purpose of restructuring, is acting as an obstacle to Turkish companies in Bosnia by using its companies' representative staff superiority in international organization's local offices. Besides all this, the solution of the problem of the political risk insurance of the investments to be made in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Eximbank's aid in this will increase the investments of Turkish companies in this country.

The tragic accident of the aeroplane that had in it the US Secretary of Trade and the high authorities of companies, and the death of the people in the aeroplane gave rise to serious hesitations in big US companies concerning doing business in Bosnia-Herzegovina. That the attitude of the US government concerning its military force in Bosnia is not yet clear increases these hesitations. Meanwhile, as in the whole of former Yugoslavia, the German businessmen who were the most active before the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina are waiting for the election results in September. Under these circumstances, competition is seen predominantly between the Turkish, Italian and French companies.

Turkish companies have acquired a powerful position in Eurasia thanks to their ability to undertake risks, establish strong individual relations, and provide cheap services. In addition, Turkey's historical ties with Bosnia and its continuous provision of support to this country during the war lead to cooperation among the businessmen of the two countries.

Turkish companies have become aware of the need of Bosnia-Herzegovina to be rebuild. Moreover, they have been the group among all the foreigners that best understands the wish of the authorities of Bosnia-Herzegovina to

have the most important authority and responsibility in this rebuilding.

FOOTNOTES:

1. **Reconstruction and Investment Opportunities-2** (Ministry of Industry and Energy: Sarajevo, 1996) pp.4-5.
2. **EIU Country Profile** (The Economist Intelligence Unit: London, 1995-1996) pp. 13-14.
3. **Bosnia and Herzegovina: Economic Issues and Priorities** (World Bank, August 11,1995) p.2.
4. Conclusions of the Peace Implementation Conference Held at London, 8-9 December 1995, p. 15.
5. **The Bosnia-Herzegovina** File, FERB Turkish-Bosnian Herzegovinian Business Council, May 1996, p. 4.
6. Anthony Robinson, " The Uphill Track of Recovery," **Financial Times** 13 Haziran 1996 : p.11.

TATARSTAN

GEOGRAPHY

Hamdi ÖZDAMARLAR

An enclave in the centre of Russia, the Tatar territory extends over an area of 67,800 km² and represents 0.4 % of the area of the Russian Federation. The Republic of Tatarstan has common frontiers in the west with the Republic of Chuvashia, the Republic of Mari El; in the east with the Republic of Bachkortostan; in the north with Russia, the Republic of Udmurtia and in the south with Russia. From the north to the south, the country extends over an area of 290 km and from the east to the west over an area of nearly 460 km. The Tatars live mainly in the valley of the Volga. The capital situated in the north-east of the country is Kazan. About one-third of the population of the Republic live there. The principal cities (19 in all) are Zainsk, Nijnekamsk, Buguma, Bolgar, Nurlat, Tchistopol, Menzelinsk, Flabuga Arsk, Chemordan, Tetiochi Leninogorsk, Mondoloevsk, Alekseevskoe, Zelenodolsk, and Naberejnye Tchelny (500,000 inhabitants, second city of the country). Tatarstan is divided into 43 administrative regions.

DEMOGRAPHY

The population of Tatarstan is of 3,747,600 inhabitants according to the statistics of 1994. This population is 2.5 % of the population of the Russian Federation. Within the Tatar population (according to the census of 1989), 43.2 % are Russians, 0.9 % are Ukrainians and the representatives of the neighbouring countries. Among these representatives are the Tehouvaches (3.7 %), the Mordoians and the Udmurtians. The Tatars represent a little less than half of the total population of the Republic (48.5), which is 1,817,586. Numerically, the Tatars are the second ethnic group in Russia and the seventh nationality of the former Soviet Union. According to the census of 1989, the Tatar population was distributed in the other republics in the fol-

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lowing way: Ukraine, 86,874; Belarus, 12,436; Uzbekistan, 467,829; Kazakhstan, 327,982; Georgia, 4,099; Azerbaijan, 28,019; Lithuania, 5,135; Latvia, 4,828; Kyrgyzstan, 72,228; Tadjikistan, 72,228; Armenia, 470; Turkmenistan, 39,245; Estonia, 4,058. According to the estimates and projections of different experts, the total population of the Tatars of the former Soviet Union varies between 6 and 7 million. Indeed, for historical and geopolitical reasons, the Tatar population today is completely scattered on the territory of the former Soviet Union where it is difficult to speak of a Tatar language. In Idil-Ural (except for Tatarstan, Baskortostan, Udmurtia, the Republic of Mari El, Mordovia, and Chuvashia), the Tatar population is distributed in the following way :

Distribution of the Tatar Population of Idil-Ural

Neighbouring countries	Total population	% Tatars	Tatar population
Bachkortostan	4,048,000	28.4	1,500,000
Udmurtia	1,637,000	6.9	113,000
Mari El	764,000	5.8	44,500
Mordovia	962,000	4.9	47,000
Chuvashia	1,361,000	2.7	37,000
Regional total	8,772,000	19.85	1,741,500

Source: *Le Courrier des Pays de l'Est*, No.1393, 1995, Documentation Française.

The total population is that of 1994. The percentage of the Tatar population is that of 1989. The figures have been rounded off.

1,741,500 Tatars live in the neighbouring republics of Idil-Ural. About 1,963,000 Tatars reside in the different cities and administrative regions of Russia (all along the Volga until the Pacific Ocean). 160,000 Tatars live in Moscow. One finds the Tatar population also in East Turkestan (Xinjiang). 1,817,000 people are the natives of Tatarstan. The total population of the Tatars in the former Soviet Union is approximately 6.6 million. Only 27.3 % (1,817,556) of the Tatars reside in the Republic of Tatarstan. 19.85 % of the Tatars live in the neighbouring republics of Idil-Ural. 73.4 % of whole Tatar population in the Idil-Ural is an urban population. The great diaspora (1,963,040) is found in Russia outside the region of Idil-Ural followed by Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Tadjikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan. It is noted that the Tatars are not many in Azerbaijan Shiite.

Distribution of the Tatar Population in the former Soviet Union

Country-Region	Total population	% Tatars	Tatar population
Armenia	3,722,000	0.01	470
Moldova	4,345,000	0.08	3,828
Estonia	1,500,000	0.25	4,048
Georgia	5,463,000	0.07	4,099
Latvia	2,657,000	0.18	4,828
Lithuania	3,761,000	1.36	5,135
Belarus	10,298,000	0.12	12,436
Azerbaijan	7,301,000	0.38	28,019
Turkmenistan	3,893,000	1	39,245
Kyrgyzstan	4,469,300	1.61	72,228
Tadjikistan	5,557,000	1.29	72,228
Ukraine	52,100,000	0.16	86,875
Kazakhstan	16,913,700	1.93	327,982
Uzbekistan	21,607,000	2.16	467,829
Idil/Ural-Tatars	8,772,000	19.5	1,741,500
Tatarstan	3,747,600	48.5	1,817,556
Russia-Tat-Id.Ural	148,285,000	1.32	1,963,040
Total	291,872,000	2.27	6,651,346

The figures of the total population (country) are of 1993 (except for Kazakhstan). The figures of the Tatar population are of 1989. The Tatar population of Russia has been obtained by deduction.

Source: *Hérodote* n° 64, Documentation Française, "Russie: la Décentralisation aux Prises avec l'Etatisme," Ex-USSR édition, 1994.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE POPULATION AND ITS PROBLEMS

The diaspora of the Tatar nation is very scattered. Never under the Soviet regime the native population exceeded 50 % of the total population of the Republic. It is only by adding all the populations of the Volga that one obtains a figure exceeding that of the Slav population. However, the Slav population is not inactive. Among the Slavs, the nationalists claim the secession of Tatarstan and the proclamation of a republic, the *Kama*. The religion also poses problems. In order to avoid inter-religion quarrels, the Tatar authorities have decided to open as many mosques as churches.

HISTORY, LANGUAGE AND RELIGION

The Tatar language belongs to a Turkish group of the Altaic family. It is difficult to speak of a Tatar language because the Tatar nation is diverse,

mixed, and influenced by the cultures of European and Muslim countries. There are three names given to the Tatars: The Tatars of Kazan are also called the Tatars of the Volga, the Tatars of Crimea (deported after the Second World War) and the Tatars of Lithuania.

THE TATARS OF KAZAN

The Tatars of Kazan are descended from the ancient Bulgarians of the Volga and the Turkish and Mongol tribes of the Golden Horde from the XIII th century on. In the Middle Ages, the Mongol kingdom of the Golden Horde was extending from Siberia to the Balkans. The dismantling of this kingdom took place in 1502 following the seize of Sarai by the khan of Crimea, Mengli Giray. The Tatars founded Khanat of Kazan that came fifty years later under Russian control. Thus, for the first time in their history, the Russians subdued Muslim states in 1552. In 1556, with the annexation of Khanat of Astrakhan, "The Russian State overcame between 1450 and 1650 the stages which brought it from the status of Great Principality paying tribute to the Muslim Tatar sovereignty of Kazan, to that of the empire of the Czars." The seize of Kazan by Ivan the Terrible, the massacre of the male population, the slavery of women and children, and the destruction of mosques were the first upsetting events of the Tatar society. The levying of higher taxes changed hands. The Tatars of Kazan were Sunnites. They resisted Russian and Christian cultures. Change in the relations between master and slave marked the beginning of the numerous insurrections and rebellions that were settled by violent repressions. In the XVIII th century Catherine II the Great went as far as prohibiting the Tatars from entering Kazan. The Russian conquest was followed by the confiscation of the lands belonging to the Tatar nobility that transformed itself progressively into a merchant nobility. Its better off members Russified their family name in the heart of the second half of the XIXth century in order to be equal with the Russians especially on the commercial plane. The formation of this elite class (negotiators, big merchants, small tradesmen, and the like) enabled the Tatars to become renowned beside the other Turkish nations of Russia. From this ruling class of Turkish-speaking and Muslim nations, there emerged in the XIXth century an intellectual modernist class originally from the Islamic movement, the *Jadid*. This movement favoured "the cultural unification of the Turkish people of Russia and their participation in the cultural and social freedom of the empire (the Pan-Turk move-

ment)." This qualified movement "analogous to whom, in the Ottoman Empire, will inspire *Tanzimat* and the Young Turks and then *Kemalism*." This movement opposed the Islamic traditionalism of the Mullahs and aimed to form a state called Idil-Ural (Idil being the Turkish name of the Volga) resembling all the Turkish Muslims of the empire. At the beginning of the XXth century, profiting from the revolutionary crises, the intellectual Turkish Muslims of Russia multiplied the meetings which other people believed to be the "Muslim Congress." The first of these meetings of the Muslims of Russia was held on 15 August 1905. The second was held on 13-23 January 1906. Threatened by the security forces of Russia, many intellectuals from Crimea, Azerbaijan and Kazan left their regions and took refuge in Turkey. The session of the meetings by the Muslims of Russia (Turkish Muslims) was earlier than the Congress of Kazan which was held in July 1917 (proclamation of the autonomy of the Muslim Tatars of interior Russia and of Siberia). This congress was followed in December of the same year by the National Assembly of Ufa. With the overthrow of Czarism, the political activities of the intellectual Turkish Muslims and, in this precise case, of the Tatars, multiplied. On 7 May 1917, the General Congress of the Islam of Russia was held and the first time a leader (Alimjan Barodi) not designated by the Czar was chosen by the participants. On 28 January 1918, for the first time since the fall of Khanat of Kazan, the State sovereignty of Idil-Ural was proclaimed. This proclamation did not survive the "divide to rule" politics of Moscow that brought a communist Muslim movement in order to fight the modernist movement Pan-Turk. Idil-Ural lost its sovereignty when the Bolsheviks proceeded with the dissolution of the National Assembly in the same year of its formation.

For geopolitical reasons, the Soviets carefully undertook to break up the Idil-Ural territory into five on the principle of the nationalities, without respecting the "natural" frontiers and the distribution of the native population. From this political blend of races was born on 23 March 1919 the RSSA (Republic of Soviet Socialist Autonomous) of Bashkiria that would see its territory enlarge by the addition of the province of Ufa whose population was mainly Russian. On 27 May 1920, was created the RRSA of Tartary within the framework of RSFSR (Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic). On 21 April 1925 the Soviets founded the RSSA of the Chuvashiani. In 1932, Udmurtia was constituted as an autonomous region and became on 28 December 1934 an autonomous republic within the framework of RSFSR. On 4 November 1920, an autonomous region was attributed to Mari (or Tchérémisses) that

rose to the status of RSSA of Mari on 5 December 1936. The five artificially broken up territories gave way to ethnic blends without homogeneity and without representative. Consequently, today, the Bashkirs, the Udmurtes, and the Tchérémisses are minorities in their own republic dominated by Russian populations and neighbouring countries.

In addition, in a parallel direction with the breaking up of the Idil-Ural bloc, the Soviets took care to set up a corridor in the North of Soviet Turkestan in order to separate the two Turkish Muslims. For this, Moscow proceeded with the creation of a Russian administrative region (oblast) in the South of the Bashkiria comprising the cities of Orenburgh and Orsk all along the Ural River. This region was joined to the Russian administrative region of Cheljabinsk. The isolation of these republics, these artificial islands plunged in the Russian ocean, lost all hope of resistance, all attempt to return to Idil-Ural or at least all rise to the status of RSS. It is in this way that the Tatars surrendered to their new fate until the collapse of the Soviet Empire.

The Tatar language (Altai people) is written in the cyrillic alphabet (adopted in 1940) of 41 letters against the Russian alphabet of 32 letters. At present the Tatar authorities reflect on the replacement of the alphabet by the Arabic or the Turkish alphabet. Before 1929 the Tatars were using the Arabic alphabet. From 1929 to 1939 they adopted the Latin alphabet. 70 % of the Tatars are bilingual. About 80 % of the population designate the Tatar language as their mother tongue that belongs to the group Kiptchak of Turkish languages. There are several dialects of the Tatar language such as the Tatar of the West and the Tatar of Siberia.

POLITICS PROCLAMATION OF SOVEREIGNTY AND INDEPENDENCE

After 72 years of the proclamation of the State sovereignty of Idil-Ural, the Soviet Socialist Autonomous Republic of Tartary which had been created on 27 May 1920 within the framework of the RSFSR proclaimed its sovereignty under the name of Tatarstan on 30 August 1990 (neither recognized by the centre nor by Russia). Tatarstan is the first autonomous republic of the RSFSR to proceed with the proclamation of its sovereignty (to rise to the status of federal republic with the same title as the other 16 republics). By proclaiming its sovereignty, Tatarstan manifested its will to leave the Russian Federation by refusing to recognize the election of Boris Yeltsin as president. (On 13-14 April 1991, the first federal assembly by the national independence party It-

tifak was held). On 12 July 1991, the day of the election of the president of the RSFSR to universal franchise, the Tatars symbolically organized their own presidential election. Mintimer Chaimiev was elected with 70 % of the votes (with 60% participation) and asked to sign the Union Treaty like an independent republic with the same status of equality as Ukraine or the Russian Federation.

Indeed, on 21 March 1992, the referendum (strongly contested by Moscow) on the creation of a sovereign state was approved by 61.4 % (80 % of participation of which 32.7 % opposed) of the voters. This result took place despite the fact that on 13 March 1992 the organization of the state had been declared anti-constitutional by the constitutional court of the Russian Federation. The Tatars voted for a "Sovereign state, subject of international law, establishing its relations with the Russian Federation and the other republics and states on the basis of treaties recognizing the sovereign equality." On 31 March 1992, Tatarstan, like Chechnya-Ingushetia, refused to sign the federal treaty that defined the powers of the 18 autonomous republics of Russia and the Federation. These two republics are the only ones to have proclaimed their total independence and refused to sign the federation treaty. The enclavement of Tatarstan, its geographical situation, its proximity to Moscow (750 km), the existence of a strong Russian minority, and mastership of the means of communication (dispatch of goods, petroleum), did not disturb the Russia Federation upon the realization of a real succession. Consequently, the Russian army did not intervene in the affairs of Tatarstan as it had done with Chechnya (December 1994) where the geopolitical and geostrategical stakes had been more important.

This "silent" ignorance of the independence of Tatarstan provoked several weeks of manifestation and strike in Kazan in May 1991. The Tatars replaced the red star on their parliament with the golden crescent. "The parties, more or less vigorous nationalists which approached power, had made the communist party collapse before its official close. The Tatar parliament—or Tatarstan—greatly became in favour of independence after the elections of 1990." Many of the parliamentarians incited the population to boycott the elections of the president of Russia and denounced "the Russian imperialism that exploited the republic." After the breaking up of the parliament of the Russian Federation on 21 September 1993, and during the organization of the referendum to the new Constitution, people supporting independence continued to denounce the hand of Moscow on their republic: Only 14 % of the voters

took part in the referendum of the new Constitution.

REGIME AND CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION

On 1 February 1992, the Republic of Tatarstan proclaimed its independence. On 12 June 1991 Mintimer Chamaiev, former president of the Council of ministers of the autonomous Tatar Republic, and president of the Supreme Soviet (named in 1990), was elected president of the Republic with more than 70 % votes. Vissili Likhatchev rose to the position of vice-president while Mukmammad Sabirov became the head of government. On 23 March 1992, following the success obtained at the referendum of 21 March, Mintimer Chamaiev proposed that Russia sign a bilateral treaty instead of the federal (multilateral) treaty. Wanting "to establish totally new relations with the Russian Federation," in the weeks following the proclamation of Tatarstan, Chamaiev proclaimed the fiscal sovereignty of his country only conceding to the centre the finance of the functions of the defence, communications and transport. This highly political act (followed by Bachkortostan and Chechnya) symbolizing the firmness of Kazan was also an act of opening in the direction of Moscow. To obtain a complete status of associate member, president Chamaiev continued to negotiate with Moscow throughout 1993 by inciting its citizens not to take part in the referendum on the new Constitution of the Russian Federation in December 1993. With the political pressure of Kazan, Moscow was disturbed by the propagation of the "calm revolt" in all its territory. Consequently, it began to retort by economic pressure threatening to close the pipeline, the vital artery of the economy of Tatarstan and of political independence. On 15 February 1994, Tatarstan and Russia made definition of powers and signed a treaty in Moscow. "The major concession made by Moscow seemed to be the decision not to make Tatarstan sign the federal treaty. As to Kazan, it renounced making an agreement according to which none of the powers had been specifically granted to the federal centre remaining to the republics. Such an agreement had until then been the proclaimed objective." Compared with the Chechen example, Tatarstan fared in the concessions with its very powerful neighbour rather well. Meanwhile, this treaty (which was put into operation on 24 February 1994 and completed by a dozen of economic agreements) was not recognizing the total sovereignty of the Tatar state. Thus, this treaty was half a success for Tatarstan.

THE ATTRIBUTION OF DOMAINS OF POWER

The division of power in Tatarstan that are known to be the most important by Russia are as follows: the Constitution and the laws of Tatarstan, foreign policy, external commerce, (but the quota of exportation and annual negotiation for petroleum and its derivatives being with the Federation), the budget, levying of taxes (but the continuation of the levying of federal taxes), the organization of the judiciary system, care of the resources and enterprises on the Tatar territory (except for the federal property, separate agreement), the central bank (the conservation of the Rouble as currency), decision of the relative questions to the Tatar citizen (not explicitly known to the other republics of the Russian Federation) and exemption of active military service in the Russian army (but civil service).

The domains of power attributed both to the government of Tatarstan and to the government of the Russian Federation are: protection of individual rights; ethnic liberties and minorities; defence of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Tatarstan; production of military equipment and their sale; conversion of factories of armaments for civil ends (separate agreement); co-ordination of external commerce; price politics; monetary politics; transport (petroleum and its derivatives) and communications.

Although the treaty signed between the two countries provides great powers for Tatarstan, it is greatly criticized by those in favor of independence that see certain dispositions of this treaty as anti-constitutional. Indeed, apart from the fact that the bilateral treaty comprises serious similarities with the federal treaty of 1992 that Tatarstan did not want to sign, the independence or the economic, fiscal, commercial (external commerce), monetary, and military sovereignty is greatly under the control of Russia. By playing the economic-military card, the Russian Federation realizes its political ambition to make Tatarstan join the other republics (except for Chechnya). The dream of a "second Baku," the ambition to become "Kuwait" and a master of one's own destiny for the first time since the fall of Kazan is anglo-ut under the compressing diplomatic-strategic Russian power. The mastery of strategic domains confers to Russia a "democratic" tutelage hardly disguised.

ECONOMY:

MINES AND INDUSTRY

NATURAL RESOURCES

Tatarstan makes use of a strong industrial capacity notably with its industries of transformation and of hydrocarbon resources (the underground is

rich in petroleum, natural bitumen, carbon and natural gas). Its petroleum reserves (mainly in the south-east) are evaluated at 850 million tons. The reserves of natural bitumen composed of nickel, vanadium and, scandium, are evaluated at more than 12 billion tons.

As to the reserves of carbon, they are estimated at 5 billion tons. Tatarstan produced in 1989, 4,236 million metre cubes of natural gas.

Distribution of Economic sectors

Industry	36.8 %
Agriculture	15.5 %
Building trade	9.3 %
Education	3.2 %
Transport	6.4 %
Health	4.2 %
Science	2.3 %
Others	17.3 %

Source: Eurasian File, TICA, No: 29, March 1995.

PETROLEUM

Although Tatarstan possesses all that is necessary to maintain its economic independence, its independence mainly revolves around petroleum (Almetievsk, Leningorsk, Mendeleevsk, Elabuga). Before its annual production fell by one-third compared with that of 1975, Tatarstan produced more than 100 million tons of petroleum. At the beginning of the 1990s, only 5 to 10 % of sales were paid to Tatarstan in foreign currency by Russia and the former Soviet Union. The Tatars claimed a very great part of the payment in foreign currency (80 %) in order to avoid the loss of sales when compared with the sales of the international market. The treaty of 15 February on the definition of powers did nothing but confirm an already existing situation. Indeed, by this treaty, Tatarstan was to negotiate annually with the Russian government to determine the quantity of petroleum to produce and to export. In addition, the same treaty stipulated the negotiation of the quantity of the product including the quotas exported by Tatarstan (among which are petroleum and its derivatives), the coordination of external commerce, the policy of prices and the monetary policy (the rouble). By this treaty, Tatarstan was constrained to moderate its ambitions to "become richer than the Russians." Since the signature of this treaty, the annual agreements on the authorized quantities to produce and to export signed with the federation satisfied the responsible Tatars. Indeed, "in terms of an agreement reached by the federal authorities in February 1994, the Republic has the right to export 48 % of its production

Principal Agricultural Products of Tatarstan (in thousands of tons)

	Annual average 1976-1980 Quantity	In % of the production of the Federation	Annual average 1992 Quantity	In % of the production of the Federation
Cereals	3.168	3	4.066	3.8
Sugar beet	765	3	896	3.5
Potatoes	1.805	4.4	1.736	4.5
Vegetables	155	1.5	220	2.2
Meat	223	3	246	3
Milk	1.296	2.7	1.619	3.4
Wool	4.9	2.2	3.6	2

Source: Goskomstat Rossii, *Rossiiskaia Federatsia, 1992 godu*, Moscow, 1993.

(3% in 1991, 17 % in 1992, 31 % in 1993), 16 % of which is sent to the States of the former Soviet Republics and 32 % to 'abroad' 8 million tons of this production is sent in part to Hungary, Turkey and Greece, the rest being commercialized on the world market by means of Western societies." To increase its economic independence (vis-a-vis other regions of Russia like Bachkortostan), Tatarstan considers transforming its petroleum by constructing new refineries with the help of foreign investors. The construction of new refineries among which is the one in Nijnekamsk is also made to meet the internal demand. Indeed, despite more than 10 thousand oil wells which the country uses and 4 million tons of extraction of petroleum, the queues in front of service stations are a common sight. The local refineries function from 36 to 40 % of their capacities. The Tatar authorities hope to increase the capacities of the refineries to 75-80 %. In May 1995, the production of petrol was 150 million tons by day when the need for petrol was reaching a level of 350 thousand tons a day. Despite the queues in front of service stations and refineries, the dream of a petroleum-state makes its little way that must pass through Russia. However, Russia may refuse access to gas pipe-lines anytime and end its policy of compromise.

INDUSTRY

Tatarstan possesses other riches than petroleum, i.e., natural bitumen, carbon and gas. Indeed, it has important scientific and technological industries

Other Industrial Products of Tatarstan in 1989

Electricity	billion kwh	18.8
Petroleum	millions of tons	103.3
Natural gas	millions m ³	4236
Wood for construction	thousands of tons	1307
Paper	thousands of tons	23.8
Cardboard	thousands of tons	76.5
Flint and steel	thousands of units	742
Caster sugar	thousands of tons	65.6
Preserved food	millions of units	25.7
Sugar	thousands of tons	64.7
Watches	thousands of units	3.3

Source: *Narodnaye Hozyaystro RSFSR*, 1989.

that place it in the 8th position among the countries of the former Soviet Union. The contribution of the industrial production of Tatarstan in 1992 was 3 %. In the field of chemistry and petro-chemistry, this contribution increased to 7.8 %. The Republic is in possession of one of the largest petrochemical complexes of Russia (Nijnekamsk). There, one finds a refinery that produces ethyl-benzene, styrene (the first place in the former Soviet Union) and caoutchouc isoprene (1/3 rd of the needs of the former Soviet Union). Tatarstan also produces photographic films, magnetic strips, audio cassettes (Kazan), nitrogeous fertilizers, and by-products (Mendeleevsk). In the

Principal Industrial Products of Tatarstan in 1993

	Units	Quantities	In % of the production of the Federation
Petroleum	millions of tons	25.8	7.3
Steam turbines	1,000 kWh	688	-
Lorries	1,000 units	57.1	10.8
Pneumatic tyres	1,000 units	11.060	30.6
Elements prefabricated in ferro-concrete	1,000 metre cubes	1.572	4.6
Refrigerators and deep-freezers	1,000 units	284	8.2
Alimentary oil	1,000 tons	3	0.3
Caster sugar	1,000 tons	89.1	2.3

Source: Goskomstat Rossii *Razvitie Ekonomicheskikh Regionakh Rossiiskoi Federatsii*, Moscow, 1994. In *Documentation Française, le Courrier des Pays de l'Est*, no: 393.

mechanical industry, the Republic manufactures helicopters (the principal producer in Russia), Il-62 aeroplanes (Kazan), computers, electric connectors, medical instruments (Kazan), measuring devices for oil wells (Bugulma), clock and watch-making articles (Tchitopol), electric domestic appliances (Zelenodolsk), and electrical and electronics equipment for transport (Naberejnye). In the same city situated in the North-East and which remains a young industrial centre, one finds lorry factories (manufacturing 150,000 lorries a year) and diesel engine factories (manufacturing 2000,000 diesel engines a year). These factories employ 44 % of Russians and 46 % of Tatars. Besides, Tatarstan has an important military-industrial complex that it considers transforming or modernizing. Industry plays a significant role in the distribution of economic sectors followed by the agricultural sector. At present, agricultural production and the production of consumer goods are the sectors of activity that the authorities of the Republic attach particular importance to.

AGRICULTURE

Tatarstan is also an agricultural country but it is incapable for the moment of realizing self-sufficiency in the field of cereals despite an increase in its production between 1989 and 1992. Due to the bad quality of its cereals, Tatarstan has been constrained to import a large amount from such countries as the USA, Canada, Hungary and Finland to complete its domestic products (40 %) treated in its mills. The dominant plant products are wheat, barley, potato, corn, flax and sugar beet. Animal production is based on sheep (1,51 million

Agriculture of Tatarstan in 1989

Cereals	in thousands of tons	2662
Sugar beet	in thousands of tons	882
Potatoes	in thousands of tons	1092
Fruits	thousands of heads	214
Cattle	thousands of heads	1615
Pigs	thousands of heads	1104
Sheep	thousands of heads	1513
Horses	thousands of heads	77.5
Poultry	thousands of heads	10417
Meat	thousands of tons	280
Eggs	million	1277
Wool	ton	4365
Butter	thousands of tons	30.9

Source: *Narodnaye Hozyaystro RSFSR* in 1989.

heads) and cattle (1,65 million heads). Pigs are 1,1 million and horses are 77 thousand.

EXTERNAL COMMERCE

The exports of Tatarstan reached 439 million dollars in 1992. The following year this figure was brought to 761 million dollars. The main customers of the Republic with respect to the percentage of sales are the USA with 27% , Germany with 13.2%, Turkey with 12.2%, Hungary with 9.3% and Switzerland with 7.5%. Tatarstan has mainly exported crude oil, fuel oil, synthetic rubber and lorries. Tatarstan imported for a value of 207 million dollars in 1992 against 187 million dollars in 1993. This is a drop of 20 million (11 %). The imports of the country consist of equipments, food products, and clothes.

The imports of Turkey from the Russian Federation rose in 1993 to more than 1,542,363,000 dollars and in 1994 to 1,045,288,000 dollars. The imports of Turkey from Tatarstan were 91.32 million dollars in 1993.

BANKS

More than about twenty commercial banks with the help of foreign investment have entered the market since the proclamation of the sovereignty. Among them may be named the Bank of Inter-regional Development of the Republic of Tatarstan, Bank for the Social Development of Tatarstan (Tatsofbank), the Tatar Commercial Bank, Bank of Joint Venture of Volga-Kama, Tattecobank, Interkamabank and Naberejnye Tchelny City Commercial Bank.

TRANSPORT

The system of ground and river transport of Tatarstan is sufficiently developed when compared with the other Republics of the former Soviet Union. The system of ground transport covers more than 16,500 km of which 15,200 is of asphalt road. The density of the roads is 243.4 km for 1000 km² against 24.5 on an average for the other Republics of the Federation. The railway transport system is 900 km that is 1.32 km for 1000 km². Industrial enterprises have their own railway that is 1200 km long. Two railways join Central Russia to Ural and Siberia. Two other railways join Kazan to the South-East serving oil-fields. The system of river transport is of 1000 km. Harbours are found on the coasts of the Volga, Kama, Belaia and Viatka. Tatarstan considers reinforcing its river transport by constructing an oil terminal on the Kama and by investing in the purchase of sea-river tankers that can

serve the North (Hamburg, Rotterdam and London) and the South of Europe (Italy, Greece and Turkey) as well as the Middle-East. As to aerial systems, Tatarstan uses two international airports situated in Kazan and in Bugulma. In this field the modernization and renovation of infrastructures (aeroport of Kazan) have been provided specially for all international flights. One of the priorities of Tatar authorities is to enable their country to have access to international markets and to diminish their dependence on Moscow.

ECONOMIC REFORMS

In November 1992 a constitution favoured a presidential regime. The reforms introduced by the new power consist of gradually passing from the planned economy to a market economy making sure that no social tensions are created. To a certain extent the exportations of petrol support the social policy of the government. Thus, they subsidize such basic food products as bread, meat and milk, and bring social aid to the most destitute persons.

Tatar authorities have settled the priorities in the form of foreign investments which are as follows: the production of petroleum by the foundation of very high technological means and conformity to the protection of the environment; production and exportation of armaments of high technology; transport and stock of agricultural products; cooperation and modernization of enterprises of mechanical industries; development of the infrastructural and social industry (habitat); introduction of a reassuring banking system that attracts foreign investors, and introduction of an organization responsible for checking and managing the funds of "national investments."

In the field of privatizations the Tatar government has taken a certain number of measures not to sell off the national patrimony to foreign investors. Moreover, bonds of privatization are distributed (10,000 roubles per inhabitant) within the framework of the Russian Federation. The Tatars have received from their government a supplementary bond of the value of 30,000 roubles that are not convertible (except when there is an investment fund). Although the law on foreign investments is very liberal, the Tatar authorities have decided not to open completely but for a short term all the sectors of existing economic activities to foreigners. This law on foreign investments provides an equal share in the creation of joint ventures, a share in the capital of existing enterprises, the right to use the lands and natural resources, encouragement in the creation of an enterprise financed exclusively by foreign capital

and the protection of foreign capital against nationalizations. Tatarstan encourages foreign investments on condition that they do not harm in the short term the interests of popular investors. It is in this way that the share of foreign investors in the privatization will be excluded from the strategic sectors such as petroleum, petrochemistry and mechanical construction. In addition, the state has decided to keep for five years the control of the enterprises that it has partially privatized in order to attain once again earlier performances.

In the field of agriculture, the transition is made gradually. The Kolkhoze and the Sovkhoze still dominate the agricultural scenery despite the first waves of privatization. 724 of these new estates have difficulty in adapting to the economy of the market. Indeed, the creation and liquidation ratio was 2 for 1 in 1993 against 5 for 1 in all the region of the Volga.

BACHKORTOSTAN

GEOGRAPHY

Hamdi ÖZDAMARLAR

Situated between the Ural and the Volga, the Bachkir territory extends over an area of 143,600 km². Its area represents 0.84 % of the territory of the Russian Federation. The Republic of Bachkortostan situated on the axis Moscow-Siberia holds a strategic geographical position. The arterial roads between the East and the West of Russia cross this little republic that is all the same the biggest and the most populated of the republics of Idel-Ural. Situated on the Western slopes of the Ural, its capital is Ufa. About one quarter of the population of the Republic lives in the old city founded in 1575. The native population lives mainly in the rural and mountainous areas of the territory and practices agriculture, animal husbandry, pastoral economy and lumbering. The principal urban centres are Ufa, Salavat and Sterlitamak.

Bachkortostan has common frontiers, in the East with Tatarstan—with whom it shares a common history—and in the North-East with Udmurtia. The rest of the Republic is encircled by the Russian Federation.

DEMOGRAPHY

A victim of artificial separation, the Republic of Bachkortostan is vulnerable by its ethnic heterogeneity. The Bachkirs, who were the first to obtain the status of Autonomous Republic within the framework of the RSFSR on 23 May 1919, are today minorities in their republic that is a member of the Russian Federation. According to the statistics of 1989 (on the basis of 3,943,000 inhabitants), they only represent 21.9 % of the total population and live especially in the Eastern part of the country. The Russians and Tatars, composing a non-titular population, alone make up 67.7 % of the total population. The most important population is that of the Russians (39.3) who live especially in the centre of the country. Then comes the population of the Tatars (28.4 %) who form the majority in the West. Finally, there are the Tchouvaches (3.2 %).

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In 1989, the Republic of Bachortostan brought together only 59.6 % of the total population of the Bachkirs in the world. More than 40.4 % of the Bachkirs were living outside the Republic mainly in the Turkish-speaking republics of Central Asia (between 6 and 8 %) particularly in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Few Bachkirs are found in Tadjikistan, Ukraine and the neighbouring republic of Tatarstan (1.3 %). Like all of its population, the biggest Bachkir diaspora is found in the Russian Federation and mainly in the its administrative regions (*oblast*) that are the neighbours of the Republic of Bachkortostan. These regions are Tcheliabinsk (11.1 %), Orenburg (3.7 %), and Perm (3.6 %). The artificial geographical separation of Bachkortostan does not correspond, as in the other republics of the former Soviet Union, to the historic territory on which the Turkish people in general and the Bachkirs in particular have evolved. The Soviets have done everything to separate the parts of the republics of Idel-Ural from each other and these republics from the rest of the Turkish population. The creation of the oblast of Orenburgh (administrative region) in 1925 had as an objective to separate the republics of Idel-Ural from Turkestan so that they would not only be unable to proclaim their independence but also be isolated from the Turkish world. The Bachkirs, like the Tatars, have never accepted the agricultural and industrial control of their territory. In the 1930s the repression of the Bachkir nationalism led to dozens of thousands of deaths. Consequently, the Bachkir population has recorded a drop of 16.6 %, i.e., 141,000 persons. It is only at the beginning of 1969 that the Bachkir population reached its level of 1926 (See the table below). In the 1960s, the growth of population was 20.22 %. Today, the growth of the Bachkir population, although greater than that of the non-Bachkirs, approaches that of the Russians and other Slavs; however, it remains lower than that of the other Turco-Muslim republics. Contrary to the other Turkish-speaking republics, the Bachkirs cannot become a majority in their republic unless there is a change of geographical configuration.

On 1 January 1994, the population of the Republic, with all ethnic blends, was of 4,048,000 inhabitants of whom 64,600 resided in urban areas. The density of the population at the same date was 28,180 inhabitants per km².

LANGUAGE, RELIGION, HISTORY

The Bachkir language belongs to the Turkish group (Volga-Ural) of the Altaic family. It can also be placed in the group Kypchak or in the subgroup Kypchak - Bulgar. The Bachkir language is rich in vocabulary where modern Turkish has ceased to be used. One distinguishes two groups of dialects in the Bachkir language: one is formed by the dialects of the South-West and the

Evolution of the Bachkir Population

Years	Total population	Evolution	%
1926	983,000	-	-
1936	842,000	141,000	-16.62
1959	989,000	147,000	14.86
1970	1,239,681	250,681	20.22
1979	1,372,452	132,771	9.67
1989	1,449,000	76,548	5.5

South-East (group of mountains) and the other by the dialects of the South-East and the centre (group of steppes). The Bachkir language that contains Mongol words is very close to the Tatar language. Two-thirds of the Bachkirs are bilingual (Russian-Bachkir). Until the XIXth century, the Bachkirs were using a language called "Turki." At the end of this same century, they adopted Tatar as their language. Until the years 1923-1930, Arabic letters were being used in Bachkir before the language was replaced by the Latin alphabet in the years 1930-1939. In 1940, the cyrillic writing replaced the Latin writing as in the other republics.

The Bachkirs are Sunnite Muslims. Their acceptance of Islam began even before the arrival of the Golden Horde in the region. With the fall of Kazan, despite the policy of Russification and Christianization, the Bachkirs preserved their religion transmitted by the Arabs. On the other hand, a part of the population had chosen to convert often to enjoy the same advantages as the Russians. This part of the population reconverted to Islam in the XIXth century. In 1788, worried about the conciliation with the Bachkirs, Catherine II created in the region of Idel-Ural "the spiritual Assembly of the Islam of Orenburgh." Later, the Assembly was transferred to Ufa.

The origin of the Bachkirs lends itself to controversies. Thus, for some, they are from the group *Pagurital* or *Boruskol* mentioned by Ptomélée in his *Géographie*. This hypothesis that excluded the Turkish presence in the IInd century as the expansion of the Turks had not as yet reached the Ural, put forward a distant Bachkir population of a non-Turkish basis. In other words, they had become Turkish and had accepted Islam a long time later. For others, the Bachkirs had been a small native Turkish tribe of the former Soviet Union that was detached from the tribes of Turkestan of the South-West. It was also often believed that the Bachkirs were a tribe of Turkmen origin. It is useful to underline that today certain intellectuals and authorities both in Central Asia and Turkey dispute the changing Russian-Soviet version or the ideological-strategic version of the history of the Turkish people of the former So-

viet Union. For the first time, The Bachkir presence in the regions of the Ural and the Volga is attested to by the writings of Arabic authors of the Xth century. Thus, Al-Istihri speaks of the *Bashkurts* as a people residing in a mountainous area situated "by a journey of twenty days from the Bulgars." Al-Bürtni calls the Ural "the mountains of the Bachkirs." At the epoch, the Bachkirs were practising animal husbandry, hunting (for beaver fur), and agriculture (honey being considered as an important element of exchange). They were also engaged in the exploitation of iron ore and copper and in the manufacturing of weapons. Thus, the Bachkirs seem to be mountain dwellers of the Southern Ural. They seem to be former Finnic-Uighurs made Turkish and converted to Islam by the Bulgarians of the Volga from the IXth century on. Formerly, the Bachkirs were considered "to be forming with the Tatars a single ethnic group; however, the communist political strategy has been bent on distinguishing just as it has been carefully separating the four ethnic Turkish-speaking groups of Turkestan. Far less diffused than the Tatars, the Bachkirs mainly remain in the South of the Ural."

At the beginning of the XIIIth century, The Bachkir territory passed under the domination of the Mongolian Khanat of the Golden Horde, under the administration of the son of Djotchi, Chayban (when devolving to Batu the general control of the Golden Horde). Incorporated into Mongolian armies and dealing with their own administration and domain, the Bachkirs were dispersed among different Khanats upon the fall of the Golden Horde in 1502. Those that remained in the North became a dependency of Khanat of Kazan, those that remained in the North-East, of Horde Blanche (Siberia), and those that remained in the South, of Horde Nogai. In 1552, Ivan the Terrible annexed Khanat of Kazan, placed in Ufa a military garrison and fought against the towns and fortresses like Orenburg and Samara in the region. Three years later the Khanat of Astrakan fell in its turn. In 1660, the Russian expansion continued with the fall of the Khanat of Sibir. In 1713, the Russians exerted their influence on the Kazakhs. In 1783, they annexed Crimea. Between the years 1782-1824, they abolished the Kzakh khanats and prepared to completely subdue all of Turkestan.

With the fall of the Khanat of Kazakh, and the Russian territorial expansion, the Bachkirs, hand in hand with the other Turkish people (of Ukraine, in the North of Caucasus), rose in rebellion. The XVIIth and XVIIIth centuries recorded great revolts of which the first lasted more than 6 years (1705-1711). The second great revolt took place in 1774 under the control of Pugatchev. In 1789, Catherine II pursued a policy of conciliation that enabled the Bachkirs to appear in the bosom of the imperial army and to fight against

Napoleonic armies. With the confiscation of lands, the diverse population began to decrease and poverty appeared. In the XIIIth century, with the development of the metal industry, peasants without land became en masse workers in factories that began to exploit the natural wealth of the people of Idel-Ural. In 1861, with the abolition of serfdom, the serfs crowded into the region further upsetting the demographic equilibrium of the region.

In 1917, the legendary nationalism of the Bachkirs revived. The Bachkirs, like the Tatars, made an effort to make Idel-Ural a Muslim republic by the reunion of the Turkish Muslim provinces of the empire. A little after the Congress of Kazan on August 1917 and the General Assembly of the Muslims of Russia, despite the doubtful outcome of the Russian revolution, in January 1918, the State sovereignty of Idel-Ural was created with the Republic of Tatars-Bachkiria as pioneer. Indeed, frequently the region was changing hands between the white and red armies. The city of Ufa was taken in October 1917 by the red army which in turn gave it to the white army in January 1918. Between these last two dates when the Bachkir autonomy was proclaimed in Orenburgh, the Bachkir territory continued to change hands between the belligerents of the revolution. The sovereign State of Idel-Ural, the existence of a Bachkir government, and the beginning of an army were swept aside by the advance of the red army towards the Ural and the refusal of the allies that had not settled the question of the East to contribute to the creation of a new "Turkish" empire in the Ural and Turkestan. Finally, on 23 March 1919, the ruling Bachkirs, constrained to negotiate with the Soviets, "founded" the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Bachkiria (ASSR) — the first ASSR of the RSFSR, before that of the Tatars — within the framework of the RSFSR. This creation was abiding by the law "divide to rule." Thus, since the first official Russian census, the Bachkirs have never exceeded one quarter of the total population in the republic that carries their name. It is only by adding the percentage of the Tatars and the Bachkirs that one obtains a majority. However, Moscow has always been inclined to cause trouble between the sister nations in order to control of the those republics. By granting different "privileges" to the republics, does Moscow try to prevent the unification of the nations of Idel-Ural that could form an additional Turco-Slav Republic of 449,000 km² with a population of 12 million? At all events, the enclavement will be in the future one of the stakes between the republics of Idel Ural and Moscow.

Today, the Bachkir nation finds itself with a disfigured and stolen past. Thanks to its resources below ground and most importantly to the intelligence of its people that enabled it to outlive several empires, Bachkiria can look to

the future with "some confidence."

POLITICS

Western way of life, industrialization, urbanization, secularization, partial Russianization have formed the people who now claim their identity, a real autonomy, independence, a complete use of their language, recognition of their culture and, naturally, the provision of resources above and below ground.

Fully aware of its weakness in the face of power, Bachkortostan, following the Tatar example, preferred negotiation rather than confrontation with Chechnya to regulate its relations with Moscow. It was thus led to sign bilateral treaties which defined the powers of Moscow as well as Ufa. On 25 May 1994, a dozen of agreements defining the power sharing the two parties was signed between the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, V.Chernomirdin and his Bachkir counterpart. These agreements prepared the signature of a bilateral treaty of the same type that was ratified with Tatarstan on 15 February 1994. On 3 August 1994, the two parties (Boris Yeltsin-Murtaza Rakhimov) signed a bilateral treaty on power sharing. Apparently, the prerogatives granted to Bachkortostan were greater than those given to Tatarstan at the beginning of the year.

In order to regulate their relations with the federal authorities, the Bachkirs did not adopt the same strategy as Tatarstan. The fact that the "nominal" population was placed in third position behind the Russians and the Tatars as well as the divergences with the Tatars on the constitution of a confederation of the Volga did not encourage the Bachkir authorities to organize a referendum on the recognition of the sovereignty of their republic. Thus, contrary to the Tatars, the Bachkirs ratified the federal treaty of 31 March 1992 without negotiating the preliminary agreement. It is only after having obtained assurances of concession on the recognition of Bachkortostan of the independence of the Federation (sovereignty), of the right to use the natural resources, of the definition of the fiscal policy and of the capacity to make use of an autonomous legislative and judiciary system, that the Bachkir authorities consented to ratify the federal treaty. Like Tatarstan, Bachkortostan benefited from a special status in the Russian Federation. The ratification of the treaty of 3 March 1994 on power-sharing between the Russian Federation and Bachkortostan came after the treaty was signed with Tatarstan and the Republic of the Kabardino Balkaria. Even though the treaty recognized autonomy in the fields of foreign politics, economic politics, the legislative and judiciary system, the exclusive ownership rights on natural riches, and a constitution or a State language, the actual independence of these States was

not that certain. In aggregate, these bilateral treaties are a barely disguised reproduction of the federal treaty that utters the last word to the Russian Federation. The republics of Idel-Ural are situated on the axis of communication and energy (East-West) lines and these republics have to take into account the possibility of a violent reaction from Moscow – the Chechnya example by way of warning – if they have to obtain an actual independence and sovereignty without concession. It is useful to analyze the Constitution in greater detail in order to take out the real stakes between the "subjects of the Federation" (republic and regions) and the central power. Especially, it is useful to observe the reaction of Moscow to the hold by Bachkortostan of external commerce and foreign politics to appraise the degree of autonomy that the republic makes use of. "During 1994, the treaties of friendship and cooperation were thus signed by the Bachkir authorities with Tatarstan, Udmurtia, Tchevachie and Abkhazia (Republic of Georgia), the aim seeming to be in this last case to test the degree of autonomy which they made use of in foreign politics." The longer Bachkortostan depends on the Russian economy, currency and defence, the more wretched its condition becomes. In the meantime, could the Bachkirs hope for a better share of power with the centre holding into account the doubtful policy that has prevailed in Russia and that still prevails? In other respects, the bilateral treaty imposes on Bachkortostan a collaboration with the federal government with respect to individual and collective rights, defence of the sovereignty, production and commercialization of strategic products (weapons, military equipment, high technology), monetary and budgetary policy (annual negotiation) and external commerce (annual negotiations of quotas of exportation for products of great importance). In the meantime, if the Bachkirs state that they are not completely satisfied with their demands, Russia may return to its concessions mainly on the pretext of the alignment of the different positions of the subjects of the Russian Federation. Indeed, on 4 August 1994, a meeting of the representatives of executive powers representative of the federal and regional levels was held in Moscow to study the compatibility of the positions of the subjects of the Federation with the Constitution of the Russian Federation. On this occasion, S. Filatov, head of the presidential administration, stated that "the fundamental law gives the regional organs the right to legislate, but it also fixes the constitutional foundations of the State that assure the supremacy of the Russian Constitution over all the territory." Filatov continued to emphasize that "there are numerous contradictions between the legislative acts of the subjects of the Russian Federation on the one hand, and the Constitution of the federal laws on the other hand and these contradictions are due to a lack of planning." Filatov proposes

a status-type to his interlocutors and the creation of a centre of coordination of constitutional reforms. He is in favour of an "adoption of a resolution that entrusts the procurator with the care to watch over the compatibility of the local and federal legislations." For the moment, the concessions granted by the centre have been made within the framework of the method of refederalization or destruction-construction. It is only once that this method will be brought to a conclusion when the different republics are given their true destiny.

In the elections of 12 December 1992, the Bachkirs elected Mourtaza Rakhimov – a former refinery director and president of the Supreme Soviet – the head of the State. On 24 December 1993, the Supreme Soviet of the country adopted a new Constitution. On July 1994, accused of corruption, the Prime Minister, Anatolie Kopsov, was constrained to resign. On 12 October 1994 – the same day of the appointment of a new President of the Supreme Soviet – Rim Bakiv was appointed Prime Minister by the same Supreme Soviet.

ECONOMY

Bachkortostan makes use of important natural resources similar to those of Tatarstan: petroleum, gas, carbon, zinc, copper, iron, manganese, gypsum, bauxite, chromium, nickel, mineral water, and the like. Gold fields that the local authorities try to valorize and develop lie hidden below ground. There were 515 kg of gold in 1993. The country has natural gas pipe-lines that pass through the cities of Ichimbal and Magnitogorsk, the pipe-lines between the capital Ufa and the city of Ichimbal. In 1993, the country produced 4 million tons of carbon, 19 million tons of petroleum and about 0.6 million m³ of gas. The contribution of Bachkortostan to the production of the Federation has thus been respectively about 1.3 %, 5.4 % and 0.1 %. Petroleum constitutes, as it does for Tatarstan, the first wealth of the republic of Bachkortostan with recoverable reserves estimated at 400 million tons. The country can thus continue to maintain its oil power a few more dozen of years. Considered as the second "Baku" since the discovery of its oil-fields in 1932, thanks to the development of the petrochemical and armament industries, the former autonomous republic of Bachkiria must negotiate each year with Moscow to determine the quotas of exportation. In 1994, Bachkortostan exported about half of its production, i.e., 32 %, to countries with strong currencies, and the other half, i.e., 16 %, to the countries of the former Soviet Union. As it is for Tatarstan, petroleum is one of the major components to guarantee the economic and political independence of the republic. If in the past the setting up of town-factories created misfortune for the Bachkirs, today

A Few Industrial Products of Bachkortostan

	Quantity	In % of the production of the Federation
Petroleum	19	5.4
Refined petroleum	30.2	13.8
Fertilizers	958	-
Inorganic fertilizers	279	3.2
Snares of fibre	10.9	3.2
Covers	58.7	9.5

Source: *Goskomstat Rossii: Razvitie Ekonomicheskikh Regionakh*, " Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Moscow, 1994.

it is by leaning on them that Bachkortostan guarantees its autonomy.

Petrochemistry and the refineries constitute the basis of the industry of the country because they contribute to more than 50 % of the formation of the PNB. The Bachkir refineries treat a part of the petroleum of their Tatar cousin who wants to limit this dependence by constructing, with the participation of foreign capitals, a refinery at Nijnekamps. The industrial production of the country places Bachkortostan in second position among the 89 "subjects of the Federation." In other words, the industrial production of the country is 3.9 %. The petroleum and petrochemical industries are concentrated in the regions of Ufa, Salavat, Sterlitamak and Ichimbai. In 1989, the inhabitants of Ufa were victims of air pollution that put into danger the health of more than one million people. The inhabitants of the republic of Bachkortostan held the Russians responsible for the degradation of their environment. One of the measures that was taken to improve the quality of the environment lies -- with contribution of foreign capital -- in the modernization of the technology and equipment of the "combines" or industrial centres that have contributed so much to the forging of the pride and power of Russia. The question of ecology has never been resolved. On 31 December 1995, a leakage of 100,000 tons of petroleum from the Ural-Siberia pipe-line provoked the pollution of the frozen river Belaia by threatening to affect the Volga and the Kama. Affected by the wind, clouds of the smoke of burnt petroleum spread quickly over the residential areas of Ufa. With linguistic demand, the ecology was one of the autonomist topics of the Bachkirs towards the middle of 1985. These demands were directed against the Russian presence and political and cultural hegemony of the Tatars. "The affirmation of the cultural, religious and especially political primacy, and the claims of Kazan to cultural, religious and political primacy have revived the tensions between the Tatars and Bachkirs in

Principal Agricultural Products of Bachkortostan (in thousands of tons)

	Annual average 1976-1980		1992		1993	
	Quantity	% (a)	Quantity	% (a)	Quantity	% (a)
Cereals	4,950	4.7	4,339	4	3,630	3.7
Sugar beet	1,317	5.2	1,651	6.5	1,457	5.7
Sunflower	60	2.4	70	2.2	-	-
Potatoes	2,066	4.9	1,767	4.6	1,303	3.5
Vegetables	232	2.2	170	1.7	195	2
Meat	264	3.6	287	3.5	-	-
Milk	1,629	3.4	1,766	3.7	1,852	4
Wool	6.8	3.1	2.8	2.8	4.8	3

Source: *Goskomstat Rossii: Rossiiskaia Federatsia v 1992 Godu*, Moscow, 1993 and *Rossiiskaia Federatsia i Regioni Quralskovo Ekonomicheskovo* -- in *Documentation Française* (a): in % of the production of Russia.

which Moscow had to arbitrate." With the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the Bachkir demands moved towards a political and economic sovereignty. Indeed, besides a refining industry, the country makes use of a strong chemical power in association with the petroleum industry. Thus, 44 % of carbonate of soda, 16 % of weed-killers, 10 % of motor-fuel, 5 % of synthetic resin and plastic are produced in Bachkortostan. With regard to the production of phenol and acetone, the republic holds first position. Bound to refining and petrochemistry that form the basis of its national wealth, Bachkortostan has a strong mechanical industry especially thanks to its enterprises of equipment, oil and refining. In 1991, the mechanical industries constituted about a quarter of the national industrial production to the formation of which also contributed the sector of telecommunication (Ufa), the sectors of chemical fertilizers and lorries (Neftekamsk), and the sectors of automobiles (Ufa) and aeroplanes. In other respects, Bachkortostan makes use of an iron and steel industry in Belorestk that mainly transforms the local natural resources.

AGRICULTURE

In Bachkortostan, the "nominal" population lives mainly in the agricultural and mountainous areas of the republic. It is on this population that agriculture, animal husbandry as well as pastoral economy and lumbering rest. Pastoral economy and lumbering are practised in 4,646 grounds each of about 23 hectares. Plant products are dominated by cereals cultivated in plains. In 1993, the country produced 3.6 million tons of cereals (wheat, rye,

corn), 1.4 million tons of sugar beet, 1.3 million tons of potatoes, 0.2 million tons of vegetables, which are respectively 3.7 %, 5.7 %, 3.5 % and 2 % of the production of the federation. Animal products rest on sheep, cattle and horses. Animal products are mainly obtained in mountainous regions. In 1993, the production of milk was 1.8 million tons and the production of wool was 4.8 thousand tons. Bachkir agriculture guarantees the self-sufficiency of the country with respect to food despite the general fall in agricultural production as in most of the republics of the former Soviet Union.

EXTERNAL COMMERCE

The exports of Bachkortostan, partially under the control of Moscow (annual negotiation), rest mainly on petroleum, refined and chemical products as well as equipment and transport material. In 1993, crude oil, refining and chemistry represented about three —quarters— amounting to 820 million dollars — of the total amount of exports out of the former Soviet Union. The principal partners of the republic are Austria, Hungary, Germany Bulgaria and Turkey.

Just like Tatarstan, Bachkortostan is a privileged commercial partner in Ankara. Turkey has for a long time suffered from its dynamic policy. Often maltreated by the Arabic world especially by its neighbours of the South, it tries to change its tradesmen dealing with hydrocarbon by maintaining its commercial relations with its former tradesmen. Even if the Russian threat has not disappeared, Ankara has effected a spectacular reconciliation with the Russian Federation taking into account the rivalry of more than three centuries as well as the littoral countries of the Black Sea. The Black Sea is about to become a second Mediterranean for commerce and petroleum. A Eurasian era dominated by the Turco-Slav world is taking form. However, such problems as the question of Nagorno-Karabakh, the question of the transport of hydrocarbon from the Caucasus and Central Asia, and the renegotiation of the status of rights remain to be solved.

With the appearance of the Turkish world, and the globalization and regionalization of the economy, Turkey and the Turkish speaking republics try to support each other. Firstly, they try to pull down the diplomatic-strategic iron curtain existing since the fall of the Ottoman Empire and to see to the stability of its environment. Secondly, they try to reinforce a newly acquired independence or autonomy, and to be open to development. For the first time since the advent of Kemalism, Turkey can make its external policy of defence less severe.

INSTRUMENTS OF SOVIET CONTROL IN THE CENTRAL ASIA

INTRODUCTION

Idris BAL

Marx had called Russia a "prison of nations" (1). He was obviously right to describe Russia in this way for several reasons, among which massive slaughters and deportations were significant. However, the Communist revolution in 1917 did not destroy the prison and give freedom to these poor nations. In contrast, after the Communist revolution, pressure on nationalities and beliefs increased. As Conquest pointed out, national feeling was never satisfied but repressed and nationality problems in the USSR were never solved (2). Although the Soviet empire collapsed at the outset of the 1990s, the reality is that Soviets controlled and governed numerous nationalities for more than seventy years; more than a hundred nations most of which claimed that Soviet territory was their homeland (3). A question which arises from here, which instruments Soviets used to control nations, especially the Central Asians. In this article, an attempt will be made to answer this question.

To this end, the article has been divided into ten subtitles; Introduction, Power structure, Education, State suppression, Migration, Divide and rule, Moral values, Propaganda and Media, Gorbachev's term. The main instruments have been pointed out and Gorbachev's term has been separated from the rest of the Soviet history.

POWER STRUCTURE

Power structure was the most important instrument used by Soviets to control nations. There were three main institutions sharing the power in the former USSR; the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Soviets, and the Government. The Communist Party was the best organised party in the world.

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It had been organized as a pyramid; from PPO (Primary Party Organizations) to Politburo. The Politburo was the most important place of the Communist party, in fact, of the whole politics. Although the government and the Soviets had significant power, in reality the Communist party controlled almost everything in the former USSR. The methods of this control can be listed as follows;

Firstly, a large proportion of the people were the members of the Communist party; CPSU had 19.5 million members and candidates, representing about one in ten adults in 1988 or one in fifteen (6.8 per cent) of the entire population of 284 million. Recruitment was the way of incorporation of society in to the political system. The members of the Communist party were not ordinary people, in contrast they were the cream of the population; in theory, membership was open to any citizen of the USSR but, in practice there were various obstacles; prospective members had to be invited to join, therefore nomination was belong to party organization. The individual had no option to choose. In order to be able to join the party, an individual had to be recommended by three party members who must have been members for at least five years and then he or she was supposed to be trained (one year), if he was successful, then, he or she could be a member of CPSU (4). Recruitment policy was based on the idea that the party represents the cream of the population, "the most dedicated and the most able, who wish to serve the country to the best of their ability". This principle had legitimized the party's dominance of Soviet political life. The elite or cream of the population were usually selected as party members; the education level of members of the Communist party was higher than the average citizen's education level; 78 % of members of CPSU graduated from secondary or higher education, 32 % of CPSU members completed higher education, whereas only 12.5 % of the employed population (generally) have higher education in the Soviet society. Also the people who occupied the key places were vastly over represented, especially in ideologically sensitive posts in the Soviets and the armed services. For example, three out of four journalists, one in four engineers and teachers were party members. The reason for adopting these people as members was not particularly dedication to the party but because, as Sakwa pointed out, they were representing the elite in their professions. The elites were supposed to represent the party in their work place. They were playing the role of mass leadership; a channel or the transmission of information to and from their colleagues (5). It can be easily said that Communist party was the representative

Table-1

Population of the Union Republics (in millions)

Republics	1940	1959	1970	1979	1989	1979 % basic nation	1989 % basic nation
RSFSR	110.1	117.5	130.1	137.4	147.4	82.6	82.0
Ukraine	41.3	41.9	47.1	49.6	51.7	73.6	73.0
Belarus	9.0	8.1	9.0	9.5	10.2	79.4	76.0
Uzbekistan	6.6	8.3	11.8	15.4	19.9	68.7	71.0
Kazakhstan	6.1	9.2	13.0	14.7	16.5	36.0	40.0
Georgia	3.6	4.0	4.7	5.0	5.4	68.8	70.0
Armenia	1.3	1.8	2.5	3.0	3.3	89.7	94.0
Azerbaijan	3.3	3.7	5.0	6.0	7.0	78.1	83.0
Lithuania	2.9	2.7	3.1	3.4	3.7	80.0	80.0
Moldavia	2.5	2.9	3.6	4.0	4.3	63.9	64.0
Latvia	1.9	2.1	2.6	2.5	2.7	53.7	52.0
Estonia	1.1	1.2	1.4	1.5	1.6	64.7	62.0
Kirgizhstan	1.5	2.1	2.9	3.5	4.3	47.9	52.0
Tadjikistan	1.5	2.0	2.9	3.8	5.1	58.8	62.0
Turkmenistan	1.3	1.5	2.2	2.8	3.5	68.4	72.0

Source: This table is prepared according to information given by following sources: Hosking, Geoffrey. **A History of the Soviet Union 1917-1991**, London: Fontana Press, 1992, p. 525; Bremmer, Ian and Taras, Ray. (ed) **Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor states**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp. 550-560; **Statistical Indicators Republics of the Former USSR**, State Institute of Statistics Prime Ministry Republic of Turkey, Ankara, 1993, p. 15.

of the better educated, more urban population. On the other hand, poor and under educated people were unrepresented (6).

By absorbing the cream of the population the party was safeguarding its existence and the Communist regime in two ways; firstly by adopting 10 % of the adult population at least that part of the society was kept under control, in addition to that the Party's message was relayed to the rest of the population through these members, who then collected information about the rest of the population. Secondly, members were the elites of the Soviet population, by means of these elites mass population was controlled and affected.

Secondly, The party had penetrated all important units by means of Primary Party Organizations whose numbers were more than 440,363 in January 1986. They existed in all important places such as all government offices, factories, farms, army units, schools, and cultural agencies. The party

Table-2 National Composition of the Party, 1986		
Nationality	Number	%
Russians	11,241,958	59.1
Ukrainians	3,041,736	16.0
Belarusians	726,108	3.8
Uzbeks	465,443	2.4
Kazakhs	387,837	2.0
Azerbaijanis	337,904	1.8
Georgians	321,922	1.7
Armenians	291,081	1.5
Lithuanians	147,068	0.8
Moldavians	100,715	0.6
Tadjiks	87,759	0.5
Latvians	78,193	0.4
Kirgiz	78,064	0.4
Turkmenians	76,786	0.4
Estonians	61,277	0.3
Others	1,550,527	8.2
Total	19,004,378	100.0
Source: Partinaya zhizn, 14 (July 1986), p. 24, cited from Sakwa, Richard, Soviet Politics , London: Routledge, 1989, p. 130.		

leadership directed the activities of PPOs. All party members had to be a member of PPO and take part in its activities. PPOs recruited, trained, and disciplined its members and their job was to mobilize the population (7). This significant penetration of PPOs left no space for any kind of opposition. They controlled everything in the first place.

Thirdly, Although it was said that all nationalities equal and they were trying to create a Soviet nation, in reality, Soviet leaders from Lenin on, viewed the non-Russian nationalities as potential threats (8) and Russians dominated the politics (9); Russians form about half the total Soviet population, but in 1986 they comprised 59.1 % of the CPSU. This percentage was higher before the 1980s, for example, 66 % in 1966. Generally, the Slavs (Russians, Belarusians, and Ukrainians) in 1986 made up 79 % of membership of CPSU and 72.2 % of the total population. On the other hand, although the five Central Asian peoples together represented 12.1 % of total population (in 1989) (10), they made up only 5.7 % of CPSU in 1986 (11). Slavs had been

over-represented in contrast to Turks, because Turkic republics had been regarded as untrustworthy republics (12). Russians (generally Slavs) dominated politics (13). It was the Russian culture, language, and nation that dominated the Soviet empire (14).

Fourthly, There were no certain limitations of power in the former USSR. The deficiency of limitations of power and improper constitution and law and the dependent judiciary system allowed the Communist Party to act irresponsibly. There was no constitutional court which should exist in a true federation to solve any dispute about the respective powers of the Republics in the former USSR (15). Rights given to the individuals by the Constitution were usually limited by general phrases such as the "interest of people". Before the creation of the Committee of Constitutional Review in 1989 there was no higher court of appeal against infringements of constitutional rights. For example, the 1977 Constitution gave certain rights and privileges to the citizens and union republics, but the procedure of claiming rights was not explained and judicial independence was mentioned in a single line; "judges are independent and subject only to law" (16). However the ways of being independent had not been explained. In practice, the Communist Party controlled the appointment of the judicial and administrative officers and it had considerable influence even in the law courts.

The relations between the party and the Soviet state (the Soviets, ministries, executive committees and so on) had been underlined by Western and Soviet writers as one of the most complicated problems of Soviet political life (17). Soviet constitutions had not defined relations between the Party, Soviet, and Governmental hierarchies. Powers of centre and republics were not clear. The constitution did not set limitations to state power. Further more, the powers of the Communist party were unlimited. There was no framework for the defence of individual rights against the state.

Fifthly, There were no democratic elections in the USSR. There was only one list of candidates prepared by the Communist party. No option was given to the people to choose, only the right to ratify had been given to people. After the elections, usually the announcement was made that 99 % of electors had voted in positive way. However, in reality, because of deaths, migrations, mistakes in voting, etc. it is impossible to count valid votes as more than 95 % (18). So if somebody is saying that 99 % of electors voted in positive way, that means, the votes have not been counted, but simply the result has been announced. It can be said that as Schapiro pointed out the elections of the for-

mer USSR had mainly three purposes, firstly, it was a public demonstration of the legitimacy. Secondly, an election in Soviet conditions was an invaluable educational and propaganda exercise. Thirdly, it provided proof that the system of control was unimpaired (19).

Sixthly, the Communist party was structured according to the principle of "democratic centralism". The organisation of the CPSU, and in fact the whole politics was governed by this principle. This principle was formulated by Lenin and claimed that it was possible to combine effective central control with democratic practices from below. This principle proposes that democratic participation through free discussion and deliberation by all the Communist party members should take place in the process of decision making, but once decision has been made, further criticism and debate are no longer tolerated; the policy must be accepted without any opposition and carried out by all party members (20). In practice, Democratic centralism served a few people who were at the top positions of the party to keep certain questions off the agenda to restrict groups-opposition within the party. By means of the principle "Democratic Centralism", the Communist Party controlled its own bureaucracy from factions, dangerous ideas. The election process was governed from the top down. In theory, the Central Committee was supposed to elect members of the Politburo, in practice, the Politburo chose the membership of the Central Committee, then confirmed by the party congress. Because of this principle, the lines of communication within the party were vertical, from the top, rather than horizontal. In practice very little upward flow of views and opinions took place, while the centralist aspects of the doctrine was fully utilised. Obviously this principle served as an instrument of totalitarianism; other groups, fictions, ideas, nations apart from a few people who had the power had been suppressed. In reality small and interlinked presidiums; the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, the Presidium of the Council of Ministers, and the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee were sharing authority and they combined a unified power structure in practice.

There was no collective leadership in the former USSR as always a figure of one man dominated the Politburo and Soviet Communist Party; first Lenin, then Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Andropov, Chernenko (21), and lastly Gorbachev. Although this principle, "democratic centralism" served to control bureaucracy, indeed the whole country, at the same time its undemocratic implementation was the source of disputes among the nationalities and deficiency of democratic society was the one of the basic factors that caused the

collapse of the USSR (22).

Seventhly, Nomenclature was a list of posts which must be filled by party members. Nomenclature included all the most politically powerful and sensitive posts. Nomenclature was the very important instrument by which the party exercised control in society. A centralised system of appointments allowed the Soviets to control all nationalities. For example, a city-level Nomenclature can include the editorships of the city's newspapers, the directorships of many of the production enterprises, the headships of the city's colleges, etc. The number of party members was proportionately very large in the leading soviets (nearly 80 % in the supreme Soviet of 1954) but smaller in the lower, local and district organizations.

As a result, nearly all of the most important posts were filled by local party members. At the highest levels the government was staffed almost entirely with party members.

By reserving the important posts for communists (or generally Slavs who were regarded as trustworthy republicans) (23) in the Party or in the state system, the colonial system of Communists was secured in the republics.

EDUCATION AS AN INSTRUMENT

Education was mainly used as an instrument of Communist propaganda and Russification. During the Tzars and Soviets Methods of Nikolay Ilminski (1822-1891) and Prof. Khun had been used to divide Turkic people. Ilminski suggested some ways of Russification; conversion to Christianity, to make the Russian language used everywhere (24), and to degenerate-divide the languages and culture of other nations that were under to control of Russia.

Ismail Gaspirali tried to get rid of small differences among Turkish dialects and he was successful to some significant extent in doing this (25). On the other hand, according to the methods of Ilminski and Khun, there were attempts to create different Turkic languages by exaggerating small differences among Turkish dialects (26). This policy was successful enough; in the 1990s an Azerbaijani or Uzbek can hardly understand a Kazak speaker, in fact they prefer to use the Russian language. This reality strengthened the position of Russian as a official language. Although it is reality that the Russian language has been used by most of the people, it can be argued that to use the Russian language does not mean that they are Russified. In fact as Gitelman said a non-Russian who uses Russian language may be hostile to Russians, and may insist on maintaining a non-Russian identity (27), in fact, the disunion of the

USSR was proof of this.

In the official schools, (in fact, there were no private schools) communist ideas were imposed on the students. For those who were not attending the schools, special lectures were organised in order to teach Communism and the history of nationalities rewritten by emphasising the brotherhood and co-operation between Russians and other nations; the preparation of "Great Soviet Encyclopedia" was an attempt of this kind (28).

Soviet concentration on alphabets was another significant policy; Turkic people had been using the Arabic alphabet for centuries. In 1928, by replacing the Arabic Alphabet by Latin ones. Russians managed to cut the cultural roots of the Turkic people (29). These Latin alphabets were also replaced by "Cyrillic" alphabets at the beginning of the second World War. Also it is necessary to point out that Cyrillic alphabets used in each Turkic republic were different from each other (30). There can be several reasons for changing the Latin alphabet to Cyrillic, the important ones are; first in 1920s Turkey itself embraced Latin alphabet. Although there were some differences between these alphabets, the Russians had been disturbed by this reality and Russians thought that Turkey could affect Turkic World. To eliminate this danger, they introduced the new Cyrillic alphabet which has been used from that time up to present. Second, by introducing new alphabets, the Russians managed to sabotage the culture of Turks again.

STATE SUPPRESSION

State suppression was the main factor keeping numerous nationalities. This had been done by means of secret police, and the army. According to KGB insiders, "some 30 % of the adult population worked for the Soviet KGB in one form or another" (31). It is estimated that during the Stalin term more than 20 million people had been killed; even Trotsky who was true Communist was killed by Stalin (32). Stalin's main instrument was his secret police; especially NKVD which was renamed as KGB later.

In the Russian Empire and Communist Soviet Empire, the Turkic People were oppressed because of their religion and nationality. Massacres and expulsion of populations took place several times. Bennigsen has pointed out these incidents as; slaughter of the Kokand population in February 1918 by the troops of the Tashkent Soviet, the massacre of over a million nomad Kazaks during the attempts at settling them in the 1930s, deportation of over a million Chechens, Ingushes, Karachays, Balkars and Crimean Tatars during

the unsuccessful attempt at genocide in 1943, the deportation of some two million Crimean Tatars, North Caucasians and Meshketian Turks, Buddhist Kalmuks and Volga Germans (33); After the glasnost, although some freedom had been given to the nationalities, force had been used in the case of some nationalist movements in Balts and Azerbaijan (34).

MIGRATION

Migration was another instrument of Russification. The practice of "divide and rule" was further implemented by sending in outsiders, usually Russians or Ukrainians (35). Under the name of economic development Russians were sent to the Republics and some Turkic people were taken from their homeland and sent to other parts of the Soviet Union (36). Turan Mirza, a member of the Birlik movement in Uzbekistan, gave an example; in 1966 an earthquake took place in Tashkent. Some aid had come from abroad and with this money new houses were financed. However, instead of Uzbeks, Russians had been settled in these houses. He also points out that more than 50 % of Tashkent's population consists of Russians (37). For example at present, in Kazakhstan, 36 % of population consists of Russians. It is understandable that if population is mixed it will be easier to degenerate the culture of this people and create a new Soviet nation (38). However, it was not so easy to do it in Central Asia because of Islamic culture. For example as Helene Carrere D'Encausse has pointed out Muslim peoples of the former USSR married with each other, mixed marriages took place between European nations of the USSR (39).

DIVIDE AND RULE

Before the Communist revolution, there was unity (at least on cultural issues) in Central Asia (40). Baymirza Hayit has pointed out that before 1925 people of Central Asia used to be called Turkistanians (people of Turkestan). Then, these people were divided into different units (41). The unity as being Muslim (or as Turkic) was dangerous for Russians. Therefore, Russians wanted to eliminate this threat by Russification and divide-rule policy. In order to weaken the power of Central Asia which was threatening the Soviets by Basmach movement, the Soviets divided the region into individual units (42). In accordance with Moscow's design in 1925 (with some later modification) and an official nationality had been given to the inhabitants of the region (43). This division was an artificial one (44). Names of tribes or clans (boy) as Uzbek, Kazak, Tatar, Turkmen, Kirgiz, Azeri, Tajik, etc. had been commonly used

and at the present they are still used too. Soviets did not mention that these people are from the same origin, in contrast they wanted to create several small nations (45). The people of the Turkic Republics were educated in this way. The consciousness of being Uzbek, Kazak, Azeri, etc. has grown among Turkic people (46). Critchlow has pointed out that some limited number of interviews with the ordinary people of Central Asia, suggest that peoples of each republic in Central Asia identifies themselves with the nationality of their individual republic rather than being a Turkestanees or Turks. In addition to that there are some hostile attitudes between peoples of republics. For example, problems between Uzbeks and Kirgizs is one example of this. Also, it is claimed that Tadjik people in the Samarkand and Bukhara are discriminated against by majority Uzbeks (47). The term "Turk" is usually used to refer to citizens of Turkey.

DESTRUCTION OF RELIGION AND MORAL VALUES

In the eyes of the Soviet rulers, science and religion, Marxism-Leninism and religious ideologies were irreconcilable. Therefore, all religions; Christianity (48), Judaism, Islam, etc, had been strictly controlled and suppressed. In their campaign against Islam, the Soviet rulers resort to two types of argument. The first is valid for all religions; according to Marxism, religion is the "opiate of the people" a reactionary and anti scientific ideology. But, Islam was the special target of vilification by the Soviet authorities; the people of the Central Asian (Turkestan) Republics and Azerbaijan were Muslim and it was a threat for the Communist Union. In order to cut the effect of Islam, Communist Rulers made some accusations against Islam. Such as; Islam is represented as a primitive and fantastic religion, a chaotic mixture of Christian, Jewish and pagan doctrines, founded by a member of the feudal trading classes of Makkah (49). Muslim people had been taught that "For centuries Islam has been the servant of all imperialists, first of the Arabs, Persians, Afghans and Turks and now of the British and Americans" (50). Under Communist rule, people had no opportunity to discover whether these accusations were true or not because of lack of freedom; as "Time" magazine, in its special issue on "The New U.S.S.R.", 10 April 1989, points out: "most of the country's 26,000 mosques and 24,000 religious schools were closed. The most of the Islamic teachers were either killed or imprisoned" (51). Also as Saray pointed out special lectures had been organised to propagandize atheism and people were forced to attend them (52).

It must be noted that there was a limit of Soviet success on this issue. For example, Broxup and Bennigsen explains that according to several sociological surveys conducted in the 1980s in the Muslim territories of the former USSR, the proportion of atheists among Soviet Muslims to be around 20 per cent (53) of the population, but even officially listed atheists had certain ties with religion; circumcision, religious marriage and religious burial. According to the surveys, 95 to 99 per cent of the Muslim population took part in these events. As Bennigsen pointed out these results were the proofs of failure of Soviet accusations against religion or in another words Soviets were not able to cut off effects of Islam completely (54).

Gitelman has pointed out that according to a major empirical study of the lifestyles of ethnic groups in the USSR, significant homogeneity of outlook has been achieved on political values, but it is difficult to talk about homogeneity on culture and, especially, family life. In fact, ethnic differences were very significant (55). It must be noted that it is too difficult to destroy religious faith permanently. Therefore, Communist rulers were not able to destroy religions. And now, Islam, Christianity, Judaism are regaining their voices.

PROPAGANDA AND STATE CONTROL ON MEDIA

Under the communist rule the media were regarded as an instrument of propaganda of the political leadership (56) rather than a source of information for the public (57). The Soviet Union had controlled media, education, sporting and social activities and they were used to propagate communist ideology.

Propaganda was one of the most important instruments of Soviets to control all nationalities. By means of propaganda it had been intended to create a model Communist citizen and to protect all nationalities of former USSR from ideas regarded as dangerous. To conduct this propaganda was not too difficult as power was concentrated in the hands of the leaders of the Soviet Communist Party which controlled the government. By means of public ownership of goods (especially the media) and restrictions, social and political life had been controlled. There were no private schools, privately owned newspapers and magazines, radio, T.V. All of these belonged to the state. People were able to get the information that the government wished the people to hear. For a real democracy, government monopolies in the media should be broken. It must be noted that censorship is an indicator of Dictatorship and free media is an indicator of Democracy (58).

After the glasnost some freedom was given to the nationalities. This fre-

edom and as Alkin pointed out, developments in communication technology led Soviet people to know the outside World and increased their political and economic demands (59). This process gave speed to the disunion of the USSR.

CENTRALLY CONTROLLED ECONOMY, COLONIALISM

Another instrument used by Soviets to control Nationalities, was centrally controlled economy. The scope for lower levels of government to choose their own priorities was very limited. As White pointed out, all of the all-union ministries situated in Moscow, produced 57 % of industrial output, union-republican ministries based partly in Moscow produced a further 37 %. Only 6 % of industry was wholly regulated at the republican level (60).

Soviet industry depended on quantity rather than quality (61). Turkic republics especially were used as stores of raw materials (62). By means of massive deportations, Stalin forced people to be "slave-workers" and in this way he was able to find a very cheap workforce for industry (63).

An Uzbek writer, Islamov, pointed out that the System kept Central Asia backward in the following ways: firstly, the region was forced into the mould of producer of agricultural and other raw materials with cotton monoculture and little manufacturing. Secondly, the least investment of all republics was allocated to Central Asia. Thirdly, economic units were organised on a grandiose scale, while public services and trade were run through equally inefficient units. Also repression of private ownership affected the Central Asian economy in a negative way, because of the existence of a strong commitment for private ownership in Central Asia (64).

REIGN OF GORBACHEV AND COLLAPSE OF SOVIETS

Above, an attempt was made to find out and underline the instruments of Soviets to control other nations, especially Central Asians. However, it is necessary to separate the reign of Gorbachev from the rest of the Soviet history as new reforms had been introduced and some freedom had been given to nationalities.

On 11th March 1985 Gorbachev became the General Secretary of the Communist Party. After he took power, the first important expression of nationalism was in Kazakhstan, following the nomination of Gennadi Kalbin who is an ethnic Russian, to replace Dinmukhamed Kunaev as party first secretary. Also demonstrations of Crimean Tatars in Red Square were important but,

mainly Soviet nationality disputes started publicly in the summer of 1987 in the Baltic republics (65). After this, Nationalist movements continued by the end of USSR. Finally, Yeltsin and the presidents of Ukraine and Belarus signed the death certificate of the former USSR (66).

According to 1961 Party programme which was still valid on Gorbachev's accession, ethnic differences will diminish and ultimately disappear as social and economic standards throughout the USSR improve.

Gorbachev pointed out in 27th Party Congress in February 1986 that an indissoluble friendship among the Soviet nations had been established that was according to Gorbachev, the outstanding achievement of Socialism.

When Gorbachev had power, he had not realized the danger of nationalism. He claimed that the nationality problem had been solved and a new Soviet citizen created. It was the evening of Saturday, July 1, 1989, when Gorbachev admitted and underlined the tremendous danger of nationalism, it was the first time he had made a broadcast appeal that emphasises the danger of nationalism for perestroika, and integrity of the USSR to the Soviet people as a whole (67).

In the Reign of Gorbachev, some positive democratic developments took place. After Glasnost the level of media restriction had declined, some issues such as activities of Communist Party, terror of Stalin, nationalities issues had started to be discussed openly. Media law in 1990, permitted almost anyone, including individuals (citizens), to build their own media organs and abolished censorship and forbade the authorities to interfere in the work of journalists. The emerging of free media gave speed to the collapse of the Communist system (68). Because, the only reason which was keeping nationalities together was fear of the power of the Communists. When Gorbachev took out the fear from the system, although he was not expecting it, the Soviets collapsed (69). Some writers argue that Gorbachev was not expecting this kind of Nationalist movement and he was dealing with the economic reform programme. Also, it can be added that Perestroika and Glasnost supported Nationalist movements by providing suitable conditions (70).

Gorbachev tried to establish a new federation and save the USSR; he pointed out the necessity of "a new union treaty" in 1990s, this would replace the treaty of 1922 on which the USSR had been established. The new treaty would guarantee real economic and political sovereignty for the republics (71). However, he lost control and nationalism beat him. Fifteen republics of the former USSR gained their independence.

It must be noted that although there is a possibility of a second disintegrating within the lands of Russian Federation as it included 21 ethnic-republics (72), Russians still have the will to control other nations and to establish colonial rule (73). For example, after the August coup, but before the disintegration, Russian State Secretary (after November 1991, first Deputy Prime Minister) Gennadii Burbulis suggested that "Russia should declare itself the legal successor to the Soviet Union, take control of all Union structures on Russian territory, transfer all Soviet nuclear weapons to Russia transform the Soviet Army into a Russian Army, and dictate terms for the control of inter-republican trade". Also some groups such as the National Salvation Front and Civic Union are still suggesting that Russia should control the lands of former Soviet Union (74).

CONCLUSION

The Soviet Union was the last empire ruling numerous nationalities. To control these nations, the Soviets used several instruments. Mainly these instruments were as follows;

Firstly, the power structure of the Soviets, especially CPSU (Communist Party of Soviet Union), was an important instrument of control. About 10 % of the adult population were members of the CPSU and education levels of party members were always better than ordinary people's education level. By means of PPOs (Primary Party Organizations) the Communist Party penetrated all important units and controlled everything in the first place. Russians were always dominating politics. Also by means of the principle "Democratic centralism" a few people (usually Russians) controlled the party, and the election process was governed from the top down.

Secondly, education, media and other social events (such as sporting events). were used to propagate Communism. An attempt was made to create a Soviet citizen.

Thirdly, force and restrictions were used to control nationalities. Deportations and massacres were seen. By means of deportations, and migrations, it was attempted to mix people. Also deportation was the way of obtaining cheap workers or slave-workers.

Fourthly, by attacking religions and moral values, the power of religions was undermined. In order to weaken the power of Central Asia which was regarded as the main threat to the Soviets, the Turkic people were artificially divided into small units.

Lastly, economies of republics were strictly controlled by the centre. Especially, Central Asia was used as store of raw materials and insufficient investment was allocated to the region. Because of a strictly controlled economy and state ownership of goods, nationalities could not finance any rival movement against Soviets.

It can be said that the main factor which was keeping numerous nationalities together was "force". When Gorbachev gave some freedom to the nationalities, it was realised that all the nations were preserving their national identity and soon after, USSR collapsed. It must be added that the collapse of USSR was inevitable, Gorbachev only gave speed to the process of disunion. Because of his glasnost disunion took place peacefully, if there was no such freedom, still disunion would take place, but it would most probably take place in the form of internal wars.

FOOTNOTES:

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6. Sakwa, Richard, **Soviet Politics**, op. cit., pp. 127-129.
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10. White, Stephen, **Gorbachev and After**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 141.
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14. Hostler, Charles, **Turks of Central Asia**, London: Praeger, 1993, p. 76.
15. White, Stephen, **Gorbachev and After**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 139-140.
16. **1977 Constitution of USSR**, Article 15.
17. Hill, Ronald. J. **Soviet Politics, Political Science and Reform**, Oxford: Martin Robertson & Company Ltd., 1980, p. 116.
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19. Schapiro, Leonard. **The Government and Politics of the Soviet Union**, London: Hutchinson & Co (Publisher) Ltd., 1975, p. 108.
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21. It is necessary to note that the degree of this domination was different. For example it is too difficult to compare Stalin with Chernenko or Andropov. Obviously they were far more weaker than Stalin.
22. Interview with Ismail Yolcuoğlu, Undersecretary (counsellor) of Embassy of Azerbaijan, Ankara, 10th of June, 1993. When interviewed Ismail Yolcuoğlu, he had pointed out that the important reasons that caused the collapse of USSR are first, oppression of the nations and deficiency of the democratic society, second, unsuccessful economy. Then, he added that if a person knew and considered these problems he or she would be able to predict the time of collapse of USSR.
Interview with Dulat Kuavisen, third secretary responsible for political affairs of Embassy of Kazakhstan, Ankara, 10th July, 1993. Dulat Kuavisan pointed out Economic problems and deficiency of democratic society as main causes of the decline of the former Soviet Union.
23. Devlet, Nadir. **Çağdaş Türkler, Doğuştan Günümüze Büyük İslam Tarihi**, op. cit., pp. 62-63.
24. Saray, Mehmet. **Türk Dünyasında Eğitim Reformu ve Gaspıralı İsmail Bey**, Ankara, 1987, pp. 26-32.
25. See for detail: Ibid.
26. Karaörs, Metin. "Türk Dilinin Birliği, Bütünlüğü ve Söz Varlığı", in **Yeni Forum**, Jan-1994, Vol-15, No. 296, pp. 62-64.
27. Gitelman, Zvi. "Are Nations Merging in the USSR?" in **Problems of Communism**, September-October 1983, p. 38.
28. Saray, Mehmet. **Azerbaycan Türkleri Tarihi**, İstanbul: Nesil Matbaacılık ve Yayıncılık San. ve Tic. A.Ş., pp. 63-65.
29. It should be pointed out that Turkey used to use Arabic alphabet therefore in order to cut effects of Turkey on Soviet Muslims, Communist administration intended to replace Arabic alphabet with Latin one but, surprisingly Turkey adopted Latin alphabet as well. Therefore Soviets were not able to achieve their goal.
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39. D'encausse, Helene Carrere. **Translated** by Tesen, Adnan. **Sovyetlerde Müslümanlar**, Ağaç Yayıncılık Ltd. Şti., 1992, pp. 63-65.
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In the cases of Crimea and Caucasus: Russian Colonialist Demographic Methods

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The consequences given rise by policies aimed at providing a demographic superiority that accounted for many inner conflicts and independence movements, have continually made their effect felt as an element of potential depression and danger. These consequences have been effective in the last two centuries of Russian history. It is possible to see clearly the traces of this effect even in the international policies of the Soviet Union. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the policies that were followed in Tsar Russia continued in the Soviet period. These policies that aimed at establishing demographic superiority in non-Russian regions and thus, at Russification policies, led to problems that made themselves seen more clearly. The most striking aspect of this situation is that the Soviet government that was ideologically against the Tsar regime and that consequently had to show this with the policies it followed, was not any different from the previous governments in the thought of providing the superiority of the Russian population or the population siding with the Russians in various regions. Besides, in the policies having the same aim, it is seen that more systematic work is being done compared with the Tsar regime and perhaps by benefiting from this regime's experience. Despite the differences in regime, the basic elements of the policies of the two regimes were the same: *causing emigration, and settlement.*

The emigration and settlement policies of the Russians are generally policies that are closely related to the Turkish world and that develop against the Turks. It is impossible to see these policies that are based on repression and oppression as one with normal settlement policies. We confront the settlement policy followed by Russia primarily as the product of a social complex. Panislamists like Dostoyevsky, feeling resentful dues to the Europeans looking down upon the Russians and their acceptance of them as Asians, were as-

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** This article is a revised version of a paper I presented at the "Turkish World Seminar throughout History from the Balkans to the Caucasus" held on 29-31 May 1995 by Istanbul University, Faculty of Literature, History Research Centre.

serting that the Russians represented in Asia not Western imitation but Western civilization. With this thought, it was decided to consider the claim of superiority as sacred. In fact, Prince Esper Ukhtomsky, who was going to ascend the throne with the title Tsar II Nikola, during his trip to Asia in 1890-1891, considered Russia's view of sovereignty as divine (1). Russian politics claimed that having dominion over Eastern nations was a divine responsibility given to it. Consequently, Russification of non-Russians was perceived as a requirement of this duty. Moreover, the policies of oppression that were followed were considered to be a manifestation of the divine right (2).

Thus, the Russians that provided a religious identity for their invasion, along with military successes, tried to render their victory permanent by adopting various demographic methods in the regions that they conquered. That the Turkic population according to the census of 1989 in Crimea, the fatherland of the Turks, remained about 2 %, is the product of these policies that were followed for two centuries irrespective of any difference in regime. The real owners of the Adyghe Autonomous Oblast are 22% of the population here. The greatest population in the Karachay-Cherkessia zone is made up of the Russians with 42%. It is certain that the numbers of people are not enough to give the real dimensions of the colonialism movements in the mentioned regions. It is also necessary to look at the importance of the places where this population has settled, the extent of its role in the government of the country, and its economic power. If the situation is looked at with respect to the quality of the population, a more effective colonialist policy will be encountered (3).

The turning points of Russia's expansion policy against the Turkic world are constituted by the seizure of Kazan in 1552 and that of Astarhan in 1556. For some time, Tsarist Russia tried to be satisfied with these regions. In successive years, however, first it increased its forces, then it confronted rivals that it could easily beat and, finally, it felt ready to fight with the Ottoman Government at the beginning of the XVIIth century. In fact, "Prut" War prevented the Russian advance in this direction for some time. However, immediately afterwards, Petro the I's seizure of the Eastern Caucasian coasts, even though temporarily, by being at the head of his forces, gave news of the beginning of the Russian influence in regional policies. This influence was announced to the real world by means of the "Küçük Kaynarca" Treaty. This treaty paved the way for the execution of the demographic invasion methods of the Russians in Crimea and the Caucasus, as in Kazan and Astarhan (4).

Crimea, the product of ten years of intrigue, was annexed to Russia in 1783. In the meantime, Tbilisi Kingdom was entering Russian dominion. This military base provided at the centre of the Southern Caucasus led to Russia's intention to permanently stay in the region and to execute policies to-

wards the realization of this intention. Firstly, the aim was to weaken the dense Turkish-Islam population in the region. It is possible to classify these methods that started in the 1780s in Crimea and the Caucasus in the following way:

a) Attempts at annihilation and massacre on the pretext of such military-political events as war and rebellion: Turkish-Russian wars in Crimea and the Caucasus were the main reasons for the Russian massacre. The people who became afraid of the oppression of the Russians who conquered Crimea and its surroundings as early as the year 1771, escaped to the mountains. In the meantime, more than one thousand Turkish towns and villages were destroyed (5). In the following years, with the massacres carried out during the wars and rebellions in Crimea and the Caucasus, the Turkic-Islam population was reduced. For example, the repression in Crimea with the support of Potemkin's Russian army of 150 thousand people was cruel (6). Those who wanted to be free from such destruction's had no other solution but to escape. Now every war was becoming the reason for the annihilation of the Turkish-Islam population.

As an example to Russia's acceptance of the massacres as a way to establish demographic superiority, we may mention the practices of Yermolov who was become the chief military commander of the Russian armies in the Caucasus in 1816. When villages were being burnt and women and children were being shot, he was speaking thus: "Hanging a Caucasian child means the survival of one hundred Russian soldiers." (7). In the same way, it is possible to show the policies of the Russian generals that had recourse to every mean to arm the Bulgarians and, conversely, to disarm the Turks in the war of 1877-1878. As a consequence of this policy, terrible massacres took place in "Es-kizağra", "Filibe" and "Malkara". Thus, many Turks had recourse to emigration to places not invaded (8).

The dimensions of the policy of annihilation in the first quarter of a century of the Soviet regime are unbelievable. Not only those opposing the regime but also the intellectual class of the Turkish-Islam population were being either killed or led to suffer in prison on unrealistic pretexts. Even Azerbaijan's communist leader Nerimanov could not help remarking, "Not even a Bolshevik Muslim was pitied." (9).

B) The emigration of the Muslim society abroad, especially to the Ottoman land while the Russian government was being established in the invaded regions: this second phase of Russia's demographic invasion policy is directly related with the first phase. It was planned that the population that could not be annihilated during the war should be afraid of the terror created and escape from the invaded countries. In fact, in 1784, Potemkin signed a declaration providing Crimean Turks some rights. However, immediately afterwards, he

gave one day for "all the Attars in the mountainous and desert regions to leave the peninsula." (10).

The aim of the policy was to clear the region from the Turks that were seen as "only an element that showed enmity," and to enable the region to become a Russian home (11). In fact, the people that were at first (in the year's 1785-1788) near the sea coasts, seaports and harbors could not bear the oppression. These people, by selling their possessions at very low prices, had to immigrate to the Ottoman government. Thus, by the year 1800, almost 33% of the population had emigrated (12).

To quicken immigration, the Russians had recourse to ways that transformed the Turks especially on fertile land into slaves. They wanted to follow the slavery regime that regarded the villager, along with the land, as the possession of the village owner. This regime was already followed in their own country. As is known, even in Crimea the villagers could independently do trade and stock breeding on lands that mainly belonged to the state or foundations, provided that they paid their tax. Besides the invasion of such lands, the wish to deprive the villagers of their freedom rendered immigration inevitable (13).

However, from time to time, we see that the government prohibited immigration. This precaution was directly to the Russians' advantage. At the beginning of the XIXth century, a group headed by Kochbei, the Russian Minister of Internal Affairs, wanted the emigration of the Crimeans to be quickly finished. In the meantime, the General Governor of Novorossiysk came to examine the region. He saw that as a result of the emigrations, the region had become almost a ruin. Thus, following his report, the government started to prevent emigration and to take back the given passports (14). However, this situation did not last long. A little after Emperor Alexander I ascended the throne, the procedure of forcing emigration started again. The Tsar's decree dated 29 August 1803, stated thus: "I realized that the settlement of other people on Crimea's mountainous areas would be more beneficial. I considered it essential to order that if there are people who own land here and would like to emigrate, they should not be prevented from doing so." (15). Consequently, in the first quarter of the XIXth century, about 400 thousand emigrants left Crimea and took refuge in Ottoman lands (16).

Again after the Crimean War, the words used by Alexander II in the decree sent to local authorities, i.e., "It is never appropriate either secretly or openly to prevent the emigration of the Tatars. On the contrary, this emigration done voluntarily will clear Crimea from unwanted elements," are evidence of the Russians' permanent policies to drive the Crimean Turks out of the country. Upon this decree, panic increased in Crimea and the people fled (17).

The Russians' emigration policy in the Caucasus was reinforced especially

after the end of the Disciple Movement. To quicken emigration here, two alternatives were being suggested to the Muslims: either to settle along the Volga or in Western Siberia where the majority were Russians, or to leave the country. The Caucasian Muslims chose the second alternative. They preferred to be governed by the Ottoman Caliph to embarking on an unknown Siberian journey. Indeed, every military success obtained by the Russians in the Caucasian region led to immigration. It is necessary to clarify this subject mentioned by a Russian writer: "When the village population was caught unawares, it was immediately taken to the nearest Cossack town under military surveillance and from there was sent to the Black Sea coast and then to Turkey." (18). During the Russian-Circassian wars, in the places that they conquered, the Russians gave a period of one month to the people to leave the valleys they were in. Upon this subject, they issued a decree stating that those who defied the decision would be treated as prisoners of war (19).

In the writing dated 3 December 1863 and sent to Istanbul from the Trabzon Governor, it is explained that the emigration of those who were to emigrate to the Ottoman Government from the places conquered by the Russians was quickened by burning their houses. Moreover, it is explained that pressure was exerted in order to crowd the seaports (20). Besides, the Russian Embassy in Istanbul, as if threatening, was clearly stating that in case of Supreme Court not accepting the emigrants, there would be bloodshed (21).

Even the civil servants in the Caucasus were supporting the government with their opinion that the Turkic-Islam population should emigrate. In fact, according to the news in the Russian newspapers, the government asked General Odomikof how to improve public order in the Caucasus. The General's answer was that this could be possible only by means of the complete ousting of the Nogay inhabitants from where they lived (22). A similar procedure was valid even for the Chechens. A project was prepared for the Chechens with the aim of driving them to the other side of Terek. Musa Kundukhov, who was currently a colonel in the Russian army learnt of the situation, preferred to emigrate to the Ottoman Government, and convinced of the Chechens too to do this (1865) (23). In the same manner, in 1862, the Russian Government took the decision to definitely make the people in the Northern Caucasus emigrate. In opposition to this, Nethach and Ubykh tribes rebelled. However, they were driven out of the country by oppression (24).

Those that emigrated to the Ottoman Government in this way were not only the Turkish and Muslim population (25). Even such groups as the Circassian, (26) Jews, (27) Cossack, (28) and Malakans (29) that were not yet Muslims had from time to time preferred to emigrate to the Ottoman Government to escape from the repression of the Russian regime. The Ottoman Government, due to financial problems, was at first against accepting those

that came. However, it became obliged to give the newcomers permission to enter so as to free them from the Russian massacre (30). Consequently, at the end of the Crimean War, upon the inability to provide the necessary life standard for the Caucasian people and later on "Imam" Shamil becoming a prisoner of war, almost 1,000,000 to 1,200,000 Muslim emigrants had to leave Crimea and the Caucasus. The number of the emigrants is not definitely known (31). Although the number of emigrants is not the same, due to similar reasons, even after the 1877-78 war, many Caucasian Muslims had to emigrate to Anatolia (32).

C) The people in Crimea and the Caucasus who never left the country being forced to settle in regions where there were many Russians: One of the most important methods followed by Russia to establish demographic superiority was to change the place of the Turkish-Islam population no matter what difficulties might be involved. In this way, the wish was to prevent the tribes that were to be dispersed in the new settlement areas from becoming a potential danger. For example, after the conquest of the places to the North of Kuban and Terek, thousands of Nogay and Kalmyk families here were made to emigrate beyond the Volga so that they would not unite with the Dagestan and Circassian forces in the region (33).

During the years of the Crimean War, some of the Turks were driven into such far off provinces as "Kerson", "Poltava", "Orlov" and "Kursk". Just as the Ottoman commander Ahmed Pasha was about to defeat the opposing armies in "Gözleve", the Turkish notables told him that the "Russians were going to drive them into Kazan. (34) The central government suggested in 1859 that the Tatars settle in Orenburg (35).

The differences in the assessments concerning the contributions of the Turks to the Russian economy were profoundly affecting the procedure of causing emigration and settlement. For example, in July 1854, Mensikof, who was the General Manager of the Treasury lands of the Tavrida Province, claimed that the Crimean Tatars did not work well in Russian villages. He suggested that consequently, "to prevent the damages of these people, they should be made to leave Crimea and emigrate to one of the distant provinces of Russia." (36). On the other hand, six years after this, Governor Graf Stroganof, explained in his report dated 3 October 1860, that "at least the Tatars all along the shore should be allowed to remain in their nations as it will be very difficult and even impossible to find workers that will do work in the vineyards and gardens and that will replace the Tatars." (37).

In the writing dated 3 December 1863 and sent by the Trabzon governor to Supreme Court, how people were asked to leave their homes and move to the inner regions of Russia is being explained (38). Again, about the same subject, the writing of the grand vizier states thus: Russia, by means of conquering

Circassia, has gone as far as where the Abkhaz tribe lives. It has proposed them to settle around Kuban. A part of the tribe has had to accept this (39).

The attitude of the Russians to the emigration of the Turkish Muslim population had begun to be seen as early as the period when the wars were continuing, namely, in the 1857s. Milyutin, who was in the Russian army in the Caucasus, wrote thus in 1857:

"We have to send the mountain-dwellers by force to the regions we choose. We have to drive them into the Don region. This is because there is no longer any uninhabited land in the Stavropol region. Even if it had not been like this, it would have been undesirable to settle these people who are our enemies behind the Cossacks. Our main aim is to settle the Russians in the regions on the skirts of the Caucasian Mountains."

In response to this, Prince Baryatinsky, the chief military commander of the Caucasian armies, spoke thus: "The only means we chose to be able to become stronger on the lands beyond Kuban is to gradually repress the mountain-dwellers by settling the Cossacks on the lands, and to destroy their opportunities to live." (40).

Indeed, in 1862, the Russian Government took the decision to make the people in the Northern Caucasus emigrate. About the subject, Bulwer, the ambassador of England in Istanbul, in the writing he sent to London in 12 April 1864, stated that the Russians forced the Circassians villagers to emigrate and meted out all kinds of cruelty to the people. He added that the Circassians wanted help (41). About the same subject, Dickson, the councilor of Sohum-Kale, in his writing in 17 March 1864, wrote that the natives were on no condition allowed to remain (42).

One of the most dramatic methods of realizing demographic superiority in the form of dispersing the population to the provinces in the internal regions was put into effect in the Caucasus. Among 1941 and 1944, the Soviet regime, by means of such accusations as the possibility of cooperation with the enemy, made eight different people leave their home and drove them into Central Asia and Siberia. These were the Crimean Turks, the Karachays and Balkaria, the Meskhians, the Chechens, the Ingush, and the inhabitants of the Volga, i.e., the Kalmyks and Germans. These people whose population was more than 1,500,000 in all, were dispersed to the different camps of the places of exile. This event that was kept a secret until the death of Stalin was officially confirmed by Krushchov who became the new general secretary in the XXth Congress of the Communist Party in 1956 (43).

d) The bringing of emigrants from European countries so that these emigrants would become the supporters of the Russian regime; these emigrants being settled in the places that became uninhabited as a result of the gradual exile of the native settlers in the region: At first, as the villager was considered

to be property along with land, and as there were very few independent villagers in Russia, the population gap was decided to be closed by means of European countries. For example, in the places vacated in Crimea, among 1784 and 1787, an attempt was made to bring in emigrants from such places as Korsika, Livorno, Piza, Geneva and Germany with various promises. At first, the number of the emigrants was far too below what was hoped. However, with time, the number of those who came with the attractiveness of the many privileges increased. Besides, in some regions, colonies were established by foreigners. For example, a Swiss colony was established close to Kefe, a German colony in Akmescit, and a Bulgarian colony on the Alma river. A Frenchman named Joseph Blanc established a vodka factory on the fertile land given to him close to Sudak. These colonists, supported by the government, and provided easy access to credit and exemption from taxes, were making various investments and using the region's economic sources as they wished (44).

Yet another demographic method that was followed was to encourage the non-Muslim population in the Ottoman Government and Iran to emigrate to Russia and to even have recourse to force in the invaded places: The Tsar government was following such a procedure in order to hinder the power of the neighboring governments while providing new population settlements in the vacated areas. Colonel Lazaref was expressing the aim by saying that "for Russia this population will become a new source of wealth." (45).

Following this thought, after 1828, 8000 families from the Armenians in Iran were made to emigrate to the Caucasus. From 1829 onwards, the 13th article (46) of Edirne Treaty was interpreted intentionally and, thus, a group of almost 120,000 Armenians from Eastern Anatolia was settled on the Caucasus lands. Consequently, military cordons were formed on the Iran and Ottoman frontiers (47).

Again around the same dates, the Greek and Bulgarian inhabitants of the places invaded in the Balkans were being sent to Russia by such means as pressure and persuasion. Supreme Court was trying to prevent the emigration by forgiving the treachery of the Greeks and Bulgarians during the war and by providing such privileges as exemption from tax. Moreover, encouraging precautions were being taken to enable the return of those who had left. In the meantime, the numbers of those who went to Russia and tried to come back due to regret were not negligible. They started to return in 1840 and continued until 1844 (48).

Later on we see that the Russian diplomats in the Ottoman Government were made to encourage the Christians to emigrate to Russia. For example, the Greek press emphasized that Athena Embassy confirmed that the transportation expenses of the Greek emigrants to Russia would be met. (49) There were people who left Anatolia with these idle promises; however, a significant

number regretted and went back. For example, that 10,000 people from the population between "Samsun" and "Bafra" decided to emigrate and that a great portion of these later on regretted and gave up leaving is understood in the news reflected in the press. Once again, it is understood that about 1,000 non-Muslims going towards "Anapa" were left to starve, that one-third of these lost their lives and that the remaining people tried to return to their Ottoman home (50). Indeed, first 450 of these people, and then a significant part of those that remained went back (51). About 12,000 Bulgarians who were deceived by the encouragement of the Russians and who went to Crimea applied to the Ottoman Government to return some time later. Their application was accepted and they were permitted to settle in "Dobruca" and Southern Bulgaria (52). In 1864, 30 households among the Greeks going from "Sivas" to Russia were not satisfied with Russia, and they applied to return to the Ottoman lands. As they were penniless, they were given 25,000 "kurush" to meet their travel expenses and were permitted to return to Anatolia (53). The presence of many non-Muslim families who went to Russia to settle between Novorossiysk and "Sohum Kale" and who later on regretted doing so and desired strongly to return attracted attention (54). Despite all this, Russia succeeded in turning Crimea and the Caucasus's demographic structure to its own advantage by benefiting from those who did not go back.

e) One of the most effective methods put into operation was the transfer of the Christian population in the various parts of Russia to Crimea and the Caucasus. Especially, the Turkish lands were seen as the most appropriate places for the dissipation of the rebellious tribes objecting to all authority. When the Turks reacted against these newcomers, the forces who were in reality against the central authority were easily siding with the government. Thus, while on the one hand the rebellious Christian tribes were moving to the side of the government, on the other hand a population balance was being realized.

In fact, at the end of the XVIIIth century, the Cossacks of Dinyeper who did not accept any authority, were settled in the strengthened villages formed between "Mozdok" and "Stavropol" (55). Besides the political and military intentions, the "Vladikavkaz" city was formed in the Southern Caucasus as an important settlement centre. The construction of the city showed that the aim of the Russians in the future was to conquer the whole of the Caucasus (56). Immediately after the Yash Treaty, drainage work was increased all along the Kuban and Terek rivers. Strong places were formed for the Cossack communities that came here. These fortifications were made from Kuban to Caspian Sea, and completely surrounded the South of the Caucasus. Again, at about the same time, on the land seized from the Bjdug tribe of the Abiges, the Krasnodar city was constructed in the name of Katherine II. (57). Moreover, Russian villagers settled in place of thousands of Nogay and Kalmuk fam-

ilies that were driven out of the South of "Kuban" and "Terek" (58).

The administration that made a great effort for the success of the settlement work carried out in these areas, formed a fund of 10 million rubles in order to meet the needs of the colonies. Moreover, it provided 124-435 rubles for every family. In addition, such infrastructure work as roads were carried out by the government (59).

Such investments positively affected the demands concerning settlements. In fact, in 1860, almost 85,000 people were settled in the various areas of the Caucasus, and 111 new villages were constructed (60). Especially, in 19 February, the independence of about 21 million of the male population as a result of the abolishment of serfdom (61), the difficulty of finding land for this population in Russia, and the occurrence of rebellions as a result of this, led the government to regard the Crimean and Caucasian areas as settlement places.

The policies that were carried out were seen as an intentional preference. This was proven by the attempts made in "Kars" that entered Russian dominion after the 1877-1878 war. Before the establishment of Russian sovereignty, the population of "Kars", "Ardahan" and "Oltu" was above 100 thousand and the non-Muslim population was not even 20 thousand. However, after the establishment of the Russian sovereignty, the Armenian population in the region increased in a normal manner. Apart from the Armenians, according to the census of 1897, under the title *colonized group*, 10,695 Russians, 12 Polish, 23,525 Greeks, 280 Estonians and Mordvinians, and 2,3300 Ossetians were brought here. Thus, on the mentioned date, against 123,418 Muslims, 100,898 non-Muslims were settled in "Kars". This resulted in a balance (62).

We see that the Russians especially in Azerbaijan gave great importance to turning the balance of the population to their advantage. The most important reason for this was Azerbaijan's geographical position and its immense wealth below ground and above ground. The region was always looked upon as a *source of wealth*. It is for this reason that the administration took special care to have the majority of the Azerbaijan population formed of Christians. In 1871, the Turkish population in the Nagorno-Karabakh area of "Gence" province was 878,000 while the Armenian population had reached 292,000. In some areas, the proportion of the Armenian population had been raised to 21%, and even upto 40%. As to the Baku province, where a great number of colonized groups had been settled, there lived 165,000 Turks, 77,000 Russians, 63,000 mountain-dwellers (the natives of the Caucasus), 52,000 Armenians, 8,000 Jews and 137,000 people belonging to other nations. Whereas at the beginning, it was of prior importance to Russification of those who worked in the civil service, in the 1880s in the Baku province, the ethnic importance of the Russians gradually increased. In the years following 1913,

only in the "Mugan" steppes, 44 settlement areas were formed and more than 20,000 hectares of land of very great quality and that could be irrigated were distributed to Christian villagers (63).

The great attempt to form demographic superiority carried out in almost all parts of the Caucasus, was continued in a planned manner throughout the XIXth century. In fact, not much importance was given to mountainous regions; however, in the region's places where there was great military, industrial and commercial importance, colonizer refugee groups were settled. Moreover, especially in the Turkish frontier, attempts were being made to render the Russian, Armenian and Christian Georgian population predominant. The demographic structure today shows that these attempts were successful.

Despite everything, the completion of colonialism by means of the Turkic-Islam population in Crimea and the Caucasus being rendered ineffective with administrative, socio-economic and cultural policies: both Tsardom and the Soviet administration were regarding the Muslim people of Crimea and the Caucasus as potentially guilty and ready for a rebellion. Consequently, every effort was being made not to give such an opportunity to Muslims. Detailed plans were prepared and carried out to destroy the basic conditions, i.e., the power of money and weapons, that would enable Muslims to attain success in a possible war of independence. It is seen that even the official Russian historians admit the economic and administrative weakening cruelly exercised in almost every region of Crimea and the Caucasus: "In a large part of the lands annexed to Russia, a military colony regime was established. As a result of this, the people of these provinces were kept under repression and plundered." (64).

Indeed, in 1859, with the construction of an oil refinery in and around Baku, production increased. Moreover, in 1872, the procedure of renting the oil fields on the lands of the royalty for a longer period through contract was introduced. Thus, the door was opened to investors with large capital. The following year, with the replacement of the old shoveling method with the piercing method, and the functioning of a very productive oil well, Baku suddenly became one of the leading oil centres of the world. In a short time, foreign investors rushed to the city. The population rapidly increased, and the city population that was 13,000 in 1863, became 206,000 in 1903. The increase in the non-Muslim population was more than 50%. While the oil industry was forming the most important source of income in the region, the Muslims were generally made to work in jobs of no quality and of low pay. As to high-paid jobs that required skill and education, they were completely in the hands of workers of Russian, Armenian or Georgian origin. While in 1870, 88% of the oil wells were in the hands of the Turks, gradually they belonged to the wealthy Armenians, Russians, Jews and Western Europeans. Only two

years later, the ratio of oil wells in the hands of the Turks diminished to 13%. (65).

Under the protective wings of Russia, the Armenians made faster strides towards modernization than the Muslims. Consequently, they became the side to gain the most from the development of the economy of Azerbaijan. In 1872, the Armenians won ten times the privilege obtained by the Turks from oil. While 49 of the organizations – and most of them small – among 167 oil companies belonged to the Turks, wealthy Armenian families were the owners of 55 medium and large organizations. From 1900 on, 29% of the 115 industrial firms in the province of Baku belonged to the Armenians; however, only 18% belonged to the Turks. In the same way, the production of wine, the management of fish, and the raising of tobacco were completely in the hands of the Armenians (66). In contrast to the great majority of the Turkish population living in Azerbaijan, this disequilibrium in the distribution of wealth shows that the Russian colonialism reached its economic aims. That the Turks were unable to play a role in the local industry or that they had a say in only a small part of it, was valid for all Crimea and the Caucasus. Although there were a few Turks in some sectors like the maritime and silk, they were exceptions.

Russia never considered the needs and desires of the Turks – in more general terms, the Muslims – in the education sector just as it had not done in economic activities. The policy followed in relation to this was either to leave the Turks as uneducated, illiterate people or, as a need for Russification, to enable them to be educated in Russian schools. As a matter of fact, when we pay attention to the figures relating to investments in education, it is possible to understand this subject far more clearly. For example, in the Caucasian education budget belonging to 1898, less payment was set aside for provinces where the majority were Muslims. In a place like Dagestan where nearly all the population was Muslim, the amount set aside from the education budget was not even one ruble per 2,000 persons. As to Tbilisi, almost three persons received a payment of 2 rubles. Again, the number of male Muslim students who were educated in the gymnasiums in the Caucasus were not more than 262 (4.2%), and the number of female Muslims were not more than 26 (0.4%). The proportion of the Russians, however, was 39.8% in males and 54.7 in females (67).

It is doubtless that the Muslim schools were closed due to lack of finance and teachers. On the other hand, people reacted to Russian schools. Both these facts play a great role in the low proportion of students in the Caucasus. As a matter of fact, the Russian education minister Graf D. A. Tolstov, in an order given in 1870, said thus: "The education of all the foreigners within the borders of our motherland should unconditionally aim at Russification and

welding them." (68).

On the other hand, it is seen that the Turks were deprived of opportunities even in the field of the press. Even a newspaper that came out from time to time was either published unsystematically or closed by the government for trivial reasons. Although the most active part of the Muslims in Crimea and the Caucasus were the Azeri Turks, it is quite difficult to say that the press life for the Turks was productive (69). Besides, in 1900, there was not even a single publication published by the Muslims in the Caucasus. In this year, 43 periodicals were published in the Caucasus. Among these, 30 were Russian, 8 were Georgian, and 5 were Armenian (70).

This short research shows that the complex demographic structure specially in the regions of the Soviet Union where the Turkic-Islam population lived emerged as a result of the continuous and intentional policies followed by the Russians throughout history. Consequently, in the root of the current problems lie the practices of the last two centuries. Generally, to form a cosmopolitan population structure in various regions, then by means of enabling conflicts to arise between them and by consequently undertaking the role of referee, Moscow's establishment of its political, military and economic superiority, is an important quality of traditional Russian policies. At times when conflicts that cannot be solved appear, it has been possible for the parties to go to Moscow and say, "we cannot settle this between ourselves. Please you be the referee." The most clear example of this constitutes the Karabakh incidents. The occurrence of similar formations in other regions should not be surprising.

Footnotes:

1. H. Kohn, **Panislavism and Russian Nationalism**. Trans. A.O. Güner, İstanbul, pp. 183, 185.
2. In this point of view, which had oppression as a base, is based on a story which takes place in the 14th section of the Lucas Bible not only in Russia but also in Europe. In the story, those that do not come to the banquet, despite being invited, are forced to do so. P. Hazard. **The Great Change in the Western Thought**. Trans. E. Güngör, I.C., İstanbul, 1976, pp. 121-122.
3. For example, in 1921, while 17% of the Turks in Azerbaijan were living in cities, 63% of the Russian population were living in cities. R.B. İsmailov, **Azerbaijan History**, Baku, 1993, p.10.
4. The Russians, during the 1768-1774 war, started a wide policy of emigration, under the name of the policy of reform, against the Turks, Tatars and Moguls living in the regions of Kazan, Southern Volga, the Northern Caucasus and the Don. A. C. Eren. **Problems of Emigration and Emigrants in Turkey**, İstanbul, 1966, p.31.
5. E. F. Gözaydın. **The Settlement and Emigration of the Crimean Turks**, İstanbul, 1959, p.64.
6. A. W. Fisher. **Crimean Tatars**, California, 1978, p. 78.
7. J. F. Baddaley. **The Russian Invasion of the Caucasus and Sheyh Şamil**. Trans. S. Özden, İstanbul, 1989, pp. 110-173.
8. See N. Ypek. **Emigration of the Turks from Rumeli to Anatolia**, Ankara, 1994.
9. T. Swietochovski, **Russian Azerbaijan (1905-1920)** Trans. N. Mert, İstanbul, 1988, p.160. Also, see M. B. Mehmetzade, **The Soviet Annihilation Policy in Azerbaijan**, ,

no. 5, Munich, 1956. For practices in Crimea in the years of the establishment of the Soviet regime, see Fisher, p. 118.

10. M. Bala - H. İnalçık, Crimea, **İslam Ansiklopedisi**, VI.C., İstanbul, 1955, p. 757; Gözaydın, p. 71. Nevertheless, when Crimea was being placed under the sovereignty of Russia, it was promised in the declaration presented (8 April 1783) that the Turks, possessions, lives and honour will definitely be taken care of. Abdullah oğlu Hasan, "Kırım Türklerine karşı Rus siyaseti" The Russian Policy against the Crimean Turks, **Azerbaycan Yurt Bilgisi**, I.C., no. 12, İstanbul, p. 442. Once again, in the instructions sent to Potemkin dated 28 June 1783, the warning given was "never to attack the religion of the Crimean Turks." See Gözaydın, pp. 66-69.
11. M. Pinson, "Russian Policy and the Emigration of the Crimean Tatars to the Ottoman Empire (1854-1862)," **Güneydoğu Avrupa Araştırmaları Dergisi**, no. 1, İstanbul, 1972, p. 37.
12. Bala - İnalçık, "Kırım," p. 756.
13. The same article, p. 757. According to official statistics, the lands taken from the Crimeans until 1796, were about 300 thousand hectares. M. Ülküsal, **Crimean-Turkish Tatars**, İstanbul, 1980, p. 128. General Tottleben, in a report he prepared in 1860, confessed that the Crimeans, by being forced to sign the documents that they did not understand, had their lands seized. Pinson, pp. 38-40.
14. Fisher, p. 88; Pinson, p. 38.
15. Gözaydın, p. 76.
16. Eren, p.33; Gözaydın, p. 78.
17. Pinson, pp. 39-42.
18. B. Baytuğan, "Kuzey Kafkasya" The Southern Caucasus, **Dergi**, XVI.C., no. 61, Munich, 1970, p. 7.
19. W. G. Cabağı, **The Caucasian-Russian Struggle**, İstanbul, 1987, p. 72; R. Tuna, "Çerkeslerin Kafkasya'dan göçü" The Emigration of the Çerkes from the Caucasus, **Five conferences upon the Caucasus**, İstanbul, 1977, p. 141.
20. **Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA.)**, *İrade-Meclis-i Mahsus (İMM)*, 1189, leaf 3.
21. **BOA, İMM**, 1189; For emigration after the Crimean war, see A. Saydam, "Kırım ve Kafkas göçleri (1856-1876)" Emigration in Crimea and the Caucasus (1856-1876). Diss. Samsun, 1992.
22. *Ceride-i Havadis*, no. 969.
23. Saydam, pp. 240-243.
24. *Takvim-i Vekayi*, no. 755; Allen, pp. 103-104.
25. In order to show the Ottoman Government's attitude to the emigrants we are content to add the following statement that is found in the writing of the grand vizier: "Whoever the people who are going to emigrate may be...let their lives be settled..." **BOA, YMM**, 266, leaf 1.
26. *Takvim-i Vekayi*, no. 809.
27. **BOA, İrade-Dahiliye**, 23899; *İrade-Hariciye*, 6857.
28. K. Karpat, **Ottoman Population (1830-1914)**, Wisconsin, 1985, p.64.
29. **BOA, Maliyaden Müdever Defterler**, 23109.
30. **BOA, Meclis-i Mahsus**, 1189.
31. Saydam, p.137.
32. N. İpek, "Kafkasya'dan Anadolu'ya göçler (1877-1890)" Emigration from the Caucasus to Anatolia (1877-1890), **Ondokuzmayıs Üniversitesi Eğitim Fakültesi Dergisi**, no.6, Samsun, 1992, pp.97-124; S. Erkan, *Kırım ve Kafkasya göçleri (1878-1908)* Emigration in Crimea and the Caucasus (1878-1908), Trabzon, 1996.
34. **BOA, YMM**, 266, leaf 1,4.
35. Pinson, pp. 45-46.
36. Ülküsal, p.136.
37. *Ibid.* p. 137.
38. **BOA, YMM**, 1189, leaf 3.
39. **BOA, YMM**, 1189.
40. "Milletimiz böyle yok edildi - Kafkasya basınından seçmeler" Our people Were Annihilated Thus - Choices from the Caucasian Press. Trans. S.E.B., *Kafkasya gerçeği* The Caucasian Truth, no.6, Samsun, 1991, p. 5.
41. "Papers Respecting the Settlement of Caucasian Emigrants in Turkey," *Accounts and Papers*, volume LXIII32, London, 1864, pp. 2-3 (no. 3).

42. Ibid. pp. 1-2 (no. 2). Again, Consul Dickson's writing dated 13 April 1864, pp. 3-4 (no.5) and p. 4 (no. 6).
43. N. Devlet, *Çağda Türk dünyası* Contemporary Turkish World, Istanbul, 1989, p.217. For the attitude and exile of the Crimeans during World War II, see Fisher, pp. 150-179 for further information.
44. Fisher, p. 92.
45. K. Beydilli, "1828-1829 Osmanlı Rus Savaşında Doğu Anadolu'dan göçürülen Ermeniler" The Armenians Made to Emigrate from Western Anatolia in the 1828-1829 Ottoman-Russian War, *Belgeler*, XIII.C., no.17, p. 404.
46. *Muahedat Mecmuası*, IV2.C., Ystanbul, 1296, pp. 78-79.
47. Beydilli, pp. 365-434.
48. U. Gülsoy, 1828-1829 Osmanlı-Rus savaşında Rumeli,den Rusya'ya göçürülen reaya The People Made to Emigrate from Rumeli to Russia during the 1828-1829 Ottoman-Russian War, Istanbul, 1993, p. 27.
49. *Ruzname-i Ceride-i Havadis (RCH)*, no. 148.
50. *RCH*, no. 1155.
51. It is interesting that in the meantime about 200 non-Muslims that were in Russia and that wanted to return, were expected to give 6.000 roubles in return for what they ate. However, when the emigrants could not pay this, the payment in question was made by Bab-y Ali. *RCH*, no.1168.
52. Karpat, pp. 64-65; M. Aydyn, "Vidin Bulgarlarının Rusya'ya göç ettirilmeleri" The Emigration of the Vidin Bulgarians to Russia, *The Research of the Turkish World*, no. 53, Istanbul, 1988, pp. 67-79.
53. *BOA*, *Yrade-i Hariciye*, 12463.
54. *Tasvir-i Efkar*, no.540.
55. Baytugan, p. 5; Allen, p.18; A. N. Kurat, *Turkey and Russia*, Ankara, 1990, pp.34-37.
56. P. Henze, *Fire and Sword: The Resistance of XIXth century Caucasian Mountain Villagers*. Trans. A. Kösetorunu, Ankara, 1985, p. 4. Besides, the dream of Potemkin, one of the favourite,s of Katerina II, was to establish an Armenian Kingdom in the Southern Caucasus (the Transcaucasus) under the control of Russia. M. S. Anderson, *The Eastern Question (1774-1923)*, London, 1987, p.11.
57. A. H. Hyzal, *Kuzey Kafkasya* The Northern Caucasus, Ankara, 1961, p. 37; M. Bala, "Çerkesler," *İslam Ansiklopedisi*, III.C., Istanbul, 1963, p.382.
58. Allen, p.18.
59. Ed Dulaurier, "La Russe dans le Caucase - L'exode des circassiens et la colonisation Russe" The Russians in the Caucasus -- The Exodus of the Caucasians and Russian Colonization, *Revue de Deux Mondes*, LXI.C., Paris, 1866, p. 60; S. J. Shaw - E. K. Shaw, *The Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*. Trans. M. Harmancy, II.C., Istanbul, 1983, p. 152.
60. Dulaurier, p.62.
61. A. N. Kurat, *Russian History*, Ankara, 1987, pp. 338-340. For further information about the reforms made in these years, see H. Seton - Watson, *The Russian Empire (1801-1917)*, Oxford, 1988, p. 332.
62. Y. Ortaylı, *Kars under the Regime of Tsar Russia*, *Y. Ü. Tarih Enstitüsü Dergisi*, no. 9, Istanbul, 1978, pp. 348-350.
63. Swietochovski, pp.32-35.
64. P. Fedenko, *The New Soviet History about the Establishment of the Russian Empire*, *Dergi*, no.42, Munich, 1965, p. 10.
65. Swietochovski, pp. 40-41.
66. Ibid. p. 67.
67. Ortaylı, p. 67.
68. B. Hayit, *Türkistan*. Trans. A. Sadak, Istanbul, 1975, p. 167.
69. Swietohcovski, pp. 47-48.
70. Ortaylı, p. 359.