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Ömer TURAN



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Emerging Nationalism or The New Strategy of Independent Kazakhstan *

Meryem KIRIMLI

The future path of Kazakhstan after attaining independence on December 16, 1991, has occupied the minds of intellectuals and analysts both in the republic itself and in the western world. Questions abound: Will this newly independent republic which was under colonialist pressure for years develop rapidly? Will Kazakhstan be able to preserve its political and economic independence?, or, Will it, after the enthusiasm of independence fades away, attempt to find shelter under the protective umbrella of Russia?; Will Kazakhstan be able to remain stable despite its complex ethnic mixture and despite the difficult economic chaos and many problems which Kazakhstan has inherited after the Soviet disintegration? Should Kazakhstan refrain from asserting to establish its national identity as the land of Kazakhs or should it try to balance its policies not to disturb its multi-ethnic structure and remain not as the Kazakh land, but as the land of a multi-ethnic society? Do Kazakhs agree to call themselves the citizens of the Republic of Kazakhstan as opposed to the citizens of the Kazakh Republic. In other words, is Kazakhstan a Kazakh state or is it a state of its multi-ethnic citizenry? Which national hero should the youths in Kazakhstan study?; The heroes of the Second World War, the heroes of the former Soviet Union, or the heroes of Kazakh nationalism such as Kenesary Kasimov, who has regarded by many ethnic Kazakhs as the first Kazakh nationalist and who had "great stature" among all of the Kazakhs, and led the Kazakhs in the 19th century in a revolt which was the greatest challenge to the Russian tsarist authority in the steppe (1).

The aim of this paper is to invite the reader to a journey in the pages of the Kazakh language newspapers in order to discover the discussions and debates going on in the indigenous Kazakh media, which is under the threat of not being published at all due to paper and other printing material shortages. Discussions and articles studied are mainly concentrated from 1994 and only partly from 1995. Some heated debates about many aspects of the future of the republic took place especially right before and after the first post-Soviet elec-

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tions on March 7, 1994. According to an Economic Intelligence Report;

President Nazarbayev's supporters and ethnic Kazakhs won an overwhelming majority in the elections... The grouping, which wants Russian to be a state language and dual citizenship for the country's Russians, also failed to get any of its candidates elected... The elections have firmly put Kazakhs in power. Since 1993 President Nazarbayev has deliberately followed a policy of "Kazakhisation"; top jobs with few exceptions go to ethnic Kazakhs regardless of ability and place names have been changed to Kazakh ones." (2)

As it can be seen from western reports, an assertion of Kazakh identity as opposed to the identity of the citizenry of Kazakhstan can be noticed in this newly independent state of Kazakhstan, especially in matters regarding the official state language and policy-making body. As the chief executive of the republic the ever-strengthened personality of President Nursultan Nazarbayev is also very prominent. Although he gained fame with his "level headed" (3) statements both on the international and national scene, he seems to accept the Kazakh intellectuals depicting him as a leader similar to the Great Kazakh Khan Abilay. Abilay, throughout the nineteenth century, had inspired the Kazakh to resist the economic and political changes imposed by the Russian tsarist colonial policy and was the leader not only of the Middle Horde but all of the Kazakh Hordes.

It seems the Kazakh, especially the native intelligentsia, has realized that, although Kazakhstan has reached independence rather smoothly without any bloody fighting and without long years of struggle, their real war of independence has started after December 1991. The main arguments is how to get rid of the remnants of the Soviet legacy and to assert the new and genuine as well as the nationalistic policy of Kazakh land regardless of a multi-ethnic society. Many of the vital issues regarding the future path of Kazakhstan will also be brought to discussion during the Kazakh election campaign. During the campaign, some parties in Kazakhstan even used these issues in order to win more votes especially from the Russians as well as from those who were already assimilated to the Russian society and culture.

There are of course many different opinions on the future path of the republic. Many group, including the well-known Kazakh intellectual and the president of the Peoples Congress Party, Oljas Sulaymenov, argue for the confederation of Kazakhstan with Russia, and also for granting official status to the Russian language in the republic. Other arguments are concentrated on the privatization of the Kazakh lands by selling or renting to individuals as an extension of privatization of the state assets, as well as on granting double citizenship to the Russian population of the Republic. At the same time arguments in support of the Russian in the republic is based on the possibility of a civil war, and cautioning the Kazakhs not to get into

conflict with the Russian Federation by displeasing the Russian citizens in the republic. In seems, the so-called "marginal" (4) group, who have forgotten their mother tongue and assimilated into the Russian society, are supporting these kind of ideas. Among them, there seems to be many native Kazakhs who have not (5) adapted themselves to the new circumstances psychologically, and who still feel strange about the idea of breaking away ties with the 70 year old Soviet legacy. According to some Kazakh intellectuals, this group is the one that has unintentionally, and rather suddenly have lost their privileged positions when they were the staunch defenders of the now-disintegrated old order (6). Many Kazakh intellectuals argued against these ideas and put forward counter arguments.

Kazakh intellectuals, among them there are writers, poets, newspaper correspondents, academicians, opposed the idea of granting double-citizenship to people in Kazakhstan. This seems a protection of the Kazakh state interest as opposed to the Russian interest, and according to the Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev "Russia's national interest in 'neighboring territories' needed to be protected 'with utmost firmness'". Nazarbayev, on the other hand, has equated this statement with Hitler's ideas on the Sudeten Question (7). However, there are, even among the ethnic Kazakhs arguments of keeping the Russians in the republic happy and allowing them to have whatever they want, such as giving an official language status to the Russian language, double-citizenship to the Russian speaking people and confederation with Russia. The 'marginal' group goes further and attempts to scare Kazakhs by saying that if the Kazakh government does not provide the Russians with a double-citizenship right and if the Kazakh government does not grant an official language status to Russian, the independence of Kazakhstan will be threatened. This kind of threat might, according to their argument, come from two sides; first from the Russian government in Moscow with which Kazakhstan still has very close ties and secondly from the Cossack groups settled in the area close to the Kazakh-Russian border region. A counter argument to this from a Kazakh intellectual claims that this is a mere clamor, and if Russia and the Russians are sensible enough not to bring any personality like Zhirinovsky to the political leadership of the federation, here will be no threat against Kazakhstan (8). In addition to this, the author states, the Russian federation has enough trouble to keep stable and peaceful some twenty autonomous regions within its border, and it is nonsensical for Russia to attempt for further trouble to restore the old- already disintegrated empire, instead of trying to tackle the problems within the borders of the federation. Those times, writes one Kazakh author, are already history in which one country would swallow another in front of the world public opinion. A giant country like Kazakhstan, he says, whose flag is among the nations of the UN, and onewhich is diplomatically rec-

ognized and has economic ties with many countries of the world, is a huge piece not to be swallowed easily (9).

There are two different opinions in the Kazakh republic. The first is rather optimistic on the future of the country as an independent entity, whose future is full of positive pose, and the second depicts not only Kazakhstan but the whole Central Asian states as weak countries that do not have enough means and strength to develop rapidly. The latter opinion considers Kazakhstan as a country which earned its independence not as a result of years of fighting, but a country that became independent by chance, stemming from the sudden disintegration of the big empire. When the so-called 'fashion of independence' ends, the group claims, things will return to their past shape in the republic. Therefore, as they claim, countries of the post-colonial world, do not have the strength to remain independent. As an example of this contention, they refer to the post-colonial turmoil in Tajikistan, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. However, the group does not bring any clarity to the sources of conflict in the above-mentioned areas.

There are also discussions in Kazakhstan about a possible future alliance of the republic with other countries. Such a discussion was carried out in an article, which entitled "Kazakhstan Does Not Have A Future Without Russia." (10) The authors of the article attempt to give a geopolitical perspective and describe Kazakhstan as a country on the periphery of the center, the area around Moscow and St. Petersburg. According to this opinion, Kazakhstan is a landlocked area, and does not have a chance of opening to the outside world without Russia. Writers of the article refer also to the southern and eastern neighboring countries of Kazakhstan, namely Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan as well as China, and to the further south, Pakistan, India, Iran and Afghanistan as the region that has no hope of opening for the landlocked Kazakh territory. Thus, it was argued in the article, there is only one source, for Kazakhstan to eliminate the negative effects of being a landlocked country, and that is Russia. If Russia agrees to help Kazakhstan, it will save the country. Russia, the authors argue, can help Kazakhstan for the sake of the Russian citizens in the republic, if not for the sake of Kazakhs. If the Kazakh government, they claim, mistakenly offends the Russian citizens in the republic, Kazakhstan's future will be similar to that of post-colonial African countries. In the concluding part of the article, it has been foreseen by the authors, Masanov and Amirkulov, that in the first half of the next century Kazakhstan will join Russia. Oljas Suleymenov, the famous writer of a much debated book, *Az i Ya*, and also one of the strongest initiator of anti-nuclear movement in Kazakhstan against Soviet nuclear testing in the country, is another figure who has supported the idea of confederation of Kazakhstan with Russia. He sees that confederation with Russia is the number one con-

dition for Kazakhstan's future and for Kazakhstan's development. He seems to be inspired by the tendencies in Europe towards a debatable confederation of Europe (11).

Another aspect that drew some of the so-called marginal Kazakhs closer to the idea of confederation with Russia is the close economic ties between the Kazakh republic and the Russian federation, which is another remnant of Soviet legacy. A counter argument by another Kazakh intellectual, Aqselev Seydimbek is as follows:

Why should Kazakhstan enter into confederacy with Russia? Is it because we are neighbors? Kazakhstan has other neighbors as well. Is it because 60-70 per cent of Kazakhstan's industrial and productive centers are dependent on Russia? Are not these the result of colonial status of Kazakhstan under the Soviet domination? Should not the real independence aim to get rid of this kind of dependency? We were in a confederation with Russia before (during the Soviet period). During that period about four million Kazakhs died, not even a single Kazakh intellectual or a leader died of natural causes. During the Soviet period, in the midst of the Kazakh sea, 500 nuclear tests were conducted. During the Virgin Land Development, two million Slavic settlers were brought to Kazakhstan among them were 12,000 specially selected prostitutes. During this campaign, about one thousand Kazakh schools were closed down... and about 40 per cent Kazakh youth have forgotten their own native language... Questions of confederation should not even come up for discussion. Neither confederation, nor a bloc, but Russia should remain as our mere neighbor (12).

Another article also reacts against the idea of confederation and attacks Oljas Suleymenov for his support of it. The author describes the idea of confederation with Russia as something similar to "an man sleeping with an elephant". The writer also refers to the US support of the official Kazakh policy and suggests that "the new strategy of Kazakhstan should include having good neighborly and peaceful relations with China and Russia, but it should also emphasize good relations of Kazakhstan with the USA." (13)

Another argument which occupied the pages of the Kazakh language media in Kazakhstan was about the still debated matter of granting the Kazakh language official status. This matter was especially used during the election campaign earlier in the year, and it was also made a motto for those who aimed to win the votes of Russian speaking people in the country. It has been reported by the Kazakh media that "some 'officious' politicians were trying to instigate the Russians by saying "Kazakh is the official language of the republic and there will not be any future for the children of Russians. Russians are suffering under such a threat." (14) As a reaction to this idea, in an open letter addressed to Oljas Suleymenov, Kazakh intellectuals stated the following:

Oljas, although you write in Russian, you are well aware of the problem that the real dilemma of the Kazakh language is the compulsion which has forced the Kazakhs to use Russian as their first language regardless of the fact that

the land on which they lived is the Kazakh territory and this compulsion was forced onto Kazakhs as a result of the communistic aggressiveness. Thus the Kazakh language had to be replaced with the Russian and remained in the secondary position. If, as you propose, the language law should be discussed in the parliament and if there will be any legislation about an amendment to the language law, then if the Russian language will be given official status, it will bring grave consequences with it. This kind of attempt will reduce the Kazakh language into secondary position again, and within the next 20-30 years, Kazakh literature and the Kazakh language will take its place among the archive materials of history. We do not like to see this kind of disaster. In Kazakhstan, one cannot find any single Russian who has forgotten the Russian language but there are many Kazakhs who have forgotten their native language. Kazakhs have been Russified as a result of the communistic aggressiveness. Kazakhs have become very close to the edge of losing their identity. For seventy-years, national consciousness was choked. In practice, Russian language is being continuously used in every phase of life and actually the Russian speaking fellows have no language difficulty. The only reason to give official status to the Kazakh language was to improve the national consciousness of the Kazakhs which was choked during the Soviet era. It was also necessary, in the first place, to urge the Kazakhs themselves (who are forgetting their language in still increasing numbers). The main idea behind issuing the language law was this (the above-mentioned reasons), to be honest. Your (Oljas Suleymenov's) proposal about the revision of language law in the constitution might have grave consequences for the Kazakh nation. Our call is directed not only to you but to the whole in the republic to be cautious in not making any mistake and adding more to the language dilemma of the Kazakhs. The party you lead, the Peoples Congress Party and the candidates of the Socialist Party are using the language problem during the election campaign. This attempt might disturb the peaceful friendship among the nationalities in the republic and it might lead to great political turmoil or even might lead to bloody fighting. We would like to protect the people in Kazakhstan from a danger of this kind. We are all against rediscussing the language section of the Constitution altogether (15).

Another argument states that, in Kazakhstan, all the official meetings and correspondence are carried out in the Russian language in practice. Eighty per cent of all the news in radio and television stations use Russian. The number of newspapers and periodicals in Kazakh is 252 as opposed to this, the number of periodicals and newspapers in Russian is 331. The number of students that use Russian at school is 38 per cent. However, there are almost no Russian student who go to Kazakh schools. In Almaty, number of Kazakh schools is 26, as opposed to this, the number of Russian schools in the capital is 93 (16).

In addition to all of these vital issues, in the Kazakh media a group of Kazakh academicians, writers, and poets published a letter addressed to the president of the republic. This letter asks Kazakh Pres-

ident to honor the famous Kazakh hero, Kenesary Kasimov, who was described as the famous Kazakh state and military figure in the nineteenth century in Kazakh history, a gifted diplomat of his age, the last khan of all the Kazakhs, the leader of the most important national-liberation movement of the Kazakhs. The letter also stated that:

The name of Kenesary has remained eternally in the history of struggle against colonial Russian policy. Kenesary, was a grandson of Abilay Khan, who united the three hordes of the Kazakhs against tsarist administration, and led the Kazakhs to attempts to form an independent entity. Kenesary Kasimov also was described as a great reformist, gifted military leader and diplomat. The letter also claimed that (during the Soviet period) the name of Kenesary was abandoned, the movement led by him was described as feudalist-monarchist reactionary movement, and the people who wrote about him were persecuted and the books about him (Kenesary) were banned during the totalitarian administration. Only when the Kazakh state became independent, Kenesary Khan was rehabilitated, his honor was restored, and his name began to be pronounced again among the Kazakh national heroes. Many books began to be published about him, a big commemoration and many conferences devoted to his activities were organized. Despite all of these activities, making the name and memory of Kenesary eternal has not been completed. Many nations in the world gave the honor to their national heroes, kings, presidents, and emperors by having their statues establishing eternally in the memory of the people and in their most prominent places of their countries. In the Kazakhstan's capital, ... there is no single monument or even a single statue established to the memory of the heroes who died for us (for Kazakhs)" (17)

This open letter is requesting official help and a decree from the President of the Republic, Nursultan Nazarbayev, to support and finance the discovery and transportation of the graves of Kenesary and his friends, who, in the nineteenth century, were killed during a battle with Kyrgyz manaps, traditional Kyrgyz tribal leaders who had both religious and social authority, from Kyrgyzstan to Kazakhstan. There is also another request of establishing a horse-mounting statue of Kenesary placed in one of the squares in Almaty. Most important of all the requests, there is one that is to name the military school (probably in Almaty) after Kenesary Kasimov. This open letter is also significant because of the following idea: Displaying respect, states, the letter writers, after the name of Kenesary will fulfill a great duty in improving the patriotic feeling of the youth and of the people. It will, they state further, help to consolidate the strength of the newly independent state.

As it has been stated above in the article, the search for finding the most suitable path for the future of Kazakhstan is now turning towards a more nationalist inclination in the eyes of Kazakh intellectuals. According to the efforts of the Kazakh intellectuals, the youth in Kazakhstan will grow up learning the struggle of their forefathers and of their former Khans against the colonialist Russian ad-

ministration. This inspiration will especially be stronger in the memories of those future graduates from the Kazakh military school, if Kenesary's name will be given to the institution. According to the wishes of a handful of Kazakh intelligentsia, the writers, poets, correspondents, the Kazakh language should remain as the sole official language, Kazakhs should be given opportunity to restore the past wrongdoing of the previous administration, and the republic has to be protected by any outside as well as inside interference that will hinder the independence and free development. The republic of Kazakhstan is the land of a multi-ethnic society, however, it should also be remembered that the real owners of the land are the Kazakhs. The unsealable stamp of the Kazakhs should be placed eternally right from the beginning of the independent era. Any attempt to force the newly independent Kazakhstan into any kind of future commitment, economically and politically, especially of the kind that reminds the still lively memory of the Soviet experience is staunchly rejected by the Kazakh intellectuals. This group of intellectuals are the representatives of the genuine culture of the Kazakhs and they, in the Soviet period, were kept in their jobs for the sake of bringing color to the multi-ethnic culture and literature of the Soviet society. They are the Kazakh intellectuals who have not enjoyed the special privileges of being the party elite, but they were the preservers of an almost forgotten native culture. According to Oljas Suleymenov, these Kazakh intellectuals were the "village teachers" of the Soviet period that, in Oljas's description, have no awareness of the movements and ideas of the world outside the Kazakh village, *awyl*, or the town (18). However, Suleymenov is ignoring another fact that these Kazakh intellectuals are the genuine representatives of the Kazakh lot, not of the Russian or Russian speaking and Russified or at least sovietized 'marginal' group.

However, the last word is vested to the Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev, who is an authoritarian leader and who seem, at least for now, have complete command and control of the republic's multi-ethnic groups. He is also in a very critical position having an official obligation to keep all the ethnic groups content in the republic. However, in the pages of Kazakh language publications he seems to accept the description of himself as the Kazakh leader similar to that of Abilay Khan. He also is a politician that knows how to appeal to the unique national viewpoint of all the ethnic groups. When he talks to the Kazakhs, he uses the age-old proverbs of the Kazakhs and even refers to poems uttered during the time of Abilay Khan which definitely and always has a positive and supportive effect upon Kazakhs regarding any policy of Nazarbayev. In an interview appeared in the pages of *Kazakh Adebityaty*, Nazarbayev referred to a poem from the time of Abiyya which describes the strategic concerns of the then Kazakh leader in a very traditional Kazakh way, in verses (19). For Na-

narbayev, courting popular support among the Kazakhs comes with emphasizing his identification with the former Kazakh khans. Will he be another great Abilay Khan of the Kazakhs?, will he be the successor to Kenesary Kasimov?, and, will Nazarbayev be the political leader of Kazakhs to complete the unfulfilled plans of Kenesary?, are all yet to be seen in the future. Rehabilitation and gratification of the name and fame of Kenesary, as had been demanded from Nazarbayev by a number of Kazakh intellectuals, will be the first clue for the future direction of the Kazakh president. On the other hand, there is the problem of preserving the stability of the republic by appealing to the feelings of non-Kazakh groups as well. In order "to keep the non-Kazakhs happy Nazarbayev used the 40th anniversary of the Khrushchev's Virgin Lands scheme on February 25, to give a speech in the mainly Russian town of Aqmola. He spoke about the positive contribution made by the non-Kazakhs to the country." (20)

When the current Russian nationalism is "borrowing its symbols, heroes and spirit from the Russian messianic nationalism used by the Tsarist regime throughout its expansionist existence" (21), it seems a natural inclination for Kazakh intellectuals to stress the name of heroes who have voiced the national interests of the Kazakhs in the past. There are also, in the Kazakh politics, favorable and contrary currents, towards thwarting Russia's effort to reestablish the old status quo. The aim of the Kazakh intellectuals is to support the struggle to strengthen independence and sovereignty and to use these to offset the concentration of the armed forces and economic power in Russia's hands. "The establishment of widespread foreign relations, securing international protection that comes with diplomatic recognition and ending political, cultural, scientific isolation" (22) are the ideas supported by the native intellectuals as the necessary conditions for Kazakhstan stepping towards a bright future.

Economic dependency of Kazakhstan on the Russian federation is another reason for the "marginal" group to support ideas of confederation with Russia. The idea of confederation means Kazakhstan's submission to Russia politically and still more so militarily which draws parallel with the idea of the Uzbek president Islam Karimov, who reportedly said that "Uzbekistan does not see a future for itself without Russia" (23). As the so-called 'marginal' group in Kazakhstan, Karimov also emphasized Russia's role as a guarantor in preserving stability and peace in the region. Fragility of stability in the region is of concern to all the leaders in the region. However, problems of forming a nation-state and its symbols as opposed to the former communist values is another dilemma for the regional leaders. Any attempt to realize this kind of aim will be hindered by "Russian troops stationed in Central Asia and in conjunction with economic and political means of influence, they will effectively assert Russian interest" (24).

Above all these, it is necessary to understand the dilemma faced by the Kazakhs in their effort to establish their genuine national independent country. An attempt to realize this aim is bound to certain conditions to be fulfilled in the near future. According to the current year's political news, Kazakhstan's Nursultan Nazarbayev is on the move to realize one of the most important conditions in establishing the cornerstones of independent Kazakhstan. This is the transfer of the Kazakh capital from Almaty to Aqmola (meaning not white molla as it has been translated in Economic Intelligence Unit Report of 1994-1995, but white graveyard), a town in the north of Kazakhstan whose Soviet name was Tselinograd and which has only 300,000 inhabitants consisting of 46 % Russian and 23 % Kazakh (25). The most important reason of this kind of decision is to prevent ethnic Russian claims of annexing the northern part of Kazakhstan into Russia. The area once even claimed by Alexander Solzhenitsyn as Russian territory consists of Qostanay (47 % Russian, 18 % Kazakh), North Kazakhstan (62 % Russian, 19 % Kazakh), Kokshetau (40 % Russian, 30 % Kazakh), Aqmola (46 % Russian, 23 % Kazakh), Pavlodar (45 % Russian, 30 % Kazakh), and Qaragandy (53 % Russian, 19 % Kazakh), as well as East Kazakhstan (65 % Russian and 28 % Kazakh). Although "this decision blighted property prices in Almaty, infuriated the foreign community and worried reformers as to how the move would be paid for." (26) The Kazakh President asked for Turkish help in moving the Kazakh capital to Aqmola during a recent visit by Turkish President Suleyman Demirel to Kazakhstan in June 12-14, 1995. According to Turkish daily Milliyet, Nazarbayev referring to transfer of the Turkish capital from Istanbul to Ankara, has asked the Turkish high officials to give help in this vitally important move (27). If Turkey helps Kazakhstan in realizing this aim of moving the Kazakh capital to Aqmola, it would certainly help Kazakhstan in easing at least one problem of Kazakhstan in its way towards independence, that is the Russian claim of annexing the northern part of Kazakhstan into Russia, which is opposed by Kazakhs, and which scares the world public opinion that this will bring a bloody ethnic clash between the ethnic Russians and Kazakhs in this republic.

Kazakh intellectuals fully support the policies of Nazarbayev in correcting some of the difficulties to which native Kazakhs were subjected during the previous period. An Uygur writer in Kazakhstan, Ziya Samedi, has congratulated Nazarbayev after the presidential referendum of extending his term to year 2000, by wishing him the same path as the first Turkish President and the founder of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (28). This is also interesting for the fact that the first Kazakh president Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan is depicted by the Kazakh intellectuals both as Abilay Khan of the Kazakhs and as Kemal Ataturk of Turkey. However, these wishes will come true only when Nursultan Nazarbayev takes radical

measures to meet the demands of the native Kazakhs and form a balance between the demands of other ethnic groups in the republic. As Kazakh constitution effectively allows only Kazakhs to stand for presidency (29), other Kazakhs who are trying to meet the demands of non-Kazakh groups in the republic, such as the poet and writer, Oljas Suleymenov or others might be the possible future candidate to the presidency. The possibility of ethnically Kazakh but linguistically and mentally Russified presidential candidates, such as Oljas Suleymenov will definitely make the non-natives happy. Being aware of this possibility, Kazakh intellectuals and native Kazakhs are supporting Nazarbayev and placing substantial responsibility on Nazarbayev's shoulders in maintaining the sovereignty and independence of the republic.

Another issue that Kazakhstan cannot overcome solely by its own effort is to use effective means to sell its huge oil reserves to meet its economic needs. One obstacle to this is the need to change the legal status of the Caspian Sea, as an international one and the establishment of pipelines that will carry and sell the Kazakh oil and gas to the outside world. When the Turkish President Suleyman Demirel visited Kazakhstan, the Kazakh President has reportedly asked Turkish help on the international arena to support the Kazakh case in defining Caspia not as a lake which is so considered by other nations that have shores to the Caspia but as a sea to which international naval laws and principles can be applied (30).

It is not only mere curiosity but a genuine wish of all freedom loving, democratic countries of the world to see Kazakhstan as a democratic, free member of the world community of nations. However, the current uncertainties and emerging balance of power in the region, makes many hesitant in placing too much hope on the future of this newly independent republic.

Foot Notes:

1. Martha Brill Olcott, *The Kazakhs*, Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 1987, p. 65 and 67.
2. Economic Intelligence Unit-Country Report-First Quarter 1994, pp. 40-52.
3. Uwe Halbach/Heinrich Tiller, "Russia and its Southern Flank", *Aussen Politik*, 11/94, pp. 156-165.
4. Kabdesh Jumadilov, "Bolashaqty Boljaganda", *Kazak Adebityaty*, No. 13, 1 April 1994, p. 3.
5. Aytan Nusipqan, "Odaqqa Barar Joldyng Oiy-Shunqyry Kop", *Kazak Adebityaty*, No. 32-33, 19 August 1994, p. 3.
6. Ibid.
7. Uwe Halbach and Heinrich Tiller, *Ibid*, p. 157.
8. Jumadilov's idea is supported by Western observers as well. *EIU Country Risk Service 1st Quarter 1995*, p. 3 states the following:
Kazakhstan's main problem will be the coming presidential elections in Russia. Kazakhstan needs a candidate who will continue present Russian policy to win. The most likely winner until now, and the best Russian president from Kazakhstan's point of view, has been Boris Yeltsin. However, his increasingly erratic behaviour, as shown by his bun-

gled reshuffle and then the Chechenya operation, may have ruined his chances. The only other moderate candidate planning to stand is the prime minister, Viktor Chernomyrdin. The election of former Russian Vice-President and putschist Aleksandr Rutskoi or the neo-fascist Vladimir Zhirinovskiy would be disastrous. Both would end democracy in Russia and scare away foreign investors. In addition, they would pressure Kazakhstan to concede more rights to the Russian minority.

9. Kabdesh Jumadilov, *Ibid*.
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11. Open Letter to Oljas Suleymenov, poet, President of the 'People Congress' Party", *Kazak Adebityaty*, No. 4, 28 January, 1994, p. 2.
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19. "Elding jayı meni qatty mazalaydy," *Kazak Adebityaty*, no. 37, 16 September, 1994, pp. 2-3.
Bilay barsang Kokang bar, salmaq saylp qoqangdar,
Bilay barsang Qalmaq bar, kushingdi eppen almaq bar,
Bilay barsang Kitay bar, japyragyngdy butay bar,
Bilay barsang Oris bar, bala berseng qonis bar.
This poem refers to the strategic concerns of the Kazakh state during the time of Khan Abilay, which was surrendered by the Khanate of Khokand in the south, by the Mongols in the east, by the Chinese in the further south-east, and by Russia in the north and west, of which all of these should be handled with great caution.
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28. Ziya Sarmedi, "Halkynga Qydyr, Elinge Qyzyr Bol", *Kazak Adebityaty*, No. 10, 2 June 1995, p. 1.
29. The Economist Intelligence Unit, *Country Risk Service*, 1st Quarter 1995, p. 3.
30. Please see *Milliyet*, *Ibid*. Still another demand put forward by the Kazakh President to the visiting Turkish delegation on June 12-14 was Turkish help in giving credit to Kazakhstan in improving Kazakh agriculture.

Central Asia: The US Interest-perception and its Security Policies

Abdul SHAKOOR

Never in the history so much has happened in such a short period of time and in such a peaceful manner. The disintegration of Soviet Union and the consequent emergence of the Central Asian States (CAS) has even caught the US policy-makers unaware. Perhaps one of the biggest foreign policy problems for the US today is to deal with the newly liberated CAS. The problem is biggest in the sense because neither the US academicians and policy-makers know much about the region nor have the US any past experience of interaction to deal with the region. As Leslie Gelb in the New York times has commented that:

Washington's Soviet experts were mainly experts on Moscow and, with the break-up of the Soviet Union, they have been adrift (1).

It has also been pointed out by an anthropologist, William Beeman as:

Years of neglect have left the United States starved for knowledgeable regional specialists. Only one institution - Indiana University - currently offers courses on the region as part of a regular curriculum of study (2).

It becomes apparent that lack of in depth knowledge and having no experience at all to deal with the region may create complications for the US. One such example is related to the much exaggerated furor over the issue of fundamentalism. The US academicians and policy-makers are making a strategic blunder by taking "Sufism" as another form of Islamic fundamentalism or extremism. This may become a source of alienation and confrontation among the Central Asian nations and the US. Hence the prime problem for the US is to define its interests and formulate policies viz-a-viz the CAS.

The present geo-political scenario differs sharply from that of an post-1945 era when the US readily filled the power vacuum created by the withdrawal of Britain from its colonial world. One fundamental contrasting feature is that Russia, unlike that of Britain, does not want itself to be replaced completely by the US, even though there is a much wider range of cooperation between the two. Russia,

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despite with its severe domestic political crises wants to retain its very influence over the whole region known as Former Soviet Union (FSU), of which Central Asia is the inalienable and strategic component.

Moreover, the situation also vary from that of a post World War-II era in terms of the numbers of actors involved in the "revisited great game". Along with the Russia, the US has not only to face China - a strong inter regional power - highly conscious of the Western and the US designs and moves towards the region but also has to face the number of assertive actors like Iran, Turkey and Pakistan.

Within this framework for the US policy-making, the structure of the paper is devised to look at the following perspectives:

- I. Where does the US stand in the region?
- II. How does the US elite tend to visualize or define its interests?
- III. What are the US policies to secure these interest?

I. The US Standings in the Region

With the Soviet Union's defeat in the cold war and its subsequent disintegration, the United States is now able for the first time to inject its political presence in the new post-Soviet republics of Eurasia - all the way to the frontiers of China as well as to dominate the Persian Gulf region on the southern fringes of Eurasia (3). Now given the existing regional geo-political vacuum, the case in a point is to fill a geo-strategic void how will the US inject its political presence in the newly liberated Eurasian States?

As regards the Eastern European States - most of them have been offered North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) umbrella and the remaining are getting significant help from the West - Western European Union (WEU) and Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) because of having same religio-cultural orientation.

On the Asian side, that is, with respect to the CAS, America has to face three states on the southern rim of the CAS - Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. To get penetration into the CAS, America has to operate via media, either or in combination with these three states. Iran, obviously, is a nonentity for the US. Turkey and Pakistan are the two states which can be instrumental for the US. Again the extra-ordinary rise or the possible establishment of even a secular Pan-Turkic region (which has such potential because of ethnic, religious and linguistic proximity) is not acceptable either to the European Community (EC), the US or Russia. This leaves out Pakistan, once the most allied of allies to play a crucial and instrumental role for the US. This time, again, because of its geo-political centrality.

Yet there is another option for the US, that is, Russia with whom

America is enjoying greater cooperation and had signed sometimes back a "partnership for peace" agreement. This aspect will be dealt with later on in this paper. However any such US linkage or commitment with the region is, primarily, dependent of its intensity of interests-perception. The question arises how does the US visualize its interests in Central Asia. This leads us to the study of the phenomenon of interest-perception.

II. The US Interests-Perception

Categorically speaking, the US has following interests in the Central Asian region:

- a) Containment of Fundamentalism.
- b) Military-Strategic Interests.
- c) Containment of Iran.
- d) Economic and Commercial Interests.

a) Containment of Fundamentalism:

The spread of Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia is not only a popular bogey, but a conceived real threat in the Western media especially after the Tajik civil war began. The US Secretary of State, James Baker, publicly warned Central Asian leaders to stay clear of radical Islam and the influence of Iran (4).

In the words of a leading American strategic analyst, the horizon of this threat-perception emerging from the phenomenon of so-called fundamentalism is:

For Russia and America the geo-political vacuum may become a dangerous whirlpool. The political awakening of Islam is generating not only a collision with residual Russian imperialism in the north, but, in time, is also likely to contest American domination in the South. He further adds that the geographical perimeter of this whirlpool may extends from Adriatic sea next to the Balkans all the way to the border of the Chinese Xinkiang province. From south to north, this border loops around the Persian Gulf, embracing parts of the Middle East, then Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan in the South, all of Central Asia along Russian-Kazakh frontier to the north, and all the way along the Russian-Ukrainian border (5).

Of course, it is a distant threat-perception. The author is highlighting the significance of in-time curbing of ever such potential Islamic resurgence.

b) Military-Strategic Interests:

The proliferation of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction is a reality for the Americans as they are highly determined

to check any such possible proliferation. CIA chief James Woolsey told a senate committee, "Non proliferation poses one of the most complex challenges the intelligence community will face for the remainder of the century." (6)

The problems raised by Kazakhstan's acquisition of nuclear weapons, the fourth largest nuclear power in the world, dominate American and the Western strategists. Kazakhstan inherited 104 SS-18 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with a total of 1,400 warheads. Each ICBM can travel up to 11,200 kilometers and carries 10 independently targeted warheads, each of which is equivalent to half a million tons of TNT (7). The point to be noted is that Kazakhstan has become the first ever Muslim state who can strike directly at the heart-lands of the West. That is why Kazakhstan has become a source of grave concern for the US whose diplomats have been visiting frequently Alma Ata after the failed coup of August 1991.

Sometimes back rumours abounded in the western press that Kazakhstan has sold an SS-18 to Iran and that it is about to provide Teheran with uranium. Speculative media reports in 1992, also, spoke of Tajikistan selling enriched uranium to potential Third World customers at the rate of \$ 100,000 a kilogram. The nuclear card became a political leverage for Ukraine and Kazakhstan, as both has tried to extract more concessions from Russia and greater financial aid from the USA (8).

However, the hectic diplomacy of the US has resulted in the signing up of the treaty in May 1992, when the President of Kazakhstan agreed to sign the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START-I) which would eventually allow the elimination of one third of Soviet and the US nuclear weapons (9). The importance attached to Kazakhstan's possession of weapon could well be judged from the treaty provision that the very first of these missiles to be eliminated would be the SS-18s, the very missile on Kazakh soil (10). This may be the convergence of the American and Russian interests and hence of the security policies.

c) Containment of Iran:

Ever since the fall of the Shah, Iran has become the chief opponent of the US in this region. In the words of former advisor of American National Security Council, Zbigniew Brzezinski:

Iran is clearly an aspirant to regional hegemony and it is prepared to outwit the US. It has an imperial tradition and possesses both the religious and the nationalist motivation to contest both the American and the Russian presence in the area. With both religion and motivation

conspiring an alien regional hegemony, the current American supremacy in the Middle East is built quite literally on sand. A good illustration of the US's limitation of regional control is provided by the fact that even the extraordinary one-sided military outcome of the Gulf war of 1991 did not yield equally commensurate political results: Saddam Hussain's regime remained in power, and both the Shiite and Kurd revolts - despite American encouragement of them were suppressed (11).

Moreover, a total destruction of Iraq in a Gulf War would have led to the emergence of Iran as a decisive regional leader which for obvious reasons America did not want.

d) Economic and Commercial Interests:

Although US officials regard economic interests in Central Asia as private sector interests (12) but given the huge energy potential this may turn into an official one - or as an alternate to the Middle Eastern oil resources in a future. These days American investors and businessmen are very active in evaluating the region's oil and gas potential. Shafiqul Islam, an Economist, in his recent article says, "The natural resources that has attracted the attentions of Americans, Japanese and other foreign investors to Central Asia is energy - oil and natural gas." (13) He also identified that the United States, major European countries, Japan, China and South Korea are on their way to becoming the region's major trading partners and investors (14).

In an overall analysis the nature of American interests may be concluded in the words of a recent study group's report on Central Asia published by the US Institute of Peace, Washington D.C, which is as under:

The only threat in former Soviet Central Asia to have evoked US interest since the dissolution of the USSR seems to come from some combination of Iran, Islamic fundamentalism, instability and the presence of a nuclear capability. Turkey, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are contending for the position of primary American or Western surrogate in containing this threat, with Egypt, India and Israel vying for similar but lesser roles (15).

Given the nature of the US strategic interests the point is how would these interests be better served? What are the US policies to attain these very interests? What would be the means to achieve these ends? To answer these inter-related questions, one has to analyze the past and the present trend of the US security policies viz-a-viz Central Asia.

Security Policies:

The US can have two central means of establishing security links

with Central Asia:

- 1) By extending hands to states having geographical proximity with Central Asian states like Pakistan, Turkey and Russia;
- 2) Or, through the International institutions like United Nations (UN), International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), CSCE, WEU and NATO.

1. a) Via Pakistan

At the declaratory level America is not supporting Pakistan because of the masses anti-American sentiments. It also can not present Pakistan for the Central Asia as a model state. More so, the US has severe contentions with Pakistan over its nuclear programme and "fundamentalism". Nevertheless, despite of this conflictual relationship the US has not totally ignored Pakistan. Recent massive foreign investment in the energy sector, finances from International Finance Commission (IFC) and Aid-Consortium, IMF's giving health certificate to Pakistan and the development of Mekran Coast should be viewed in this context.

Another reason for America's reluctance to rely on Pakistan as a credible instrument of securing interests is its domestic political instability and regime vulnerability.

b) Via Turkey

In the beginning, the West pushed Turkey to play a modernizing and moderate role in Central Asia. In February 1992, the NATO Chief, Manfred Woerner, said in Moscow that Islamic fundamentalists were becoming increasingly strong in the Muslim Republics and that this did not conform to NATO interests. NATO looked to Turkey to redress the balance (16). Bush pointed to Turkey as the model of a democratic, secular state which could be emulated by Central Asia. For that he referred to Turkey as, "In a region of changing tides, Turkey endures as a beacon of stability." (17)

Nevertheless, Turkey's activities are supported by the members states of the European community and the US to an extent. Setting relations too close may also antagonize Russia, which may feel vulnerable. For instance,

Turkey is bogged down in the conflict that has erupted in its vicinity between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh, and has also realized that Russia is determined to assert its paramount role in Central Asia (18).

Besides developing good relations with Pakistan and portraying Turkey as a model state for the CAS, Israel's efforts should also be viewed within the context of containing Iran as the US and Israel are

keen to offset Iranian influence (19).

On the other hand, India is also trying hard to en cash upon the idea of Islamic fundamentalism by which it can develop cordial relations with the US, Russia and Israel (20).

c) Via Russia

As earlier it has been pointed out that the whole and sole reliance on Turkey could also lead to the emergence of Pan-Turkic region. Even if it is a secular one, it is not either in the interest of the US, EC and Russia. Of late, one can find a shift in Washington's policy towards Central Asia. Now the US is having a greater tilt towards Moscow for settling affairs in the Central Asia by allocating Russia paramount role in the region.

Last year President Yeltsin and President Clinton signed a treaty which attributed Russia the role of gendarme over the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) (21). President Clinton in front of the world, in his speech "on the situation of the Nation" confirmed the right to intervene attributed to Russia (22). Thus the American foreign policy package viz-a-viz Central Asia, or for that matter with Russia, consisted of, on the one hand, forming an alliance with the West through disarmament and a global collective security system and, on the other, backing collective security system (CIS) with Russia's dominant role. The US is extending recognition to Russia for the exercise of sheer force internationally as last winter in Moscow, President Clinton acknowledged that Russia would be involved - militarily - with its neighbours "just like the United States has been involved in the last several years in Panama and Grenada near our area." (24)

2. IMF's Role

The US interests and policies are much reflected in the IMF's and the World Bank's role viz-a-viz the CAS. These international lending agencies are rapidly setting up offices in the CAS as these states have started negotiations for loans, credit and aid. For instance, in 1992 IMF sanctioned Kazakhstan \$ 1.2 billion loan spread over 3 years which is a heavy investment for a small population. Also, in May 1993 the IBRD approved a \$ 60 million for Kyrgystan (25). This is not only a clear indication of the West's interests in the region but also reflects the emergence of their political clout in the economies of CAS.

For instance, IMF which earlier had suggested for the creation of ruble zone, recently has abandoned its advice to CAS to stay within the ruble zone and it is now encouraging the republics to establish their own currencies as the first step towards gaining IMF's financial

support. Thus it was a shock for the remaining CAS, when Kyrgyzstan abandoned the ruble zone and set-up its own currency. Tension rose to such an extent that President Karimov had ordered Uzbek-Kyrgyz's common border to be closed and trade relations to be cut off. While Kyrgyzstan, on the other hand, received a credit of \$ 60 million from World Bank, \$ 100 million from Washington in aid, % 60 million and \$ 10 million pledge from Japan and Switzerland respectively, this may be considered as the West's deliberate efforts to undermine the Central Asian unity (26).

However, in the overall analysis for the US, Russia stands, by and large, the main instrument of securing its interests. So without dealing in detail with the role of Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey, the paper is more from the perspective of upon the Russian-US relations in the region - which is inevitable and has tremendous imperatives for the region.

As discussed earlier, at this juncture there seems to be a greater convergence and harmony in the US-Russian policies because of the perception of interests and benefits sharing. This proposition is backed by the strong evidence of convergence of the US-Russian interests and by the level of cooperation both states are extending to each other. Following are the compelling factors for their enhanced and extended level of cooperation:

First is security, which stood as the prime factor for the present cooperation of both states at the strategic level. The Christian-oriented governments of the US and Russia are hyper-sensitive and extremely susceptible to the threats of Islamic fundamentalism. Events in Tajikistan, Armenia-Azerbaijan and Chenchenia are disturbing them equally.

Secondly, both the states are equally critical of nuclear weapons that Kazakhstan has inherited from the Former Soviet Union. This aspects has been discussed earlier in this paper.

Thirdly, these states do not want to see the CAS developing their connections with the Islamic countries like Iran, Turkey and Pakistan. In fact the US and Russia were surprised by the pace of the CAS establishing diplomatic relations with Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Arab and the western states. Both the states are fearful of ECO and their programme of creating common market (27).

Last but not the least, is to note that Russia and the US did not want the CAS to develop their transportation routes through their southern neighbours, that is through Pakistan and Iran which can provide the CAS with shortest trade routes to world markets and vice versa (28).

Viz-a-viz transport, both states ensuring that Russia has unrestricted

access to rail links between Europe and Asia, at non-extortionate price, and trying to ensure that as much as possible trade continues to flow between Europe, the Middle East and the Far East via Russia (29).

This convergence of interests and policies of both states made Russia to show its renewed assertion in the CAS. For instance President Yeltsin said at the CIS summit, "We cannot allow situation where a Central Asian block led by the Kazakhstan goes off on its own." (30) Worth mentioning are the remarks of the Russian Foreign Minister, Andrei Kozyrev who said, "Russia will shed its Asiatic baggage and will also pull Central Asia in the direction of the civilized western world." (31)

The intention and determination on the part of Russia to secure Central Asia as their sphere of influence became quite conspicuous. In July 1993, Muslim republics were served by a virtual ultimatum from Russia's First Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Shokhnin that they must decide between joining an economic union planned by the three CIS (Russia, Belarus and Ukraine) and the ECO anchored by Pakistan, Iran and Turkey (32).

Russia also sensed that its interests would be better served if it assumes the international responsibility thrust on it by virtue of being a nuclear power and a member of the UN Security Council (33). Therefore, President Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Kozyrev had spoken even at the UN General Assembly about the right of Moscow to intervene in the former Soviet republics. There has also been a request by Russia to provide its troops stationed in these territories the status of U.N. peacekeepers (34).

While at the same time, Russia is committed to outdo any intervention on the part of external powers such as the US or Europe or the regional powers - Iran, Turkey and Pakistan. On August of previous year, the Russian foreign ministry denied suggestions that the United States would play a significant role in quelling conflicts in the ex-Soviet Union and asserted a special Russian interest in doing so (35). Regarding Europe's role, Russia has sometimes back vetoed proposals that peace-keeping operation be multilateral or that the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) be given at least a role in mediating political settlement between combatants. However, at the same time, Russia arrogantly insisted that the CSCE finance Russia's solo military operations in the former republics... (36)

Russia's hegemonic intentions are so far fully backed by the US. Such a perceived role of Russia viz-a-viz the Central Asia is not only backed by the US but also by the West, the traditional-cum-historical rival of Russia Shirin Hunter in the "World & I" of September, 1994 has opined that:

Many Western observers have viewed Russian hegemony as not only the lesser evil but perhaps a benefit because of its stability impact and its containment of fundamentalism. Western policies, notably excessive concern over Islamic fundamentalism and the absolute priority given to Russia in overall Western strategy, have played important roles in the destiny of regional states. Most significantly, Western policies have facilitated the return of (sic: legitimized) Russian hegemony (37).

Recent renewed Russian assertion is backed by the West and the US unanimously, primarily, because of two reasons: First is the already explained phenomenon of convergence of the interests of the US and Russia. While second emanates from the Western fear that any political and territorial instability in Russia may facilitate either the rise of ultra-nationalists like Zhironowsky or the rise Islamic fundamentalists (38). Either of the case is not acceptable to the US and the West.

It is perhaps because of the strong physical presence and the political clout which Russia has in Central Asia, that America still wants to see Russia playing the decisive or hegemonic role in the Central Asia. However this is not clear whether or not the US wants this on a long-term basis. It may be for the time being, or just up to the time when the America's or the Western penetration matures enough to strike a final blow at Russia.

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Georgia and Armenia Troubled Independence

Paul B. HENZE

Introduction:

There were many reasons why Armenia and Georgia should have been among the most successful post-Soviet states. Both are inhabited by vigorous peoples with a longer history than any other components of the Soviet/Russian empire. Both peoples have high rates of literacy and high standards of education. Both countries had experience of independence at the end of World War I and, therefore, traditions of modern statehood on which to base a political, economic, and cultural revival. Both peoples have a reputation for intelligence, industriousness, and inventiveness. Both were known for skill in finding ways around some of the more onerous features of the communist system. The Soviet system left both with an economic base that --with reform-- offered fair prospects for transformation to a more open system. These countries are well situated geographically, between Europe and the Middle East, with direct access to the Black Sea in the case of Georgia, practical routes to the sea through Turkey for Armenia, and access through Azerbaijan to the Caspian and Asia beyond for both.

None of these advantages has saved these two countries from a troubled --indeed, often stormy-- four years of independence. They have gained little from the advantages under which they became independent. Was this inevitable? Their advantages were offset by disadvantages. Seventy years of Soviet rule left a legacy of distortion and corruption which produced severe social strains and contradictions. The development of their infrastructures and economies did not reflect the priorities of the peoples themselves. Populations lacked time to train themselves in responsible self-administration and exercise of realistic political judgment. All these disabilities were compounded by the circumstances under which both countries moved toward independence.

Among all Caucasians there is a widespread conviction --and some evidence to support it-- that Soviet officials deliberately fomented strain and strife between Caucasian peoples with the aim of

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prolonging Moscow's hegemony and undermining their capacity to manage their own affairs. Since independence, a significant record of Russian interference in the affairs of both Georgia and Armenia has accumulated. In part Russian involvement was inevitable. Russia has a legitimate interest in stability and progress in these countries, but it can be questioned whether Russian intervention has always had the effect -- or even the aim-- of advancing stability or encouraging progress. Aspects of Russian policy will be discussed at greater length in the sections which follow.

In their fourth year of independence both Georgia and Armenia still carry a heavy burden resulting from the crises, misjudgments, and misfortunes that have bedeviled them. Can the vicious circles of political turbulence, economic decline, and troubled foreign relations be broken? What are the lessons of their experience to date? What have they learned from their misfortunes?

This brief essay will examine some of the problems of the recent past, consider some of the deeper historical and geopolitical factors that affect these two countries, and attempt to chart a few hopeful possibilities for the future.

Georgia's Bad Start:

The if's of history are always hard to calculate, but it seems likely that if Georgia had had a leader with the skill of Levon Ter Petrosian, its independence might have developed far more positively. Zviad Gamsakhurdia was even more a disaster for Georgia than he was for himself. The most serious problems that Georgia still has to grapple with were all exacerbated by Gamsakhurdia. His uncompromising approach to the problems of Abkhazia and South Ossetia made reasonable solutions impossible. His extremism gave moderates among the Abkhaz and the Ossetes no alternative but to fall in behind their own extremists. Hundreds of thousands of people have been uprooted as a result. His provocative anti-Russian attitude and his suspicions of Russian plots against him became self-fulfilling prophecies. Russian conservatives and neo-imperialists concluded that undermining Gamsakhurdia --and Georgia itself-- was fair game.

Gamsakhurdia showed none of the skill a successful politician must periodically exercise: ability to compromise and engage in positive consensus-building. In a period of a few short months he alienated almost all the Georgian political groups that he might have drawn into cooperation. Worst of all, while concentrating on political issues, Gamsakhurdia neglected economic and social reform. Georgia

lost valuable time which need not have been lost as the economy deteriorated. Georgia has only now begun to make up these lost opportunities. By the time Gamsakhurdia fled his bunker and the wreckage around it at the end of 1992, power in Georgia had fallen into the hands of warlords.

Shevardnadze and Abkhazia:

By the time Shevardnadze was persuaded to return to Tbilisi to try to fill the political vacuum, Georgia had fallen into a condition comparable to its situation in the late 18th century. There was no Georgian then to try to pull things together. Russia became protector and then master, achieving an aim some Russians had been pursuing every since the end of the 16th century. Russia was too weak and confused to become Georgia's protector in 1992, even if any significant number of Georgians could have contemplated that solution. A Georgian had to be persuaded to take on the job.

No leader of an ex-Soviet state has taken on a greater challenge than Shevardnadze did when he returned in March 1992. Inevitably, he carried as baggage with him the pluses and minuses of long previous experience. His communist past had been in part atoned for by his timely break with Gorbachev. He gained a substantial international standing by doing so. His international stature has served Georgia well by ensuring that the country has gained attention from other world leaders which, without Shevardnadze, it would not have had.

But Shevardnadze was detested by conservative neo-imperialists in Russia. They regarded him as one of the prime wreckers of the Soviet Union. Though he was able to work out a compromise on South Ossetia where a precarious peace under *de facto* Russian occupation has been maintained ever since, the Abkhaz problem proved impossible to manage. Abkhaz separatists, supplied and encouraged by conservatives. Russian military leaders and neo-communist imperialists, persisted in their efforts to gain control of this rich and attractive region. Shevardnadze's substantial abilities to compromise and negotiate with the Abkhaz were continually frustrated by the military actions of Georgian warlords over whom he had minimal influence and no control. The well-meaning efforts of various international bodies to mediate the Abkhaz situation delayed the de-nouement of the crisis but came to nought because the pro-Russian Abkhaz leadership, confident of Russian conservative support and active military assistance, was determined not to compromise on

their aspiration for independence under Russian protection. Yeltsin looked the other way.

Gamsakhurdia came back onto the scene from Chechen exile and confused the situation further for a while, but in the end perished. Shevardnadze, went to fight and came close to perishing himself. He was saved by Russian intervention but had to pay a heavy price: joining the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) (which Georgia had up until then consistently refused and for which there was no popular enthusiasm) and accepting Russian military bases. Close to three hundred thousand (mostly) Georgians, half the population of Abkhazia, became refugees.

The Abkhaz leaders gained a Pyrrhic victory, for Abkhazia, which should be one of the most prosperous parts of the entire ex-Soviet Union, is a half-depopulated disaster area. Even a portion of the Abkhaz who lived there, who constituted only 17 % of the total in 1989, has fled, leaving a mixture of Armenians, Greeks, North Caucasians, Russians, and a few Georgians in addition to the Abkhaz who have stayed. This is not enough to man the economy, let alone reconstruct the infrastructure of the area. There is little evidence that Russia, with all the demands on its budget, including the demands of the Chechen misadventure, can afford to invest much in rebuilding Abkhazia.

Improvement in Georgia:

In the wake of the Abkhaz disaster Georgia has begun to experience a greater degree of political and economic stability than it has had since independence. That is not to say that much progress has been made or that the country is in any respect actually stable. Politics remains chaotic but democratic forms have been maintained. Parliament meets and debates legislation. Parties engage in political dialogue. So does a relatively free press. There is some degree of intellectual life. Ajaria continues to flourish economically and there are other islands of relative quiet and a modest degree of economic order in the country. Informal trade has expanded substantially. Two new border crossings have been opened with Turkey. Efforts are being made to introduce a currency that may have some chance of maintaining its value. The U.S. dollar, with the Russian ruble as a poor second, serve as the effective medium of exchange. There are plans to introduce a new Georgian currency, the Lari, in 1995.

Abkhazia is still an extremely rancorous issue in Georgia. A task force led by two senior Georgian political figures attempted to set out to "liberate" Abkhazia in early January. It was halted by Georgian se-

curity authorities. The effort is indicative of the acute frustration many Georgians still feel over Abkhazia, for they are reminded constantly of the acute refugee problem on which very little progress has been made. Shevardnadze sensibly judges that there is no chance of improving the situation through renewed fighting. He favors continued pressure on the Russians to negotiate and believes—perhaps hopes is a better word—that the predicament the Russians face in Chechnya improves prospects for some degree of shift in Russian attitudes toward Abkhazia. The most serious question is: Do Russian leaders in Moscow have enough cohesion or control over their military forces and independently operating political elements to devise and implement a workable Abkhaz solution? Russian inability since independence to develop an effective policy for dealing with the North Caucasus gives little reason for optimism.

The Abkhaz separatist leaders have achieved less than they hoped, for Russia has at least demonstrated that it will not officially go against the principle of inviolability of borders given international recognition at the time of the Soviet collapse. Under pressure from Moscow Abkhaz leaders appear to have agreed to negotiations about a federal arrangement between an autonomous Abkhazia and sovereign Georgia. They are likely to go on for an indefinite period and will at least discourage resumption of military action. Meanwhile economic reality may force Abkhaz leaders to permit return of Georgian refugees and restoration of economic relationships.

Moscow has a pragmatic interest in constructive relations with Shevardnadze's Georgia now that she has forced him to acquiesce in CIS membership, Russian bases, and significant Russian participation in control of the Turkish border. Moscow also has an interest in sufficient stability in Georgia to permit dependable transit to Armenia and in transit traffic from Turkey through Georgia to Russia itself which is of considerable economic importance. For reasons that are understandable, though deplorable, Shevardnadze has been led, as a result of his experience with Abkhazia, to endorse the Russian attempt to bring Chechnya to heel by military means. Recent public opinion polls, however, reveal considerable sympathy for the Chechens among Georgians.

The oil pipeline issue is complex. Georgia has little oil itself (though efforts to develop production show some promise) but has oil transport and storage facilities that could be renovated and expanded to facilitate transit from Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan as well as to provide Georgia and Armenia with dependable supplies of both petroleum and natural gas. Oil could be

loaded to tankers in Batumi or a pipeline could be extended into Turkey to connect to those to the Mediterranean. Russia's attitude is not clear. There are competing interests, attitudes and aims. The oil issue will undoubtedly get more serious attention in the months ahead.

Armenia's Tragic Beginning --Karabakh Above All!

Armenia had --and has-- an advantage Georgia lacks. While Georgians have never been an emigrating people and the small Georgian diaspora can give the homeland only meager support, Armenia has an enormous diaspora, much of it commanding substantial wealth as well as political influence. The willingness of Armenians abroad to support the newly independent republic gave it the possibility of rapid economic expansion to a level of prosperity no other ex-Soviet republic could have attained so soon. Almost three years before independence the Armenian diaspora joined many international organizations and friendly countries in sending aid to remedy the damage of the disastrous earthquake of 1988. Armenia has profited from substantial material aid from Armenians abroad since it became independent. Unfortunately, the existence of a large Armenian diaspora has been as harmful as it has been helpful and the effect of much of the financial support the Armenian diaspora has provided has been squandered.

No modern people has cultivated a psychology of victimization as assiduously as Armenians have. During the final decades of the Soviet period, Moscow discreetly encouraged steadily mounting Armenian agitation against Turkey for the disasters Armenians in the Ottoman Empire experienced from the end of the 19th century through World War I. Terrorism against Turks by clandestine Armenian exile organizations exacerbate relations with Turkey to the point where rational dialogue became impossible. Some Armenians in the diaspora were often equivocal about terrorism, but the majority who did not support it were nevertheless energetic in their efforts to dramatize and publicize Armenia as a unique Christian martyr nation whose grievances required not only international recognition but compensation and/or rectification. All this fed into the intense upwelling of nationalism that occurred when Armenia became independent in 1991. Armenians from the diaspora rushed to play a role in the life and politics of the independent republic and contributed massively to the spread of unrealistic expectations about the country's prospects and poor judgments about its priorities.

During the late 1980s Nagorno Karabakh developed into a major

region of contention between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Moscow's interventions, whether they were in part designed to exacerbate matters or unintentionally had this effect, did not help. The Armenian Karabakh Committee, from which Ter Petrosian emerged as a major leader, helped create a climate where a massive turn to violence in the territory became inevitable. Independent Armenia and independent Azerbaijan inherited a war being fought by increasingly rabid and uncompromising partisans that neither weak government could control. By 1992 the Armenians had gained a clear upper hand over the less well prepared and politically less well organized Azeris. The fiction that the war was being waged by Armenians in Karabakh with Armenia itself only an onlooker was transparent. Armenians from the diaspora abetted intensification of the Karabakh conflict and played a major role in extending Armenia's gains deep into Azerbaijan, compounding the already serious refugee problem.

One of the most serious consequences of Armenian persistence in supporting a military solution of the Karabakh problem has been that it has prevented rational development of Armenian relations with Turkey. Karabakh itself was problem enough, but some extreme elements in the Armenian diaspora compounded the situation by advocating pursuit of demands on Turkey for financial and territorial compensation. Armenian support for Kurdish extremists --at times quite blatant, especially abroad-- also contributed to exacerbation of relations with Turkey. Those who advocated and took these actions appeared oblivious to value to independent Armenia of land and air corridors through Turkey for contact with the outer world as well as the gains that could come from normal commercial relations.

The course of Karabakh developments is too well known to require repetition here. The effect of the war and the tension it has caused has left Armenia itself crippled. One of the most serious consequences of Armenia's situation, very little publicized, has been massive emigration. As much as a quarter of the small population may have left. During the winter of 1994-95 the Russian Embassy in Yerevan continued to be the scene of daily lines of Armenians applying for Russian citizenship and emigration to Russia. Sizable numbers have continued to find their way to other destinations abroad.

Evolution toward Realism in Armenia:

Armenian domestic politics have been even more turbulent than Georgia's, with continual parliamentary commotion, accusations of corruption and treason, assassinations, and other forms of violence.

Ter Petrosian's once warm support has been drastically eroded, but Ter Petrosian himself has held firm against his critics and shown continual evidence of learning the hard lessons of experience. In this he has been the exact opposite of Gamsakhurdia in Georgia. Pro-Russian feeling has always been a strong undercurrent in Armenia -far more so than in Georgia. Ter Petrosian's willingness to take steps to maintain warm relations with Moscow, including provision of military facilities, has therefore provoked little opposition or embarrassment. Ter Petrosian's approach to the election of a new Catholicos of the Armenian Apostolic Church has been skillful.

During the past year Ter Petrosian has made consistent efforts to free himself from the influence of Karabakh extremists. He has supported a serious truce in the fighting against Azerbaijan and shown a readiness to begin exploring the possibility of a permanent settlement of the issue, however far away it may be. He has shown continually less readiness to be manipulated by diaspora extremists to the point of bannig the Dashnak party at the end of 1994 and taking measures against politically active Armenians holding foreign citizenship. Most significant of all has been Ter Petrosian's increased willingness to consider moving away from toleration of provocations against Turkey and taking concrete steps toward normalizing relations. This has led to an agreement now in progress for opening an air corridor over Turkish territory to Armenia. A logical next step would be opening the border and a land transport route to Trabzon.

Georgia and Armenia, like their Transcaucasian neighbor Azerbaijan, are small countries situated in a volatile part of the world. They have a long history of relations with their three most powerful neighbors: Russia, Turkey, and Iran. These relations have always to some extent been troubled. They have not yet settled into completely comfortable and predictable patterns. Some aspects of these relations have already been discussed. Let us take a further look at the stance of each of the three regional powers with some consideration of how it could to develop in the future.

Russia and the Caucasus:

Russia's active interest in the Caucasus extends back at least three centuries. Russia's campaigns to consolidate control of the entire Caucasus during the 19th century left a legacy in Russian history and literature comparable to British attitudes toward the India-but with an important difference. While Englishmen no longer aspire to predominant strategic influence in the Indian subcontinent, large num-

bers of Russians retain a sense of entitlement to political and strategic interest in the entire Caucasus. The fact that the North Caucasus remains a still illdigested port of the Russian Federation reinforces these attitudes. Russia's sensitivity about the Caucasus is compounded by resentment of the desires of Turkey and Iran to expand relations with countries with which they have an even longer historical link than Russia has.

There are many cross-currents in this situation. Rising nationalism in Russia fuels worries among Georgians about possible ultimate Russian desires to reassert political predominance. The aspirations of Russian neo-imperialists, however, are not matched by military capability or economic strength. The poor performance of the Russian armed forces in Chechnya arouses concern about Russia itself becoming a source of increasing instability. Georgian warlords have equipped their forces with arms and supplies acquired through illicit sales by Russian officers and soldiers. Russian border controls do not necessarily help Georgia and Armenia deal with smuggling or arms and drug traffic. Russia and Armenia need trade with Russia, but Georgia, at least, is already to a great extent oriented toward informal trade with Turkey. The same is likely to occur with Armenia if and when more normal relations with Turkey are established.

All that can be said with assurance at the present is that Russia's relations with Georgia and Armenia will continue to be subject to many uncertainties, more suspicions and sensitivities in the case of Georgia, fewer probably in the case of Armenia. And Russian efforts to manipulate internal politics in either country -whether from Moscow or locally initiated- cause strong reaction. Conditions in the North Caucasus will continue to be a major concern for Georgia, for ferment there is always likely to spill over the crest of the Caucasus and affect Georgia in undesirable ways. North Caucasian political assertiveness and ferment are a constant factor in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Turkey and the Caucasus:

The Seljuks came into Anatolia through the Caucasus more than 900 years ago. Turkic connections with the Caucasus extend even farther into the past. Until recent years Turkey's last active involvement in the Caucasus was during World War I and the outcome was negative. Ataturk's policy of rigid avoidance of irredentism or foreign adventurism guided Turkish policy until 1990. The large Caucasian-derived components of the Turkish population, including political

refugees after both world wars, were strictly deterred from undertaking political activity directed at their homelands or even from direct efforts to maintain family ties.

For the Turkish Republic the Caucasus was a closed area until 1990. After Turkey joined the western alliance, Moscow did all in its power to make the Caucasian border impregnable-as anyone who has looked out from heights of Ani across the valley of the Arpacay to the lines of barbed wire, plowed strips, and guard towers, with helicopters hovering overhead, will remember. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the independence of the three Transcaucasian countries was an unexpected but welcome development for Turkey. All political parties have favored expanded relations and trade with the Caucasus. Turkey has made no effort to manipulate internal politics in Georgia or Armenia but has aspired to close, normal relations and expanded trade with both. Until recently Armenian attitudes and actions made normal relations impossible.

Turkey's relations with independent Georgia have been constructive from the beginning. Turkey has provided significant emergency relief and economic aid to Georgia. The commotion that led to Gamsakhurdia's fall and eventual return of Shevardnadze had almost no effect on rapidly expanding commercial and private travel to and from Turkey. The border crossing at Batumi has been a major channel for travel to and from Georgia. Links between relatives on both sides of the border cut for 70 years have been restored. Georgian shoppers in Trabzon, Rize, and other cities of the northeast contribute to the prosperity of the area and the consumer goods they bring back to Georgia alleviated severe shortages of food and clothing. Greater political stability in Georgia and reform and revitalization of the Georgian economy will lead to expanded relations with Turkey.

Iran and the Caucasus:

Politically Iran is much less attractive to all countries and peoples of the Caucasus than Turkey. Iran's hostility to the West and its proclivity to meddle in religious affairs keep Caucasians on their guard. For Georgia and Armenia, predominantly Christian, the religious factor is of little importance. Iran as a trade partner and a source of aid and investment is attractive to both countries. To Armenia especially Iran is an important transport outlet to the Middle East and the outer world. For this reason Armenia is rushing a bridge over the Aras at Meghri to completion. Iran's economic importance to both Georgia and Armenia is probably most important as a participant in pipelines

for transport of oil and natural gas to the Black Sea and to Turkey.

Georgia, Armenia, and the Rest of the World:

The United States, Europe, Japan, and major countries of the Middle East have all welcomed the independence of the states of the Transcaucasus and none has shown any desire to wish these systems, reforming their economies, and laying the basis for improved living standards and social and cultural progress for their peoples. UN agencies and international financial institutions financed by the Free World have been responsive to the needs of the countries of the Transcaucasus for advice and aid. The United States has provided substantial emergency relief and other forms of material aid to both Georgia and Armenia. On a per capita basis, Armenia has benefitted to a greater extent than Georgia -a reflection of the influence of the active Armenian- American lobby. Germany has demonstrated a special affinity for Georgia. Some of the smaller European countries have shown surprising readiness to provide help in many forms, both governmental and private, to Georgia and Armenia. Europeans and Americans are eager for closer educational and cultural relations with these countries and have already undertaken considerable governmental and private initiative in this direction. Were political and economic conditions to stabilize in Georgia and Armenia, tourism from Europe and America could be expected to develop steadily and contribute to closer relations and greater understanding. Let us hope that this can occur.

The Process Of Gagauz Autonomy: Past and Present

Günden PEKER

The tide of nationalism and ethnic passions is still rising in a wide arc from Central Europe to the heart of Asia (1). In the aftermath of the Soviet disintegration, the international fora is busy with trying to bring about solutions to problems of transition, especially ethnic ones which turned into dead-ends wars ranging from the former Yugoslavia to Azerbaijan-Armenia. Moldova among the other former Union Republics, inherited the consequences 70 years of Soviet totalitarian political rule. Being a mini empire composed of Moldovans, Russians, Bulgarians, Ukrainians, Gagauz, the Republic of Moldova is now a candidate to become the first state to have solved an ethnic/nationality problem through granting ethnoterritorial autonomy to an ethnos composing its national structure, peacefully. It is also one of the few states where xenophobic ultra nationalist motivated groups did not become cogent. With a nationality composition where more than 1/3 of the population is made up of non-Moldovans (Russians: % 13, Ukrainians % 13.8 and the Gagauzi % 3.5), Moldova has been involved in secessionist wars at two fronts: Gagauz at the south and *Transdnisterians* at the east bank of the country.

Moldova has declared its independence on August 27, 1991 with fundamental problems ranging from economy to ecology. The rise of the Moldovan weighted Popular Front to power and rumors of unification with Romania mobilized other ethnic groups in Moldova to go after their won respective ethnic cases: the ethnic -Russians in *Transdnister* and the ethnic- Turks in the *Gagauz Yeri*. The Popular Front a democratic movement has been instrumental in mobilizing other ethnic groups in institutionalizing their ethnic cases. The pro-Russian groups formed and grouped EDINVSTO: the internationalist Movement for Unity supported mostly by the *Transdnisterian* population. The Gagauz on the other hand, coupled under the *Gagauz Halkı Organization* in 1987. Ethnic awakening of the Gagauz found its expression at the same time with the national awakenings of the peoples of the former USSR mobilization when perestroika and glasnost made life easier for the various ethnic groups in Moldova starting by mid- 1980's.

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Brief Historical Background of the Gagauz

The Gagauz are a Turkic language people of Orthodox Christian faith emerged in the 13 th. century in the North and East Balkans. The number of Gagauz in the world today is estimated to be about 250.000. The majority of them are scattered throughout the territory of the former USSR. According to the 1989 census, 152.000 of them are living in Southern Moldova today defined as Gagauzia. Some 40.000 are living in Ukraine in the Odessa and Bolgrad region, a former Bessarabian territory (2). Some also live in Kabardino-Balkaria, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Bulgaria, Greece, and Romania (Dobruja).

The Gagauz ethnogenesis is generally coupled to the Turkish tribes like the Uzes, Peçeneks and the Kumans. They inherited their language from the Oguz, their traditions from the ancient Turkish ethnos, as well as other cultural elements linked with the cultures of the Central Asian people. The Gagauz as a new ethnos came into being near today's Dobruja and Deliorman formed their earliest state namely the *Uzi Eyaleti* the 13 th. century, which lasted until the 15 th. century. There is not too much data as to the history of the Gagauz between 13 th. and 18 th. centuries.

In the 18 th. century, the Gagauz started to be announced among the distinctive ethnos of the multiethnic Bucak population, when they started to migrate from Bulgaria and South Bessarabian to Bucak. There, the Gagauz started a new life, replaced the Turkic Nogai's who had lived there for 300 years famous for their skills in land-cultivating and cattle-breeding. In the early 19 th century Bulgarians, Germans and Moldovans were also settled in Bucak together with the Gagauz when they enjoyed as colonies some degree of autonomy as to self-government granted to them by Russia's Governing Senate on December 29, 1818 (3). The Russians however thought that the Gagauz being an Orthodox nation was not different from the Bulgarians which led to moderate relations between them. The reason behind the non-extinction of the Gagauz against all invasions and foreign rule may be traced to this mix. The evidence behind the compact Gagauz settlement in Bucak in the early 18 th. and 19 th. centuries in spite of all hardships experienced *en route*, is that they were settling relatively compactly and simultaneously delimiting the framework of their agricultural territories on the land's 19 th-century map.

By the continuous migrations in the 19th. century, the Gagauz people split into two most of them were settled in Bessarabia and the lesser part in Bulgaria, which was after 1812 incorporated to the Russian Empire. the South West lands of Bucak was given to Moldova in 1861, but the Gagauz who were afflicted about this new order migrated to Bulgaria, and to South Ukraine. The Gagauz in 1905-1906 pro-

claimed the "*Komrat Republic*" but this went on only for two weeks, when it was severely suppressed by Russian-Moldovan forces. The Romanian occupation of Bessarabia in January 1918, prevented any possibility of autonomy for the Gagauz. This went for 22 years during when the Gagauz as well as Moldovans and Bulgarian etc. were subject to national discrimination. The Gagauz were deprived of using their own language, preserving their national culture and right to education in Gagauz language. 1940 did not change anything for the Gagauz when on August 22, the Moldovan SSR was founded: more was that the Gagauz lands were arbitrarily divided into two unequal territories. The Moldovan SSR hosted % 80 (3 cities and 23 villages) and Ukraine % 20 of the Gagauz adjacent to Bucak. This split have widely separated the Gagauz people who had lived in a multi-ethnic mass in Bucak. Scattered through various administrative units, within the borders of two states, the Gagauz were once again deprived of consolidating an ethnic territorial state of their won. The Gagauz deprived of their rights to education with their own language were forced to speak Russian and/or Romanian and started to loose their sense of national consciousness. Between 1979-1989, % 5 of the Gagauz were recorded to have lost their capacity to talk in their native language (4).

Under the Soviet rule the Gagauz were subject to linguistic Russification, which was augmented with the absence of any local cultural institutions and schools of Gagauz language. From the late 1950's until the end of Soviet rule, the Gagauz were taught only Russian language at all levels, and the local press and radio also functioned in Russian (5). The Gagauz have been pro-Moscow and more Russified then being Romanized, as the Moldovans themselves promoted this pro-Russian process. When the Gagauz SSR was proclaimed in 1990, the leaders insisted on Russia's being the official language instead of that of Gagauz. The Gagauz also supported the continuation of the Soviet rule in Moldova, being afraid of Romanization. The Gagauz leaders conjointly with the Transdnistrians faught for secession from Moldova in response to Moldova's decision to elevate Moldovan as the state language. The Gagauz also voted Yes in the referendum held for the continuation of the USSR in 1990.

By 1985, the Gagauz heartened up for the next stage of their national survival with the general atmosphere of mobilization all though the former-USSR. They started to express themselves more and more against the dangers of Romanization and Russification, especially after 1980 with the effect of Glasnost and Perestroika. *Gagauz Halki*, first as a public club exponent of people's increasing national awareness instituted in 1987, has been very instrumental in pro-

claiming Gagauz autonomy in November 12, 1989, within the Republic of Moldova. The Moldovan Republic however did not recognize this move. On 19 August 1990, the Gagauz Congress of deputies declared the "Gagauz Republic" and on 25 October 1990 the Gagauz held elections to a Republic of Gagauz. The Popular Front sought to prevent this sending by 50.000 volunteers commanded by the Moldovan Prime Minister Mircea Druc to the area. The elections proceeded, and on 31 October 1990 the Gagauz National Assembly was founded where Stefan Topal was elected as the President. The Republic of Moldova in 1994 agreed on the transfer of administrative responsibility to the Gagauz in continuing negotiations with the Gagauz authorities. A draft law "On the Special Legal Status of *Gagauz Yeri*" no. 344-XIII was passed on 23 December 1994.

The Law on the Legal Status of *Gagauz Yeri*

The law on the special status on *Gagauz Yeri* was discussed on 17 December, 1994 in Chisinau in the Moldovan Parliament. Some of the Moldovan deputies deserted the term *Gagauz Yeri*, while some were agitated to grant a special status to the Gagauz as the move might have mobilized other ethnic groups and produce spill-over effects over the country. CSCE High Commissioner responsible from national minorities visited Komrat in late 1994 to discuss the issue of autonomy where he concluded that, the draft law depended on the territorial integrity of Moldova and that the solution of the Gagauz problem will help stabilize the totality of the ethnic chaos in the country. A Joint Commission under the Presidency of Prime Minister Andrei Sangeli started working on a project to vitalize the special status on *Gagauz Yeri*. Valerie Bulgari, the Vice Prime Minister was appointed as the Head of the Commission. The draft was submitted to the Moldovan Parliament in June 1993. But just before the session, a number of nationalist pro-Romanian radicals, raised a draft law with opposite contents entitled "On the status of the Gagauz national minority" where the issue was reduced to so-called cultural autonomy. The rapprochement had found its expression in the fact that the Gagauz party relinquished its own Constitution and agreed to form its autonomy on the basis of rather narrowed political rights. The document was agreed to and approved on a level of the President, Parliament, and the Government of Moldova who affianced themselves to submit it to the Parliament session.

An article was introduced to Moldova's new constitution guaranteeing the Gagauz inhabited districts a "special status" (Article 113), before the basic law was adopted concerning autonomy. The Moldovan Assembly adopted the law on the special status of the *Gagauz*

Yeri in a session, where 69 voted for, 2 voted against and 16 walked out protesting. By this new law, the Gagauz are considered as a people and Gagauzia as an autonomus national territorial unit which is an important development as to the right of self-determination. The devolution of power from the center to the regional basis, is the breakthrough introduced in this law. The Gagauz are defined as a people with the aim of internal self-determination within Moldova.

Within the context of the Law on the special status on *Gagauz Yeri*, the Gagauz will have the jurisdiction in areas like culture, labor, education, housing, local budget, budget, finance, however none of these laws will have juridical power if they contradict with the Moldovan legislation. According to the law, the official language of the *Gagauz Yeri* are Gagauz, Romanian and Russian (6). *Gagauz Yeri* has its national symbol, used together with the official symbols of the Republic of Moldova. Republic of Moldova will be authorized over matters of foreign policy, defense, citizenship, monetary emission, and circulation. Article 6 of the special law on the status of *Gagauz Yeri* stipulates that all resources within the borders of the autonomous Republic falls under the jurisdiction and full control of the Gagauz.

Article 10/5, states that one of the vice presidents of the Halk Topluş will be a non-titular Gagauz. There are some fears that the law was prepared in such a way to limit the use of the Gagauz language: that is as long as there will be a Vice President in the Topluş who does not speak or understand the Gagauz language, the sessions will be held in Russian. "Even if it is 100 people speaking Gagauz, where one does not understand it, they start speaking in Russian rather than trying to teach the non-titular speak Gagauz (7).

Article 14 stipulates that the highest authority in *Gagauz Yeri* is the *Başkan*, who must be over 35 years of age, a Moldovan citizen and must be fluent in Gagauz. This has produced some discomfort among the Gagauz as they interpreted this as a potential scenario to bring the figures Moldova prefers to power, as it is not only the ethnic Gagauz but also the Ukrainians, Moldovans, and Çıfıts who speak the Gagauz language.

In the framework of Article 7, the *Gagauz Yeri* is granted the right to secession. This is eminent under the circumstance that if Moldova decides to join Romania, Gagauz will become independent. *Gagauz Yeri* consists of territories with compact Gagauz population including towns and villages the territorial extent of *Gagauz Yeri* has been delimited by the referendum held under Moldovan Law on March 5, 1995 where 31 settlements were included in the Autonomous Republic. The cities and villages included in the *Gagauz Yeri* a composed of cities namely: Komrat, Vulcanesti, Çadır and villages: Alek-

seevaka, Avdarma, Baurçi, Beşelma, Beşgöz, Bucak, Karbalia, Kazayak, Çokmeydan, Çeşmeköy, Köselia Ruse, Kiriet Lunga, Kirsova, Kongaz, Kongazcikul de Jos, Kıpçak, Kotovskoe, Dezginja, Duduleşti, Etulia, Etulia Noue, Ferapontevka, Gaydar, Joltay and To-may.

Article 8, designates "Millet Kongresi" (People's Congress) to ratify laws in the sphere of culture, science, education, housing, municipal services, health protection, physical culture, sports, budget, finance, economics, and ecology by simple majority of the total number of deputies (8). If they do not disclaim with the Moldovan Constution and are adopted by *Başkan* within 15 days, if not returned (9). Article 20 stipulates that Moldova guarantees the full and unconditional fulfillment of the powers of the Gagauz Parliament in case of the danger of the breach of the cnotract. Article 21 rules the status of the Gagauz that it may only be modified by the acquiescence of the Gagauz Legislative Assembly.

On March 5, 1995 a referendum on the delimitation of the territorial extend of the *Gagauz Yeri* was made in the South. The fear of indefinite divisibility because Southern Moldova is also heterogenous, raised fears that the rights of other non-Gagauz nationalities would be hampered throughout the referendum. The Gagauz tried to convince other non-Turkish minorities in the South, where referendum was held that even in a non-federal Moldova, their cultural rights would be preserved. Thus, some provinces with Bulgarian majority have also voted for inclusion in the *Gagauz Yeri* in the referendum made on March 5, 1995. The capital of *Gagauz Yeri* is Komrat as against Çadır-Lunga decided by the referendum made on 28 May 1995. Gheorghe Tabuşnik the former Soviet Secretary in Komrat is elected as the executive leader *Başkan* of *Gagauz Yeri* who will also be appointed as the deputy Prime Minister of Moldova gaining % 64 of the votes on 11 June 1995. 55 years old Tabuşnik has openly stated that he was fond of promoting the territoial integrity of the Moldovan state. He declared that "Gagauzia is an indivisible part of Moldova" (10). Hisprogram concentrates on the improvement of the underdeveloped regions of the Autonomous Republic especially those effected by heavy draught in 1994 and the necessity of developing the agricultural sector is underlined.

Gagauzia today is an autonomous state within the borders of the Republic of Moldova composed of 31 settlements. Its economy is and will probably remain mainly agricultural. 170173 hectar of total land of which 22308 is reserved for wine yarding which is an important economic activity for the country. Yet, in 1985 the Lvov Oil Institute estimated an oil reserve of 5.3 million tons and an gas reserve of 16 bil-

lion cubic meters in the South of Moldova. What is more interesting is that an American oil company "Redeco" has signed an agreement in 19 December 1994 with the Government of Moldova enabling them to receive oil and gas prospecting and extraction rights in the Valeni region as well as in the South (11). This is significant especially when one considers the fact that Moldova is an energy dependent country. If this potential is exhausted, it is inevitable that the *Gagauz Yeri* will have a critical tool at hand to sustain and promote its self-rule.

Autonomy will not bring an automatic relief for the Gagauz who have critical problems ranging from irrigation, drinking water, health services, to domestic political instabilities. An ethnos who has quitted the idea of total independence and accepted to create an autonomous formation is now in a harsh process of self-development. Although the devolution of power from the center to the region has been a positive development, the fact that the Gagauz local institutions will have dual accountability; also to the relevant agencies of Moldova might give birth to unpleasant clashes and difficulties as to the practical implementation of the division of powers. Conciliation and compromise which have brought the Gagauz case to its present phase, has to be reinstated in the next phase: materialization of autonomy.

The Gagauz Issue From a Theoretical Point of View.

The Gagauz who were long refused to be recognized as a people and who have succeeded against all extreme circumstances of romanization, Bulgarization and Russification to uphold their language and cultural compactness have at last been able to experience a form of self-rule within Moldova as an autonomous state. Autonomy for the Gagauz constitutes the start of a process at the end of which they will be able to consolidate their intellectual potentials through which they will sustain and promote their national presence. The *Gagauz Yeri* Autonomous Republic is unique not only in the sense that, it is the only and one state constituted within the former Soviet space in terms of ethnic-territorial autonomy, in the post-Cold war era, but it is also a perfect example of settling an ethnic problem peacefully: among the peoples who have been living together within the frontiers of one state for centuries sharing the same destiny. The Moldovians have realized that the solution of many problems before stabilization, requires the acceptance of the ethno-genetic diversity of the country and correspondingly searching ways to accommodate ethnic demands of the Gagauz, without endangering state unity. The Moldovan economy shaken by high inflation, dangerous fall in production, troubled economic balances, has by a unique approach induced conditions for a peaceful solution among the ethnic groups.

If successful, civil construction in the form of granting autonomy to the Turkish - speaking Gagauz will be cited as a precedent by historians to come. The Gagauz have constantly been refused to be recognized as a people, they were instead taken as a minority. Yet, in the context of international theory a minority is a part of a nation who is living far away from the metropolitan territory. For example the Bulgars living in Moldova are a minority, as there is an independent Bulgarian state in the international arena. The Gagauz living within the borders of an independent non-federal state: Moldova, do not have a metropolitan state, and they are a distinct ethnos.

It is basically the Center through its actions, inaction's and reactions that precipitate autonomy (12). The opportune moment for the Gagauz has been the rise of the Moldovan President Snegur to power. The assurances of the Agrarian Party mobilized the Gagauz in that they convinced them that they will resolve the Gagauz issue promptly. President Snegur officially stated that at the Congress "Our Home the Republic of Moldova" that the Republic was building its own statehood, will not unite with Romania, and will ensure equal rights for all its citizens, and will not allow them to be infringed upon (13). The assurances produced a conciliatory mood, and a positive atmosphere among the Gagauz. Stefan Topal, the former President of the *Gagauz Yeri* said: "We now live in anticipation - anticipating that the leadership of Moldova in the person of President Snegur and the political forces that have come to power will keep their elections promises and solve the Gagauz problem in March 1994 (14). Mutual concessions have been conducive to the settlement of the Gagauz problem. The Gagauz participated and displayed great activity during parliamentary elections in March 1994. At the same time the Gagauz have refrained from the use of force in their struggle for autonomy, and did not challenge existing borders. They have even tried to rule out the only extremist group consists of the former 'Minister of Internal Affairs' Ivan Burgucu who was in favor of use of force and marginalized him while most of his paramilitary unit has been disarmed.

Gagauz movement has been rather peaceful when compared to that of Tiraspol, in that it does not aim to challenge existing borders and no organized armed resistance has developed. The Gagauz have maintained good relations with Tiraspol to put pressure on Chisinau and wanted a tripartite federal state but by mid-1994 they abandoned this approach with the moderating role of Turkey, and shifted to a bilateral strategy. From then on, the Gagauz have negotiated for a political rapprochement with the Moldovan leaders on mutual basis.

Questions have arisen about the easy attitudes of the Moldovan

government to be accommodating when compared to the Transdnistrians. The answer may lay mostly in economic realities. The Transnistria gives the % 40 of the output in the country and energy, it is the heartland of economy and the center of the traditional heavy industry and manufacturing while the Gagauz are poor: they have no arms, and rely on Chisinau for their defense, and subsidies for the local budget. Moldova still facing a heavy financial economic crisis plans to attract foreign capital to the country by stabilizing the thorny process of transition. One significant potential they have at hand to be valuable for the future is the Circulești Port within their borders. If a port is built in the near future as it is planned. *Gagauz Yeri* will become an important outlet to the Black Sea for its proximate region as it will become the only outlet to sea of a landlocked state.

The Moldovan government by pursuing a conciliatory peaceful policy towards the Gagauz have departed from totalitarian Stalinist policies and became a country where "rule of law" is promoted. It should be this kind of civilized approach that is conducive to peace and stability as to the solution of problems related to the realization of rights of people to self-determination in sovereign multi-ethnic states. This positive experience may be simplified and used as a model by others in resolving inter ethnic conflicts emerging in the course of struggle of peoples for their right to self-determination and national sovereignty.

Conclusion

The splits of the Gagauz people resulted in the break of ethnogenetic and ethno-cultural links between the Gagauz people leading to the Gagauz ethnos erosion through history. Other ethnic groups and nations in Moldova have always received the support of their brother states: the Bulgarians were backed by the Bulgarian state against the mono-national policy of the Moldova state, too did Ukraine, Belarus and Russia pursued similar protectionist cultural, educational, social policies for their co-nationals in Moldova. The Gagauz people, however have been deprived of this sort of metropol support and they have never been granted the right to be recognized as a people, consequently their right to self-determination was continuously denied. In a state where more than 1/3 of the population is made up non-Moldovan minorities, the Gagauz were concerned about the pan-Romanian euphoria which dominated the agenda during 1989. The language laws in particular mobilized the Gagauz, because less than % 4 of the non-Moldovans speak Moldovan as the language of communication. The recent law also set a mandatory testing plan for every Moldovan citizen - after a period of learning by 1996.

Today the Gagauz are struggling to obtain their own statehood in the form of a national/territorial autonomy within the Republic of Moldova. The *sine qua non* elements for secession / autonomy are present in the Gagauz case:

1. First of all, the traditional culture and linguistic distinctiveness of the Gagauz, as their national-identity as one of the most ancient Turkic peoples is present. The Gagauz are distinguished by their distinctive national culture; customs, epochs, rites etc. They have succeeded to shelter their linguistic compactness, as the language is used exclusively by the Gagauz themselves representing their ethnic majority in their ethnic territory in present-day. The Gagauz constitute a harmonious separate community in their territory.
2. The Gagauz are characterized by a high-degree of historical consciousness. They are a separate community cognizant of their distinctiveness. This self-consciousness is also augmented by the national cultural traditions.
3. The Gagauz have a very compact territorial settlement within Moldova. Bucak was inhabited by different people at different times. The Gagauz who have nowhere else to go and live naturally consider Bucak their only motherland. Thus, legalizing their national-territorial autonomy is a political means of political self-survival. The Gagauz are now cumulating their previously uncoordinated intellectual power under an autonomous state structure. They see Central Bucak their only motherland. Due to the specific natural climatic conditions of the territory, specific economic traditions developed (land-cultivation) sufficient to the self-development and self-production of the ethnos at the end of the process at which the people inherited its own customs and rites accumulated throughout ages.
4. The Gagauz have displayed a consistent and continuous aspiration for self-identification and self-determination manifested in different forms of collective struggle.

The Gagauz issue was a *fait accompli* inherited, thus solving the issue was a prerequisite to clean up the way to a healthy transition. Plus, the generality Moldovans have regarded the Gagauz as a distinct ethnos having the legitimate right to self-rule within Moldova.

The *Gagauz Yeri* Autonomous Republic is unique not only in the sense that, it is the only and one ethnic-territorial state constituted within the former Soviet space in the post-Cold War era, but also it is a matchless example of how to bring about means to solve an ethnic problem peacefully among peoples who have been living together within the frontiers of the state for centuries.

It is mandatory to reorder inter-ethnic principles of multiethnic state, towards creating a system of equal citizens, peoples who have been living together within the frontiers of the same state, under historical circumstances. States and nations are not always congruent. Moldova has proved that culturally and linguistically plural states can remain stable and survive without disintegrating by pursuing a policy of acceptance.

Will it be taken as a model in the post-communist world as a means to solving ethnic problems in multiethnic states, through mutual compromises is a matter of historians to evaluate.

Foot Notes:

1. Gidon Gottlieb, "Nations Without States", *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 1994.
2. The Bessarabian territory until 1818 denoted only present day Bucak, after that date, the toponym spread to denote the whole of the Dniester-Prut interfluvium.
3. Paper submitted to the European Parliament by the Gagauz Parliament October, 1994 Comrat.
4. *Economica Nationala a Republicii Moldova*, 1991 **Department of State Statistics**. 1992, 78.
5. Vladimir Socor, "Gagauz Autonomy in Moldova: A Precedent for Eastern Europe?" *RFE/RL Research Report*, 3:33, (26 August 1994), 21.
6. Article 4 of the law on Special Status of Gagauzia.
7. Article 4 of the law on Special Status of Gagauzia.
8. Article 8 of the law on Special Status of Gagauzia.
9. Article 19 of the law on Special Status of Gagauzia.
10. "Gagauz Yeri Başkanına kandidat G.D. Tabuşnik'in programından kimi alıntılar", *ANA SÖZÜ*, 26 May, 1995.
11. "The American's are ready to extract oil in Moldova" *Independent Moldova*, 21 April 1995, 3.
12. Alexis Herackides, "The Self-determination of minorities in International Politics" London, 1991, Frank Cass and Company Ltd. p.56.
13. *FBIS-USR - 94*, 043 21 April, 94 p. 21.
14. *FBIS-USR - 94*, 043, 23 April 1994, 52.

Peacekeepers That Keep War Going

Albert WOHLSTETTER and Gregory S. JONES

Genocidal wars have been spreading ever since the communist dictatorships in the Warsaw Pact collapsed. To stop the systematic terror and to deter its recurrence will call for concerted action by coalitions or alliances of countries that are willing and able to face terrorist regimes with superior force. Not neutral negotiators, even if they are as high-minded as Jimmy Carter. And not intervention by lightly-armed UN military forces committed to avoid taking the side of the victim against the aggressor, and operating under constraints maintained by the permanent members of the UN Security Council. **Some permanent members and their "peacekeepers" have in practice backed an aggressor spreading genocide.**

The spreading dangers are long terms as well as immediate. Both the dangers and the ways of meeting them have a technological as well as a political aspect. Technological advances, cumulating even more rapidly in cruise missiles than in ballistic missiles, almost surely will improve the ability of many countries, including some deeply hostile terrorist dictatorships, to deliver nuclear, biological and chemical weapons at great distances. Atoms for Peace agreements, including the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), have perversely been subsidizing the acquisition of plutonium warheads for such missiles. Clinton mediators know that. Yet in the current meeting on the NPT in New York of 174 countries, they advocate extending the NPT without change forever. By changing the NPT to exclude the sale or civilian use of plutonium we might slow the spread of plutonium warheads, but it is much harder to slow the proliferation of advanced missiles. The technologies underlying missile advances have very large net economic benefits, in contrast with the civilian use of plutonium which has none.

The ability to launch satellites will have a genuine civilian use for some countries and an arguable utility for others. But space launchers are long range ballistic missiles than can place a payload anywhere on earth. Even more, revolutionary advances in navigation and pre-

* Mr. Wohlstetter headed the 1975 study that led the U.S. to abandon the civilian use of plutonium; he also guided the 1970s Long-Range R & D studies of precise and discriminate non-nuclear weaponry for contingencies outside Europe that affect important US and European interests. Gregory S. Jones, a defense consultant in Los Angeles, was a major contributor to both sets of studies.

cise guidance for cruise missiles, especially those exploiting the Global Positioning System (GPS) of 24 small satellites, already in use to guide and track trucks and some rental cars, will bring immense benefits measured in lives and billions of dollars saved by avoiding collisions in civilian air transport. Differential GPS, a recent advance using a fixed location with a second receiver for the satellite signals, will make accuracies measured in meters available to international airlines (and, therefore, also to adversaries) -- better than the GPS accuracies we had originally hoped to reserve for our own military forces by coding more precise signals to them than those available for civilian (and adversary) use. Differential GPS will also greatly increase the precision and discriminateness of our own nonnuclear missiles, and so reduce our own and allied reliance on nuclear weapons to deter or answer terror strikes against US and allied interests at home and abroad.

We'll need to emphasize technologies for acquiring and transmitting information, and for denying it to adversaries, if we are to cope with the emerging disorder within reasonable budgets. The large manned platforms -- the bombers, ships and armored vehicles -- that are the focus of Service procurement programs, cost so much that they have to last many decades. The huge changes in effectiveness enabled by the continuing micro-electronics revolution -- the doublings in performance every two years or so -- need to be introduced by way of improved instruments of reconnaissance, navigation, guidance, communication and control. These instruments are mainly carried by unmanned air vehicles or by small unmanned satellites. They are increasingly essential to make the expensive manned platforms effective throughout their long life. There should, however, be no doubt about the growth and spread of the distant as well as close-in dangers to our own and allied interests; and about the continuing need for alliances and ad-hoc coalitions against external threats from adversaries, as distinct from organizations like the League of Nations or the United Nations which it was once hoped, could keep or enforce the peace among its members.

But Western defense and foreign ministries have been as unprepared for the genocidal disorder that has followed the collapse of the Warsaw pact as they were for the collapse itself. Shortly before-joining the administration, Secretary Perry co-authored a hopeful monograph expressing the belief that national military forces should sharply limit their ability to strike deep "at rear and homeland targets" and should only defend national territory; and that forces in excess for this purpose should take part in multinational forces as UN peacekeepers or to enforce UN sanctions. It said also that "all major

military establishments" declare -- and really expect to do -- the same. Such a proposal for "cooperative security" may be consistent with Presidential Decision Directives (PDDs) on the role of the UN in "peacekeeping" and the enforcement of sanctions.

However, it isn't consistent with Yeltsin's and Kozyrev's assertion since last June that Russia's only international borders are those of the former Soviet Union; nor with Russia's strategic programs; nor with its actions in the newly independent states in its near and not-so-near abroad, and in still more distant places like Iran and the Balkans. In the Balkans two weeks ago, Maj. Gen. Prelyakin, the Russian in command of 1,600 UN Russian and Belgian peacekeeping troops, blocked the Belgian UN troops trying to stop Serbia from crossing Croatia's international borders with 900 Serbian soldiers and more than a dozen tanks, rockets and other weapons. He has been fired by the UN for black-marketeering and collaboration with the Serbs, but it's not clear that he'll leave the area. Over two years ago Col. Victor Loginov, who commanded a battalion of Russian peacekeepers in Croatia, was told to disarm the Serbs but didn't. Instead, he caroused with Arkan, Serbian most notorious terrorist. Loginov also was fired for collaborating with the Serbs, accepting bribes and black-marketeering, but remained in the area to form a "trading company" with Arkan. This time, however, the Russian Foreign Ministry defends its peacekeeping Mafiya and Gen. Perelyakin.

Nor does the Administration faith in UN mediation and peacekeeping fit the casual disregard of UN sanctions against Serbia by European mediators and peacekeepers. **In the critical Bihac pocket, UN peacekeepers actually struck "an imaginative deal" giving some of their own fuel to restart Serbia's stalled war machine. Last week's news revealed that they have let Iranian oil drilling equipment slip through Greece and Bulgaria destined to pump oil in Serbia-occupied Croatia to fuel Serbia's continuing invasion.** The Serbs do not reciprocate European generosity. They robbed a UN fuel convoy of 10,000 Deutschmarks and blocked delivery of fuel to resupply UN peacekeeping convoy to Gorazde, compelling the UN to use mules. And a Serbian sniper took careful aim at a French peacekeeper in a UN-marked white jeep, and killed him.

The Serbs find it useful to humiliate the UN and to emphasize its servility. As a way to implicate accessory to Serbian genocide. "The French are on their knees", a Bosnian army commander has remarked.

The major military establishments of some of our principal allies, as well as Russian, maintain an interest in striking "rear and homeland targets". The French defense ministry, for example, recently de-

clared that its longer-range Arme de Precision Tiree a Grande Distance is "a weapon of national sovereignty... not open to international cooperation." The French want to be able to strike deep. Like the Russians, moreover, they are intent on selling somewhat less up-to-date versions of their front line capabilities. (The Russian have just sold the South Koreans two aircraft carriers that with cruise missiles might easily reach rear and homeland targets on the Korean Peninsula.)

The French have just rejected questions raised in an AISC monography by Dennis Gormley and Scott Mc Mahon about their export of the Apache, a stealthy cruise missile. And the US Commerce department has approved the export to China of a very large number of Garrett turbofan engines that will enable the Chinese to upgrade their short range Silkworm anti-ship cruise missile into a land-attack system capable of delivering a 450-kilogram warhead to 600-kilometer range. China has in the past exported the Silkworm to Iran.

Capabilities for striking rear and homeland targets will spread well beyond the "major military establishments." In the emerging new disorder, if we are to avoid relying on preemptive strikes (and indiscriminately-wide area strikes against targets of uncertain location at that), coping with the probable spread calls for the synergy of a precise, discriminate nonnuclear offense and active defense. The latter (like the offense) can never be perfect, and may be sized to deal with small attacks that are genuinely and realistically within the technical and operational capabilities that will have spread by the time a defense can be in operation. But it should be highly effective against such attacks, and not artificially constrained by a distinction between "theater" and "strategic" forces that eroded decades ago.

"Strategic forces" once referred to the massive nuclear forces of the United States and of a Soviet Union that would supposedly maintain at any cost the capability to strike deeply and without restraint to destroy American civilians. Against that apocalyptic strike only a defense that was "leak-proof" could suffice, and that was plainly infeasible. NATO planners linked this apocalyptic strike to the equally implausible contingency of an all-out Warsaw Pact attack through the Fulda Gap and NATO's thickest defenses in the center of Europe. The US, if not the Russians, was expected quickly to make the conflict nuclear even though that would be suicidal. It was this farfetched extreme contingency that formed the canonical basis for NATO planning.

Much of the precise and discriminate nonnuclear weaponry displayed in Desert Storm, and some that could have been available except for the inertia of the Service bureaucracies, were the product of an early and mid-1970s Long-Range R & D study that proceeded on the contrary assumption: that the plausible, important contingencies af-

fecting US and European interests would be on the flanks, particularly in such places as the Persian Gulf -- which the Europeans especially considered "out of area," as if they were in outer space. The contingencies examined included all the ones that have turned out to be of major importance before and after the collapse of the Soviet Union -- the Soviet attack on Afghanistan, the Iraqi invasion of Iran, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the potential for its going on into Saudi Arabia; and war in the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Trans-Caspian.

The world emerging from the fall of the communist dictatorships contains a variety of rivals and potential adversaires with advanced technologies for producing and delivering weapons of mass terror. We can't cope with a genocidal disorder spreading from Croatia and Bosnia to the Caucasus and Transcaspian by nuclear bluffs nor by agreements signed among potential adversaries including perpetrators of the genocide. Nor by inserting UN "peacekeeping" forces where there is no peace to keep.

We may have to face the problem immediately.

For the United States even to extract British, French and other UN "peacekeepers" from the consequences of such folly in the ongoing genocidal Balkan war -- as the NATO Council last week recognized may soon be necessary -- the commander-in-chief of US armed forces in the region, Gen. Joulwan, will need powers, like those of Gen. Schwarzkopf in Desert Storm. He will have to conduct a campaign that, rather than merely reacting to individual assaults, anticipates and suppresses Serbia's ability to disrupt the operation and imperil our forces. Otherwise we would invite an enormous disaster.

The chief argument against lifting the embargo against Bosnia made by Britain and France has been that the Serbs might attack aircraft delivering the arms and overrun UN enclaves. For similar reasons, the US Congress is likely to insist, and Britain and France and other countries that contribute troops in UNPROFOR would have to agree, that a US-led campaign of willing NATO and regional powers to extract UNPROFOR from its present untenable position should disable Serbia's potential for disrupting the operation. Then Bosnia and Croatia with the embargo against the victims lifted, could handle Serbia's proxies and bring the war to an end quite quickly.

Agreements among potential adversaries can have useful limited effects. The NPT is one such agreement that can be useful, provided it is altered to serve, rather than subvert, its original purpose. But the increasing spread of genocidal terror can be discouraged or dealt with only by coalitions that exclude the perpetrators of genocide and their supporters and are equipped and willing to back coalition diplomacy with precise and discriminate force.

The Georgian Economy: Problems of Reform

Vladimir PAPAUA

Since independence in 1991, the Georgian economy has been in a severe decline. A break down in traditional trade and payments relations with other FSU countries, civil conflict and the war in Abkhazia, and expansionary financial policies have combined to effect a collapse in output, massive inflation and currency substitution, and a large external debt. The population's living standards have declined sharply, and the country has had to rely on external aid to help meet its most basic needs.

In close cooperation with the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, we have developed a program for economic stabilization and structural reform. This framework paper provides information on steps already taken by the Government on the road of economic reform and stabilization. In addition, this paper outlines measures the Government of Georgia proposes to implement in the immediate future. It is within this process of further and continuing reform that the Government of Georgia invites the international donor community to be a partner in Georgian development.

A. Background

Georgia is a country of 5.4 million covering 70,000 square kilometers and bordered by Russia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Turkey and the Black Sea. The country has traditionally served as an important trade and transit corridor between Europe and Asia.

Georgia is resource rich country. There are approximately 300 known mineral ores in the Republic; a bit more than half of which are currently being utilized. The principle mineral resource is manganese. There are also substantial reserves of corbanates and clay for production of cement and other construction materials. Total coal reserves are 400 million tons and known oil reserves are 27.5 million tons. About 40 % of the land area is agricultural, and 40 % is forested.

* Vladimir PAPAUA, Minister of Economy, Georgia

Georgia was among the first republics of the FSU to declare independence doing so April 9, 1991. Although official pre-independence statistics on per capita income ranked Georgia relatively low among the republics of the FSU, it was in fact relatively well-off due in part to a strong tradition of entrepreneurship and an agricultural sector with significant private sector activity. The republic had the highest proportion of college graduates among the republics of the FSU and one of the highest levels of saving deposits.

In 1989-1991, industry accounted for 37 % of NMP and agriculture for 33 % - somewhat more than in the other FSU republics. The main products included agriculture (citrus, tea, wines), agro-industries (processed foods, fertilizers), and natural resources, notably manganese. Georgia was also a relatively large producer of steel-pipes, electric motors, synthetic fibres, roofing materials, texties, and shoes. The tourist subsector was well developed due to Georgia's geographical location, attractive climate, and abundance of agricultural product. Exports included wine, tea, citrus, mineral water, manganese, and light industrial products. Georgia was heavily dependent on imports of both raw materials and energy from other republics.

B. Recent Economic Developments

In recent years, the Georgian economy has experienced a severe economic decline. While they may underestimate private market activity, official estimates show NMP declining 21 % in 1991, 43 % in 1992, and 40 % in 1993. Since in 1989, industrial production has declined approximately 75 %, agricultural production has declined about 55 % and construction activity has virtually ceased. Real exports and imports have fallen sharply. Unfortunately, these tendencies have been continued in 1994.

Contributing factors in the economic decline include a number of factors common to all small, energy-importing republics of the FSU: the disruption of trade with the other republics sharply higher energy prices and difficulties in obtaining key imports. The increase in energy prices was devastating as the price of imported oil and natural gas increase over 500 % in dollar terms between 1990 and 1993. In addition, problems unique to Georgia have worsened the economic situation. The war in Abkhazia forced some 270,000 refugees to flee their homes placing a severe burden on the economy. The war directly affected Georgia's citrus and tea export crops and decimated

the tourism industry. Civil strife and a deterioration of law and order in 1992 and 1993 disrupted the economy and consumed the Government's attention.

Fortunately, the political and social situation in the country has improved considerably over the last year although the economic situation has not. The war in Abkhazia has ceased. While progress to date has been disappointingly slow, Georgia has consistently sought a peaceful resolution of the Abkhazia conflict and the peaceful return of the refugees to their homes. Actions implemented in the spring of 1994 have resulted in a sharp reduction in the criminal activity. The improvement in the political and social situation has enabled the Government to turn its full attention to solving the economic crisis. With the assistance of the World Bank, IMF, other international agencies and bilateral donors we are determined to do so.

The impact of the economic decline on the Georgian population has been considerable. Even with a substantial rise in private sector employment, total employment has declined approximately 30 % since 1990. In addition hidden unemployment is widespread. Wages of most workers in the state sector, as well as pentanes and unemployment compensation, are less than a US \$ 2-3 per month. While many are able to supplement this wages with private sector activity, many can not. Natural gas and electricity are rationed and central heating was discontinued in 1993. From January 12, 1995 the Government halted gas supply to the population (households) because only 9 % of due payments were paid by them. Many rural families have been able to switch to wood heat but this is creating a problem with deforestation. Most rural residents are without electricity and urban residents are subject to extended blackouts. Recent increases in bread prices will increase the hardship for many.

While the situation has improved dramatically in recent months, the Georgian economy has also been beset with hyperinflation. Prices increased approximately 60 % a month from mid 1993 through mid 1994. The foreign exchange value of the Georgian coupon declined accordingly. Shortly after it was issued in April 1993 the Georgian coupon traded at 700 hundred coupons per US \$ 1. In late October 1994 the rate was 2.030.000 coupons per US \$ 1. As a result there has been widespread currency substitution. The Dollar and Ruble are now used in most private market transactions. The Government of Georgia recognizes that this inflation is primarily the result of the fiscal policies followed in recent years. In the past the Government had little alternative to large budget deficits due to the large

economic and social problems faced by the Government and reduced ability to collect taxes due to the civil unrest and decline in the Government's authority. As outlined below, steps are now being taken to reduce our budget deficit. In recent months the inflation has lessened and the foreign exchange value of the coupon has stabilized.

Georgia joined the World Bank and IMF in 1992 and began reform program in cooperation with both institutions shortly thereafter. Unfortunately, both these relationships and our reform program were interrupted by the war and accompanying breakdown of law and order. With the return of social stability, our relationships with the Bretton Wood institutions were re-established early 1994 and we have been working closely with them to stabilize and reform the Georgian economy. In December 1994, Georgia received first tranche of **Systemic Transformation Facility (STF)** from the IMF. We expect negotiations with the World Bank on the Economic Rehabilitation Loan to be completed in the near future. We will now detail the reforms which we have undertaken to date and our plans for the future.

C. Stabilization Policies

Fiscal Policy. Our most immediate economic challenge is to stop the inflation which has beset the Georgian economy. High inflation hampers investment and discourages economic activity. As noted above, the Georgian Government that this inflation is the result of the fiscal and monetary policies of the recent years. In 1993, taxes and other revenues covered about 28 % of the combined government budget; the rest was financed by money emission. With the assistance of the IMF, we have put together a program to reduce our budget deficits and strict limits on National Bank financing have been agreed to. Our Parliament has passed a budget which provides a "zero" deficit for the final quarter of 1994 and we have put in place expenditure controls to assure that this is realized. This "zero" deficit was covered not by money emission but by monetarization of humanitarian aid. The same principles were used for the 1995 budget, which was approved by the Parliament on January 11, 1995.

Expenditures. Despite the great needs facing our Government, we are working to reduce expenditures. In the recent past, subsidies for natural gas, electricity, and bread accounted for sizable portion of Government expenditures. In May 1994, energy prices for the non-household sector were increased significantly and many large

natural gas consumers began negotiating their own contracts with foreign suppliers. In September 1994, natural gas and electricity prices were increased to world levels for all consumers including households. In the future, these prices will be adjusted each month to maintain parity with world energy prices. In September 1994, bread prices were raised from 700 coupons per kg to 200.000 coupons a kg - an increase of 285 times the previous level. From December 1994 bread prices increased by 40 %. The Government intends to completely eliminate bread subsidy in the nearest future. In conjunction with energy and bread price increases, Government wages and pensions were increased somewhat but the overall effect was a substantial reduction in expenditures (and real wages). Obviously, these price increases are difficult for the Georgian people in the current economic conditions but the Government felt they were necessary in order to establish control of the budget and inflation.

Budget subsidies to state owned enterprises (SOEs) have been eliminated. In addition, the Government reduced the number of workers on the state payroll approximately 30 %. Defence expenditures, which were never very high - even during the war in Abkhazia - are also being reduced. To improve budgetary control all accounts of the Republican Government have now been centralized in the National Bank and a system of strict expenditure control under the Minister of Finance has been instituted. Local Governments are prohibited from borrowing from the National Bank.

Taxes. The Government is also working to improve tax collections, which amounted to only 3 % of GDP in 1993 and reached 4 % of GDP in 1994. To this end, a special enforcement unit has been established within the office of the Tax Inspectorate with strong economic incentives for finding tax avoiders. In addition, penalties for late payment and for non-payment of taxes have been increased substantially. The decline in the inflation rate should also help improve tax collections by reducing the incentive to delay tax payment. The Tax Law adopted in December 1993, moved the tax structure away from taxes which are difficult to collect, such as the profits tax, and toward more collectible taxes, such as excise taxes. Finally, we look forward to further improvements in the tax area with technical assistance of the World Bank and IMF.

Until the Fall 1994, Georgia has a 14 % VAT, a profit tax with rates ranging from 10 % to 35 % with exemptions for new enterprise, an income tax with rates ranging from 12 % to 20 %, a 2 % duty on non-CIS imports, a property tax, several excise taxes, a tax on kiosks,

and several minor taxes. Following the IMF recommendations, by the end of 1994 we raised the VAT to 20 %, imposed a 10 % VAT on bread, increased the import duty to 12 %, increased the tax on kiosks, raised the tax on gasoline to 15 %, and eliminated the tax on exports. In addition, road transport, precious metals, casinos, and some agricultural raw materials will no longer be exempt from the VAT.

Monetary Policy. Since the present National Bank administration was installed in mid 1993, monetary policy has been more strictly enforced. Almost no new credit has been extended to the banking system since that time. As some of the old bank debt was repaid to the National Bank, a portion (but a small portion) was re-auctioned off in order to establish the free market base rate. In dollar terms, credit to banks has been reduced over 90 % from the June 1993 level. All restrictions on cash withdrawals from Coupon accounts have been eliminated. In attempt to sterilize part of the money emission due to the Government deficits, reserve requirements on deposits in both domestic and foreign currencies were raised to 20 %. Many banks, particularly the private commercial banks, are having trouble in meeting these requirements but actual reserve holdings have been increasing steadily and the National Bank has frozen the accounts of those banks which are not making progress in increasing their reserves.

As previously noted, due to the hyperinflation which has occurred, the population has lost confidence in the Georgian Coupon and currency substitution is widespread. Once the budget is under control and the foreign exchange value of currency can be stabilized, we intend to introduce a new national currency, the Lari.

Exchange rate and trade policies. Georgia has flexible exchange rate. Exchange rates are set twice weekly in auctions on the Tbilisi Interbank Currency Exchange (TICEX). At present, there is a 32 % surrender requirement at the market rate determined in the TICEX auctions; the Government intends to abolish this requirement by the end of 1995.

Since the fiscal reforms were introduced in September 1994, the Coupon has stabilized against the US dollar and strengthened against the Russian ruble. On September 20, the coupon traded at 2.4 million coupons per \$ 1 and 1030 coupons per 1 ruble on TICEX. On October 28, the rates on the TICEX were 2.03 million coupons per \$ 1 and 660 coupons per 1 ruble. End February 1995, the rates on the TICEX were 1.3 million coupons per \$ 1 and 300 coupons per 1 ruble.

External Debt. Presently, Georgia's external debt totals approximately \$ 1 billion including arrears. Our largest obligation consists of debt arising from our imports of natural gas from Turkmenistan. We also have sizable debts to Russia and EU. Georgia takes its debt obligations seriously and intends to do its best to meet them. However, our present lack of foreign exchange earnings makes this extremely difficult. We are instituting negotiations with our creditors in hopes of restructuring our debt on more concessional terms and within our ability to pay.

D. Structural Policies.

Prices. Almost all prices were liberalized in 1992. Currently under the Government's control are prices of bread, municipal services, natural gas, electricity, public transportation, communications, and some medicines. With the recent increase in energy price, most of these administered prices have now been raised to world levels. Bread prices have also been raised considerably. We intend to completely eliminate the bread subsidy in the nearest future, and in 1995 the Bread Corporation will be broken up and privatized. We also intend to increase transportation prices to world levels.

The recent energy price increases create several problems. In the case of natural gas, most gas for household sector is not metered but is priced on the basis of average consumption. It is not technologically possible to cut off many natural gas users for non-payment. The electricity situation is better but again some users are not metered. The problem of collecting gas and electricity bills is serious one and is receiving the Government's closest attention.

Social Safety net and Wages. Our budget resources do not allow us to establish an adequate social safety net. In September 1994, in conjunction with the price increases for bread, gas and electricity, the minimum wage level was increased to 1 million coupons (or about \$ 0.50) a month. In addition, wages and pension of all receiving less than 2.5 million coupons (about \$ 1.20) have been supplemented to bring them to that level - resulting in significant salary compression. Allowances are also received by single mothers and refugees. From January 1995 these amounts increased by 50 %. This shift from general subsidies to a benefit system will allow us to target the Government's limited resources to those most in need.

The new wage and benefit levels are clearly not adequate, but our budget constraints do not allow us to do more at this time. The

current minimum wage and pension (which is about 10 kg. of bread) is not sufficient to feed a family much less provide clothing or housing. Indeed, our statisticians estimate the cost of the necessary market basket for one person at 73 million coupons per month. Of course many are able to supplement this income with private sector activities or by selling family assets but many can not. Most of the Georgian population was without heat last winter and will be again next winter. Electricity will be severely rationed. The patience of the Georgian people in the face of this hardship is remarkable.

Privatization. Georgia was one of the first republics to privatize housing doing so in early 1992. At present about 40 % of cultivated agricultural land and 75 % of vineyards have been privatized. While more than 2100 enterprises had been privatized by mid February 1995, privatization of state enterprises has not proceeded as fast as the Government wishes. However, a new law passed in spring of 1994 giving employees the right of first refusal and allowing the Ministry of State Property Management to initiate the privatization process is speeding up the privatization process significantly. We intend to complete the small scale privatization process in 1995. We expect to commence a voucher based program of mass privatization of large enterprises in the first half of 1995. About 30 % of large enterprises have been corporatized to date.

Financial sector reform. Some 225 private commercial banks have been formed in Georgia but many are not financially sound. The National Bank has made substantial progress in its efforts to regulate and strengthen the banking system. Minimum capital requirements have been increased over ten fold and reserve requirements have been increased to 20 %. Accounts of non-complying banks have been frozen and several banks have been closed. The payments system has been strengthened and speeded up and penalties for overdrafts have been increased substantially. The state commercial banks are being corporatized and will be privatized.

In co-operation with the IMF, the Government has drafted a new National Bank law which will strengthen money and credit regulations, enhance the National Bank's supervisory role, and increase the independence of the National Bank. The National Bank intends to start a system of on-site inspections code and debtor-creditor laws inhibit banks from making mortgage or collateralized loans. In addition, modern accounting and control system need to be introduced. We also need to develop financial markets, including a money market, and to increase the

accountability and reliability of investment firms (several of which have disappeared with their depositors' money).

Health and Education. Georgia has a high quality health system but one that is beyond our current ability to finance. A detailed reform proposal has been approved by the Cabinet of Ministers and will be submitted to Parliament shortly. This reform will guarantee all citizens basic but limited health services. All other treatment will be on a free for services basis. Some hospitals and clinics will be privatized and all will become self managing. Our educational reform program guarantees nine years of free basic education. Education beyond this basic level would be self-financed with assistance for the needy.

Government reform and private sector development. To help balance the budget and to better accommodate the role of the state in a market economy, the Government is planning a restructuring of the state administrative structure. We reduced the number of workers on the government payroll by approximately 30 %. Obsolete and redundant government structures will be eliminated. The current state order system phased out and replaced by procurement according to market principles. To encourage exports, legislation has been submitted to the Parliament to eliminate the current export duty. In addition current export licensing requirements (which are basically automatic at present) will be eliminated. Recognizing the importance of attracting foreign investment, the Government of Georgia intends to create an environment which will encourage foreign investors to participate in our economy including unrestricted remission of earnings and dividends.

E. Financial Needs.

The Government of Georgia is extremely indebted to our friends in the international community who have already extended aid to us. The level of humanitarian assistance to Georgia has been immense and is greatly appreciated by both the Government and people of Georgia. Without it many of our people would have faced starvation. We still face a large grain shortage and still have approximately 270,000 refugees who can not return to their homes in Abkhazia.

At this point, our main development need is for balance of payments assistance which will allow Georgian producers to import the inputs, equipment, and energy necessary to restart production. Before independence, Georgia was highly integrated with the rest of

the Soviet Union and was dependent on imports for raw materials, intermediate goods and energy. The disruption of trade with the FSU has had a large negative impact on the Georgian economy. The decline in exports has been sharp with estimates ranging as high as 90 %. Due to the resulting lack of foreign exchange, imports of inputs and energy have also been severely curtailed.

Aside from some hydroelectric power, virtually all of Georgia's energy is imported. Since 1990 official imports of fuel oil, gasoline and diesel fuel have been reduced approximately 90 % - although official imports are supplemented somewhat by cross-border imports of gasoline. Imports of electricity, which totaled 5.5 billion KWH in 1990, have virtually ceased and the power line from Russia has been destroyed. Due to substantial arrears, Turkmenistan has reduced its natural gas deliveries to less than one third the 1990 level.

Balance of payments (BDP) support at this time will enable Georgian producers to obtain the necessary inputs to restart production so that they can employ our citizens to export once again. Imports of crucial agricultural chemicals will enable private Georgian farmers to increase production (which has declined 55 % since 1991) and restore our position as an exporter of fruits, vegetables, and wine to the FSU.

Together with our fiscal reforms, balance of payments support will allow us to stop the hyperinflation which is hampering our development and our transformation to a market economy. While beneficial in the long-run, the expenditure cuts and tax increases which we have instituted to-date, and are planning to institute in the near future will have a negative impact on economic activity in the immediate future. BOP support will enable us to bridge the gap until our economy can adjust to this new fiscal structure. By providing some foreign exchange reserves, BOP support will allow us to stabilize and restore confidence in the Georgian coupon and allow us to introduce our new currency, the Lari. Finally, BOP support will ease the adjustment to our structural reforms.

While our main purpose at this time is to seek BOP support, the need and potential for public investment support in the future is also great. To mention a few, Georgia has great hydroelectric potential both for domestic consumption and export that is not being realized at present. Our power supply systems are also in disrepair. We have reserves of oil, gas, and coal and need assistance in evaluating and realizing their potential. Our roads and railways are in serious disrepair and are a hindrance to economic development.

Improvements in this sector would provide some of the needed infrastructure for development. Improvements in our ports in Poti and Batumi are needed both for our use and to enable us to serve other countries in the region.

The economic challenge facing the Georgian Government is formidable. The condition of our economy and our people is dire. However, the Georgian people are highly educated and resourceful and, as demonstrated by their perseverance the last few years, their tolerance for hardship and will to survive is great. With the assistance of the international community, we are confident that we can thorough our current problems and realize our high economic potential.

Project for Revitalization of the Ecological System and the Biological Productivity of the Aral Sea

B.D. TASHMUHAMEDOV, A.K. KURTOV, B.K. KAMILOV—

We can define the ecological crisis of Aral Sea, well-known by a large number of students, using the following statistics: In the last few decades, the development of agricultural policies which necessitates a good irrigation fascilitics in the farms, in Central Asian Republics, caused a decrease more than three times of the Aral Sea reserves - from 1000 km³ to 300 km³. Accordingly, the amount of mineralization in the Sea increased to 10 gr/lit. This ratio is even more, that the amount of salt in the oceans. As a result of drawing of the shores, drying up of the deltas and lakes, a land more than four million sq.km has occurred. Millions of tons of salt and earth are carried towards the green areas, for hundres of kilometers, with the help of the winds. At present 2 million hectars of tillable land has turned into a dessert. Plateaus, reed beds, and the pastures along the rivers are becoming extinct. The water level of the Aral Sea has dropped more than 15 meters. This still continues. It is because of the fact that the amount of water carried into the Aral Sea by Amuderya and Side-rya rivers has dropped from 64 km³, in the 1960s, to 10 km³ yearly. In order to recover the amount of water evaporating from the surface and to keep the water level the same, it requires 30-35 km³ of water supply. Otherwise, Aral Sea will continue drying up. It has been more than five years that fishing has died in the Sea. There are not fishes. Due to the excessive mineralization of the sea, the fishes, *Süleyman*, *Zagare* and above all world famous Aral moustache fish have become extinct. By the year 2000 the amount of salt will reach to 200 gr/lit. and by the year 2010 the salt at the bottom of the sea will begin accumulating. This continuity may end the biological cycle of the sea.

Many proposals were offered for the preservation of the Aral Sea. Nevertheless, non of these projects seems practicable. One of those projects is to carry the Caspian Sea water through pumps and canals

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to Aral Sea. But the realisation of this highly expensive project is impossible under today's circumstances. It is also useless to search for underground water supplies for Aral. Because there are not that amount of water sources in the region. It may be helpful, to an extent, to suggest the economical usage of water in the areas where massive irrigation is required. But even this attempt does not provide the tens of cb. km. of water required for Aral. It may only play a partial role in improving the demographic situation of the region by providing some irrigation for the additional agricultural lands. Under these circumstances, we must approach the problem realistically, and must search for ways to ease the problem by acting on time, rather than wasting time with projects that are, impossible to realize under today's conditions. Thus we must try to recover the Sea back to its original state. If this cannot be done, we must at least try to recover some certain parts. This is not something that cannot be realized. It is possible to treat the water supplies near the city of Aral'sk and to restructure the *Sarıghhanak* (Small Sea) in the north of Aral, even if it costs the cutting of Siderya's supplies. There are also some projects for building a dam on the Amuderya delta and on some parts of the previous beds of the Aral Sea to recover the Aral Sea.

The drawing sea puts the necessity of creating new projects, by itself, forward. It has been observed that the sea is gradually being divided into two parts; the deep part being in the west, and shallow and bigger part being on the east. In the coming two years, Vozrodenija island extending from north to south will join the main land in the south, with the emergence of new islands forming a peninsula with deep water currents thus joining the two parts of the Aral Sea. It is possible to accelerate this formation by constructing small dams in the region. If the Aral Sea is to be left alone, there will be great salt and sand desert extending from north to south formed by the evaporation of the water in the deep crack in the west and in the shallow part in the east. The project we are offering aims at bringing Aral Sea, partly, back to its original state and thus protecting the sea. We will explain the main features of this project, below:

If we can direct Amuderya, which has 8 cb. km. of water reserve, to the western part of Aral along the western shore of the river delta, the situation will change. That is to say our efforts may become easier. (This does not mean that the river bed will be changed. Because, the subject embodies the water supplies in this region of Uzbekistan.

This can easily be realized.) If we could add 2 cb.km. of underground water reserves to the above calculations, we will have 10 cb.km. of water reserve. These drinkable water slowly accumulating may drift the salty water, with the help of northern water currents to the eastern part of the sea. Apart from the natural water ways, it is possible to make use of canal waters that are available today, i.e., Sudoche lake and, even, at least Muynak water reservoirs. In addition, it will be possible to realize phytomeliorative procedures in the depths of Ac-cibay straight which will have started biological cleansing period on this bioplateau.

This project is not planned to protect the eastern part of the sea which will moisturize a big landscape in the future. But if the project proves to be successful, it will not only protect the western part of the sea. At the same time it will be possible to re-enliven the first echosystem of Aral, which will be obtained by drinkable water supplies gained by preserving the sea back to its former status. This forms the 36 % of the Aral's overall reservoir.

It is necessary to bring the amount of salt in the sea back to 18 gr/lit in order to obtain the hydrogeological conditions which will meet the former ichtiofauna of the sea. If only this can be realized it will be possible to breed long-living open-sea fishes in the sea. According to calculations made, it seems possible to decrease the amount of salt to 18 gr/lit within the coming decade with the already existing 10 cb.km. of water supplies. Beginning with the first year water layers having different densities (stratification layers) will move considerably towards north more than expected, thus cleansing the mineralized waters with the help of deep currents. Then, it is easy to control, artificially, the necessary amount of saltiness required.

With the reorganization of the hydrogeological regime it is possible to re-enliven the previous echosystem of the sea directly. This scientific problem which seems rather complex embodies the reintroduction of all the extincting hydrobionts, under less salty regions, i.e., marshes (dry sea shores), ports (small water basins), litorals (depths of sea shores), limnions (lakes), and, or unification of the parts which may be seen rarely in the distant parts of the sea. This variety of the ecological environment may create an opportunity for the reproduction of fish population.

The degree of mineralisation of the western part of the sea, and, ac-

cordingly, the increase in the reed like water plants along the costs of the sea and the newly formed peninsulas may provide opportunities for the fauna of amphibians. The amount of the mineral based fertilizers in the Amuderya river should be accepted as an element which eases the situation to increase the photosynthetic function of the sea. Moreover, it may pave the way for the production of edible major and minor chains of biomassa. All these are necessary for the in-theofauna which takes place at the end of the edible products chain. The main problem that prevents the increase of the biological productivity of the sea is the pollution caused by the pestidtsids in Amuderya river. But today the precautions thought for the minimal usage of the various pestidtsis, along with absolute control of their usage as well as the detoxication process of the sea may provide easy ecological conditions as a result of provard. In the future, the western part of the sea having deep currents may change into a drinkable water basin like that of the western part of the Balkash Lake. There is no doubt that, the existence of 100 cb.km. of reproduced drinkable water supply will play an important role, economically, in the development of the western shores of Aral.

The importance of the sea, from the point of view of the economy of the region, is the reintroduction of all types of fishes in the edible products chain that are gradually becoming extinct; churtan fishes (bahri fish, süleiman fishes (Aral origined), zağare fishes (moustache fish, zağare fish, white fish). The preservation of rare fish types which are only found in Central Asia has a vital importance, as well as providing an environment for their reproduction. But, above all these it also has a scientific importance.

It must be noted that, the rare types of fish, Chortan family, caught in the Caspian Sea are protected at the cost of artificially produced types of fish in the factories. Increase in the natural population of the fishes stems from the peculiarities belonging to their productivity. What we are suggesting is that the süleiman fish prefers the waters in the higher parts of the rivers for reproduction. Today, dams and reservoirs built on the rivers block their natural migration routes. Bahri fish which live in Uzbekistan lay their eggs 2000 km away from the Aral Sea, in Surhan Sea's shallow and rocky shores, as well as to Karaderya and Narin rivers which fall into Siderya river. The reasons for extenction of those edible and valuable fishes in Aral Sea, Amuderya, and Siderya, is the absolute spoiling of their ecological environments

and ending the artificially and naturally provided studies for the reorganization of the ecosystem of the region.

Today we have opportunity to breed female fish groups for reproduction. It is possible to fish Bahri type of fishes in the Balkash Lake where an environment for their reproduction is made available. Aral moustache fish is preserved only in small water basins around Amuderya. Previously, Aral Süleiman fish was considered to be rare. But today it became extinct. But, in the higher regions of the Amuderya river, Amuderya Rose fish still exists. This type is accepted as the last and the closest relation to Süleiman fish. It can be used as an agent to reproduce the Aral Süleiman fish. Since Süleiman and Rose fishes lay their eggs into similar places, it is assumed that they have common genetic qualities. It is possible to bring Caspian and Lena Chortans, and last types of Caspian Süleiman fish to Aral, in the near future.

The general reorganization of the Aral Sea's ichtheofauna, along with technical proceedures to divert Amuderya's water through western rivers and canals, also includes the following proceedures:

1. Development of biotechnical methods to produce some types of fish artificially.
2. Creation of fish-production mechanism and their schematic arrangements.
3. Industrial use of small fishes and fish having a two-year life span and their distribution to open water basins. (It is possible to make use of other countries' experiences so as to realize the spread of fishing industry.)
4. Another important task of the project is the reconstruction of hydroflora together with the hydrofauna along with the edible products.

Together with pool fishing, breeding fish in the water basins depending upon scientific researches enables the realization of industrial fishing that would serve Aral people as a source of meat, as well as being an additional source of income. If we take some countries' people depend upon fish a main course, in consideration, we can easily see that this is vitally important.

This project we have just submitted on the improvement of the echoystem of Aral Sea and founding a sophisticated and fertile fish-

ing industry is produced by the association of a large group of professionals - like, hydrogeologists, hydrobiologists, ichtheologists. The professionals from Tashkent State University, Uzbekistan Science Academy Institutes have stated that they were ready to take active parts in the project. Academician, P.S. Pavlov of Moscow State University Head of the Department of Ichtheology, wrote that "To join the projects that are offered to protect the ichtheofauna of the Aral Sea is a sacred mission of every single ichtheologist." The leading scientist of this department B.Y. Verigin who has 27 years of experience in team works in Uzbekistan also states that he is willing to share his experiences in the process of realisation of Aral projects. Competitors hope that their projects prove to be successful in the elections and be put into practice as soon as possible.

This project that is being suggested, is the first step of strengthening Aral ecologically, and does not deny the internationally designed big projects planned, to reconstruct the Aral Sea and Aral banks, on a universal platform that requires massive financial means.

The History of Kumyks and Their Current Problems

Asst. Prof. Dr. Kamil ALIYEV

Population Distribution, Population and Territory

From a population view, Kumyks are second to Azerbaijanis as Caucasian Turks. The plains and foothills of the Northern Caucasus and particularly the east of today's Dagestan Republic, known as Kumukiye (Kumykia hereafter) in history, constituted the region where the ethnicity of Kumyks was formed and developed. Kumyks live collectively (%82.2) in 7 of the 11 towns which are located on the plains and foothills of Dagestan. The total surface area of the region exceeds 12,000 square km. Besides, a certain number of Kumyks live in areas which belong to Chechnya (Guidermesskiy county) and the North Ossetia Republic (Mozdokskiy county). There are also Kumyk groups living in Turkey, Iran and Syria. The urbanization rate of Kumyks is %47 and most of them live in Mahaçkale (Anji, Prot-Petrovsk), Buynaks (Temur-han-Şura), Izberbaş, Kaspiysk, Kızılyurt, Hasavyurt, Kızılyar. The region where the capital of the Khazars-Anji (Semendeve) is located is also host to Mahaçkale which is the historical center of Kumyks.

According to the 1992 census, the number of Kumyks is over 300,000 and the population growth rate is seventh with %48.5 in the Russian Federation (1970-1989). % 98.158 of Kumyks are employed. % 18.6 of them are employed in industry, % 28.2 in agriculture, % 7.0 in various institutions of the Ministry of Transportation, % 7.4 in health services % 7.1 in sports and social services and % 10 in education. The percentage of white-collar employees is considerably high and stands at % 31 of all employed Kumyks. % 3.1 of Kumyks are working in administration. % 8.2 of Kumyks are university graduates (The Russian average is % 11.3) (1).

Economy

Kumyks are primarily engaged with farming. The main products

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of farming constitute cereals, fruits and vini-culture which has been developing since the 8 th and 9 th century. In the past, Kumyks were also engaged with cattle-breeding. As % 70 of the republic's economy is located where Kumyks live, Kumykia is justly called the region's granary. Almost all industry (tool production, machinery production, conservation, vine industry etc.) is located there. Rice cultivation and fishery is also developed.

There are natural resources such as oil, natural gas, various mineral basins and construction material raw material (glass sand, aggregate, sea gravel etc.) in the region.

Also, there are a good number of recreational springs (on the Caspian coast), thermal springs and mineral water springs, hydrogen sulfide (Talgi), hydro carbonate-sodium (Kayakent), chlorine, lime springs etc...

Ethnopolitical Past and Culture

The people of Kumykia is the legal inheritor of its ancestors who founded the Caucasus, Khazar and Tarkav states between the 4 th and 19 th centuries. Between the 14 th and 19 th century Kumykia has continued its existence as a half-feudal state (Şamhallık) under the protection of Turkey, Iran and Russia. In the 16 th century, this state fought against the Russians and Kabardins and thus hindered the expansion of these states in the Southern Caucasus (2).

The borders of this state stretched from Derbent in the south to Kabardino in the north. For several centuries this state has been a significant element in international relations. However, when Russia conquered all of the Caucasus in 1867 the Kumyk state came to an end. One part of the Kumyk state, Zaslavskaya Kumykia was given to the Terskiy province (an old Kumyk region) and another part of it the Tarkovskiy region was given to Russian's Caucasus Governorship's Daghestan province.

However, Kumyks joined the Turkish modernist movement (jadidist movement) in the 19 th and 20 th centuries and have struggled to reestablish their national state. During 1908-1916 Kumyk representatives became members of the 'Committee of Oppressed Turks and Muslims In Russia' founded by exiles in Turkey. They also pleaded their case at the Lausanne Conference in 1916 and asked for the support of many Asian and European leaders.

During the revolutionary years Kumyks actively joined the in-

dependence movements of the North Caucasian peoples and constituted an important element in the founding of the North Caucasus Democratic Republic, the Tersk Daghestan Government and the South-East Union. Kumyks assumed significant roles in the 1918 North Caucasus Democratic Republic government (such as Head of Government, Head of the Parliament Union, Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Internal Affairs, Finance and Defense). Among these men, leaders of parties and institutions such as the Central Committee of the Joint Mountaineers Union, the *Cemiyet-ul Islamiye*, the National Committee, *Sirat-ul mustakim* (The Just Way) were brought up.

In 1920 the Bolsheviks announced the autonomy of Daghestan. This autonomy caused Kumyks to live in Daghestan and Russia without status. Kumyk leader D. Korkmaz's struggle to gain status for Kumyks and to establish a state that would consider the multinational structure of the region ended unsuccessfully. Kumyk leader and Head of the Daghestan government D. Korkmaz was accused with inciting Pan-Turkism and bourgeois nationalism. Thus he became the object of oppression. At last, 7 national administrative regions (Bunak, Kayakent, Karabudakhkent, Korkmaskal, Kizilyurt, Babayurt and Hasavyurt) based on ethnic and regional realities were established.

Kumyk Culture, Language and Civilization

Kumyks belong to the the great European race's Balkan Caucasus branch. Therefore they are considered brother nations of Kabardins, Balkars, Karaims and Crimean Tatars. They are Sunni Muslims. Islam began to spread between the 8 th and 9 th century and established itself in the 15 th century. Kumyks, like other Turks, used to believe in theism. Later some of them accepted Judaism and Christianity. Today in all Kumyk regions there are mosques. According to some data % 80 of Kumyks are believers. Currently there is an independent Kumyk ulema administration present in Mahaçkale.

The Kumyk language belongs like the Kabardino-Balkar, Karaim and Crimean Tatar languages to the Altaic language family. They mainly have rooted historical characteristics like Bulgar, Khazar and Kuman languages. The Kumyk language has been an intercommunal language among the peoples of the Northern Caucasus and has also been used internationally. Also, it has been taught in Russian universities and other post-secondary schools during the 19 th century. It has been recognized as the official language at the 1917 Northern Caucasus Peoples National Congress (3). In 1923 the Kumyk lan-

guage has been declared as the official language of the Daghestan Autonomous Republic. With the adoption of Islam Kumyks also adopted the Arabic script. After 1917 the Kumyk language developed in the direction of Buynak and Hasavyurt accents. In 1929 a script based on the Latin alphabet was developed, but the Cyrillic alphabet was adopted in 1939.

Kumyks are the inheritors of a rich culture, a developed literature, folklore and arts. The Kumyks produced scientists, writers, poets and commanders such as; Süleyman Ibn Daud Sakoini Süveri (12 th century), Ishak Ibn Kundaç El-Hazari (9 th century), Ali -Kuli-han Baleç Daghestani (18 th century), Bagdad Ali (17th century), Kadir Murza (18th century), Yırçı Kazak (19th century), Muhammed Osmani, Devlet Murza Şeyx Ali, Abdurrahman Atılı Boyunlu (19 th century), Ab-usufyan Aka, Nogay Batırmurza, Manay Alibek, poet/film director father and son Tarkovskys. Among scientists are eminent names such as Murat Kaplanov, Mucaid Hangışiyev, Raşit Askerhanov, Şakinet Hacıyeve. Currently there are more than 250 PhD and above level scientists, 6 academics and 3 university rectors working in the education system and other scientific fields. Also a renown group of writers and artist such as Enver Acıvyev, Bariyet Muradova and Isbat Batlbekova are Kumyk. Kumyks are also successful in sports; El-Kılıç, Salı-Süleyman,, Kazı-bek, the Nasrullayev brothers are quite famous in free-style wrestling, Saypulla Absaidov, Muhammedşapı Abuşev are Olympic champions.

The 1930-1980 Ethnic Division Policies

Against Kumyks-Consequences

After the establishment of Soviet power and Stalin's totalitarian regime became rooted in the early 1930s, Kumyks, like other Turkish peoples, became the target of ethnic divide-and-rule policies in the name of founding a historic union. Two alphabet reforms in ten years (1928-1938) created a deep gap between Kumyks and their historical and cultural heritage. The planned education of the people came to a halt for some time. The traditionally high literacy rate (Kumyks have the highest literacy rate among Daghestan peoples) also suffered. Many intellectuals (about 20) were arrested. Economically the most productive part of the people have been forced to migrate to other places.

National identity has been ruthlessly suppressed under the disguise of fighting Pan-Turkism and bourgeois nationalism. Frequent

changes in the administrative structure, the division of land in 1928-29 which preferred the socialist central structure instead of a cantonal division made Kumyk nationbuilding unstable. These policies took Kumyks away from their natural foundations. Non-Kumyk nations were encouraged to migrate to Kumykia on an unheard scale. Following long years of ethnic and demographic aggression, the annexation of Kumyk lands, Kumyks became a minority in their homeland. Today, Kumyks constitute only % 25 of the population.

These policies were followed by forced migration from towns and villages, and the abolishment of small Kumyk farms. Hence over 60 farms were abolished in the Babayurt and Mahaçkale regions and were forced to join the mountain town farms. In 1944 ten thousand Kumyks living around Mahaçkale were forced to migrate to Chechnya from where oppressed Chechens were sent to Kazakhstan. Kumyk lands were given to the Avars of Gubin by an administrative decree and still are at the hands of Avars.

Another form of ethnic discrimination was the excessive taxation of land and the confiscation of Kumyk lands in exchange of the "concealed" mountain farms. All of these policies were approved by the autocracy of the Communist Party provincial leadership. Today 3658 sq km of Kumyk land, namely % 35 of Kumykia or % 50 of arable land belongs to these "concealed" farms. Whereas according to international legal norms "no people, at no time can be deprived of the means of ensuring their possessions".

In recent years, namely in 1991, despite Kumyk objections, a decision to open the way for ten thousand non-Kumyks to settle and establish their own administrative region north of Mahaçkale has been approved. Despite the fact that these regions are regions from which Kumyks were forced to migrate in 1944. Therefore, land is a constant source of ethno-political tension in Kumykia and has the potential to explode at any time. Yet, Moscow is uninterested about the concerns of Kumyks.

From a national viewpoint, the education system is not suitable. There is not a single school that offers education in the Kumyk language. The footsteps of national education, namely Educational high-schools and vocational schools have been abolished long ago. It can be said that a Russian-Daghestani school model, devised by Russian imperial ideologues, which aims to assimilate Daghestani languages into Russian is being applied. Primary language at these schools is Russian. All national institutions have been abolished. The non-national character of city-life has been portrayed as an example of an

ideal lifestyle. All lectures which could strengthen national identity have been neglected. A large proportion of the people is ignorant about their language, history and culture. The number of people who attend Kumyk theatre is consistently falling in recent years. Also, the number of printed Kumyk language newspaper, magazine, books and readers is decreasing.

Until recently, men who argued that national identity should be protected, that people should claim ownership to their lives and lands were prosecuted. These men were sent to prison and exile particularly during 1929-1953 and immediately removed from their posts between 1964-1980. During the 1990s Kumyk leaders were accused of inciting separatism, extremism and nationalism.

Present forms of political inequality and injustices in wealth distribution (these are also effecting Kumyks), are the sources for internal and international conflict at a societal level. Also, Kumyks have 18 seats in the Daghestani Parliament (None in the Russian Parliament) but they cannot influence the decision-making process although they constitute a majority in the region. They cannot influence decisions which pertain to themselves and cannot protect their national rights. There is an arithmetic structure in the Parliament and any problem is solved through a simple vote seeking a simple majority.

The Kumyk Peoples Movement (KPM)

Tenglik, the Kumyk Peoples Movement, which came about when dissatisfaction was consistently increasing, constituted an influential communal-political movement in Daghestan during 1989-1993. This movement was organized by the Founding Congress on November 19, 1989. Currently, it has its own program, byelaws, and 30 to 40 thousand adherents. *Tenglik* lead the Kumyk people in the co-ordination of the January 1991 and March 1992 Extraordinary Congresses. At the first congress a declaration that underlined the desire of Kumyk self-determination was approved. Also, the status of the National Parliament-an arm of the National Congress was examined and it was decided that this parliament shall undertake regular talks with state institutions. At the second congress it was decided to have a referendum regarding the establishment of an autonomous Kumyk Region within Daghestan and Russia.

The KPM, *Tenglik* organized the Daghestani Peoples Congress in October 1992. At the congress it was decided to found the Daghestan Peoples Kurultai. The leader of *Tenglik* (KPM) S. Aliyev was elected

Head of the Kurultai. The Congress is currently organizing its own political activities and became a member of the North Caucasian Democratic Forces Assembly (NCDFA). The leader of the movement is the General Secretary of the NCDFA. *Tenglik* is member of the Turkish Peoples Assembly and participated in the Antalya-Turkey meeting at which representatives of this assembly, representatives of Turkish communities and Turkish states were present. The movement is recently part of the stiff opposition party and movements block and is consistently criticizing the High Soviet of the Daghestani Republic. Also, the movement is producing evidence for the need of a federal Daghestan and the establishment of two parliaments. Regarding this matter, the *Nogai Birlik*, the *Lezgin Sadval* movements, the Chechen-Akkins and Ter Kazakhs are supporting the KPM.

Ways and methods to lead the people to a republican democracy are sought.

The Demands of the Kumyks

The Kumyk Peoples Movement has transformed itself from a communal union to a structure that is capable of fighting oppression and dictatorship, to a movement capable of determining its own political goals and developing its own democratic methods. The source of this confidence is its people known for its peace-loving, traditionally democratic, culturally, methodologically peaceful, people-oriented, human rights inclined nature and characteristics.

Tenglik (KPM) has been recognized as the sole representative of the Kumyk people at the Turkish Peoples Assembly. In July 1994, the leader of *Tenglik* Salav Aliyev and his representatives have been invited to the "Non-Represented Peoples Organization" subcommittee meeting in Geneva. *Tenglik's* membership to this organization has been approved.

The experiences of Kumyks and nations in similar situations (Balkars, Nogais, Crimean Tatars etc.) indicates that unless there is a political and legal guarantee to ensure national sovereignty and a legal mechanism capable of solving arising problems, it is extremely difficult to protect national interests. Therefore, Kumyks should pursue their struggle in light of the legal frameworks of the Russian Federation, The Daghestani Republic and other international legal institutions. The demands of Kumyks are as following:

1. Granting Kumyks the right to determine their own fate, to es-

establish their own national government and economy on their land.

2. When the structure of the state is changed and the rule of human rights is ensured, the unity/entirety of Daghestan shall remain.
3. To ensure equal conditions for the continued existence of national language and culture, to ensure equal conditions for the revitalization of ethnic structure and the process of reproduction of ethnic composition.
4. The democratization of the peoples education, the re-starting of national schools and the switching back to the Latin alphabet.
5. Protection of lifestyle and space which is ecologically and demographically appropriate to the Kumyk people.
6. To stop the communal migration in Kumykia and the return of lands which have been illegally taken by force.

Solutions to and Developments of the Kumyk Problem-An Evaluation of Predictive Perspectives

Considering the state of the Kumyk people, the tendencies of political and ethnic developments, the ethnically and socially heterogeneous political system, there predictions can be made:

- If all components of Daghestan's political system recognize the need to reform the constitution - according to the national problem, and the "upper" authority starts federalizing Daghestan by initiating talks with various national groups, ethnic and political developments may find a normal balance and order. As indicated, a mechanism to organize Daghestan's national problems needs the following three elements:

- a) National-regional autonomy (Similar to Swiss cantons),
- b) Furnishing national minorities and national groups with land,
- c) Cultural autonomy.

- If the government, inconsiderate of national subjects, will insist on its old unitary structure and will obstruct constitutional reform it will be inevitable for opposition forces to start a democratic struggle. Lately, ideas supporting two parliaments and a national parliament for self-determination are becoming increasingly acceptable. What is

needed is to produce the necessary legal framework for these demands.

- If the government will choose to suppress national movements, which may happen, this will add to the rising of tensions and the radicalization of morals and activities of national movements.

What is realistic for the near future is legal action that will lead to the changing of the republic's High Parliament and the establishment of national parliaments. There is no doubt that these measures will be long-lasting. Hence, it will be adequate for the legalization and modernization of ethno-political activities, and for the ensuring of the multipartite and multinational unity of the Daghestani Republic.

Endnotes:

1. All census statistics have been borrowed from the 1989 general census of the USSR.
2. B.Bartold, Kumiki, *Ensiklopediye Islama*, Moscow, 1982.
3. Kumuklar, *Islam Ansiklopedisi*.
4. G.Pantuyhov, *O Kumikax*, Tbilisi, 1896.
5. D.Şeyh-Ali, *Kumik o kumikah*, T, 1948.
6. RSFSR State Statistics Committee Daghestan Branch **Socio-demographic characteristics of the various nations and peoples in Daghestan (According to the 1989 census)**, Mahaçkale, 1992.
7. "Mojet li imet budushego Kumikskiy narod. K konsepsii natsionalnogo razvitiya" (Can the Kumyk people determine their future? On the essence of national development)
8. "Konsepsiya Natsionalnogo Razvitiya Kumikskogo Navoda" (The essence of the development of Kumyk people), "Tenglik", 1992, (project).
9. Programma i Ustav KHD "Tenglik" (KPM The program and bye-laws of "Tenglik").
10. "Konsepsiye Kumikskoy Avtonomii v sostave Dagestana i Rossiyskoy Federatsii" (The essence of the Kumyk Autonomous Region within Russia and Daghestan).
11. Konsepsiye Federalizatsii Dagestana (The essence of federalizing Daghestan), 1993, (project).
12. K.Aliyev, Kumikskoe Navodnoe Dvijenie "Tenglik" (predposilki vozniknoveniya u tendentsii razvitiya) (Kumyk Peoples Movement "Tenglik" (Conditions of its origin and the essence of its development) "Tenglik", Moscow, 1993, no. 7.
13. K.Aliyev, "Kak narodu sberech sebe ili pravo na roдинu" (How should the people hide itself or homeland rights) "Tenglik", 1992, no. 8.

14. S. Aliyev, Sili Permen "Natsionalno - demokratichesko dvijenie v Dagestane, ...i perspektivi" (Forces of Change (National Democratic Movement: Regulations and Perspectives) "Tenglik" 1992, No. 8.
15. Yu. Kulçik, H. Djabraikov, **Dagestan: Kumikskiy Etnos** (Daghestan: The Ethnos of Kumyks), Moscow, 1993.
16. **Kumikskoe narodnoe dvijenie. "Etnonolis"** (Kumyk Peoples Movement "Ethnonolis"), Moscow, 1993.
17. Razdel, Kazlad, Raspad (Separation, Breakdown, Disintegration) (Meeting with leaders of "Tenglik" K. Aliyev and H. Ibragimov), Gazette **Soyuz**, November 1992.

A Project and Report on the Minorities in Bulgaria *

Ömer TURAN

International Center for Minority Studies and the Foundation of Intercultural Relations have prepared a project named "The Relations of Compatibility and Incompatibility between Muslims and Christians of Bulgaria" in Sofya which is organized by the support of the PHARE program of the European Union. The Project was directed by Antonina Zhelyazkova from Bulgaria. J. Nielsen and J. Kepel from the European Union countries participated in the execution of the project. The work which started in October 1993, lasted for a year. According to the statements of the participants, the objective of the project is while determining by the help of various scientific disciplines the sources of compatibility and incompatibility and developing spheres of harmony, proposing strategies to reduce the spheres of conflict which are the disguised sources of tension between ethnic and religious groups.

The Project is composed of three major parts namely, sociological, historical and ethnological. In the historical part there are two articles by Prof. V. Mutaftchieva and Prof. N. Danova. This part encompass, periodicals dating from the beginning of the Bulgarian national movements (19th century) together with examinations of national folklore, scientific literature and historical sources.

The differences of Islam and Christianity, their mutual adaptations, the forms of relations where they have been compatible, the "other" image both inside and outside, and the transformation of these nations are underlined. With the help of historical experience the factors contributing to characteristic foundations, are investigated. By this way, positive characteristics are put forward.

Although the totality of the historical part has been written five years after the collapse of the communist regime, the format of the

* International Centre for Minority Studies and Intercultural Relation's Foundation, *Relations of Compatibility and Incompatibility Between Christians and Muslims in Bulgaria*, Directed by Anatolia Zhelyazkova, Sofia, 1994.

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Ottoman-Bulgarian relations section shows that the historians have not succeeded to give up writing in the traditional style. According to V. Mutaſchieva the Bulgarians were forced to adopt Islam, and they were not free to materialize their national culture, under the Ottoman rule. The sole reason behind their backwardness was again the Ottoman pressure, thus the Bulgarians could never appreciate the Turks. According to V. Mutaſchieva, within this historical perspective, the Bulgarians may not be considered unjust.

One cannot stop asking to the writer who is repeating the classical statement: "If the Ottomans did really have such a policy, why couldn't they progress in 600 years of reign?; or why did not they pursue the same policy for the Gagauz who are linguistically Turkish, but Orthodox, or why did not they start it from the Gagauz?, the Serbians, Greeks, and the Armenians were also subjects of the Ottoman Empire, but how come they sustained their national cultures?; The principal threat to the Bulgarian national identity in the 18th century has been Greekification, if the Ottomans had a policy of Turkification and Islam, why did the wealthy Bulgarians been more Greekified, more than being Turkified, was not it the Pope Paisi, the first inciter of Bulgarian nationalism, who had resisted Greek economic and cultural domination.

After Mutaſchieva's article, N. Danova, discusses how the Greeks as the qualified and rich managing class have dominated the Bulgarians and incorporates the words of the Bulgarian nationalist leader: L. Karavelov "The Greeks hired the God and like selling frozen fish, they are seling it to the other orthodox nations. Greco-Bulgarian emnity is historical, eternal, unrecoverable and hopeless." I reccomend that Mutaſchieva first should start with Barbara Jelavich's "General Balkan History", Peter Sugar's "South-East Europe under Ottoman rule", Standford Shaw, and go on reading Flemish Art Historian Micheal Kiels "Art and Society in Bulgaria, under Turkish rule", a book prepared by Ottoman, Bulgarian and European sources.(1)

Mutaſchieva is chronologically presenting the recent history of Bulgaria and Bulgarian Turks in a distorted manner: "Even very soon after the Ottoman-Russian war, the Bulgarians were good the Ottomans (p. 19)... Turkish customs were preserved by means of their own courts. The wages of 12 müfti were paid by the state, and the Turks were educated in 1300 schools, where the medium of education was Turkish. In spite of the Bulgarian assistance to education, be-

cause many schools were religion dominated, because of their lower quality, because they could not get to the level of the Bulgarian schools, and because of the indifference of the Muslims to education, the targeted progress was not achieved... The Turks who resided in Bulgaria preserved their lands." (page 21)

Where to start to correct! Today the responsables of the 1876 Bulgarian revolt are known to everyone. According to the documents of the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the plans of the 1876 Revolt were prepared by a comission. According to this plan, the places which were likely to threaten the Revolt: Edirne, Filibe, Tatar, Pazarcık, Karlova, Ihtiman, Izkadı, and all of the villages of Sofia would be burnt. All of the Bulgarians who would resist would be forced to participate. Turks living in mixed villages would be killed, their houses would be burnt and their belongings would be plundered. All of the Muslim villages within the area of Revolt would be burnt (2).

During the Revolt, all of these plans were executed without any exceptions. According to the reports of Mr. Baring (the official sent by the British Embassy to the area for investigation) and the American Protestant Missioners, the Bulgarians forced the peasent to revolt saying that the Turks would slander them otherwise. Yet, a Bulgarian Pope who did not participate was killed (3). During this Revolt many Turkish villages like Okçular, Caferli, Doğanlı, Uraçlı and Palanka were burnt (4). There were no Ottoman soldiers in the area of revolt. Consequently the top rulers were able to stop the revolt by groups they formed among volunteers and prevented more and more Turks form being killed, in massacred Turkish villages. However, this was presented to the European public opinion as the massacre was executed by the Turks against some 100.000 Bulgarians. Today, 100 years after this incident, we know the truth.

If we are to have a look at the 1877-1878 Ottoman-Russian war ; it is a reality accepted by the Russians that in a region where Turks and Bulgarians cohabitated in equal numbers, a systematic war of annihilating a race with the aim of providing a territory for the Bulgarians was held and as a result of this war, the previously 1.600.000 numbered Muslims were reduced to 800.000 due to the massacres and forced emigrations, thus a territory for the Bulgarians was secured (5). It was the Turks who lost their lives during these massacres and wars. Thus it is the Turks who will always remember these wars and the massacres, but not the Bulgarians. Against all these, I

have nothing to say about statements like: "Even after the 1876 incidents and the 1877-75 war, the Bulgarians were good to the Turks."

It was a stipulation of the Berlin Agreement that the Turks would have religious and cultural autonomy in the Principality Period: Article 5 of the Berlin Agreement provided that religious diversity did not constitute a barrier against the realization of rights, it also guaranteed the freedom of worship, the free organization of the non-Christians according to religious hierarchy and their non-hindered contacts with their religious leaders, stating that these must constitute the basis of the Civil Law of Bulgaria. In spite of this, the Turks of Bulgaria were not granted these rights and freedoms. In this context, various regulations were issued about the religious organizations of the Muslims of Bulgaria, yet Bulgaria did not conform to any of these. They did not grant the right of the Muslims to elect their own mufti, a right previously secured under laws. They deported muftis they did not favor, and assigned others they preferred. The relations between the Muftis with the highest authority "Seyhulislam" in Istanbul were also banned (6).

According to these regulations, the Muslims were supposed to settle disputes among them through religious law, in religious courts. Yet, the Bulgarian government issued a proclamation stating that, matters of inheritance and testimony would be settled in Courts of Bulgaria. The representatives of the Muslims however could not change this, through their lobbies even with the Bulgarian Prince. Yet by the intervention of the French Deputy Consulate in Varna, the Bulgarian government by the pressure of France, gave up The Bulgarian Parliament in 1889 adopted a similar law amending ordinance. With the pressure of the Ottoman Sofia Commissioner, this law was suspended. In late 1891, Bulgarian Ministries of Foreign and Religious Affairs submitted a similar proposal of law to the Parliament. With the pressure of the Ottoman Empire this was not passed into a statute, but it was put into force as a law in the totality of Bulgaria. In 1906, the Bulgarian deputies once again became active in passing a law of similar content, yet this was returned due to intense pressure (7). The essence of Turks' preserving their customs through their own courts, as Mutafchieva discusses is as such.

It is true that the 12 muftis were paid by the Bulgarian government. Yet, because of reasons of savings it was common that the wages of some were reduced, and sometimes the office of mufti were

closed. The Bulgarian government by this way limited the freedom of action of the muftis, and thought that they had the power of disposal over them. As a matter of fact, in 1903 the then Bulgarian Prime Minister had admitted that Bulgaria was interfering in the matters of the muftis saying that "If the Ottoman Empire paid the muftis, the Bulgarian government could not interfere". After this even though the Ottoman Empire activated and attempted to pay its muftis, they could not succeed (8). The wages of the aforementioned twelve muftis is a real negligible amount, when one considers the number and costs of the demolished, siezed and burnt Islamic foundations. I do not want to get into too much detail, but for further information one may refer to our upcoming book, stated in the footnote.

During the Principality Period, the schools of the Turks enjoyed special status in Bulgaria. Within this context, it is true that they received some amount of financial assistance annually from the Bulgarian government. Yet, for example in 1907 while the financial assistance recieved from the Bulgarian government was 75.000 leva, the education tax they paid was 1.575.928 leva. That is the Bulgarian Turks could only recieve 1/20 return from their education tax which they paid as an obligation. The unsystematic financial assistance could only meet % 4 of the expenses of the Turkish primary schools thus the Turks had to compensate the rest (% 96) (9).

It is not a true assertion that the Turks were underdeveloped because of a religion dominated education. Naturally, religious education was given, but it was only the medresseh's where the domain of education was solely religious, and while their number was 20 between 1900-1901, they were left only 10 between 1909-1910. The reason behind the backwardness of Turkish education was the arbitrary interferences of the Bulgarian governments, the siezure of the revenues of the foundations by the Bulgarians and the expropriation of well-located Turkish schools and their replacement with dark and unhealthy ones. The Bulgarian Turks' having 1300 schools in those times is not a consequence of the Bulgarian policies. Before the war, the number of Turkish schools in Bulgaria was about 2500. According to Bilal Şimşir, nearly 1500 buildings of Turkish schools and medresseh's were destroyed and burned down between 1877 and 1886 (10).

Mutafchieva asserts that the Turks left in Bulgaria preserved their lands after the war. (p. 21) Still, according to the ascertions of

R.Crampton an authority of the then Bulgarian history, even there were 100 ranches only in Old Zağra before the war, in 1886 four were left and only one of these belonged to a Turk. Again, according to Crampton's statements, because of the lack of correct statistical data between 1877-78 war and the mid 1890's it is impossible to ascertain the quantity of land transferred in Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia. No one can know the degree of usurped lands. Although the Bulgarian statistics are not dependable, other reliable data reveal that in Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia up to 1888, 4.5 billion decar, in other words more than one fourth of the cultivable land was transferred. Seven million decars of land due to Turkish and Greek migrations and the increasing poverty of the Bulgarians by late 19th century, were transferred. Majority of these lands were transferred from the Muslims to the Christians. Thus, the ratio of the lands left at the hands of Turks in Eastern Roumelia between 1876 to 1885 decreased from % 50 to % 28 and then from % 28 to % 14. The ratio of the Muslim landowners in the period of the Principality by 1890's was even less than this (11).

I leave it to my readers to judge the message in the sentence of Mutaſchieva "A desire of revenge developed among the Bulgarian intelligentsia against the Turkish minority, something never appeared before." as a response to him in the light of everything written upto here.

Mutaſchieva also discusses the reason behind the liquidation of the Turkish, Muslim minority by Bulgarianizing them. "There are still some unanswered questions like: how come the Bulgarian intelligentsia attempted such a risky and large-scale operation, what were their motivations, what were the basis of their extreme optimism...?" First of all, up to this time failure was not discussed... As a natural consequence of the system, silence dominated the agenda for about a half century. They were misinformed about the veracity and lacked reliable statistical data. The Bulgarian authorities;

1. Probably were timid that an intense Islamic fundamentalist propaganda directed and financed by leaders like Houmenyni and Kaddafi, would hamper Bulgaria's political and moral unity.
2. They were afraid of the outstanding increase in the population of the Bulgarian Turks during 1960's and 1970's, while the Bulgarian population was remaining constant. This increase was rooted in the elevation of the standard of life and revenues,

something which did not satisfy the Bulgarians, but constituted an assuagement for the Turks (p. 29).

"Fundamentalist Islamic propaganda" discussed here is an element of propaganda where it is presented as a continuous danger that puts the Bulgarians in a position where they can do whatever they want. It will be seen in the sociological part of this study personally in the statements of Mutaſchieva that the Bulgarian Turks and the Muslim did not have fundamentalist orientation... It is a fact that the Bulgarians are afraid of the Turks' increasing population, but this trend is not special to 60's and 70's; Turks birth rate has always been higher than the Bulgarians. Plus, is not it confessing that the Turks were destined to live a lower standard of life than the generality of Bulgaria when you explain the increase in the population with the elevation of the standard of life and revenues, something which did not satisfy the Bulgarians, but constituted an assuagement for the Turks.

"Objectivity makes us say that the Bulgarianization of the Turks is not something exceptional in the Balkans, like in the example of the Kemalist Turkey where a new born infant is obliged to be given a Turkish name of course, we are not saying this to rationalize the forced name changing campaigns. This is absolutely a ruthless behaviour. Yet, we can not stop asking why not any of our neighbours pursuing similar policies are not suspected? (p. 29-30)" How can one compare the disposition of a new born Turkish citizens taking a Turkish name with forced name changings in Bulgaria like from Ali-Recep to Boris-Ivan, the ban on speaking Turkish, the eradication of mosques, the forbiddance of observing minimum religious duties like fasting, circumcision, sacrificing, and the wearing of regional-cultural suits, rights guaranteed under various bilateral and international agreements and also by the Bulgarian state. What kind of an objectivity is this?

I leave to my readers to review the following statement: "Turkey has used the losses in the exaggerated fashion which politician would discount this opportunity? After the forced name changing campaigns, a rapid collapse took place in the Turkish employed industries. Of course, statements like "they were encouraged by foreign powers to behave like this," (p.31) is a typical example of considering them not as people displaying natural and humanitarian reactions, under certain circumstances, but only instruments of foreign powers (especially Turkey) and a sort of fifth column. I do not know with

which psychological definition may we explain a policy of presenting the sources of every development through Turkey's guidance, instead of exhibiting realities. I leave it to my readers' to evaluate Mutaftchieva's sentence: "The relations between the Turks and Bulgarians developed after the Bulgarians gained their independence" (p. 20).

Mutaftchieva has proposals like: Because of various reasons, it is not possible to calibrate the Turkish population, so the best solution will be to omit the "nationality section in the census. It is useless to deal with the ethnic connection of the people in the late 20th century (p. 21). Which are non-convincing, especially having seen the way he has analysed the circumstances about the Turks. The sole reason of the failure in the calibrating of the number of the Turkish or Muslim population in Bulgaria is the pressures, tricks and manipulations played over them. Can the doubling (576.927) of the population of the gypsies, when compared to their number in 1989 as 287.732, be explained by their free choice in declaring themselves one way in the previous census and the other in the later. There are serious assertions that the Bulgarian authorities manipulated the figures in order to manifest the Turkish and Muslim population, lesser than they really are.

Because the Greeks dominated the Bulgarians as the well-educated, qualified and rich class in the Ottoman period, there is an enmity and jealousy against them. According to L. Karavelov's explanation, greco-Bulgarian enmity is historical, eternal and unrecoverable. Under the Ottoman rule, because the Serbs were also Slavs, Bulgars seemed to be more sympathetic to them, but after the Bulgarian Principality was instituted, they fall into conflict. The confrontation of partitioning Macedonia caused problems among these two Slavic nations and the 1885 Serbo-Bulgarian war started, thus the Serbian image among the Bulgarians was encumbered.

Feelings about the Romanians are positive among the Bulgarians, because they had hosted the Bulgarian rebellions. Yet, after the institution of the Bulgarian Principality, because of problems relating to Southern Dobruca and some others, relations deteriorated. This negative image was transmitted to the Bulgarian children through school books, until the Communist regime. In the communist period, similar images were used to explain through clan conflicts.

Turks are the second in the classification of enemies only after the Jews, in the Bulgarian folklore. The Bulgarians believe that the Jews

use Christian blood in their bread and meals, a belief rooted in considering the Jews as the total enemies of Christianity. In Bulgarian historical stories, the passing of some border cities including Tirnova to Ottoman rule, is traced to the treachery of the Jews. According to the Bulgarian folklore, the Jews demolished Bulgarian schools, churches and monasteries and cooperated with the Ottomans against the Bulgarians. The Bulgarians both during the 1876 April Revolt and the 1877-1878 Ottoman-Russian war even without any evidence were convinced that the Jews turned in them against the Turks. It is a fact that the Bulgarians were heavily instigated by the Russian attitudes towards the Jews. (p. 32-37)

The two paragraphs we have taken and summarized but without distorting their contents from Mutaftchieva's previously referred essay and N. Danova's article named "Greek, Serbian, Albanian and Romanian characters in Bulgarian literature" reveals by the use of astrological terminology that, the Bulgarians lived as the satellite of the Russians without trusting any of their neighbours and in an escalating mood of apprehension.

The situation in Bulgaria in the last years is perhaps a distinguishing indicator of how far it can be gone by presenting the millions of ethnic minorities living in the country as the "House of Truth" or the fifth column and adjudgating each and every neighbour their enemy.

II. The Ethnological Part

The ethnological part has been prepared by a team presided by Associate Professor Tsvetana Georgieva. Field studies were made in Asenovgrad in 1993 and in Razgrad, Zlatograd and Ruscuk in 1994, where the researchers worked in 3 cities and 30 villages. In these studies the focus was on how the Muslims of Bulgaria cohabitated with the Christians. In this section, following an introduction, there are five articles, by T. Georgieva, V. Tepavicharov, A. Antonov, D. Dimitrova and K. Stoilov. According to their analysis, ethnic determination is far more significant and thus presumable. The Pomaks and the Muslim Gypsies individually or by groups converted to Orthodox Christianity, because in the Central and Eastern Rodops, they affirmed that Islam constituted a barrier before their integration into the Bulgarian society. The Pomaks residing at the west of the Rodop

mountains and some Muslim Gypsies in spite of the fact that their mother language was Bulgarian, declared themselves Turks.

When discussing issues of nationality, ethnicity more than beliefs is underlined. Thus, accordingly, no matter what their beliefs are, a Bulgarian is a Christian, a Turk is a Muslim, and a Gypsy is a Gypsy.

First, by calling them Bulgar Mohameddians instead of Pomaks, they are presented like original Bulgarians. In the second phase, when it is stated that ethnicity is accentuated, it seems as if their being Bulgarian is concurred in advance which is something indisputable. In the third phase, saying that "a Bulgarians is a Christian" is a unilateral move. Here is a deception: why do not they call the Muslims linguistically Bulgarian Muslims instead of Bulgar Mohameddians.

"Naturally, the way a people gets dressed represents her or his groups' visual identity. In this respect, in the forced Bulgarianization period, with the aim of creating a single Bulgar nation, limitations were introduced as to the women's dressings: they outlawed wearing baggy trousers and veil and who insisted wearing those were sentenced." T. Georgieva with a rationalization of these policies, avers that this form of dressing has been perceived as the symbol of the reactionary and underdeveloped Muslim population and the token of the pre-industrial conservative society, since 50-60 years. After this statement he adds that: "A woman whom we had interviewed in a field was laughing when she explained that she had to return to home half-naked, when they forced her to take off of their baggy trousers, in the Galata village." Such a serious and large-scale tragedy has thus been passed over by such flexible words.

The author while presenting how these dresses have been adjudged in Bulgaria in the last 50-60 years using the passive form, tries to conceal that it is the Bulgarian authorities, who have served to this process. Don't the Bulgarians reveal that they have been agitated by the dressings of the Muslims, no matter in the Principate-Republic or Communist Periods. People working and living in the fields, mountains will absolutely wear nothing but the most comfortable suit: baggy trousers... He says that this is the dress of the pre-industrialization times! Did you introduce the latest technology and did they resist it, did you build a factory and they did not accept it? When I was there, I visited all the regions where I established that unemployment was

very common. People there are trying hard to cultivate potatoes in small and crude fields they have set up between mountains and are collecting mushrooms. I leave it to my readers to evaluate the circumstance a woman is put through, and the shock she will have when forced to take off her baggy trousers in the middle of the fields beside her husband, and children round, being half-naked... I suppose that the women interviewed in the Galata village, was still in shock that she was laughing. I myself was told similar stories of degraded people who were still in a mood of shame.

T. Georgieva affirms that with the forced changes in people's dressings followed by bans on religious symbols, Bulgarians start to challenge religious demonstrations and communal problems through contemporary methods. According to the author, "the problem of Islamic education of the Muslim children and the endowment of large religious mosques, was projected as the sources of conflict, viable in the active characteristics of fundamentalist Islam. The teaching of Turkish and Koran to the children in the schools and the construction of huge mosques produced a new sphere of conflict. This, at one point reflects the conflict between modernism and customs."

While a group of people's desire to learn their own language and religion, and their reconstructing new mosques which were demolished by the Bulgarians in the forced name changing campaigns periods, are deemed as conservatism, some Bulgarians' agitation about these is considered to be modernism... though I do not know what kind of a modernism, this is. I think modernism is the very ultimate name that could be given to agitation due to people's learning their own religion and language. When I was visiting the Rodop Mountains in Bulgaria, in the summer of 1992, I came across with numerous demolished mosques which were being reconstructed with the contributions of the poor Muslims.

Although it was the Bulgarian State who had knocked down these mosques, they did not contribute by any means to their reconstruction. These people even could not demand any compensation or assistance from the Bulgarian government. They were only able to take Turkish courses after the normal curriculum 2 or 4 hours a week, only in some primary schools. Is not it unfair to label such an innocent move through degrading definitions like "to receive the support and sympathy of some Western states and the common expression of today 'fundamentalists' which we do not know who it implies and

what it covers? What is more, is that in this single report in the conclusion of the Peter Mitev the director of the sociological part, it is manifested that there is nothing of fundamentalism among the Muslims.

What is manifest in all these statements is that, the national identities of the Muslims and Turks of Bulgaria are targeted and anything related to their national identity (mosque, language, dressing) are projected as a source of conflict. If it is continued with this logic, the only way out, to avoid conflicts would be to Bulgarianize and Christianize (Orthodox) the totality of the non-Muslim elements, namely the Turks, Pomaks and the Gypsies. So, why are we suspecting Todor Jivkov and his team? Or is it a disguised policy of placing into the minds of people the idea "they were also not totally wrong"?

The article by Donka Dimitrova is full of driving examples of how some Bulgarian papers and journalists misdiverted the public opinion and provoked two groups in the Bulgarian Society. Here are some concocted titles from 1993 Bulgarian papers: "The Bulgarian Muslims are facing forced Turkification", "A Turkish Republic is about to be declared in the Rodop mountains" "You may come across with Islamic fundamentalists anywhere in Bulgaria", "The Turkish Army is training Jannissaries for the Bulgarian Army in a disguised manner", etc. etc.. Again according to these papers, 10.500 peace of weapons were distributed to the members of the Movement of Rights and Freedoms, the mosques have become places where anti-Bulgarian propaganda was generated, more than being religious cites, and that the Islamic fundamentalists who constitute a major danger for the Bulgarian state should be stopped... The article by Dimitrova and the examples cited reveal that the principal reason of the ethnic tension in Bulgaria is rooted in the policies of the Bulgarian newspapers and journalists since they continuously publish news of anti-Turkish and Muslim content, and produce a mood of mistrust and provocation among the Bulgarians.

Sociological Part: The sociological part is prepared under the presidency of Professor Petar Emil Mitev. Interviews have been made with politicians and specialists, while party programs and publications about ethnic groups are examined. In this part, the relations between ethnic identity and religious groups are discussed in a time when politics and culture is in a rapid process of change and a new style of economy is evolving. In this part the results of the sociolog-

ical researches are presented in a more equitable manner, when compared to researches of Mutaftchgeva and Georgieva.

According to the establishments set here, the Muslims in Bulgaria are more peaceful and respect the freedoms of other religions. They are far from fanaticism and fundamentalism even more than the Christians of Bulgaria. While the percentage of religious intolerance within the Bulgarians is % 10, this ratio is % 3-5 within the Muslims. (p. 206) There is no religious fundamentalism among the Muslims of Bulgaria (p. 205). Being an atheist is something better than being a fanatic, for the Muslims, plus the Muslims are more tolerant towards the atheists, than the Christians. Although atheism is rooted mostly from Christian origins, 1/3 of the Muslims perceive this natural, while only 1/5 of the Christians are tolerant to it.

There are some circles in Bulgaria who are fond of banning religions other than Christianity. % 10 of the Bulgarians are for the banning of Islam, and % 14 of them are for that of Judaism and Buddhism in Bulgaria. On the other hand, there is even no single Muslim who is against Bulgarian religious fasts and their churches.

Turks being tolerant and not being fanatic though they have been since 1877 till today, forced out of Bulgaria by the eradication of their religion, nationality and national identity, by the Bulgarian authorities, can only be traced to the fact that they are still carrying on the superior ethical values which then possess since the times of the Ottoman Empire, against every provocation and negative circumstances.

P. Mitev's calling Todor Jivkov the modest follower of Kemal Atatürk is an unremediable mistake (p. 190). Here, he wants to maintain that the forced campaigns of name, and identity changings; racism, have started with Mustafa Kemal and kept on by Jivkov in Bulgaria. I suppose the only comparison that could be made between Kemal Atatürk and Jivkov, is that while Jivkov pursued anti-humanitarian policies of nationalism and racism, Atatürk, established a new state from a disintegrated empire through humanitarian understanding of nationalism.

Conclusion : According to the contributors of this project, the objective of this project is while determining by the help of various scientific disciplines the sources of compatibility and incompatibility, and developing spheres of harmony, proposing strategies to abridge the spheres of conflict which are the disguised sources of tension be-

tween ethnic and religious groups. It is inalienable that, such a study should be built upon impartiality while discussing spheres of compatibility and incompatibility and bringing about solutions and strategies. Yet, we can not observe total adherence to this principle in this report.

Mutafchieva's and Georgieva's contemplations that the dressings of the Muslim women working in the mountains and fields is the symbol of the pre-industrialized society, conservatism and backwardness; the learning of the Muslim children Turkish language and Koran: (that is the most natural human right) leads to conflict and this being presented as a confrontation between conservatism and modernism; where the author absolutely takes the side of modernism, constitute some examples of how the two analyze history. I suppose it would have been better, if Muslim and Bulgarian Turkish scientists had participated this project, so that we could have been able to see the other side of the story.

It would have been better, if each article was written conjointly by a Turk/or Muslim and a Bulgarian scientist.

A typical point that we see in some articles in this report is that, in various periods the migration of the Turks from Bulgaria to Turkey was partly reversed because of the lower standards of Turkey (see p. 26-27-147). Absolutely after every immigration, some of the Turks have returned to Bulgaria, but the reasons are not simple and single as explained in this report. As the doors closed, families collapsed, the ones who could not transfer their relatives to Turkey from Bulgaria returned. The ones who were close to their retirement experienced problems of transferring their social security rights to Turkey so had to return to Bulgaria, or the ones who could not get used to living in an open economy with full competitiveness also returned to Bulgaria. I do not want to get into a useless comparison like which country is poorer and which is wealthier. Of course, our critics in this project report do not portray all of our disturbances, yet they are the most striking ones. Because of limited space, we could not discuss them all.

What makes us dispirited in such a subjective study is the wasting of the sources of the PHARE Program which has the objective of assisting the reduction of ethnic conflicts. What more dispirites us, is the misinforming and transmitting the bias of the authors' to some related circles.

Foot notes:

1. Barbara Jelavich, *History of Balkans*, V.I, Cambridge University Press, 1989; Peter Sugar, *Southeastern Europe Under Ottoman Rule, 1354-1804*, University of Washington Press, 1977; Machiel Kiel, *Art and Society of Bulgaria on the Turkish Period*, Van Gorcum, Assen/Maastricht, 1985.
2. *Public Record Office, Foreign Office Archives* (Bundan sonra FO), No. 424/43, Confidential, 2964, No. 602/4, s. 360-372.
3. FO, No. 424/43, p. 431, and also p. 353; Also *Papers of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Mission*, Houghton Library, Harvard University, 16.9.5, Mission to Turkey, European Turkey Mission, 1871-1880, Vol. 1, (Letters) A-H (350), The Suffering in Bulgaria, No. 36/1-24.
4. FO, No. 424/43, p. 339.
5. See Ömer Turan, *The Turkish Minority in Bulgaria (1878-1908)*, Türk Tarih Kurumu, Ankara (forthcoming).
6. Turan, *ibid*
7. Turan, *ibid*
8. *Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi*, A.MTZ. 04. No. 13/2, 62/15, 76/6, 79/38, 113/6, 142/95.
9. Bk. Turan, *ibid*
10. Bilal Şimşir, *The Turks of Bulgaria (1878-1985)*, K. Rustem & Brother, London, 1988, p. 19.
11. Richard J. Crampton, *Bulgaria 1878-1918, A History*, East European Monographs, Boulder Distributed by Columbia University Press, New York, 1983, p. 181-186.

Perspectives On the Unrest In the Altai Region of the USSR *

Hasan Bülent PAKSOY

In a recent article on the potential dissolution of the USSR, Russian nationalist Eduard Volodin included historically non-Russian lands (the Volga-Urals, Siberia, the Altai) in his picture of a "new Russia." Concerning the Altai Turks, he wrote, "The peoples of the Altai... preserved for themselves, for us, and for humanity, one of the most ancient cultures of the world." (1) The implication of this statement, in the context of authors' arguments, is that Altai is now considered a part of "Russia" and "Russian territory" to be preserved in case of dissolution of the Soviet Union (2).

The designation "Altai," as Uzbek and Kazakh, are primarily geographical, tribal or confederation names, not ethnonyms (3). Those names were taken from geographic reference points, by early explorers or ethnographers and mistakenly or deliberately turned into "ethnic" or "political" classifications. Early in the 8th century, the Turks themselves provided an account of their identity, political order and history. These were recorded on the scores of stelea, written in their unique alphabet and language, and erected in the region of Orkhon-Yenisey (4). The designation "Turk" (5) and its variants are encountered centuries earlier, in the Byzantine and Chinese sources, the Turks' Western and Eastern neighbors, respectively. Most mountains, cities, lakes, deserts, rivers in this region, from early historical times until the Soviet period, carried Turk-origin names (6). They are being restored in the late 1980s. Turk language and its many dialect groupings such as Orkhon, Kipchak, Uyghur, Chaghatay, constitute a very large portion of the Altaic family. The dialect currently spoken in the Altai region is related to old Orkhon and Uygur. Only since the Soviet language "reforms," especially of the 1930s, have the dialects been asserted to be "individual and unrelated Central Asian languages". They are mutually intelligible. As Denis Sinor points out in his introduction to Radloff's *PROBEN* (7), in the past 100 years, "new, artificial, names have been created and it is not always easy to es-

* This paper was distributed electronically by Radio Liberty, from Munich, Germany, via the SOVSET computer network, on 10 September 1990.

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tablish equivalencies."For example: Altai was known as Kara-Tatar, later changed to Oirot (doubly misleading, since Oirot is a Mongolian dialect); and back to Altai; Tuvinian was originally Soyon and Urinkhai and sometimes Shor; Khakass was called Abakan or Abakan-Tatar; Kachin and Sagay were jointly "converted" into Khakass; Taranchi became "Modern Uyghur"; Kazakh was Kirghiz.

Thus, when it was recently reported that political unrest and ethnic conflict broke out in the Tuva ASSR, that news came as a surprise to some Moscow based politicians (8). This is primarily because, in the Soviet historiography, the Altai region rates only spotty coverage, mostly recording the past 100 years of Russian settlement and exploitation. It can be stated that after the Turk Empire (East and West) of the 4th-6th c., (in the vicinity of the Orkhon-Yenisei stelea), came various Uyghur and Kirghiz political entities. There was a period of Chinese subjugation, which culminated in large scale uprisings by the Turks prior to the 8th c. Between the 9th-12th c., Karakhanid, Ghaznavid and the Seljuk empires were contiguous from the Chinese to the Byzantine Empires. In that era, the altaians constituted a sub-grouping of the then powerful Karluk confederation (9). During the Mongol irruption, most Turk entities came under Mongol suzerainty (13th 14th c.). After the dissolution of the Mongol empire, the Chinese (Manchu) asserted control over portions of the previous eastern Mongolian territories in the 18th c. (approx. 1757-1912), including a part of a larger Altai region, the "Tuva" area Altaian Turks became vassals of the Chinese. Tuva was designated a "country" for the benefit of the tsarist government, and in 1912, like Mongolia, gained independence from China. It became a Russian "protectorate" in 1914 (10). During 1921, the Tuva People's Republic was created, much like the Mongolian Republic, theoretically not part of USSR. In 1944, Tuva "asked" to join the Soviet Union. The Altaian Turks eventually were incorporated into the Russian Empire, in the Altai okrug, administered directly by the tsarist Cabinet, though counted as "aliens." This okrug was about the size of France and had a total population of 3.6 million, including many Russian settlers. The number of settlers grew, displacing the native population from their land. During 1907-09 alone, 750,000 Russian settlers came to the Altai region, taking land that had been declared "excess." During the 19th. c., the railroad had linked Altain towns to Russian markets, thus strengthening the exclusive economic links with Russia. A Bolshevik-dominated soviet took power in the capital, Barnaul in 1920. Thus the greater part of Altai region was incorporated into the expanding USSR. The recent news concerning the economic initiatives by the Altaians, and their desire to establish economic contacts with the outside world in-

dependent of Moscow ought to be taken in this context (11).

It should be noted that the 18th to 20th century Western authors have produced interpretive volumes on the history of the Turks, some of which are speculative narratives, including assertions pertaining to a certain "Pan-Turkism," ostensibly a movement by the Turks to establish hegemony over the world, or at least Eurasia. This "pan" movement has now been documented to be a European creation, to accommodate 19th century European balance-of-power politics, related to the "Great Game in Asia" between the British and the Russian empires. Accusations of "Pan-Turkism" are still employed today, especially, but not exclusively, in the Soviet Union. It will come as no surprise if Moscow institutions invoke that bogey-man notion once again in connection with the recent outbreak of demands for freedom and independence in the Altai (12).

Notes:

1. "The New Russia in a changing world," *Literaturnaya Rossiya* (26 January 1990). For an analysis of the referenced piece, see John Dunlop, *RL Reports*, February 20, 1990.
2. 50 of the 168 deputies elected in nationalities districts (that entitles them to seats in the RSFSR Council of Nationalities) are high-placed Russian officials who had almost no chance to be elected in Moscow and sought the safe seats in the country. See Julia Wishnevsky, *RFE/RL Daily Report*, 7 June 1990.
3. See "Z.V. Togan on the origins of the Kazakhs and the Uzbeks." H.B. Paksoy, Editor, *CENTRAL ASIA READER: The Rediscovery of History*. (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1994).
4. See T. Tekin, *A Grammar of Orkhon Turkic* (Bloomington, 1968), Indiana University Uralic Altaic Series Vol. 69. (Contents dating from the 8th c.)
5. There is no distinction between "Turkish" and "Turkic" in the language of the Turks. Therefore the present article uses simply "Turk".
6. See Kashgarli Mahmud. *Compendium of the Turkic Dialects: Diwan Lugat At TÜRK*, Robert Dankoff (Tr., Ed.) (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Printing Office, V.1 1982, V.2 1984, V.3 1985) [Original written in 11th c.].
7. (Bloomington and The Hague, 1967).
8. See Ann Sheehy "Tuva--A New Center of Ethnic Conflict", *RFE/RL Daily Report*, July 30, 1990; idem, "Tension in Tuva", *RFE/RL Daily Report*, August 3, 1990.
9. W. Bartold (Fourth Ed.), *Turkestan Down to the Mongol Invasion*, (London, 1977).
10. For "treaty," details, see J.R.V. Prescott, *Map of Mainland Asia by Treaty*, (Melbourne, 1975).
11. See Bess Brown, "Altai Seeks Foreign Investment", *RFE/RL Daily Report*, August 1, 1990.
12. See H.B. Paksoy, *ALPAMYSH: Central Asian Identity Under Russian Rule* (Hartford, CT: Association for the Advancement of Central Asian Research Monograph Series, 1989).

Kazakhs famous poet: Abay KUNANBAY

Dr. Zeyneş İSMAİL

Introduction

Abay is the founder of Kazakh written literature; moreover, he is also known as a statesman, writer, and a philosopher. The respect and love for Abay among the Kazakhs in all over the world is very great. There is a University called Abay in Kazakhstan, Academy of Sciences, one of the departments of the Institute of Language and Literature is devoted to the researches on his works. There is a big statue of Abay, opera house and theatre in Almaty. His picture is printed on Kazakhstan Republic's currency "tenge." His name is given to many schools and places. Abay's works have been translated into many languages and Turkish dialects. Assoc. Prof. Zeyneş İSMAİL and Ali Abbas CINAR have translated them into Anatolian Turkish. On the occasion of 150th anniversary of his birth, Republic of Kazakhstan has devoted the year 1995, and UNESCO issuing a declaration announced 1995 to be "Abay's Year."

In this article we will be dealing with Abay's, life and poems the greatest name of the Kazakh Literature.

I. Abay's Life

After the collapse of Kazakh Khanate, Kazakhs inevitably went under the Russian occupation. Occupation forces started spreading bad habits like lies, deceit, treachery. Kazakh traditions, customs and order started being corrupted. Abay was born in such a chaotic era.

Abay was born in Cengizdağı (today's Abay county) in Semey region of Kazakhstan on August 10, 1845. His real name is Ibrahim. He belonged to the Tobıktı tribe of the Argın clan which belongs to Kazakhs central section (1). His father was Kunanbay Bey, and his mother was Ulcan Hanım. He was born to a wealthy family. Abay, who had a deep interest in poetry, at the age of 10, in 1855, writes a poem called "camel chaser."

His father sent him to Ahmet Rıza medrese in Semey, in 1857, for education. Abay, along with the teachings of his medrese teachers,

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acquires a deep knowledge of Arabic, Persian, and Jagatai by studying himself. He acquaints with the works of famous poets like Nizamî, Fuzulî, Firdevsî, and Nevaî. These poets were the first ones who prompted him to write poetry. His poems belonging to his apprenticeship period were written under the influence of their poetry. Abay attends a Russian school for a period of three months, in his Semey period. Thus, he finds an opportunity to know the works of Russian classics like Pushkin, Lermontov, Krilov, and Turgenev. Later he reads the poems of European writers like Goethe, and Byron. These poets cause the broadening of his vision of world, and the development of his poetic universe. But, Abay cannot establish his own poetry in his youth. This stems from his father's, Kunanbay, desire to see him as an administrator like himself. Kunanbay Bey secures him in getting an administrative post even before Abay's graduating from school. Abay's youth passes between a potent and generally directing father, and a merciful mother. Abay, who takes his people's grievances his own, was elected bolis (2) with the support of the people in the elections. Here, he witnesses the hypocrisy, and bad attitudes of the some of high ranking lords, religious officials, and clan leaders. All these prompt the idea of justice and its application in him.

As Abay is an administrator the scopes, bibliographists and rhetoricians gather around him. They all enable the development and the accumulation of speaking sharply, acting courageously, and as well as thinking right. Abay experiences the bad and the good sides of life. He makes use of all the things he has witnessed and heard. He devotes himself to his people and to his country with deep sincerity. All of these experiences and accumulations pave the way to variety of feelings in him. He reflects his people, joys and sorrows, as well as the winds of change of the outer world in his poetry and prose. He never hesitates to criticise his own people if it is necessary, he wants to guide them. Thus he leaves everlasting and guiding works.

He dies on his own land on June 23, 1904.

II. Abay's Art

Abay is both a poet and a writer. He has nearly 200 poems, 3 epics, 47 prose works and translations. His poetry covers various issues. Abay's poetry consists of themes like; love, nature, unity, knowledge, science, woman, justice, deceit, rumour, disunification, peace, affection, death, contradictions between people, struggles between tribes, disputes of water and land, as well as his people's weak sides.

Muhtar Avezov, who studies Abay's life and works, says that, "This great realist poet has enlarged the small frame of the traditional

poetry. He has brought various novelties to the Kazakh poetry. He has reflected the real aspects of Kazakh life as they were. He has analysed the social structure of the Kazakh nation of the age," (3). Thus it is easy to deduce that Abay's poetry covers a great range of issues. It is necessary to take a close look at his works.

Major themes of his poetry are injustice, uncivilized people, negative attitudes reflected from administrators and lords, jealousy, praise, deceit, rumour, laziness, and disunification. Abay does not hesitate to criticise bitterly all the negative aspects with all their nakedness.

He criticises the bad temperaments of people saying:

Does not find wealth working hard
Does not exchange ideas with his skill
Thus lies in his empty house,
Travels around consuming
Sells his honour of manhood.

Abay is not satisfied only with the bad temper, cruelty, and oppression of man. One of the aspects that proves Abay's greatness is his non-contentment with criticism but his showing the right way. Consequently, he paves the way to science and civilization for Kazakhs with his criticisms. In his works he asserts that the only way to get over the hardships is to work, to study science, and to keep the manly honour above anything else. In his "Eight Feet" poem he argues:

If not vindictive,
But pluralist
Put your life to the fore.
Joke without reason
Fight without cause
Would there be a state, stay away.
Don't complain if you work,
You'll have enough to eat, don't beg.

Abay, in his works takes up the inequality between people and social realities, and reveals the social problems. This theme is taken up in his poems known as "Autumn and November; December: this one or two months." The poet, in these two poems reveals the lives of rich and poor people with all their realities, and expresses this as:

Poor walks look [ing] at the goods [continuously],
Doesn't have wood to burn [continuously].
Warms his frozen spindle, tans his leather overcoat,
Sews vest the wife, shivers and starts trembling.

One of the themes of Abay's works is woman. There were two concepts against woman in the Kazakh social life and literature up until Abay. In the first of these the women were held in high esteem, whereas in the other they were accepted unimportant. Abay strikingly exhibits the role and the importance of woman, in social life, in his poetry and in his epic "Masğut," emphasising her peaceful aspect:

Wonder if man [could] be in good health?
Could there be a quarrel without control at [his] home?
[If] her husband is nervous, his wife calms [him down]
[If he] settles down, would [he be] quarrel some again?

One of the themes he has mostly used is friendship and love. These themes were not taken in hand so skifully by any poet in Kazakh literature until Abay. Abay declares his beliefs saying, "man must love man, he must be in good terms with him, must live with real mind." He narrates his belief in his "Young men! game is cheap smile is worthy," as:

Days are few, strange [is the] time, have joy,
If inadequate harmonize'em.
With a real heart full of peace
Let treachery leave your mind.

The theme of love occupies an important place in his poetry, he openly expresses that love is the most beautiful feeling.

Lover's language is silent tongue,
See it with thine eyes know it by thy heart.

In another poem he expresses that the world is meaningless without a friend.

World without love is debris,
Let 'em harness it to a bear.
If ever in vain of happiness
You have your wife, children and friend(s).

Abay argues that the beauty can not be understood by solely looking at the appearance, and asserts that the beauty of a person can only be understood when the appearance and the soul are taken together.

Don't fall in love with someone just because [he/she] has splendour

Don't canform to your carnal mind bubbling with zeal.

Woman can not be good with splendour,

Don't fall in love, before having learn'd [her] temprament.

Thus, he sounds his advises and guides.

He is a shining star of his age. He calls the people to science and civilization, emphasizing the importance of education he says.

Didn't consider science important in my youth,

Saw its advantages but didn't analyze.

Didn't fall into my hands when I grew up,

I couldn't reach my hand out on time.

Here he advises the youth saying "do not waste your youth, learn science and civilization;" for he could not receive more education in his youth, he was sorrowful. In another poem he emphasizes the importance of science as.

Don't praise yourself before becoming a scholar

Don't be happy without reason.

He is not a free-lance poet but a guide showing definite goals, a philosopher, and an intellectual. He mentions the necessity of man, his existence as a value and the things he should do as.

You also are a maker of sun-dried bricks for the world

Find its gap be useful.

He gives advices, he puts the goals of being a good person to the fore, and he narrates it in one of his poems as follows:

Avoid five things,

Sympathise five things,

If you want to be a man...

(.....)

Gossip, deceit, boast (ing)

Laziness, wasting riches for nothing,

Know these five enemies.

Preserverance, diligence, deep-thought,

Contentment, mercy, thus

You find five real friends.

He also informs that man is just a guest of this world, that the time will fly away, and that one must make use of time properly.

Minute hand of a watch never turns in vain,
 Always informs of a life passing.
 A minute is just like a man's life,
 Passes, goes away, impossible to turn back again.

He argues that all the things on earth change and that nothing stays the same. He likens the changing world to running water and says: "World is a great pond, but the time is beating wind. Previous waves were elder brothers, the following waves are little brothers, these compliment each other." Abay considers man the most important feature of the real world. According to him man borns, grows up, dies and comes to the world as a material. There are two major differences between man and animal. The first of these is to know himself and the world, to know the truth, to depend upon science; and the second is to do useful things. In his prose writings he says "if you work for your own sake, you will not be so different from a grazing animal." In his poetry he reveals this saying "move and let the society benefit." Abay is an intellectual poet. He says "if your mind does not accept do not believe."

He also argues that the intellect, perseverance, and heart are bound with each other, and all three should be held equally.

Previously the intelligent mind a cold ice,
 A warm heart that warms the whole body.
 Self-confidence, firmness,
 Stem from this ardour, should you know.
 Keep mind, ardour, and heart equal,
 [Thus] you can be [more] efficient [than others].

Abay who is sincerely devoted to Islam is away from all the concepts that consider world unimportant. In his view one must consider the realities of the world in which we live, and must make the necessary developments in science and technology, and must take his/her place in the contemporary world.

Abay, as the defender of Kazakh history, literature and dialect, reveals it in his poetry and prose. He is fed with national cultures. He is closely acquainted with Arabic and Persian sources, as well as Russian and Western literatures. Making good use of Eastern and Western sources he melts them in Kazakh culture. With this aspect of his, he becomes the first founder of modern Kazakh literature.

He gives a new and an abundant voice to Kazakh literature. He has brought novelties to Kazakh poetry in regards to subject, theme, language, form and structure. The meter of his poems, along with

bringing perfection to the structure of the Kazakh language, embodies a fluent, fascinating, and rhetorical qualities. He explains the most difficult concepts of philosophy in a very appropriate manner. His poetry shows a depth consisting a union of feeling and thought. Kazakh poetry was written in syllabic meter until Abay's time. These were the poems in which 7-8, 11 or syllabic quatrains were used together. Abay, as well as bringing novelties in subject and theme, also introduces novelties, form-wise, to the Kazakh poetry. He uses forms such as; 5,6 (3+3), 8 (5+3) or first couplet having 5, third having 8, fourth and fifth having 5 each, sixth having 8 syllables. He calls this "sekiz-ayak," (octa-meter), or "altı-ayak," (hega-meter).

He ends the supremacy of quatrains in poetry, uses new forms. He introduces reforms in rhymes between the lines.

As a famous rhetorician and philosopher, Abay's works will always shed light upon the development of Kazakhs and their getting acquainted with the contemporary world. Abay is accepted as the symbol of the feelings and thoughts of Kazakh Turks.

Notes:

1. Kazakh Turks have three major branches. There are Ulu, orta and kişi cüz.
2. In Tsarist Russia it was an administrative region, and it was the name given to the administrators of the region.
3. Muhtar Avezov. "Abaydın Halıqshılığı: Cene Realistiği," *Culdız*. No. 3, 1976.
4. Dr. Zeyneş ISMAIL, and Ali Abbas ÇINAR. *Abay'ın Eserlerinden Seçmeler* (Selections from Abay's Works), Türksoy Yay. No. 2, Ankara, 1995.

Translator's note: Poems are translated literally. I would like to forward my apologies for the incongruities that may arise.

Did Fatih Sultan Mehmet "Seriously" Consider Becoming a Christian?

Oya AKGÖNENÇ⁽¹⁾

Fatih Sultan Mehmet is considered to be a brilliant military commanders in history. In addition to his other military successes, he conquered Constantinople, a city that was one of the most highly prized and strategically located capitals of the medieval times. The fall of the city ended the agony of the long-ailing Byzantine empire that had been on a decline for several hundred years. The conquest would occasion momentous changes in Anatolia, Europe, Russia and the Middle East. Beginning in 1453 Constantinople became Istanbul (or a variation of this name, e.g., Islambul) and it began to acquire a central position in the Ottoman empire. Fatih Sultan Mehmet's ability to place a firm grip on the administration of the realm contributed vastly to strengthening the foundations of the empire that was being ruled within the framework of an Islamic legal code.

Notwithstanding the idiosyncracies of the individual rulers, who occasionally might have been less than orthodox in their personal behaviors, it is safe to state that the Ottoman empire was an empire ruled by the Muslims, and in the name of Islam. The ruling and Muslim institutions, which included members of the ruling dynasty, the military, the ulema, and the administrative elites of the empire, were largely composed of ethnic Turks and other Muslims. While the Sultan was the chief-executive of the state, his power was strictly constrained by the Islamic law which was a domain of the ulema. Under the Islamic law, a non-Muslim could not become or remain, if he converted, head of an Islamic state.

While the above statements contain what most historians of the Ottoman period would consider as irrefutable facts, there are some journalists and pseudo-historians who have systematically attempted to cast doubts on the religious and ethnic origins of some of the Sultans and other members of the "Ottoman Ruling Institution." There seems to be an insidious attempt to target the most prominent of the past leaders and then raise doubts about their ethnic origins and religious beliefs. In some cases the Turkish origin of their ethnicity is denied and in some other cases their religious beliefs are questioned. In either case, the attempts seem to be to de-link the achievements of the Turks from their Islamic framework.

For the Muslims, who shun racial and caste distinctions, ethnicity

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of their leaders played no part in offering dedication and loyalty to them. For the Muslims it mattered little whether a certain Sultan, commander, philosopher, alim, or a sufi was racially Indo-European, Semitic, Turk, Black, Sinitic, or a member of any other racial-linguistic group. What did matter was his faith, and his dedication to Islam. Under the Ottoman rules even a prince born of a non-Muslim mother (who did not wish to convert) could not ascend the throne.

Fallacious innuendoes, conjectures, and gossips about the ruling class members began to appear fairly soon in the post-conquest period in the writings of some European travellers-cum-writers who used their fertile imaginations to write what they believed their prospective European readers would enjoy reading. It made good financial sense and it satisfied their religious fanaticism, to boot. (see Edward Said, *Orientalism*). These illconstrued essays authored by ill-informed "experts" became references for future generations. As a result of continuous circulation and propagation of misinformation, other writers, today, still repeat or even further distort the original mistakes. In reality, all those who neglect to check the sources carefully or fail to analyze events in their proper historical framework are guilty of repeating the mistakes and perpetuating the errors committed under circumstances radically different from that of today.

Ambassador Singh's Article

This brings me to the purpose of writing this commentary.

Recently, I read an article entitled "Contributions of Turkic Languages in the Evolution and Development of Hindustani Languages" written by the ambassador of India in Turkey, K. Gajendra Singh. It was an article showing the links that developed between the Turkic and Hindustani languages in the course of commercial, military, and cultural interactions between the Central Asian Turks and the people of Hindustan. I enjoyed the article. It was interesting and informative, as far as languages and their influences on each other was concerned. It was useful to note the close links between the political developments in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent and the Central Asian regions. Similarly, the influence of the languages of the rulers and the ruled on each other was made clear with references to syntaxes and vocabularies of some of the Turkic and Hindustani languages, fortified with examples of words and idioms currently in use in these languages. Although this study is a worthy effort toward a better understanding of the subject matter, its scholarly value would have been enhanced if proper citations and essential sources were included in the article. Still, the author deserves our thanks and praise for his efforts.

In the comments below, my purpose is not to present a critique on the linguistic-links that developed between the Turkic and Hindustani languages. Rather, it is to question the validity of the fol-

lowing statements that appear towards the end of this article. Although it is obvious that these statements added little to the theme of the article, the author has, wittingly or unwittingly, joined the forces who wish to disparage some of the greatest Sultans of the Ottoman empire. Along with disparaging the Ottomans, the ambassador took the opportunity to express Indian official views on the Mughal Sultans Akbar and Aurengzeb, both of whom are controversial figures. Below, I will make a brief statement on this subject.

This commentary analyzes the following statements in the aforementioned article:

1. "It has been suggested that many Turkish rulers became muslim (sic) for political and state reasons. It automatically combined the powers of the Sultan and the Khalifa, thus making it easier to rule the domains."
2. "Some have even raised doubts whether Ertugrul, father of Osman who established the Ottoman (Osmanli) dynasty in Asia Minor (Anatolia) was muslim (sic) by birth."
3. "Some suggestions have been made recently (Prof. Julian Ruby (sic) of Oxford has done a Phd. thesis on this subject) that Fetih, (sic) the Conqueror of Constantinople, seriously considered in the 1450s embracing Orthodox Christianity, ..." (emphasis added).
4. "... many Ottoman princes were brought up almost as Christians."

All of the above statements may be found in *Eurasian Studies* (vol 2, No. 1) Spring 1995, pp. 72-73. *

Akbar and Aurangzeb

Before proceeding with the four points listed above, let me make a brief statement on the Mughal Padishas, Akbar and Aurengzeb. The Indian ambassador has praised Akbar for the creation of a new religion in Hindustan. This attempt is praised without proper analysis of its effects on the Muslim community in the subcontinent. Prominent ulema of the time considered Akbar's "Din-e-Elahi" a subversive instrument designed to undermine the foundations of Islam in Hindustan. It was merely supported by a handful of self-indulging sycophants: Zoroastrians, Hindus, and Muslims. It was strongly opposed by the ulema and the Muslim masses. Also, it found no favor with the Hindu masses.

While Akbar's Din-i-Ilahi died with the death of the king, this short-lived event has, naturally, received the seal of approval of those who wished to see Islam disappear from Hindustan. Their appreciation of Akbar and his hotchpotch of a "religion" is in fact their expression of sorrow for the lost opportunity to deliver a fatal blow to the

* The same article also appeared in the *Foreign Policy* quarterly (Vol XVIII, pp. 134-152) and in the *Turkish Daily News* (June 1, 2, and 3, 1995) which published a slightly shortened version of it.

existence of Islam in the region. If Din-i-Ilahi was such an attractive experiment in Hindu-Muslim coexistence, as the ambassador seems to imply, what prevented the Hindus from joining this movement in large numbers?

In the context of the political developments in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent, the heroes of one nation (Muslim) have become the villains of the other (Hindus). This is manifested by Ambassador Singh who points an accusatory finger on Aurengzeb for "virtually" destroying the Mughal empire. I would like to point out that Aurengzeb is known as one of the handful of rulers who united the subcontinent under one rule, and extended the life of the Mughal empire nearly one hundred fifty years. One should also remember the political forces of the time and the expanding European imperialism over the Asian continent. To obtain their political, religious and economic goals, the ambitious indigenous leaders coalesced with the outside forces to weaken the Mughal empire. Perhaps, the blame for the destruction of the Mughal empire should be shared by the Sikhs, Marathas, Afghans, and the English.

As to whose policies were more beneficial for the Muslim community in Hindustan: Akbar's or Aurengzeb's? Akbar's Din-i-Ilahi was against the long-term interests of the Muslim community in Hindustan. Had it succeeded, it would have destroyed the Islamic foundations there. Attempts, such as that of Akbar's were countered by the ulema, sufies, community and political leaders of Hindustani Muslims such as Sheikh Ahmed of Sirhind, Moinuddin Chishti, Shah Wali Allah, Syed Ahmed Khan, Syed Amir Ali, Mohammed Iqbal, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the Ali brothers (Mohammed and Shevket) and others who kept the spirit of Islam alive and invigorated throughout the centuries. The loss of the empire was certainly harmful to the economic and political well-being of the Muslims. However, the loss of faith in the true religion of Islam would have been fatal. Akbar's Din-i-Ilahi would have extinguished Islam from Hindustan.

Mr. Singh's comparison of Aurengzeb's alleged "fanatic (al)" policies with the Ottoman policies of tolerance is also interesting and thought provoking: His comparison makes the reader wonder what really caused the demise of these two empires? tolerance or alleged intolerance? or, whether, the causes could be narrowed down to such an extent? If so, what should be the lesson of such a dichotomy? Were these the only powerful factors determining the end of the empires? What part did the non-Muslim groups within these empires and the European colonialism play in their destruction? Without all these additional questions and many others, would it not be a rather simplistic explanation of the momentous events and changes which effected the lives of millions of people?

A Refutation of Singh's Statements

Rather than following the serial sequence in which I have listed above the author's objectionable statements, I would like to begin by examining his claim that the Fatih Sultan **seriously considered becoming an Orthodox Christian**. To support his statement, the ambassador, parenthetically, refers to a doctoral dissertation accepted by Oxford University in 1980. However, no page number for this significant or other similar statements appear. So, there is no way to verify it, unless, of course, one perused the dissertation page by page and line by line. This lengthy procedure, however, was deemed unnecessary in view of the overwhelming evidence to the contrary.

Under these circumstances, I have used two methods to present my refutation of K. G. Singh's statements listed above. First, and most importantly, I have consulted with the doyen of Ottoman historians, Professor, Dr. Halil Inalcik; and secondly, I have consulted several foreign and Turkish sources available in the Bilkent University library. Most of the information on Fatih Sultan's period contained in this commentary was orally obtained from Prof. Dr. Inalcik and the rest of it was gleaned from the sources listed at the end of this paper.

I believe that it is highly unlikely that a venerable university such as Oxford would have approved a dissertation that contained such a statement, without a substantial and authentic documentary roof. If such a proof had existed it would certainly not have remained hidden for so long, the media would have circulated this information to the four corners of the world. Since such has not been the case, the only conclusion one is constrained to draw is that the author of the article has distorted Dr. Raby's statements, to satisfy, superficially, one must add, a thesis of his own article.

The aforementioned Raby is an Ottoman art historian whose dissertation deals with Fatih Sultan Mehmet's "patronage" (2) of Western art. His dissertation's title is **El Gran Turco, Mehmet the Conqueror as a patron of the Arts of Christendom**. (Faculty of Oriental Studies, Oxford, 1980.) It is a study concentrating on the Conqueror's patronage of a number of European artists who upon invitation of the Sultan came to Istanbul and produced a number of paintings for the ruler.

As is well known, Orthodox Islam does not approve of painting human or animal portraits. The only kind of human and animal paintings that were not frowned upon were mainly in miniature forms. Yet, Fatih Sultan Mehmet, in 1460s and 1470s had commissioned foreign painters to portray his image on a large canvas. Among those who did come and work there were artists such as Bellano, Bellini, and De Ferara. Fatih Sultan Mehmet admired European art, even Italian religious art, just as he admired Eastern art, and saw nothing wrong in providing patronage to the artists.

While Fatih Sultan Mehmet may have manifested less than com-

plete orthodoxy in his personal religious practices, in his public life, he maintained a strict Orthodox Sunni order and only allowed Orthodox Islam to prevail. The Conqueror's interest in European style of art and his patronage of Christian art and artists gave rise to some rumors and speculations. However, the Conqueror gave support and patronage to Muslim art and artists, as well. He was not just a ruler or a soldier but a truly intellectual man with refined tastes.

The subject matter of the above-mentioned dissertation being the "patronage" of Christian art, naturally, Raby, the author, concentrates on the Sultan's numerous efforts to obtain the services of some known Italian and other artists with the help of foreign rulers with whom the Ottoman empire had commercial and diplomatic links.

Raby also points out that the Sultan had ordered the protection and preservation of the Christian religious relics, endeared both by the Orthodox and Roman Christians, that had been found in the vanquished city's churches and monasteries. All of these items were valuable monetarily and spiritually. Raby also discusses the existence of a small painting, **Madona and the Child**, allegedly commissioned by the Sultan. Are these and similar other activities a proof positive that the "...Conqueror of Constantinople seriously considered in (Sic)1450s embracing Orthodox Christianity..."?

Now the question is what kind of a proof would be acceptable to the historians? The most reliable proof would be the Sultan's own statement written down either by him personally (in a private letter or a confession) or by one of his clerks. Does such a proof exist anywhere? The answer is unhesitating in the negative.

Another type of proof might be a recorded statement of an Orthodox patriarch with whom the Sultan had been in communication regarding this issue. The Sultan had close association with three Orthodox patriarchs: Gennadios, Maximus III, and George of Trebizond. Has any one of them left a statement that would support the contention in the article? The answer is again in the negative.

Another type of evidence (secondary) that might be acceptable would be the Sultan's confidential or semiconfidential statement heard by an impeccable witness. Is there such a proof? The answer, once again, is in the negative.

All other kinds of "evidences" could be categorized as "gossips," "innuendoes," "conjectures," "surmises," etc. Evidence that falls in any of these categories is less than useless for scholarly research and writing.

The next question might be as to why did Fatih Sultan Mehmet develop relations with the Orthodox leaders? A simple answer is, because these leaders represented a new **millet**, the Orthodox community, in his growing empire. It was essential for him to try to understand the basic precepts of the Orthodox religion. Thus the Sultan ordered translation from Greek into Arabic George's **On the**

Truth of Christian Faith and Maximus's Exegesis of the Creed. The Sultan's own knowledge of Greek was rudimentary and the court ulema were probably not any better. Thus, it was necessary to have the books translated. Here, it is important to note that Prince Mehmet had learned the Holy Koran and reportedly had acquired sufficient knowledge in the science of Fiqh under the watchful eyes of his teachers and the court ulema. It is also important to note that as the supreme ruler of his realm, the Sultan was the head of all *millets* within his domain. It was he who selected and appointed the patriarch, the sheikh-ul-Islam, and the Chief Rabbi, as head of the Orthodox, the Muslim, and the Jewish millets, respectively. Therefore, he must have deemed it necessary to know as much as possible about a new millet in his expanded realm. Does this fact constitute a serious intention on the Sultan's part to change his religion? Should a person's intellectual curiosity and his desire to serve his subjects better, by becoming familiar with their religious dogmas and laws, be identified as a serious intention to change his own religion?

If Fatih Sultan's patronage for Western Christian art cannot be considered a serious element in this curious allegation; and, if his close ties with the Patriarchs is not a sign of his intentions (as shown above), then what other "gossips" are there to blemish his name? To understand other sources of conjectures, we must briefly describe Fatih Sultan Mehmet's military plans after the conquest of Constantinople.

Among the many Christians, Constantinople was known as the daughter of the mother church, the mother being the Vatican in Rome. It is reported that after the conquest of Constantinople, the Sultan said, "now that I have the daughter, it is time to get the mother as well." Symbolically, this statement indicated that the Sultan had planned to take Rome.

Within a decade, Fatih Sultan Mehmet began to put his plans to work in this direction by first occupying Negroponte (July 1470) which belonged to the King of Naples. As was customary among the Muslim rulers, Fatih Sultan Mehmet invited the King of Naples, Ferdinand, to accept Islam and to jointly wage a war against the Papal and other states on the Italian peninsula. Ferdinand declined to accept the offer. The Sultan appointed Ahmet Gedik Pasa to supervise preparations to conquer Naples. However, this project had to be postponed due to certain development in the Balkans and else where. After this event, the Sultan's attention became focused on the island of Rhodes that was being ruled by the Knights of St. John; and, consequently, at this time, the Italian peninsula was not attacked by the Ottomans. However, the military preparations for a military campaign continued for a while. Finally, in August, 1480, a small but strategically important town, Otranto, fell to the Ottoman forces led by Ahmet Gedik Pasha. The aim of Fatih Sultan Mehmet to bring the

"mother church", Rome, under his rule perished with his death in Spring 1481.

During this period the head of the Apostolic See was Pope Pius II, a noble humanist. His writings were fairly well used by the Northern Christian Humanists. Some of these writings claim that Pope Pius II wrote a letter to Fatih Sultan Mehmet, inviting him to embrace Christianity and promising to validate his "accession" to the Byzantine empire. So far, only references to the Pope's alleged letter have been seen in European publications. We are not sure whether or not this letter was ever dispatched to the Sultan. No such letter has been found in the Ottoman archives.

Does this event prove that Fatih Sultan Mehmet was leaning toward Christianity or that he was seriously considering becoming an Orthodox Christian? Obviously, the Pope's alleged letter would not have invited the Sultan to accept Orthodoxy. On the contrary the head of the Holy See would have asked him to accept Roman Christianity. It should be noted that in the middle of the 15th century, the prestige of the Papacy had not yet fully recovered from the damage caused by the "Babylonian captivity" (Avignon) of the Pope. Therefore, Fatih Sultan Mehmet could not have been much impressed by Christian faith, even for reasons of state.

Against such unsubstantiated assertions, there are clear and substantiated proofs of the Sultan's activities that show his unwavering commitment to Islam: he accepted into Islam members of the last Byzantine royal family and appointed at least two of them in important positions. This is not the kind of action expected of a man who himself wanted to change his religion. At a huge personal cost (much more than he might have spent on the "patronage" of Christian art), the Sultan had a *camii* and a school built in Istanbul. He ordered the conversion of Aya Sophia church into a *camii*. He invited the King of Naples to accept Islam.

Fatih Sultan Mehmet himself was also a well-learned, broad-minded and intellectually curious ruler. He was raised and educated by the finest Muslim scholars of the time. Such as Akşemseddin, one of the leading follower of Hacı Bayram Veli, a very well known and respected religious leader of the time. Others being scholars and scientists such as Mollas Ayas, Çelebizade Mehmet, Temcidoglu, Hocazade Musluhiddin Mustafa, Hatipzade Mehmet, Molla Seracettin, Abdulkadir Efendi and Molla Gurani and Molla Husrev Hz., famous Muslim scholars of the 15th century.

Fatih Sultan Mehmet showed great tolerance to his Orthodox Christian subjects, recognizing them as a separate community, millet, within the empire and allowing them the freedom to practice their own religion and culture. This action deserves a good reflection and comparison with the other rulers of his time and even after his time.

The deep knowledge, intellectual curiosity and open mindedness

of Fatih Sultan Mehmet led him to endless inquiries about religions, cultures and other subjects throughout his life. It should also be remembered that there was a strong psychological factor at work with the Ottomans at the time. That was the self-confidence and feeling of contentment of the Ottoman Turks. Only then, one can understand the mood of the 15th century in the Ottoman capital. Sultan Mehmet, the Conqueror, was a victorious ruler. He was proud of his own religion and culture. He had total and complete conviction and trust in its superiority and strength of it over every other religion. Under all these circumstances, it is hard to imagine any reason or motive for the Sultan to abandon his own religion and culture in favor of anything else. Besides, he could not have hoped to lead the Ottoman empire, if he had done anything like conversion to another faith.

The speculations about his "intentions," serious or otherwise are based on lack of proper knowledge about Sultan Mehmet, the conqueror, his personality and character, his knowledge, his intellectual capacity and curiosity; and the Islamic system that was the mainstay of his political-military power. Misconceptions stem from lack of understanding of the true nature of the Ottoman system and traditions. Thus, the claims and rumors about Fatih's intentions were based on rumors and Christian missionary zeal that tried to attribute Fatih's success to something other than the strength of his own convictions and traditions.

I would like to end this section with a statement reportedly made by Fatih Sultan Mehmet:

"Our empire is the home of Islam; from father to son the lamp of our empire is kept burning with oil from the heart of the infidels." (3)

"Many Ottoman Princes Were Brought Up As Christians"?

A second issue I wish to comment upon is about the education of the Ottoman princes many of whom, ambassador Singh claims were brought up as Christians. The author does not provide any source on which he founded his claim. It is obvious that ambassador Singh has not perused sources dealing with the educational system of the princes or of the palace in general. Let us recall briefly how and by whom the Ottoman princes were educated.

There was a strict palace tradition of education established according to Sunni Muslim traditions and practices. No prince or princess could be raised outside of this encompassing educational system of the Ottoman palace. The princes were trained by Muslim teachers and their mothers' influences on the children were minimized. In fact, mothers, Muslim or non-Muslim, played no part in the education of the princes. Peripheral influence that a non-Muslim mother might have imbued to her prince-child could not be so effective, in the face of strong Muslim education, to deduce that the princes were "brought up almost as Christians."

Although, the Ottoman palace was a truly cosmopolitan place, it had a well established form of Ottoman-Islamic education and training for all the categories of the palace inhabitants. The members of the court were expected to adhere to the Ottoman culture and tradition. Only, for the non-Muslim women, the Islamic law allowed them to keep their own faith, if they so desired. There was no compulsion for religious conversion. However, their children, were raised as Muslims.

A well-documented event may help to illuminate for the reader the conviction and strength of the Ottoman sultans and princes in their own religion, culture and in themselves, as a result of such an education. This is the case of Cem Sultan, Fatih Sultan Mehmet's younger son, who contested his older brother, Beyazit, for the throne after his father's death in 1481. In the struggle with his older brother, Prince Cem was defeated and he had to flee the Ottoman domain. After 13 years of captivity in Rhodes (1482), de Zizini (1482-89), the Vatican (1489-94), and under the captivity of France's Charles VIII, who took him as booty from Rome (1494), Prince Cem died on the way to Napoli in 1495. The point I wish to make is that here was a prince of the Ottoman dynasty, who notwithstanding all the physical and mental distress caused by the captivity and the alien environments, refused to accept Christianity as a means of relieving his discomfiture and agony. The Pope offered military help to Prince Cem to capture the Ottoman throne if the Prince would become Christian. The prince rejected this offer without hesitation. He did not seek freedom or glory at the cost of abandoning his religion. Islam gave him his inner strength that carried him to his end, without becoming an apostate. Prince Cem's rebuke to the Pope declaring that he (Cem) would not change his religion even if the Pope gave him the rule of the whole world has been recorded by a Vatican official present on this occasion.

At Birth, Sultan Ertugrul Was a Non-Muslim?

Ambassador Singh's statement that "Some have even raised doubts whether Ertugrul, father of Osman" was Muslim by birth is the next subject of my comments.

First, let me describe the source of this fallacy. Those who doubt Ertugrul's religious affiliation at birth base their argument on his name which they claim was not given to Muslim children. This is not a serious or a substantive argument and it is being refuted by the facts presented below.

It is a well-known fact that Ertugrul, his father, and his entire tribe, KAYI, belonged to the Oguz confederacy. From the Oguz Turks came the founders of the Seljuk and the Ottoman dynasties. The Oguz confederacy had accepted Islam long before they entered Anatolia. Under these circumstances, what evidence is there that either Ertugrul's

father had not been a Muslim or that he had converted to another religion before his son's birth? Only a valid evidence of Ertugrul's father being a non-Muslim would prove Ertugrul's non-Muslim birth. Is there a proof to this effect? Is there any proof that the Kayis had defaulted from the Islamic path, to chart a neoreligious course for the tribe? In the days under discussion, individuals, especially leaders of tribes, did not change their religions without consultations with the tribes. And, if the leader changed his religion, he would lose leadership, without the tribe following suite.

It is true that many Turkish rulers used their traditional and typical Turkish names. **Ertugrul, Korkut, Ata, Beyazit, Orhan** are only a few of such examples. Turks continued to use their traditional Turkish names uninterruptedly. They did not link the notion of personal names and titles with the faith they embraced. After all, many of the Arab names had been originally local and traditional Arab names before they came to be considered as Muslim names. So, were the traditional Iranian names which survived through the Muslim era. Turks were no exceptions to these practices. They accepted Islam and also continued to use their own traditional names.

"Many Turkish Rulers Became Muslim For Political and State Reasons"

Ambassador Singh writes, "It has been suggested that many Turkish rulers became Muslim for political and state reasons. It automatically combined the powers of the sultan and the Khalifa, thus making it easier to rule the domains..."

Once again, the author has injected into the discussion the element of personal motives for conversion, without providing any evidence. He says, "It has been suggested..." by whom, on what evidence? Let us briefly review the circumstances and the time of conversion of Turks to Islam.

The Turkish conversion to Islam began in the 7th century when the Arab armies reached the vicinity of Amu Derya and it reached its apogee around the end of the 8th and beginning of the 9th centuries. Many Turkish rulers were already in positions of power when they embraced Islam, it was their own choice to do so. The role of the Khalife did not enter into the Turkish system until several centuries after their original conversion. So, the motives of personal gains and political glorification were not factors in the Turkish selection of a new religion.

From the time of their conversion to Islam, the Turks dedicated their political and military resources for the defence and advancement of the religion. Not only the Muslim Turks establish principalities and kingdoms, they also defended the dar-ul-Islam against the onslaught of the Christian Crusaders. It was the Muslim Seljuk Turks who for centuries kept up the Holy-War against the Crusaders and acted as a dam against the flood of danger and destruction to the

Islam, Khilafet and the Turks

As far as ambassador Singh's statement that some Turkish rulers converted to Islam because "It automatically combined the powers of the Sultan and the Khalifa" is concerned, let us look at the number of Turkish Khulafa, before Yavuz Sultan Selim appropriated, in 1517, the mantle, puissance, and prerogatives of the Khilafat from a scion of the Abbasides living under the protection of the Memlukes in Cairo. At the defeat of the Umayyads in 750, the Khilafat became bifurcated: the Abbasides in Baghdad and the Umayyads in Spain. The Khulafa who ruled in these two centers until 1258 and 1492, respectively, were of Arab descent. Neither the Shii Buyyids nor the Sunni Seljuks made any attempt to appropriate the mantle of the Khalifa from its rightful owners, the Abbaside Khulafa. The Seljuks expanded westward and established several principalities, without finding it necessary to combine the power of the Sultan with that of the Khalife.

Another dynasty that made a competing claim to the Khilafet was the North African Fatimids. This was a Shii dynasty and their claim was based on the Imamate. This was not a Turkish dynasty. Furthermore, a claim to the Imamate required direct descendance from one of the Shii imams, a requirement that would disqualify all Turks.

The above review of the historical events shows that there were no legitimate Turkish Sultan-Khalife before Yavuz Sultan Selim. So, what are the implications of the statement made by ambassador Singh? As the ambassador's statement expresses plurality "many Turkish rulers." Who were they? Where did they rule? When? Even the Muslim Turkish rulers of the different regions in Hindustan maintained their power without combining the puissance of the Khilafet. Thus, it is clear that ambassador Singh's claim and statement is based on misinformation and lack of historical knowledge and understanding.

Claims such as these were made by writers who tried to analyze the factors behind the Ottoman achievements and successes. One such writer was Herbert Gibbons who wrote, **The Foundation of the Ottoman Empire**. He was an English journalist and not an historian. He did not read any of the Ottoman chronicles and did not know any of the languages used by the Ottomans. This journalist literally invented a theory about the zeal and determination of the Muslim Ottoman Turks. For him, the reasoning was quite simple: the zeal of a new convert and the drive for more political power. Since the Turks were relatively new in converting to Islam in comparison to the other groups in the Middle East, Gibbons assumed they would act with certain zeal to compensate for the lost time and that they had converted for political gains.

One last argument in the same article was that it was the converted ex-Christian population in Anatolia which provided sophisticated administration and learned ways to the Ottoman Turks. The claimer of such arguments seem to forget that Turks had already established the Iranian and Anatolian Seljuk empires and had accumulated experience and sophistication of running a state and an empire before they established the Ottoman empire as a new political entity in Anatolia, Balkans and the Middle East. Naturally, the locally available resources were used by the Ottomans for the administration of the new lands, but this did not mean that the Turks were devoid of "sophisticated" administrative techniques.

It is most regrettable that a person whose official duties require him to create good-will and friendship between the people of Hindustan and Turkey has indulged in spreading innuendos, misinformation, and gossip about some Turkish hero-Sultans in an article on the development and influence of languages on each other.

It is also highly regrettable that such an article that ostensibly attempted to show cultural links became an attempt to disparage a great Mughal ruler, Aurengzeb, as well. If Aurengzeb showed harshness toward the Hindus simply because of their religion, then, according to today's standards, he was wrong. But, then can we apply the same standard of evaluation to the Indian government's policies and actions in Kashmir where thousands of Muslims have been slaughtered by the Indian military during the past 50 years? or to the "tolerance" shown by the Indian police while the Babari mosque was destroyed by the Hindu mob?

It is difficult to draw a logical conclusion about ambassador Sing's motives:

Firstly, in writing such an article which is full of innuendos, misinformation and unchecked, unverified rumors about Turkish historical heroes.

Secondly, in having it republished in 1995, following a strong media reaction to the 1994 publication of this article.

His official duties require him to create an atmosphere of goodwill or friendship between the peoples of his country and that of the host country. His objectionable statements contained in this article will certainly act as obstacles to creating a friendly atmosphere between Hindustan and Turkey.

I am confident that the editors of the publication (Eurasian Studies, Turkish Daily News, Foreign Policy) accepted the ambassador's article as a gesture of goodwill, not realizing that the author has injected at the very end of the article a number of irrelevant or insidious statement disparaging the Turkish historical heroes.

We strongly condemn these unacceptable statements and hope that the ambassador would be more careful and sensitive when he further indulges in expressing his thoughts on Turkish heroes and history.

1. The author wishes to express her deep appreciation and gratitude to her former mentor, Prof.Dr. Halil Inalcik, for his most valuable assistance in the preparation of this commentary. In addition to insightful analysis and interpretation of the Fatih period, he provided guidance for locating library sources on the subject. The author also wishes to express her sincere thanks to her husband, Prof.Dr. Mohammed Mughisuddin, for providing information on the Mughals and for his editorial assistance. For any factual or typographical errors that might have escaped my careful attention, I take full responsibility.
2. In the case of Fatih Sultan Mehmet, "patronage" did not necessarily mean that he paid all the expenses and wages of the European painters. Occasionally, such payments were made by the European rulers who obliged his request for painters.
3. This is taken from the frontispiece of Lybyer's **The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the Time of Suleiman the Magnificent**.

A Select Bibliography

In addition to the books mentioned above in the article, the following books and articles may be consulted:

1. Babinger, Franz. **Mehmet the Conqueror and His Time**. (Translated by Rlph manheim). Princeton, 1978.
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3. Clot, Andre. **Fatih Sultan Mehmet**. (Translated by Necla Isik) İstanbul, 1991.
4. Inalcik, Halil. "Mehmet II" in **Encyclopedia of Islam**, Second edition.
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6. Lybyer, Albert Howe **The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the Time of Suleiman the Magnificent**. 1913.
7. Runciman, Sir Steven. **The Fall of Constantinople 1453**, 1965.
8. Sapolyo, Enver Behnan. **Osmanlı Sultanları Tarihi**. İstanbul, 1961.
9. Tansel, Selahattin, **Fatih Sultan Mehmed'in Siyasi ve Askeri Faaliyeti**. İstanbul, 1971.

Book Reviews

CENTRAL ASIA: EMERGING NEW ORDER

K.WARIKOO (ED.) NEW DELHI: HAR ANAND PUBLICATIONS, 1995 p. 352.

Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union in December 1991 and the emergence of the Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan the geopolitics of Eurasia have been significantly altered. Since 1991 Central Asia has become the focus of international relations as it is strategically located nearby the world's richest oil resources and raw materials, is a potential hotspot for inter-ethnic conflict and is known to harbor micro-nationalist tendencies.

Putting into perspective the aforementioned interest in the region the Jawaharlal Nehru University Himalaya Research & Culture Foundation organized a conference titled "The Emergence of a New Order in Central Asia" on January 21-22, 1995. Mr. Warikoo kindly updated and edited the conference presentations and contributed to the publishing of this invaluable book.

The book consists of four sections. Contributed by experts from Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, it deals with topics ranging from rising nationalism, religious and ethnic separatism to economics and security in the region.

The first section, titled "Central Asian in Transition" deals with the problems of the post-Soviet period. The contributors of this section are; K.Warikoo, R.R. Sharma from India, Z.Dzhunusova and D.Balgamis from Kazakhstan and G.A. Kyidayatov from Uzbekistan.

The second section, titled "Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism" features T.Zarcone (France) who deals with the Islamic awakening and Sufi movements in the region. Other articles respectively deal with "The impact of language and culture in Tajik politics" by K.N. Pandita (India), "Developments of ethnic nationalism in Uzbekistan" by Dr. P.L. Dash and "The Problems of the Uighurs in Kazakhstan" by G.L. Semiatova.

Section 3, titled "Economic Potentials and Some Future Predictions" features the late Prof. Jayashekar (India) who examined "Economic stabilization and structural change in the region", Prof.R.G. Gidadhubli - "Problems of economic transformation" and Ajay Patnaik - "Problems of switching to a market economy."

The final section is dedicated to regional problems. In this section D.Banerjee (India) is investigating the problems of regional security and nuclear proliferation. Other author and topics are as following: "K. Warikoo - The Afghan factor in Tajikistan's Civil War, Devendra Kaushik - Central Asian relations with Russia, Shirin Akiner (United Kingdom) - Iran's approach to the region, Gareth M. Winrow (Turkey) - Central Asian relations with Turkey, Surendra Chopra (India) - Pakistan's relation with regional states A.K. Ray (India) - Security in the Middle East and Central Asia, K. Warikoo & S.K. Soni - Mongolia and Central Asia.

As is evident, the problems that Central Asian states have been facing in the post-Soviet era have been examined by a wide variety of specialists. Central Asian studies are still at a stage that is far from satisfactory. We believe that this book is a positive step toward filling the gap of information about Central Asia. • Orhan TEK

A Guidebook To Men Of Letters & Writers In The Caucasian Diaspora

Sefer E.Berzeg, Sönmez Matbaacılık: Samsun, 1995, s. 283)

The Caucasus, stretching from the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea, without distinction of race, religion and language, is a geography of people who are very close by spirit, psychology, habit and custom. It is geography which hosts overhundred languages and has witnessed conflict & disorder since the early ages of humanity.

Tsarist Russia's occupation of the Caucasus, the ensuing century-long struggle and massacre - deportation - ethnic cleansing was completed in 1864. Following the occupation Russian colonization policies in the Caucasus and consequent resistance movements in 1866, 1878, 1906, 1921, 1944, post-WW II years and current conflicts & wars in Abkhazia, Ossetia, Karabakh and Chechnya caused millions of Caucasians such as Abkhazians, Abazins, Ajarins, Adygeins, Ahiskalis, Avars, Azerbaijanis, Chechens, Ingushs, Lezgins, Laks, Ossetians, Nogais, Karachais, Karabakhians, Kumysk, Wubihians to flee their homelands for exile. Subsequent of their exile many Caucasians went to a variety of areas ranging from Central Asia to Siberia, from the Ottoman empire to Europe and the United States. Hence, today we have a Caucasian diaspora of approximately, 10 million people which mainly lives in Turkey, regards Turkey as their "second homeland", but is also dispersed to Iraq, Syria, Israel, Jordan and Yugoslavia where they live settled in villages. In Europe, the U.S. and former Soviet republics (except the Caucasian republics) they live in urban areas.

Caucasians never forgot their homelands from which they had to part throughout a process that begun about 130 years ago. They have sought ways to reestablish their independence in the Caucasus and have showed considerable effort to return to their homelands. On the other hand, Caucasians have assumed key roles in the development of states in which they were living. Caucasian traits such as ultimate obedience to the elderly (thamate) which underlines their hierarchy structure between generations and loyalty to one another brought about their rapid organization. Although their overall numbers were small, their disciplined attitudes as a community, their formidable organizational-collective unity, has allowed them to assume key roles in the defense and other difficult times of their host countries.

Sefer Berzeg, known with his work on the Caucasus has published an extensive and updated version of his 1968 work titled "North Caucasian Writers in the Diaspora" under the title - "A Guidebook to Men of Letters & Writers in the Caucasian Diaspora" in which he compiled the biographies of 209 writers, men of letters and scientists who have lived or are still living in the diaspora.

The aforementioned research includes significant new information for those who work on the Caucasus. For instance there is compact information on activities of the cadre of the founders of the North Caucasian Republic of 1918 (Haydar Bammam, Barassi, Baytugan, Balo Bilatti, Vassan Girey Cabagi, Ahmet Canbek, Tambiy Elikhoti, Bahaeddin Hurs, Ali Han Kantemir, Pşimakho Kosok, Aytek Namitok etc.) which they undertook after the end of the republic and had to leave the Caucasus for Turkey, the Middle East, Europe and the U.S. Researchers who work on and wish to understand the Caucasus need to investigate the roots and background of this great and old plane-tree called - The Caucasus. Otherwise, it is possible to come to incorrect conclusions about current conflicts in Karabakh, Abkhazia and Chechnya. • Hasan KANBOLAT

Azerbaijan

- Iran who has a % 5 share in the \$ 7.4 billion project which aims at developing the Azeri oil fields in the Caspian Sea, announced that it allocated \$ 16.6 million for common exploration and seismographic work. (Turkish Daily News, January 6, 1995)
- A group of exiles which includes former President Ayaz Muttalibov (in exile in Moscow since 1992), former Prime Minister Suret Husseinov, former Defense Minister Rahim Gaziyevev and the leader of the separatist Talish movement Alikram Gumbatov formed an alliance to oust President Haydar Aliyev and to cancel the "Centuries Agreement" signed between the Azeri government and the Western Consortium which consists of 8 Western oil companies and is lead by British Petroleum. Gumbatov and Gaziyevev escaped from prison last September where they were held for "committing crimes against the state". (Foreign Report, January 12, 1995)
- Following the dismissal of Customs Minister Tahir Aliyev due to corruption and bribery at Azerbaijan's customs, Azerbaijani President Haydar Aliyev also dismissed Justice Minister Ilyas Ismailov. (Yeni Yüzyıl, January 14, 1995)
- According to Azerbaijani state statistics referring to the first ten month of 1994, the following economic indicators fell respectively; internal production by % 20.5, industrial production by % 25, agricultural production by % 15.5, investments by % 49 when compared with the statistics of 1993. While the amount of retail goods available in markets decreased by % 33, income from foreign currency transactions also fell by % 41. The budget deficit reached 109 billion manat during the same comparative period. This number signifies an 18 billion manat increase when compared with the same period in 1993. (Eurasian File, No. 24 January 1995)
- Following talks between Prime Minister Çiller and Azerbaijan's Head of State Haydar Aliyev it has been decided that the TPAO's share in the "Caspian Oil Consortium" shall be increased by % 5 and become % 6.75. (Yeni Yüzyıl, February 5, 1995)
- Organized by the Foreign Policy Institute and TICA a meeting titled "Security, Stability, Welfare and Inter-dependence in the Southern Caucasus" was held in Ankara. Azerbaijani and Armenian officials were also present at the meeting. (Turkish Daily, News, February 25, 1995)
- Armenian President Levon Ter Petrosyan's Head Consultant announced that Armenia cannot agree to a Turkish contribution to the multi-national peace force to be sent to Karabakh within the framework of the CSCE. (Turkish Daily News, March 1, 1995)
- Special police forces who reacted to the arrest of their fellow men started a revolt. The policemen were accused of taking part in smuggling activities in the Kazakh and Aksafa regions of Azerbaijan. The special police forces (OMON), lead by Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Ruşen Cevadov started their revolt when President Aliyev dismissed Mr. Cevadov. (Milliyet, March 14, 1995)
- Following the cancellation of Iran's share in the Caspian Oil Consortium, Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Ekber Velayeti argued that the consortium agreement which excludes Iran is invalid as the international legal status of the Caspian sea is not clarified yet and because

of the oil consortium lacking any legal basis. (Milliyet, April 11, 1995)

- The agreement which increases Turkey's share from % 1.75 to % 6.75 in the Caspian Oil Consortium was signed by Prime Minister Tansu Çiller and President Haydar Aliyev in Baku. (Milliyet, April 13, 1995)
- It has been reported that the fighting between former Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Ruşen Cevadov and government troops is continuing in Azerbaijan. (Milliyet, April 17, 1995)
- Russia's Ambassador to Baku has threatened Turkey via a statement given to the Turkish-language newspaper "Genç Çizgi": "The efforts of some countries to compete with the Russian Federation after the Soviet Union's withdrawal from the Caucasus and Central Asia would produce negative results... After the breakdown of the system nobody shall impose ideology to these countries. Nobody shall desire to replace Russia. Otherwise there will be a disaster. Nobody shall contemplate of surpassing Russia. I am speaking openly. It would be a great disaster..." (Milliyet, April 17, 1995)
- Azerbaijan's Head of State Aliyev announced that despite American efforts to isolate Iran, his country does not intend to sever ties further with Iran. (Financial Times, May 8, 1995)
- Due to the first anniversary of the cease-fire with Armenia, Aliyev announced that Baku has decided to release all Armenian POW unilaterally and without condition. (Milliyet, May 14, 1995)
- Russia and Azerbaijan signed a "Common Intelligence Activities" agreement. According to the agreement signed by Azerbaijan's National Security Minister General Namık Abbasov and Head of the Russian Federal Security Service Sergey Stepashin in Baku, the two country's intelligence services agree to cooperate in combatting terror, organized crime, narcotics smuggling. Within the framework of the agreement Moscow's intelligence service staff, as before, will be operating in Baku. (Milliyet, June 3, 1995)
- Being in preparation for a year, the Third Congress of the Azerbaijani Popular Front gathered in Baku on June 24, 1995. Azerbaijan's former President and leader of the popular Front Ebulfez Elçibey participated to the congress through a video recording. (Turkey, June 25, 1995)
- The Turkish Republic Ziraat Bank and the Azerbaijani Agrara Sanaye Bank have founded a common AZER-TURK BANK. The partnership agreement was signed at the Ziraat Bank Head Office on May 25, 1995. Both banks have equal shares of % 50. While the bank's capital is \$ 1.000.000, the bank will operate in Azerbaijan's capital Baku. (Eurasian File, No. 34, June 1995)
- According to the Azerbaijan State Statistics Committee, Azerbaijan's 1994 foreign trade volume reached \$ 1.414.680.000. 1994 imports were \$ 777.910.000. Exports were \$ 636.770.000 during the same period. Azerbaijan realized % 63 of its imports and % 44 of its exports to CIS countries. Turkmenistan ranked first and Turkey fourth among the foreign trade partners of Azerbaijan. (Eurasian File, No:36, July 1995)

CIS

- Armenia announced that it signed the agreement which bans the use of chemical weapons. (Yeni Yüzyıl, February 5, 1995)
- The CIS Summit took place on February 10, 1995 in Almaty. There was no concrete development towards closer economic and political integration among 12 member states. The only document approved jointly proved to be a memorandum aiming at improving regional peace and stability. Bilateral agreements among member states were also signed at the summit. (Financial Times, February 13, 1995)

- Total industrial output of CIS countries for January-March 1995 decreased by % 8.3 when compared with the same period last year. Compared with the first quarter of last year, Armenia was the only country which increased its industrial output by % 14.8 during the first quarter of 1995. In all other countries industrial output decreased. The decreases were as following: Russia % 4.5, Belarus % 10.4, Ukraine % 12.1, Kyrgyzstan % 18, Tajikistan % 24.4, Moldova % 25.6, Azerbaijan % 27.5, Georgia % 30. Oil production during the first quarter of 1995 increased by % 39 in Uzbekistan, whereas decreases were recorded in Russia, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine by % 3 and in Kazakhstan by % 8. (Russia Express No. 150, May 22, 1995)
- On May 26, 1995 the 18th CIS Summit gathered in Minsk - the capital of Belarus. The most significant topic on the agenda was the common defense of borders and the establishment of a common force for this end. Despite Russian pressure to sign the agreement only seven countries agreed to sign. Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan refused to sign the agreement. (Milliyet, May 27, 1995)

Kyrgyzstan

- Kyrgyzstan signed a bilateral natural gas agreement with Uzbekistan to buy Uzbek gas in 1995. (Central Asian Newsfile, January 11, 1995)
- Kyrgyzstan started a new passport and identity card application program. (Central Asian Newsfile, January 16, 1995)
- Kyrgyzstan opened a new consulate in Istanbul for the further development of commercial and economic relations with Turkey. (Eurasian File, No. 24, January 1995)
- The Asian Investment and Development Bank is extending a \$ 40 million credit to Kyrgyzstan. \$ 30 million of the credit will be used towards the supporting of the Som. The remaining \$ 10 million will be used for the "Kyrgyzenergo" company, the purchasing of building equipment for the Ministry of Transportation and computers for schools. (Eurasian File, No. 24, January 1995)
- Following bilateral talks in Almaty, Kyrgyz Prime Minister Cumagulov and his Kazakh counterpart Akejan Kajageldin signed a commerce agreement. According to the signed protocol Kazakhstan shall pay \$ 20 million of its \$ 52 million debt to Kyrgyzstan until the end of 1995 and shall export diesel oil, gas, wheat, steel and other commodities in exchange of the remainder of the debt. Besides, Kazakhstan also agreed to pay \$ 2 million in 2 month to be used for railway transportation. The two countries also signed an agreement about energy transportation. (Eurasian File, No. 24, January 1995)
- The EU Commission Social Welfare Foundation assisted Kyrgyzstan with technical aid worth \$ 4 million within the framework of the reform of its activities. (Eurasian File, No. 24, January 1995)
- In the first rounds of the first elections after Kyrgyzstan's independence 2 candidates succeeded to enter the 35 member Senate and 13 candidates entered the 70 member High Parliament. (Yeni Yüzyıl, February 8, 1995)
- An agreement which stipulates political, economic and commercial cooperation between Kyrgyzstan and the European Union for 10 years has been signed. Both sides agreed to lift commercial quotas and give each other Most Favorite Nation status. (Financial Times, February 10, 1995)
- The IMF is giving a \$ 104 million credit towards supporting Kyrgyzstan's restructuring program. The credit will be given in installments and will be supervised by the IMF. The aim of the credit is to finance the intermediary economic program from 1994 to 1997. The main macroeconomic target of the program has been announced as converting the % 5 negative growth of 1994 to a % 5 positive growth by 1997, to reduce annual inflation to % 6.5 by 1997, to reduce the budget deficit/total production ratio to % 9 by 1997. In addition

to the above it is targeted to reduce the budget deficit/total production ratio to % 3. (Eurasian File, No. 26 February 1995)

- The government of Russia and Kyrgyzstan signed an agreement which stipulates the foundation of a finance and industry partnership called "Roskyrgyzinvest". Institutions and enterprises from both countries shall be developed under the Economic Union Agreement in the fields of industry, commerce, credit, finance, insurance, and common international companies. % 50 of the Roskyrgyzinvest shall be owned by the Russian Federation and % 50 of it shall be owned by Kyrgyzstan. Through these kind of agreements both governments envisage to create economic conditions that would prevent the migration of the Russian-speaking population from Kyrgyzstan. (Eurasian File, No. 26 February 1995)
- Kyrgyzstan signed an agreement with Uzbekistan whereby the exchange of military aircraft with natural gas was proposed. According to the agreement, apart from the \$ 42.2 million Kyrgyzstan is to pay Uzbekistan, Bishkek also proposed to give 10 Czech-made L-39 military aircraft to the Uzbek government. In exchange, Uzbekistan agreed to give Kyrgyzstan 900 million cubic meter natural gas in 1995. (Avrasya Dosyais, No. 27, February 1995)
- Kyrgyzstan's Finance Minister and Head of the Central Bank visited Ankara. Followings talks with Turkish Eximbank officials the bank agreed to give Kyrgyzstan a \$ 75 million credit for 1996. (Eurasian File No. 27, February 1995)
- On overall examination of the Kyrgyz economy revealed decreases in many areas of the economy. These decreases effected the population in all economic sector, in living standards and services. In 1994 the minimum living cost of a Kyrgyz increased 1.7 times. Monthly inflation decreased to % 105.5 in 1994 from the 1993 number of % 125.4 and this caused a % 0.6 increase in savings when compared with the preceding year. Deposits in the Kyrgyz Bank and other commercial banks totalled 101 million som which is 5 times more than total deposits in 1993. Kyrgyzstan's foreign trade with non-CIS states decreased by % 4 and totalled \$ 146 million. \$ 93.4 million of this trade materialized as exports and \$ 52.6 million were imports. These figures show that the foreign trade balance decreased from \$ 65.1 million in 1993 to \$ 40.8 million in 1994. % 53 of Kyrgyz export materialized to China and % 23 to the United Kingdom. Among main export items sold are: wool - \$ 24.5 million, inorganic chemicals - \$ 14.4 million, iron related metals - \$ 8 million, tannery raw materials \$ 5.3 million. Kyrgyzstan's main import partners in 1994 were Turkey, China and Germany with respectively % 27, % 19 and % 9 shares. (Kyrgyzstan Chronicle)
- During the last three years in Kyrgyzstan, total output volume decreased by half, industrial output by % 58, agricultural output by % 28. Industrial investment decreased by % 55 only in 1994. While the population remained the same, living standards decreased enormously. Kyrgyzstan who initiated its market reforms and let market prices free at the same time with other republics has made considerable progress. As of January 1, 1995 5196 state enterprises have been privatized. This number equals % 52 of all state enterprises. At the end of the year 12.600 people registered as unemployed. However, the real unemployment rate is above this number. Since the beginning of 1995 Kyrgyzstan's foreign debt increased \$ 15 million and reached a total of \$ 365 million. (Eurasian File, No. 33, May 1995)
- As of April 1, 1995 Kyrgyzstan's population is 4.499.100. The population of the capital city Bishkek is 599.500. While 71.197 people migrated from Kyrgyzstan, 20.104 migrated to Kyrgyzstan in 1994. (Aalam May 3, 1995)
- India extended a \$ 5 million credit payable in 12 years with no payments in the first three years. The aforementioned credit will be used toward the establishment of Indo-Kyrgyz partnership companies.

Kazakhstan

- Kazakh Foreign Minister Kasymzhomart Tokayev went to Cuba and had talks with Cuban officials regarding economic cooperation and an oil-sugar exchange between the two countries. Also, cultural, scientific and technical cooperation agreements were signed. (Central Asian Newswire, January 4-5, 1995)
- Bruce Kozosky, an executive of American Chevron Overseas announced that the most appropriate pipeline route to the problem of transporting Kazakh oil to Europe is a pipeline route through Thrace that would connect the Black Sea to the Aegean. (Yeni Yüzyıl, January 9, 1995)
- The sale of foreign currency in Kazakhstan has been banned by a presidential decree. (Central Asian Newswire, January 16, 1995)
- It has been announced that Russia and Kazakhstan agreed to transport Kazakh oil to the Black Sea. According to the agreement, the rich Tengiz oil resources of Kazakhstan will be transported to a Russian Black Sea port to-be built via a \$ 400 million new pipeline in the Caspian region. (Financial Times, January 20, 1995)
- Following talks of leaders of Kazakhstan and Russia at the Kremlin the two countries announced that efforts towards the uniting of the two armed forces will begin. According to the announcement, Russian and Kazakh armed forces will be under a common military plan and will be trained jointly. Both armed forces will be used jointly. Yeltsin and Nazarbayev also signed an agreement which eases procedures for Kazakhs in Russia and Russians in Kazakhstan to obtain dual citizenship. Another agreement signed between the two countries opens the way to establish a free trade zone for the coordination of finance policies and stability of national currencies by both central banks. (Yeni Yüzyıl, January 21, 1995 and Turkish Daily News, January 24, 1995)
- The Asian Development Bank extended two credits totalling \$ 60 million to Kazakhstan. One of the credits is to aid the structural reform program thought to ease the switch to a market economy, the other is to stop production and living standards to fall. (Eurasian File, No. 25, January 1995)
- Russia approved its agreement with Kazakhstan about the common defense of the Kazakh-Chinese border. (Central Asian Newswire, February 7, 1995)
- Leaders of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan signed various agreements on political and economic cooperation. Also, it was decided to found a Central Asian Development Bank with \$ 3 million contribution by each state and a total capital of \$ 10 million. (International Herald Tribune, February 13, 1995)
- On January 24, 1994 a Partnership and Cooperation agreement between the European Union and Kazakhstan was signed in Brussels. The ten-year agreement aims to develop economic, political, financial, technological and cultural cooperation. (Eurasian File, No. 27, February 1995)
- Following the decision of the Kazakh Constitutional Court to cancel the 1994 elections, President Nursultan Nazarbayev closed the Parliament down. President Nazarbayev asked Prime Minister Akecan Kacageldin, the ministers of defense, internal affairs and security to stay in office until June 15, 1995. (Milliyet, March 13, 1995)
- 130 Members of Parliament reacted to President Nazarbayev's decision to close the Parliament down and formed the "People and Parliament" movement under the leadership of the Kazakh People Congress Olcas Süleymanov. Members of Parliament are accusing President Nazarbayev with using the Constitutional Court decision to get rid of the Parliament and govern the country with decrees. (Cumhuriyet, March 14, 1995, Yeni Yüzyıl, March 15, 1995)
- The Kazakh Central Bank let the new 1000 Tenge banknotes into circulation. The most significant aspect of the new banknotes is that one side of it is in Russian and the other in

Kazakh. (Eurasian File, No. 28, March 1995)

- It has been announced that Kazakhstan is examining the Japanese proposal to transport Kazakh oil via China to the Japanese Sea. (Turkish Daily News, May 20, 1995)
- Kazakhstan signed the Partnership for Peace Agreement which aims at military cooperation between NATO and former Warsaw Pact countries. (Milliyet, May 28, 1995)
- Kazakhstan's President Nazarbayev gained a % 95.4 support in a referendum which prolonged his term in office until 2000. (Eurasian File, No. 33, May 1995)
- The Kazakhstan Peoples Assembly decided to change Kazakhstan's name to the Kazakh Republic. (Orta Doğu, July 2, 1995)

Uzbekistan

- Former communists scored an impressive victory in the first elections after independence. According to the Local Elections Commission the *Demokratik Parti* namely the former communists, won 179 seats of the 250-seat parliament. Hence, the *Demokratik Parti* won % 30.6 and the *Vatan Terakki Parti* % 9.8. There was a % 93.6 participation rate to the elections. (Turkish Daily News, January 7, 1995)
- President Islam Kerimov visited Poland. Following talks with Polish President Lech Wałęsa agreements were signed regarding the protection of investments, overcoming double taxation, scientific and technical cooperation. (Central Asian Newswire, January 10-11, 1995)
- A law suit begun against the Erk Party which is accused of initiating a coup d'etat against the government. (Central Asian Newswire, February 1, 1995)
- President Islam Kerimov completed a 3-day visit to South Korea. Following talks with South Korean President Kim Young Sam it has been decided to strengthen bilateral cooperation. Agreements regarding commerce, economic cooperation, agriculture, investments, education, tourism and culture were signed. (Central Asian Newswire, February 14-17, 1995)
- The Republic of Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz Republic signed a commerce and economic cooperation development agreement for the year of 1995. The agreement aims at lifting compulsory customs problems in export and import. (Eurasian File, No. 26, February 1995)
- The International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreed to extend a \$ 74 million credit to Uzbekistan. In an IMF statement it was announced that the credit aims to reduce inflation and support the wide-scale economic reform program in Uzbekistan. (Eurasian File, No. 28, March 1995)
- It was announced that in the March 26, 1995 referendum about Uzbek President Islam Kerimov's term extension to the year 2000, almost all of the voters voted "Yes". Islam Kerimov's term would have ended at the beginning of 1997. The referendum decision came from the Uzbekistan High Parliament at its meeting on February 24, 1995. (Cumhuriyet, March 28, 1995)
- On February 18, 1995 the founding meeting of the new "Uzbekistan Justice Social Democrat Party" took place. At the meeting aims and targets of the party were discussed and it was stated that the principles of the party are to improve independence and loyalty to the homeland. It has been declared that the main goal of the party is to found a democratic legal state, to strengthen social justice and to higher ethical standards for all inhabitant nations in Uzbekistan. At the meeting, the executive committee was elected and it was decided to publish the party's weekly paper "Adalet" (Justice).
- Starting September 1995 education will be in Latin alphabet in Uzbekistan. As a preparation for the Uzbek people, Uzbek TV has started to show the word "Uzbekistan" in the Latin alphabet following the Cyrillic title "News from Uzbekistan". (Eurasian File, No. 32,

May 1995)

- Japan signed a \$ 140 million agreement with Uzbekistan which aims to improve poor telecommunication facilities in Uzbekistan. The credit is to be used for the "Uzbekistan Telecommunication Network Development Project". The credit, Japan's first development aid to Uzbekistan, is based on % 3 interest, over 30 years with no payments in 10 years. (Dünya, June 26, 1995)

Turkmenistan

- President Saparmurat Niyazov went for consultations with President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani regarding the natural gas pipeline project. Also, agreements in the fields of commerce, transportation and culture were signed. (Central Asian Newsfile, January 29-30, 1995)
- Sapar Murat Niyazov-Head of State of Turkmenistan, Levon Ter Petrosyan-Head of State of Armenia and Eduard Shevardnaze-Head of State of Georgia met in Turkmenistan's capital Ashkabad on December 2, 1994. Economic and political matters were discussed. In light of their common interests, the Heads of State underlined the need for effective measures for the immediate and just solution of disagreements on CIS territories. Natural gas debts to Turkmenistan were also discussed. (Eurasian File, No. 24, January 1995)
- The third Intergovernmental Council meeting which discussed the transport and export of Turkmen natural gas through Iran and Turkey to international markets took place in Ankara on January 17, 1995. Headed by the President of Turkmenistan, Council countries Turkey, Turkmenistan, the Russian Federation, Iran and Kazakhstan's ministers of energy and other Council officials decided to establish three companies for the development of the project. They also decided to add Ukraine to these companies. All three headquarters of the companies will be in Turkmenistan. (Eurasian File, No. 26, February 1995)
- For the improvement of the demographic structure of Turkmenistan a census has been completed on January 20, 1995. As it was the first census after the gaining of independence, great significance has been given to the census campaign. Currently there are 4.5 million inhabitants in Turkmenistan. Those who were employed in 1994 totalled 1.660 thousand. They were employed; % 53.3 in the state sector, %25.4 in the agriculture and cooperation sector, % 20.8 in the private sector and % 0.2 in joint ventures. (Eurasian File, No. 28, March 1995)
- The Heads of State of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan gathered in Dashovuz-Turkmenistan over Turkmen President Saparmurat Niyazov's invitation. The participants agreed to find a solution to the ecologic disaster of Lake Aral at the meeting and prepared a common statement. Seven main projects which have been in preparation for two years and target to revitalize Lake Aral were examined. The \$ 225 million financing matter was also discussed. In an agreement between the World Bank and Turkmenistan the World Bank extended a \$ 25 million credit towards the revitalization of Lake Aral. It was noted that Japan offered a \$ 850.000 credit to be used during the preparation phase of the project. (Eurasian File, No. 29, March 1995)
- American Energy Minister Billy White who visited Turkmenistan, proposed that Turkmen natural gas should be transported via the Caspian through Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. (Turkish Daily News, April 27, 1995)
- According to information given by the Turkmenistan State Statistics Committee Turkmenistan's exports to countries outside the former Soviet republic increased 2.8 times and reached \$ 349.9 million when compared with last year. Imports totalled \$ 278.8 million. (Eurasian File, No. 30, April 1995)
- Yeltsin and Niyazov met in Moscow. Apart from bilateral matters, "The Danger of Islam" in Central Asia and the sharing of natural resources in the Caspian Sea were discussed.

Yeltsin indicated that the "Islamization" of Central Asia could produce dangerous consequences and asked for Niyazov's help. The meeting produced 23 agreements relating to fields ranging from the Russian-speaking population in Turkmenistan to economic cooperation. (Milliyet, May 19, 1995, Turkish Daily News, May 19, 1995)

- According to the general census there are 4.460.000 people living in Turkmenistan. % 54.4 of Turkmens are living in rural areas. The number of women is 2.247.000. Men are 30.000 less than women. There are 536.000 people living in the capital of the country. (Eurasian File, No. 32, May 1995)
- It has been noted that the bilateral tourism cooperation agreement Turkmen President Niyazov signed with Russia during his visit to Moscow is the first document which involves the tourism institutions of a foreign state and that of Turkmenistan. The document envisages the encouragement to form partnerships, the exchange of information, the common planning in the training of expert personnel and the reducing of customs formalities both between state and private institutions of the two countries. The two presidents also agreed to open official agencies, to cooperate with the World Tourism Organization and other international organizations. (Turkmen Press, No. 22/62, June 5, 1995)
- The Turkmen Parliament approved the Consulate Agreement signed on June 29, 1994 and the agreement regarding the sale and purchase of Turkmen natural gas signed on October 26, 1994.
- The Foreign Ministers of Turkmenistan, Armenia and Iran signed an Economic Cooperation Agreement in Ashkabad. The sides agreed to create business opportunities among themselves and to establish an export-import regime. (Dünya, June 29, 1995)

Turkey

- The Economic Cooperation Organization assembled with the Foreign Ministers of Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan and Central Asian States. (Central Asian Newsfile, January 21, 1995)
- March Grosmann, the American Ambassador to Ankara declared that his country supports the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline project for the transportation of Kazakh and Azerbaijani oil. (Yeni Yüzyıl, February 1, 1995)
- Mongolia will cooperate with Turkish companies in the exploitation of natural resources, in the construction of small and medium size thermoelectric power stations. A cooperation agreement between the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources and the Mongolian Ministry of Energy, Geology and Mining was signed. It was stated that Turkish technical aid could be used for feasibility studies at the Tavan Tolgoi coking coal beds. (Eurasian File, No. 26, February 1995)
- Following the approval of the Cabinet, three agreements signed between Turkey, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan went into effect. Two of the three agreements between Turkey, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, published in the Official Gazette of February 12, 1995, aim at "encouraging and protecting mutual investments" with Turkey. Increasing mutual investments and economic cooperation is also targeted. (Eurasian File, No. 28, March 1995)
- UNESCO declared 1995 the year of "Manas" - Kyrgyzstan's greatest legend. Various activities are organized in Turkey within this framework. TICA is contributing to a "Manas" documentary, the printing of an album, and the organization of a "Turkish World Folklore" festival in Iznik. (Eurasian File, No. 31, April 1995)
- Capital flow from Turkey to Kazakhstan increased by % 95 and totalled to \$ 130 million. This figure gave Turkey a second place after the United Kingdom in Kazakhstan. All of the capital flow to Kazakhstan materialized in the last three years. Capital flows to Kazakhstan reached \$ 3.7 million in 1992, \$ 59.5 million in 1993 and \$ 66.8 million in 1994.

Capital flow to the five Turkic republic totalled \$ 160 million. \$ 130 million of this figure was to Kazakhstan, \$ 1.4 million to Kyrgyzstan, \$ 9.5 million to Azerbaijan, \$ 3.7 million to Turkmenistan, \$ 14.1 million to Uzbekistan. The number of foreign companies active in Turkey reached 2.900 by the end of March 1995, and total foreign capital in Turkey reached 39 trillion TL. The number of CIS-based companies was 101. Azerbaijan lead CIS-based companies with 39.5 bn TL, Kazakhstan was second with 12.4 bn TL. Turkmen capital was 7.5 bn TL. Uzbek capital is at the 1.5 bn TL level. (Eurasian File, No. 32, May 1995)

- Russia reminded Turkey not to interfere in the Caspian oil deal and to Azerbaijan. Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Grigori Karasin, hinting at Turkey, stated: "Efforts to interfere or initiatives to give directives to Caspian Sea countries by countries which have no coast at the Caspian are, to say the least, inappropriate and unsuitable". (Milliyet, June 7, 1995)
- Armenia's controversial nuclear plant, located by the Turkish border, begun to function after 1989. This operation will be a test phase. Energy production will begin in two month. (Milliyet, June 20, 1995)
- While Turkey's imports from the Russian Federation, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tacikistan and Turkmenistan in 1993 reached \$ 2.264 bn, 1994 figures revealed a \$ 443 million decrease and totalled to \$ 1.820 bn. Both in 1993 and 1994 most imports were from the Russian Federation. The least imports were from Belarus. A comparison between 1993 and 1994 indicated tat imports from the Russian Federation, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Tacikistan and Turkmenistan decreased while remaining countries reached higher import levels. The highest increase for the same period was with Uzbekistan. Imports with countries that increased their imports was \$ 1.030 bn in 1993 but totalled to \$ 1.412 bn showing a \$ 382 million increase. Most exports during the same period were with Russia While exports to the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Tacikistan and Turkmenistan increased, exports to other counties decreased.
- The decision of the Russian Duma not to approve the "Prevention of Double Taxation" agreement meant a strong blow to Turkish companies which negotiated business deals worth billions of dollars. (Milliyet, June 25, 1995)

Notes For the Authors:

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